Summary A large survey of German and Israeli younger and older adolescents was conducted to reveal their opinions and attitudes towards violence and aggression, their personal engagement in aggressive and violent behaviors in and outside the school environment, their attitudes toward physical activity, their engagement in physical activity, and the linkage between physical activity engagement and conductance of violence and aggression. The findings point out that there are more similarities than differences between German and Israeli adolescents concerning violence and aggression (...) in and outside schools. No linkage between physical activity involvement and the extent of violent and/or aggressive acts is found. The findings pertaining adolescents’ opinions and attitudes toward aggression and violence and their behaviors in and outside school are encouraging. (shrink)

Der Zeichnung kommt im Trecento nicht allein in der Praxis, sondern auch als theoretisches Fundament einer „wissenschaftlich“ akzeptierbaren ars eine zentrale Rolle zu. Sie ist Medium der Bewahrung und Erneuerung, zudem auch unverzichtbares Kommunikationsmittel in den verschiedenen öffentlichen Bau- und Ausstattungsprogrammen zwischen Mailand, Florenz und Siena. An Cennino Cenninis umfassendem Praxishandbuch, dem ‚Libro dell′arte‘, sowie an einigen Beispielen der Zeichenkunst um 1400, lässt sich ablesen, dass disegno nicht allein die lernende Nachahmung und den Naturabzug, sondern auch den Auszug aus den (...) gespeicherten Sinneseindrücken meinen kann. Vor allem aber wird durch Cenninis Rede vom „Zeichen in deinem Kopf“ der graphische Akt zur Metapher der Neugestaltung der memorierten Bilddaten durch die vis imaginativa der Fantasie. Die Spuren dieser dem Werkstattgespräch entnommenen bildkünstlerischen Fachterminologie reichen allerdings weit zurück und lassen sich über Francesco Petrarca, die Dante-Kommentatoren und Dante selbst bis in die Zeit um 1300 verfolgen. Bereits in der ‚Vita Nuova‘ kann Dante mit dem terminus technicus „disegnare“ in komplexer allegorischer Rede die Fantasie als kreative Arbeit mit dem Gedächtnis hervorheben und mit einer solchen intermedialen Brechung wirkungsvoll vom verdeutlichenden Hervorbringen eines deutenden inneren Bildes durch die ekphrastisch gesteigerte literarische Repräsentation sprechen. (shrink)

Cells mitigate the detrimental consequences of DNA damage on genome stability by attempting high fidelity repair. Homologous recombination templates DNA double‐strand break (DSB) repair on an identical or near identical donor sequence in a process that can in principle access the entire genome. Other physiological processes, such as homolog recognition and pairing during meiosis, also harness the HR machinery using programmed DSBs to physically link homologs and generate crossovers. A consequence of the homology search process by a long nucleoprotein filament (...) is the formation of multi‐invasions (MI), a joint molecule in which the damaged ssDNA has invaded more than one donor molecule. Processing of MI joint molecules can compromise the integrity of both donor sites and lead to their rearrangement. Here, two mechanisms for the generation of rearrangements as a pathological consequence of MI processing are detailed and the potential relevance for non‐allelic homologous recombination discussed. Finally, it is proposed that MI‐induced crossover formation may be a feature of physiological recombination. (shrink)

Dietrich Bonhoeffer's theology has bad a role in the development ofthe Protestant Churches in the GDR which was not at all unimportant. Wolf Krötke has a closer look at the reception of Bonhoeffer in the GDR. He describes Bonhoeffer in wide perspectives. They range from a socialist demand on the one hand up to critical claims against socialism on the other hand. In these perspectives the slogan of »Kirche im Sozialismus« plays a prominent and at the same time (...) problematic role. Krötke's study demands a critical inventary of the Bonhoeffer-reception in the GDR and gives a first and cautious contribution to this analysis. (shrink)

Brettschneider extends this analysis from freedom of expression to the freedoms of religion and association, and he shows that value democracy can uphold the protection of these freedoms while promoting equality for all citizens.

In this essay I develop and defend a theory of state punishment within a wider conception of political legitimacy. While many moral theories of punishment focus on what is deserved by criminals, I theorize punishment within the specific context of the state's relationship to its citizens. Central to my account is Rawls's “liberal principle of legitimacy,” which requires that all state coercion be justifiable to all citizens. I extend this idea to the justification of political coercion to criminals qua citizens. (...) I argue that the liberal principle of legitimacy implicitly requires states to respect the basic political rights of those who are guilty of committing crimes, thus prohibiting capital punishment. (shrink)

Bringing these two emergent areas of thought into direct conversation in Before the Law, Cary Wolfe fosters a new discussion about the status of nonhuman animals and the shared plight of humans and animals under biopolitics.

Religious freedom is often thought to protect, not only religious practices, but also the underlying religious beliefs of citizens. But what should be said about religious beliefs that oppose religious freedom itself or that deny the concept of equal citizenship? The author argues here that such beliefs, while protected against coercive sanction, are rightly subject to attempts at transformation by the state in its expressive capacities. Transformation is entailed by a commitment to publicizing the reasons and principles that justify the (...) basic rights of citizens. (shrink)

At the very beginning of L’Homme-Machine, La Mettrie claims that Leibnizians with their monads have “rather spiritualized matter than materialized the soul”; a few years later Pierre-Louis Moreau de Maupertuis, President of the Berlin Academy of Sciences and natural philosopher with a strong interest in the modes of transmission of ‘genetic’ information, conceived of living minima which he termed molecules, “endowed with desire, memory and intelligence,” in his Système de la nature ou Essai sur les corps organisés. This text first (...) appeared in Latin in 1751 under the title Dissertatio inauguralis metaphysica de universali naturae systemate, with the pseudonym Dr Baumann; it was translated by Maupertuis in 1754 as Essai sur la formation des corps organisés and was later included in his 1756 Œuvres under the title Système de la nature. Now, it is clear that Maupertuis was a kind of Leibnizian; and that his molecule possessed higher-level, ‘mental’ properties. In that sense he falls under the first category described by La Mettrie. But he was also involved in a debate on this issue with Diderot, who put forth a sustained critique of Maupertuis’ theory of the molecule in the additions to his 1753 Pensées sur l’interprétation de la nature. Where Maupertuis attributes higher-level properties to his living minima, Diderot argues that these properties are ‘organizational’, i.e., they can only be properties of the whole. At issue here is the degree of commitment to a form of materialism. (shrink)

When the Supreme Court in 2003 struck down a Texas law prohibiting homosexual sodomy, it cited the right to privacy based on the guarantee of "substantive due process" embodied by the Constitution. But did the court act undemocratically by overriding the rights of the majority of voters in Texas? Scholars often point to such cases as exposing a fundamental tension between the democratic principle of majority rule and the liberal concern to protect individual rights. Democratic Rights challenges this view by (...) showing that, in fact, democracy demands many of these rights. Corey Brettschneider argues that ideal democracy is comprised of three core values--political autonomy, equality of interests, and reciprocity--with both procedural and substantive implications. These values entitle citizens not only to procedural rights of participation but also to substantive rights that a "pure procedural" democracy might not protect. What are often seen as distinctly liberal substantive rights to privacy, property, and welfare can, then, be understood within what Brettschneider terms a "value theory of democracy." Drawing on the work of John Rawls and deliberative democrats such as Jürgen Habermas, he demonstrates that such rights are essential components of--rather than constraints on--an ideal democracy. Thus, while defenders of the democratic ideal rightly seek the power of all to participate, they should also demand the rights that are the substance of self-government. (shrink)

Liberal political theorists often argue that justice requires limits on policy outcomes, limits delineated by substantive rights. Distinct from this project is a body of literature dedicated to elaborating on the meaning of democracy in procedural terms. In this article, I offer an alternative to the traditional divide between procedural theories of democracy and substantive theories of justice; I call this the ‘value theory of democracy’. I argue that the democratic ideal is fundamentally about a core set of values (political (...) autonomy, equality of interests, and reciprocity) with both procedural and substantive implications. Further, I contend that limits on policy outcomes can be newly understood as part of the democratic ideal. Key Words: democracy • rights • substantive • procedural • Habermas. (shrink)

My strategy is to examine a recent trend in philosophical discussions of responsibility, a trend that tries, but I think ultimately fails, to give an acceptable analysis of the conditions of responsibility. It fails due to what at first appear to be deep and irresolvable metaphysical problems. It is here that I suggest that the condition of sanity comes to the rescue. What at first appears to be an impossible requirement for responsibility---the requirement that the responsible agent have created her- (...) or himself---turns out to be the vastly more mundane and non controversial requirement that the responsible agent must, in a fairly standard sense, be sane. (shrink)

There are many possible ways to approach the topic of educational theory and critique. One could inquire into the meaning of critical phenomena and subject-matter in practical education and instruction, investigate the various forms of critique with the goal of determining the extent to which they assist in clarifying pedagogical action, or one could ask: ‘What is meant by critical educational research?’ and ‘How do the various approaches to this topic relate to one another?’. This article inquires into the relationship (...) between critique and negativity. Such a distinction is relevant for the practical, theoretical and research-oriented use of the various forms and subject matters of critique. This analysis of their relationship aims to clarify how the structure of human learning connects to that of pedagogical action; and, additionally, how the theoretical guidelines and orientation for pedagogical action relate to scientific analyses and research in education in a way that is productive. Distinctions made in thought, judgement and action are not simply delimiting positive characteristics. Such distinctions are at once mediated by the relations of knowledge and ignorance, ability and inability. Although ignorance and inability can be transformed into positive knowledge and ability, they are not superseded in the process. Ignorance and inability are, on the contrary, constitutive elements of learning. The possibility for transitions from ignorance and inability to knowledge and ability—a possibility that itself presupposes knowledge and ability—point to a form of negativity within the process of education (Bildung). This form of negativity relates to the human ability to learn (Bildsamkeit) and provides the definitive basis of human learning. A form of negativity constitutive of learning processes leads to one that grounds pedagogical processes. Pedagogical efficacy is mediated by a double negativity, comprised of both a universal and a particular form of negativity. The relation of negativity to learning and pedagogical efficacy, with specific reference to educational research studies on teaching and learning processes, is considered. A form of educational research that operates beyond fundamentalist criticisms—that is to say, criticisms based on unshakeable beliefs—and utilises issues arising from a pluralisation of critique to confront the pluralism of critical positions, is considered. The article closes with reflections on the relation between the Critical and the Uncritical. (shrink)

Tomus 1. Schriften zur Intellekttheorie.

English summary: Ernst Cassirer's philosophy of culture provides surprising insights into the relationship between culture and religion. The authors of the articles in this volume discuss the controversial question of whether and how religion can be an integral part of human culture. German description: Der Philosoph Ernst Cassirer ist zu einer Schlusselgestalt kulturwissenschaftlicher Diskurse der Gegenwart geworden. Im Mittelpunkt des Interesses steht sein Begriff der symbolischen Form, der unterschiedliche Felder der Kultur miteinander zu verknupfen erlaubt. Dieser Gedanke der symbolischen Form, (...) der die klassische deutsche Philosophie beerbt, gewinnt besondere Aktualitat, sobald kein zusammenfassender Allgemeinbegriff von Kultur mehr gegeben werden kann, sie aber dennoch als ein grosser Zusammenhang gedacht werden soll. Das Ganze der Kultur baut sich erst im Vollzug des Begreifens auf - damit wird Kultur auf neue Weise zum Thema der Theologie, so wird Religion als Element der Kultur neu gedacht. In den Beitragen dieses Bandes diskutieren Theologen und Philosophen Perspektiven der Kulturtheorie Cassirers und ihrer Beziehung zur Religion. Damit wird zugleich ein Grundproblem der Kulturphilosophie Cassirers erortert. (shrink)

Agents are often assumed to have degrees of belief (“credences”) and also binary beliefs (“beliefs simpliciter”). How are these related to each other? A much-discussed answer asserts that it is rational to believe a proposition if and only if one has a high enough degree of belief in it. But this answer runs into the “lottery paradox”: the set of believed propositions may violate the key rationality conditions of consistency and deductive closure. In earlier work, we showed that this problem (...) generalizes: there exists no local function from degrees of belief to binary beliefs that satisfies some minimal conditions of rationality and non-triviality. “Locality” means that the binary belief in each proposition depends only on the degree of belief in that proposition, not on the degrees of belief in others. One might think that the impossibility can be avoided by dropping the assumption that binary beliefs are a function of degrees of belief. We prove that, even if we drop the “functionality” restriction, there still exists no local relation between degrees of belief and binary beliefs that satisfies some minimal conditions. Thus functionality is not the source of the impossibility; its source is the condition of locality. If there is any non-trivial relation between degrees of belief and binary beliefs at all, it must be a “holistic” one. We explore several concrete forms this “holistic” relation could take. (shrink)

In this short essay, I respond to Brian Leiter’s Why Tolerate Religion. I focus on two criticisms. First, I argue that Leiter’s own theory depends on an unacknowledged ideal of equality, and that equality is central to the utilitarian and Rawlsian bases for religious toleration that he draws upon in his book. Second, I argue against Leiter’s allowing, in certain circumstances, the state to establish religion and to promote religious conceptions of the good.

This chapter contains sections titled: Contractualist Justification and Private Property Three Models of Welfare Rights The Proposals as Reasonable Alternatives Objections Conclusion References.

Behaviourism is the view that preferences, beliefs, and other mental states in social-scientific theories are nothing but constructs re-describing people's behaviour. Mentalism is the view that they capture real phenomena, on a par with the unobservables in science, such as electrons and electromagnetic fields. While behaviourism has gone out of fashion in psychology, it remains influential in economics, especially in ‘revealed preference’ theory. We defend mentalism in economics, construed as a positive science, and show that it fits best scientific practice. (...) We distinguish mentalism from, and reject, the radical neuroeconomic view that behaviour should be explained in terms of brain processes, as distinct from mental states. (shrink)

We give a review and critique of jury theorems from a social-epistemology perspective, covering Condorcet’s (1785) classic theorem and several later refinements and departures. We assess the plausibility of the conclusions and premises featuring in jury theorems and evaluate the potential of such theorems to serve as formal arguments for the ‘wisdom of crowds’. In particular, we argue (i) that there is a fundamental tension between voters’ independence and voters’ competence, hence between the two premises of most jury theorems; (ii) (...) that the (asymptotic) conclusion that ‘huge groups are infallible’, reached by many jury theorems, is an artifact of unjustified premises; and (iii) that the (nonasymptotic) conclusion that ‘larger groups are more reliable’, also reached by many jury theorems, is not an artifact and should be regarded as the more adequate formal rendition of the ‘wisdom of crowds’. (shrink)

This chapter argues that the same logic that imbues the state with the legitimate authority to punish also imposes restraints on that authority. It suggests that scholarship on punishment puts more emphasis on the political legitimacy of state punishment rather than on the moral question of what is deserved by criminals. It turns to Rousseau's social contract based justification for punishment as a crucial resource in that effort. It begins by closely examining Rousseau's claim that the criminal consents to punishment, (...) and by suggesting that his seemingly absurd and perverse claims are actually defensible. It goes on to clarify two senses in which Rousseau's understanding of consent serves to ground the rights of the guilty. First, it argues that the idea of consent itself legitimizes some punishment but also sets strict limits on when and how the state can punish. Second, it argues that Rousseau's account of welfare rights also sets a limit on when the state may rightfully punish. The final two sections of the chapter consider the role of punishment outside the social contract in Rousseau's theory and suggest an important contrast between Rousseau's and Hobbes's conceptions of punishment. (shrink)