Over the decades, the claim that everything is revisable (defended by Quine and others) has played an important role in Epistemology and Philosophy of Science. Some time ago, Katz (1988) argued that this claim is paradoxical. This paper does not discuss this objection but rather argues that the claim of universal revisability allows for two different readings but in each case leads to a contradiction and is false.

Over the decades, the claim that everything is revisable (defended by Quine and others) has played an important role in Epistemology and Philosophy of Science. Some time ago, Katz (1988) argued that this claim is paradoxical. This paper does not discuss this objection but rather argues that the claim of universal revisability allows for two different readings but in each case leads to a contradiction and is false.

BackgroundThe number of students enrolled in higher education in China accounts for more than one-fifth of the world, and universities, as a community of faculty, staff and scholars, currently do not have a scale that specifically assesses the well-being of the population in the environment of Chinese universities. However, the University of Pittsburgh has developed a comprehensive well-being scale, referred to as the Pitt Wellness Scale, specifically to measure people’s well-being in a university environment.AimsInvestigate the psychometric properties of the Pitt (...) Wellness Scale in Chinese university environmental samples.MethodsThe original scale was culturally adapted and modified through expert consultation, a random sample of 1870 current faculty, staff, and students were selected for the questionnaire survey. Exploratory factor analysis and confirmatory factor analysis were used to investigate the potential factor structure of the Chinese Revision of the Pitt Wellness Scale and to measure its reliability and validity. Finally, the factors that affect people’s well-being in the Chinese university environment were explored.ResultsThe Chinese Revision of the Pitt Wellness Scale retained 30 items, and the EFA supports a five-factor structure, which differed from the results of the original scale, and the CFA results showed that the model fitted well. The discriminant validity of the modified Chinese scale was excellent. The overall Omega coefficient of the scale was 0.958, and the reliability of the retest after 4 weeks was 0.821.ConclusionThe Chinese Revision of the Pitt Wellness Scale possesses satisfactory psychometric properties, and it can be considered an instrument for assessing personal well-being in Chinese university environment. (shrink)

Partiendo de la constatación de que el colectivo LGBTIQ+ sufre un contexto de discriminación y opresión sistemáticas, este artículo busca dar respuesta a este contexto desde el sistema universal de protección de derechos. Para ello, se explican los principios de igualdad y no discriminación como punto de partida para justificar un enfoque basado en derechos como la metodología pertinente para realizar una revisión de las provisiones específicas aplicables al colectivo LGBTIQ+ y realizar una propuesta de mejora, que incluye la (...) aprobación de un tratado específico que sirva para corregir la situación. (shrink)

We look at various notions of a class of definability operations that generalise inductive operations, and are characterised as “revision operations”. More particularly we: (i) characterise the revision theoretically definable subsets of a countable acceptable structure; (ii) show that the categorical truth set of Belnap and Gupta’s theory of truth over arithmetic using \emph{fully varied revision} sequences yields a complete \Pi13 set of integers; (iii) the set of \emph{stably categorical} sentences using their revision operator ψ is similarly \Pi13 and which (...) is complete in Gödel’s universe of constructible sets L; (iv) give an alternative account of a theory of truth—realistic variance that simplifies full variance, whilst at the same time arriving at Kripkean fixed points. (shrink)

It follows from Humean principles of plenitude, I argue, that island universes are possible: physical reality might have 'absolutely isolated' parts. This makes trouble for Lewis's modal realism; but the realist has a way out. First, accept absolute actuality, which is defensible, I argue, on independent grounds. Second, revise the standard analysis of modality: modal operators are 'plural', not 'individual', quantifiers over possible worlds. This solves the problem of island universes and confers three additional benefits: an 'unqualified' principle of compossibility (...) can be accepted; the possibility of nothing can be accommodated; and the identity of indiscernible worlds can be decisively refuted. (shrink)

I used to think of the connection between a particular and a universal that it instantiates as a contingent one. Now I think that this is not quite right. This revision, as I now see it, is not a very large one. I still think that the states of affairs (Russell’s facts in his great Lectures on Logical Atomism) that unite particulars and universals are contingent beings. But the connection within states of affairs is, in a certain way, necessary.

I used to think of the connection between a particular and a universal that it instantiates as a contingent one. Now I think that this is not quite right. This revision, as I now see it, is not a very large one. I still think that the states of affairs that unite particulars and universals are contingent beings. But the connection within states of affairs is, in a certain way, necessary.

Owen revisited Content Type Journal Article DOI 10.1007/s11016-010-9447-7 Authors Henry A. McGhie, The Manchester Museum, The University of Manchester, Oxford Road, Manchester, M13 9PL UK Journal Metascience Online ISSN 1467-9981 Print ISSN 0815-0796.

Quine's holistic empiricist account of scientific inquiry can be characterized by three constitutive principles: *noncontradiction*, *universal revisability* and *pragmatic ordering*. We show that these constitutive principles cannot be regarded as statements within a holistic empiricist's scientific theory of the world. This claim is a corollary of our refutation of Katz's [1998, 2002] argument that holistic empiricism suffers from what he calls the Revisability Paradox. According to Katz, Quine's empiricism is incoherent because its constitutive principles cannot themselves be (...) rationally revised. Using Gärdenfors and Makinson's logic of belief revision based on epistemic entrenchment, we argue that Katz wrongly assumes that the constitutive principles are *statements* within a holistic empiricist's theory of the world. Instead, we show that constitutive principles are best seen as *properties* of a holistic empiricist's theory of scientific inquiry and we submit that, without Katz's mistaken assumption, the paradox cannot be formulated. We argue that our perspective on the status of constitutive principles is perfectly in line with Quinean orthodoxy. In conclusion, we compare our findings with van Fraassen's [2002] argument that we should think of empiricism as a stance, rather than as a doctrine. (shrink)

The paper attacks the almost universally held view that belief revison theories, as they have been studied in the literature of the past two decades, are founded on a Principle of Minimal Change, or Principle of Informational Economy. The principle comes in two versions. According to the first, an agent should, when accepting new information, aim at a posterior belief set that minimizes the items on which it disagrees with the prior belief set. If there are different ways to effect (...) the belief change, then according to the second version, the agent should give up the beliefs that are least entrenched. Although widely endorsed and advertised by belief revision theorists, the paper argues that both versions of the principle are dogmas that are not in fact (and perhaps should not be) adhered to. Two simple mathematical observations substantiate this claim, and it is defended against four possible objections that involve contractions, reconstructions, dispositions, and truths. (shrink)

This integrative volume proposes major revisions to the APA ethics code and works toward creating an ethics code applicable across psychology, psychiatry, and related mental health professions. Careful analysis identifies theoretical and structural deficits in the principles and standards comprising the existing APA code, corrects its ambiguities, and provides scientific and compare-contrast illustrations to address current and potential controversies arising from current gray areas. Proposed revisions are informed by the American Medical Association, Canadian Psychological Association, and international ethics codes, emphasizing (...) not only clearer language and diverse situations but also deeper conceptualizations of professional skills such as decision-making and client engagement. Ideally, the resulting universal code would be more inclusive of evolving ethical challenges in increasingly complex work environments and society. Included in the coverage: Comparison of the APA and CPA ethics codes. Proposing five core and five supplementary ethical principles and their sub-principles. Analyzing the APA's ethical standards toward revising the APA ethics code. Elucidating new standards, domains, sub-domains, and meta-principles. Culling lessons from the 2017 AMA medical ethics code. Examining ethical decision-making: fallacies/biases and models. Proposing new concepts, such as participatory ethics and psychological co-regulation. Giving concrete and practical recommendations toward revising the APA ethics code and creating a universal mental health ethics code. An exhaustive text that spans clinical, research, teaching, and education domains, Revising the APA Ethics Code is essential reading for ethics scholars, practitioners, and the APA administrative and ethics committee hierarchies. These real-world guidelines will help ensure that the mental health professions remain both modern and moral. (shrink)