Traditional Turkish love is identified with suffering. This study investigates how suffering in love is metaphorically conceptualized in Turkish via natural phenomena and disasters. Based on figura...

This paper deals with calibration in scientific practices which investigate relatively well-understood natural phenomena by means of already standardized instrumental devices. Calibration is a crucial topic, since it conditions the reliability of instrumental procedures in science. Yet although important, calibration is a relatively neglected topic. We think more attention should be devoted to calibration. The paper attempts to take a step in this direction. The aims are two-fold: (1) to characterize calibration in a relatively simple kind of scientific (...) practices; (2) to provide conceptual and taxonomic tools of broader scope that help to get a better understanding of calibration in more complex cases and other kinds of scientific practices. For this purpose, we first provide indications for why a conceptual framework is needed. Second, a bibliographic survey of works dealing with calibration is attempted. Third, we introduce different tools to enable a better understanding of calibration. Fourth, we turn to the elaboration of what we call a “simple exemplar” of calibration, illustrated through the case of the calibration of an equal-arm balance. Fifth, the tools previously introduced, and the framework of the simple exemplar, are applied to a more complex case of calibration: calibration procedures in X-ray experiments. This serves to show the work accomplished by the simple exemplar and to emphasize features of more complex cases of calibration. Eventually, we revisit and specify the nature, status, scope and value of the proposed framework. (shrink)

ArgumentThe present paper is an attempt to understand how medieval astronomers working within the Ptolemaic astronomical context in which the annular eclipse is an unjustified and impossible phenomenon, could know, define, justify, and later make attempts that led to success in predicting annular solar eclipses. As a context-based study, it reviews the situation of annular eclipses with regard to the medieval hypotheses applied to the calculation of the angular diameters of the sun and the moon, which was basic for contemplating (...) the possibility of annular eclipses. This gives the premises and the preliminary insights that were necessary to clarify the complex situation of the annular eclipse in the late medieval Islamic period and to explain the historical mechanisms leading to justifying the phenomenon during that period. This was, first due to a convincing and efficient observational evidence which, of course, was available only to a number of medieval astronomers and significantly for only a limited time period, and, second, the result of an amazing interaction amongst various astronomical traditions available to them. At a more general level, the research aims to inspect or, at least, to give some impressions of the essential conditions, i.e., identification of phenomenon, empirical evidence, and the justifying underlying tradition, under which it became possible in the tradition-based science of the `medieval period to permit a not-already-defined and tradition-opposed phenomenon to be posed and justified. (shrink)

Biological organisms appear to have agency, goals, and meaningful behaviour. One possibility is that this is mere appearance, where such properties are not real, but only ‘as if’ consequences of the physiological structure of organisms. Another possibility is that these properties are real, as emerging from the organism's structure and from how the organism interacts with its environment. Here I will discuss a recent theory showing that the latter position is most likely correct, and argue that the theory is largely (...) consistent with the basics of the field of biosemiotics. The theory can be represented as a triad that resembles the semiotic triad proposed by Peirce, which connects a sign with its object through a process of interpretation. In the theory presented, the sign is an internalized version of fitness which refers to the true fitness through a feedback loop that in effect produces interpretation. The feedback loop entangles deterministic and stochastic forms of causation in such a way that genuine agency, goal-directedness, and their associated meaning emerge. It produces a strong form of emergence not reducible to its constituents. The result is that novel phenomena arise that are real and necessary components for a complete understanding of living organisms. (shrink)

Do people classify nature in ways that can be described as archetypes? Could it be that these can be interpreted as health promotive? More and more researchers today suggest that archetypes can be used to analyze, describe, and develop green spaces. In parallel, an increasing number of research results since the 1980s have shown that human health and well-being are positively affected by stays in certain nature areas. The qualities in these nature areas which stand out to be most health-promoting (...) are interpreted to be properties of nature that humans through evolution are prepared to perceive in a positive way. In this study, 547 respondents in southern Sweden answered a questionnaire on properties in natural areas. Through cluster analysis, these properties have been grouped into 10 types of nature and landscape. The 10 clusters are related to specific phenomena and places in Scandinavian nature, which could be described as archetypal. These natural phenomena and places are discussed, partly based on references to archaic Scandinavian mythology, Scandinavian lifestyle, and cultural canon, and partly on research on evolution, human preferences, and how nature can affect human health. We discuss how these nature archetypes evoke anxiety, fear, and distancing as well as calmness, tranquility, and connection. However, researchers have so far focused on how visits to natural environments have affected the sympathetic nervous system, and not realized the possibility of including the calm and connection system as well as the oxytocin in their explanatory models. In a follow-up article, we intend to develop a model for how the nature archetypes can interact with the calm and connection system. (shrink)

The existence of various physical phenomena stems from the concept called asymptotic emergence, that is, they seem to be exclusively reserved for certain limiting theories. Important examples are spontaneous symmetry breaking (SSB) and phase transitions: these would only occur in the classical or thermodynamic limit of underlying finite quantum systems, since for finite quantum systems, due to the uniqueness of the relevant states, such phenomena are excluded by Theory. In Nature, however, finite quantum systems describing real materials clearly (...) exhibit such effects. In this paper we discuss these apparently “paradoxical” phenomena and outline various ideas and mechanisms that encompass both theory and reality, from physical and mathematical points of view. (shrink)

The correlations between distant systems in typical quantum situations, such as Einstein-Podolosky-Rosen experiments, strongly suggest that the quantum realm involves curious types of non-Iocal influences. In this paper, I study in detail the nature of these non-Iocal influences, as depicted by various quantum theories. I show how different quantum theories realise non-Iocality in different ways, whichreflect different ontological settings.

The correlations between distant systems in typical quantum situations, such as Einstein-Podolosky-Rosen experiments, strongly suggest that the quantum realm involves curious types of non-Iocal influences. In this paper, I study in detail the nature of these non-Iocal influences, as depicted by various quantum theories. I show how different quantum theories realise non-Iocality in different ways, whichreflect different ontological settings.

From the outside, our senses are spatially integrated in our body in manifestly different ways. This paper starts from the suggestion that the philosophical formulation of the problem of spatial perception, as it flows from the modern opposition of mind and world, is partly responsible for the fact that philosophers have often explicitly disregarded the spatial nature of the senses themselves. An indirect consequence is that much philosophical work focuses on how the senses can – or cannot – perceive the (...) same spatial features of objects in the same way, while disregarding the massive differences in performance among the senses. This paper explores the ways in which the spatial integration of our senses determines what each of our senses excels in, and hence what they contribute to our spatial relation to a physical environment. By juxtaposing descriptive analyses of a variety of selected cases, the paper gives priority to how various aspects of the world appear to us in order to obtain insight into the meaning of spatiality for different senses. (shrink)

From the outside, our senses are spatially integrated in our body in manifestly different ways. This paper starts from the suggestion that the philosophical formulation of the problem of spatial perception, as it flows from the modern opposition of mind and world, is partly responsible for the fact that philosophers have often explicitly disregarded the spatial nature of the senses themselves. An indirect consequence is that much philosophical work focuses on how the senses can – or cannot – perceive the (...) same spatial features of objects in the same way, while disregarding the massive differences in performance among the senses. This paper explores the ways in which the spatial integration of our senses determines what each of our senses excels in, and hence what they contribute to our spatial relation to a physical environment. By juxtaposing descriptive analyses of a variety of selected cases, the paper gives priority to how various aspects of the world appear to us in order to obtain insight into the meaning of spatiality for different senses. (shrink)

La naturalisation de la phénoménologie et la nature des phénomènesLe projet de naturalisation de la phénoménologie est né comme une tentative d’intégrer réciproquement les neurosciences et la philosophie phénoménologique. Les principaux représentants de ce projet, Jean Petitot et Francisco Varela, ont étés inspirés par Merleau-Ponty en tant que référence philosophique permettant de développer de façon féconde ce point de vue. Cependant, les deux auteurs ne semblent pas assumer jusqu’au bout les enjeux réels posés par la réflexion philosophique de Merleau-Ponty qui, (...) si d’un côté permet certainement de concevoir la pensée et l’expérience en termesd’incorporation, d’autre part, développe une ontologie phénoménologique qui échappe à l’approche réductionniste commun à Varela et Petitot. Dans les deux cas, en effet, le présupposé ontologique est encore dérivé d’une compréhension de la nature comme domaine de la matière comprise en termes déterministes, modèle que l’ontologie phénoménologique de Merleau-Ponty permet au contraire de subvertir. Par conséquent, les fructueuses indications théoriques contenues dans le projet de naturalisation de la phénoménologie doivent néanmoins faire face à une compréhension adéquate de la signification de l’idée de naturalisation, qui soit effectivement phénoménologique en n’acceptant pas de façon acritique aucune option théorique quoique significative.La naturalizzazione della fenomenologia e la natura dei fenomeniIl progetto di naturalizzazione della fenomenologia nasce come tentativo di integrare reciprocamente le neuroscienze e la filosofia fenomenologica. Gli esponenti principali di questo progetto, Jean Petitot e Francisco Varela, si sono ispirati a Merleau-Ponty come a colui che ha consentito di sviluppare nel modo più fecondo tale prospettiva. Tuttavia entrambi gli autori sembrano non fare fino in fondo i conti con la riflessione di Merleau-Ponty, che se da una parte consente effettivamente di concepire il pensiero e l’esperienza in termini di incorporazione, d’altro canto sviluppa una ontologia fenomenologica che sfugge all’approccio riduzionistico comune a Varela e Petitot. In entrambi i casi infatti il presupposto ontologico è pur sempre ricavato da una comprensione della natura come dominio della materia intesa in senso deterministico, che l’ontologia fenomenologica della natura di Merleau-Ponty sovverte. Pertanto le pur feconde indicazioni teoriche contenute nel progetto di naturalizzazione della fenomenologia devono ancora fare i conti con una adeguata comprensione del significato dell’idea di naturalizzazione, che sia autenticamente fenomenologico nel non assumere in modo inavvertito alcuna opzione teorica per quanto significativa. (shrink)

La naturalisation de la phénoménologie et la nature des phénomènesLe projet de naturalisation de la phénoménologie est né comme une tentative d’intégrer réciproquement les neurosciences et la philosophie phénoménologique. Les principaux représentants de ce projet, Jean Petitot et Francisco Varela, ont étés inspirés par Merleau-Ponty en tant que référence philosophique permettant de développer de façon féconde ce point de vue. Cependant, les deux auteurs ne semblent pas assumer jusqu’au bout les enjeux réels posés par la réflexion philosophique de Merleau-Ponty qui, (...) si d’un côté permet certainement de concevoir la pensée et l’expérience en termesd’incorporation, d’autre part, développe une ontologie phénoménologique qui échappe à l’approche réductionniste commun à Varela et Petitot. Dans les deux cas, en effet, le présupposé ontologique est encore dérivé d’une compréhension de la nature comme domaine de la matière comprise en termes déterministes, modèle que l’ontologie phénoménologique de Merleau-Ponty permet au contraire de subvertir. Par conséquent, les fructueuses indications théoriques contenues dans le projet de naturalisation de la phénoménologie doivent néanmoins faire face à une compréhension adéquate de la signification de l’idée de naturalisation, qui soit effectivement phénoménologique en n’acceptant pas de façon acritique aucune option théorique quoique significative.La naturalizzazione della fenomenologia e la natura dei fenomeniIl progetto di naturalizzazione della fenomenologia nasce come tentativo di integrare reciprocamente le neuroscienze e la filosofia fenomenologica. Gli esponenti principali di questo progetto, Jean Petitot e Francisco Varela, si sono ispirati a Merleau-Ponty come a colui che ha consentito di sviluppare nel modo più fecondo tale prospettiva. Tuttavia entrambi gli autori sembrano non fare fino in fondo i conti con la riflessione di Merleau-Ponty, che se da una parte consente effettivamente di concepire il pensiero e l’esperienza in termini di incorporazione, d’altro canto sviluppa una ontologia fenomenologica che sfugge all’approccio riduzionistico comune a Varela e Petitot. In entrambi i casi infatti il presupposto ontologico è pur sempre ricavato da una comprensione della natura come dominio della materia intesa in senso deterministico, che l’ontologia fenomenologica della natura di Merleau-Ponty sovverte. Pertanto le pur feconde indicazioni teoriche contenute nel progetto di naturalizzazione della fenomenologia devono ancora fare i conti con una adeguata comprensione del significato dell’idea di naturalizzazione, che sia autenticamente fenomenologico nel non assumere in modo inavvertito alcuna opzione teorica per quanto significativa. (shrink)

This paper illuminates the explanatory role of vagueness und species membership against the background of scientific developments in recent stem cell research. With the help of the Neo-Aristotelian concept of “life form naturalism” ontologically vague entities such as stem cells, all above induced pluripotent stem cells, could be described as necessary constituents for the correct sorting and naming of natural processes and its bearers. Furthermore this specific assessment allows drawing some important ontological and ethical consequences.

I argue that Leibniz consistently subscribes to the view that phenomena (thus bodies) have their being in perceiving substances. I then argue that this mentalistic conception of phenomenon coheres with three of his doctrines of body: (1) that bodies presuppose the unities or simple substances on which they are founded; (2) that bodies are aggregates of those substances; and (3) that bodies derive or borrow their reality from their simple constituents.

According to the neo-Kantian and cultural anthropologist Ernst Cassirer, man always interacts with nature. This assumption forms the basis for his philosophical approach to the Philosophy of Symbolic Forms of 1929. It is based on the thesis that we do not conceive nature as objects (‘Ding-Wahrnehmung’), but immediately feel and suffer nature through the so-called ‘perception of expression’ (‘Ausdrucks-Wahrnehmung’). Thus, our understanding of the world is based on interaction with nature, because feeling and suffering depend on something we feel and (...) suffer about. In conclusion, Cassirer developed already a theory of Enaktivismus, embodiment, and respectively to modern film theories of immersion. The thesis of the following paper is based on these findings of Cassirer and states that that there is no dichotomy between nature and man. (shrink)

This paper examines Newton's argument from the phenomena to the law of universal gravitation-especially the question how such a result could have been obtained from the evidential base on which that argument rests. Its thesis is that the crucial step was a certain application of the third law of motion-one that could only be justified by appeal to the consequences of the resulting theory; and that the general concept of interaction embodied in Newton's use of the third law most (...) probably evolved in the course of the very investigation that led to this theory. (shrink)

Following a survey of how universal the electromagnetic interaction (EMI) and light, its radiation, are in the living experience and spirituality of men and women, I make a case for the hypothesis that the EMI serves as a physical correlate for the immanence of God. This in turn will be used as partial support for the principal thesis of this article: given the vast spectrum of natural phenomena, from atoms to human brains, that operate via the EMI, we (...) need seriously to consider the EMI in formulating a viable natural theology. The encompassing properties of the EMI provide a unifying and cohesive influence heretofore neglected by the natural theology community. I intend here to stimulate more rigorous study of this approach. (shrink)

Amidst the seemingly endless books on more and more narrowly specialized topics within politics, Mark Blitz offers something very different. Reason and Politics: The Nature of Political Phenomena examines the central phenomena of political life in order to clarify their meaning, source, and range. Blitz gives particular attention to the notions of freedom, rights, justice, virtue, power, property, nationalism, and the common good. At the same time, Blitz shows how, in order to understand political matters correctly, we must (...) also understand how they affect us directly. We do not merely theorize over political questions; we experience them. Blitz also considers matters such as the powers and motions of the soul, the nature of experience, and the varieties of pleasure and attachment. Living at a time when technological change makes it difficult even to claim convincingly that there are defining human characteristics and natural limits that we simply cannot change, Reason and Politics proposes that there are in fact basic phenomena not only in politics, but that make up human affairs as such. In examining these central phenomena in a lucid and articulate manner, this book makes a unique contribution not only to the study of politics but also to the study of philosophy more broadly. It will interest undergraduate and graduate students, political scientists and philosophers, those interested in politics, and general readers"-- Back cover. (shrink)

For an ‘explanation' of physical facts by laws of nature, we have to establish a relation between physical facts and laws of nature. It is an open question, whether the laws of nature govern the facts with necessity or whether the laws are related to the facts merely by supervenience. In addition, it is not quite clear, whether the known laws of physics describe only artificially simplified cases, e.g. isolated situations, or whether the laws of physics actually grasp real facts. (...) Known solutions of these problems refer to situations where laws of classical physics are applied to phenomena of classical physics. However, if the same laws were applied to matter of facts of the domain of modern physics, then in many cases there would be no ‘explanation' in the sense mentioned. These new problems can be treated either by additional ‘interpretations' of the theories in question, or by a radical change of the ontological preconditions of classical physics. (shrink)

There is a passage in Hume’s Enquiry concerning Human Understanding that I have always found striking and rather charming. It concerns a metaphysical theory that Hume regards as bizarre; and he offers two philosophical arguments in its confutation. It is the first of these that I have in mind:First, [he says,] It seems to me, that this theory… is too bold ever to carry conviction with it to a man, sufficiently apprized of the weakness of human reason, and the narrow (...) limits, to which it is confined in all its operations. Though the chain of arguments, which conduct to it, were ever so logical, there must arise a strong suspicion, if not an absolute assurance, that it has carried us quite beyond the reach of our faculties, when it leads to conclusions so extraordinary, and so remote from common life and experience. (shrink)

I argue that there is a problem for a wide class of theories of art that arises from counterexamples drawn from everyday artistic activity, rather than high artworld artistic activity. I explore how the counterexample functions. Part of the point is to reflect on methodological issues concerning the use of examples when considering theories of art. We will also see why thinking about everyday cases is theoretically significant.

In Phenomena of Power, one of the leading figures of postwar German sociology reflects on the nature, and many forms of, power. For Heinrich Popitz, power is rooted in the human condition and is therefore part of all social relations. Drawing on philosophical anthropology, he identifies the elementary forms of power to provide detailed insight into how individuals gain and perpetuate control over others. Instead of striving for a power-free society, Popitz argues, humanity should try to impose limits on (...) power where possible and establish counterpower where necessary. Phenomena of Power delves into the sociohistorical manifestations of power and breaks through to its general structures. Popitz distinguishes the forms of the enforcement of power as well as of its stabilization and institutionalization, clearly articulating how the mechanisms of power work and how to track them in the social world. Philosophically trained, historically informed, and endowed with keen observation, Popitz uses examples ranging from the way passengers on a ship organize deck chairs to how prisoners of war share property to illustrate his theory. Long influential in German sociology, Phenomena of Power offers a challenging reworking of one of the essential concepts of the social sciences. (shrink)

Brentano famously changed his mind about intentionality between the 1874 and 1911 editions of Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint (PES). The 1911 edition repudiates the 1874 view that to think about something is to stand in a relation to something that is within in the mind, and holds instead that intentionality is only like a relation (it is ‘quasi-relational’). Despite this, Brentano still insists that mental activity involves ‘the reference to something as an object’, much as he did in the (...) 1874 edition of PES. The question is what Brentano might have meant by this, given that he rejects a relational account of intentionality. The present paper suggests an answer. It draws on recent work on pretence theory to provide a model of Brentano’s notion of the quasi-relational nature of mental phenomena, as well as of the notion of mental reference to an object, and argues that the model helps to explain why Brentano might have been able discern a clear continuity between the views of the 1874 and 1911 editions of PES, despite the differences. (shrink)

In the face of causal complexity, scientists reconstitute phenomena in order to arrive at a more simplified and partial picture that ignores most of the 'bigger picture.' This paper will distinguish between two modes of reconstituting phenomena: one moving down to a level of greater decomposition (toward organizational parts of the original phenomenon), and one moving up to a level of greater abstraction (toward different differences regarding the phenomenon). The first aim of the paper is to illustrate that (...) phenomena are moving targets, i.e., they are not fixed once and for all, but are adapted, if necessary, on the basis of the preferred perspective adopted for pragmatic reasons. The second aim is to analyze in detail the second mode of reconstituting phenomena. This includes an exposition of the kind of pragmatic-pluralistic picture resulting from the fact that phenomena are reconstituted by a move up to a level of greater abstraction. (shrink)

The literature on the nature of understanding can be divided into two broad camps. Explanationists believe that it is knowledge of explanations that is key to understanding. In contrast, their manipulationist rivals maintain that understanding essentially involves an ability to manipulate certain representations. The aim of this paper is to provide a novel knowledge based account of understanding. More specifically, it proposes an account of maximal understanding of a given phenomenon in terms of fully comprehensive and maximally well-connected knowledge of (...) it and of degrees of understanding in terms of approximations to such knowledge. It is completed by a contextualist semantics for outright attributions of understanding according to which an attribution of understanding is true of one just in case one knows enough about it to perform some contextually determined task. It is argued that this account has an edge over both its explanationist and manipulationist competitors. (shrink)

This study provides a survey of phenomena that present themselves during moments of naturally occurring inner experience. In our previous studies using Descriptive Experience Sampling we have discovered five frequently occurring phenomena—inner speech, inner seeing, unsymbolized thinking, feelings, and sensory awareness. Here we quantify the relative frequency of these phenomena. We used DES to describe 10 randomly identified moments of inner experience from each of 30 participants selected from a stratified sample of college students. We found that (...) each of the five phenomena occurred in approximately one quarter of sampled moments, that the frequency of these phenomena varied widely across individuals, that there were no significant gender differences in the relative frequencies of these phenomena, and that higher frequencies of inner speech were associated with lower levels of psychological distress. (shrink)

Explanation of physical regularities from positions of the thermodynamic approach -- Application of the thermodynamic approach to the processes going in the human organism.

The dichotomy between the qualitative and the quantitative has been a classic throughout the history of science. As will be seen, this dichotomy permeates all ontological levels of reality. In this work, phenomenological examples potentially related to semiosis are presented at the different levels established by Mario Bunge and Josep Ferrater Mora, contrasting the qualitative categorizations with the quantifiable physical reality. Likewise, the need to continue in the quantification of the biosemiotic and linguistic studies will be presented, while, in contrast, (...) the need to establish a qualitative framework in the little-addressed study of technosemiotics will be raised, of potential interest given the notable advances that are expected in communication systems for inert artifacts in the next years. In short, in the thesis defended here the qualitative precedes the quantitative in the defining path of science. (shrink)

This book is an experiment. Inspired by the bizarre and uncanny, it is an attempt to use logic to expose the illogical foundations of logic; an attempt to use science to peek beyond the limits of science; an attempt to use rationality to lift the veil off the irrational. Its ways are unconventional: weaving along its path one finds UFOs and fairies, quantum mechanics, analytic philosophy, history, mathematics, and depth psychology. The enterprise of constructing a coherent story out of these (...) incommensurable disciplines is exploratory. But if the experiment works, at the end all these disparate threads will come together to unveil a startling scenario about the nature of reality and our condition within it. The payoff is handsome: a reason for hope, a boost for the imagination, and the promise of a meaningful future. But it does not come for free: this book may confront some of your dearest notions about truth and reason. Yet, one cannot dismiss its conclusions lightly, because the evidence it compiles and the philosophy it leverages are solid in the orthodox, academic sense. (shrink)