This book presents a philosophical study of the idea of reenchantment and its merits in the interrelated fields of philosophical anthropology, ethics, and ontology. It features chapters from leading contributors to the debate about reenchantment, including Charles Taylor, John Cottingham, Akeel Bilgrami, and Jane Bennett. The chapters examine neglected and contested notions such as enchantment, transcendence, interpretation, attention, resonance, and the sacred or reverence-worthy-notions that are crucial to human self-understanding but have no place in a scientific worldview. They also explore (...) the significance of adopting a reenchanting perspective for debates on major concepts such as nature, naturalism, God, ontology, and disenchantment. Taken together, they demonstrate that there is much to be gained from working with a more substantial and affirmative concept of reenchantment, understood as a fundamental existential orientation towards what is seen as meaningful and of value. The Philosophy of Reenchantment will be of interest to scholars and advanced students in philosophy-especially those working in moral philosophy, metaphysics, philosophy of religion, theology, religious studies, and sociology. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThis article examines the relationship between political myth and sacrifice. In recent years, as a result of theoretical advances as well as practical concern to understand the rapidly changing landscape of contemporary politics, the phenomenon of political myth has attracted increasing scholarly attention. This has led to a refined and robust theory of political myth, with a sharp analytical edge and relevant practical applications. The relationship between political myth and sacrifice, however, has not been convincingly addressed so far. Gathering insights (...) from the works of Hannah Arendt and Hans Blumenberg, it is argued here that while political myths succeed in providing guidance and orientation to people in a world that is significant to them, they may also involve a loss of sense of reality and produce a dangerous logic of sacrifice. (shrink)

Young Hegelianism has often been identified as a crucial element in the reorientation of Western philosophy during the mid-nineteenth century. Due to its substantial contribution to the ‘revolutionary rupture’ between Hegel and Nietzsche, it is even said to have had a direct and lasting influence on the identity of philosophy today. This article attempts to shed a new light on the Young Hegelians’ radical critique of traditional philosophy by focusing on their existential condition as youngphilosophers. More particularly, it attempts to (...) see their revolutionary philosophical project from the perspective of a generation conflict. In order to underline the validity of this perspective, three specific arguments are elaborated and brought together. The first draws attention to the fact that the emergence of an independent youth generation was a totally new phenomenon in European civilization at that time. By demonstrating its intrinsic relationship with rebellious youth movements such as Young Italy, Young Europe and Young Germany, Young Hegelianism is situated in the social and political context of a wide-ranginggeneration conflict in European culture. The second argument establishes that the name ‘Jung-Hegelianer’ was anything but an external or superficial indication since, by the end of the 1830ies, it became the consciously preferred self-identification of the radical fraction within the Hegelian school. Hence, the use of the prefix ‘young’ should be associated with the then prevailing subversive meaning of the term, expressing the belief in a whole-sale cultural renewal by the young generation. The third and final argument reveals how the philosophical revolution of the Young Hegelians is fundamentally linked with Hegel’s dialectical understanding of the different stages of life. In that respect, their name also expresses a well-considered philosophical choice for the stage of youth and accordingly determines a specific way of philosophizing. (shrink)

Offers a philosophical appraisal of secularization in light of re-emergence of religion in the past several decades. This book explores the adequacy of classical theories of secularization, as well as what might be offered in their place. It asks the question to what extent philosophy itself has nourished and inspired these kinds of prophecies.

The question of 'the end of metaphysics' is generally considered as a central issue concerning the nature and significance of philosophy as such, and, accordingly, as belonging to the realm of 'pure' or 'fundamental' philosophy. By contrast, this book investigates to what extent the end of metaphysics might be related to specific influences from outside philosophy. Focusing on the period between 1830 and 1848, it argues that metaphysics was not so much challenged by internal philosophical argument, but rather by a (...) transformation of Western culture in its entirety. Metaphysics was overtaken by the modern spirit of the age. In consequence, this book approaches 'the end of metaphysics' as a problem of the philosophy of culture. Three historians of culture provide an overview and analysis of the 'Age of Revolution' by focusing upon the political revolution in France, the industrial revolution in England and the intellectual revolution in Germany respectively. The proclamations of the end of metaphysics by Auguste Comte, Friedrich Engels and Otto Friedrich Gruppe are shown to mirror this threefold cultural transformation. Against this backdrop, the idea of the end of metaphysics is brought into relief as a historical reality during the years 1830 to 1848. The editors are members of the Centre for Metaphysics and Culture at the University of Antwerp. (shrink)

Examination of contemporary debates on metaphysics and its critique yields the conclusion that there is an overall tendency to defend an inextricable bond between them. According to the vast majority of participants in these debates, any reaction against metaphysics, however powerful or radical, is bound to remain trapped in the metaphysical tradition. The dominant view is that criticism either remains tied to or eventually returns to forms of metaphysics, if it does not in fact remain metaphysical in itself. This view (...) confirms the persistence of a typical pattern, namely, that of a circular relationship between metaphysics and its critique. Conspicuous by its absence is the idea of a critique of metaphysics that is not caught up in this vicious metaphysical circle. Moreover, the alleged self-defeating and counterproductive character of critique has become so widely and uncritically accepted—even among opponents of metaphysics—that strong and well-founded objections to metaphysics have largely disappeared from philosophical discourse. Contrary to the conventional idea of a crisis of metaphysics, there appears to be a crisis of the critique of metaphysics. This paper attempts to turn the tide of this crisis. It demonstrates that the categorical assertion of a circular relationship between metaphysics and its critique cannot be logically justified. Furthermore, it presents three different forms of criticism that cannot be metaphysically recuperated. It therefore concludes that the wide acceptance of the idea of an inescapable metaphysical circle, instead of being inspired by sound and irrefutable arguments, is essentially based on a myth. (shrink)

This book pursues the need for philosophical responses attuned to the complexity of terrorism.

In the course of Western history, philosophy has proven to be an active participant in the process of secularization. This article seeks to examine that philosophical role more closely. The central question is how the role of philosophy must be rethought in light of the contemporary critique of classical secularization theory. The first part of the article sheds light on the current crisis of secularization theory. Drawing on recent scholarship in the social sciences, it explains why the classical tenets and (...) assumptions of secularization theory are no longer being considered as plausible and empirically grounded hypotheses. Against that background, the second part turns to philosophy. It examines the implications for a philosophical tradition of religious criticism that has consciously operated within this once-undisputed model of secularization. The question is how this critique of religion must be rethought, if its prominent role in the history of modern philosophy can no longer be ascribed to a general secularization of the Western mind. The third and final part attempts to answer this question by focusing on one of the most frequently overlooked, yet most significant and crucial elements in the history of philosophical secularization: the intrinsic intellectual attraction of religious disenchantment. (shrink)

In this brief response to Herbert De Vriese’s The Charm of Disenchantment, his attempt to link secularism and modernity is questioned. Criticism is leveled at De Vriese’s use of the correspondence between Voltaire and Frederick the Great without reference to the historical context, notably the confessional states that existed between roughly 1650 and 1800 in Europe. De Vriese’s apology for disenchantment and modernity is also questioned in the light of both modern religious and secular responses to (...) modernity as exemplified by the Dalai Lama and Bernard Stiegler. (shrink)

This article examines the different avenues to protect animals globally under (a zoological perspective on) international law. A first approach is to use existing organizations, which are limited in scope but through which it is easier to find common ground. The second approach is to use a global existing and overarching organization. The Organization for Animal Health has the advantage of having quasi-universal membership and of issuing science-based and objective reports. However, its powers are currently quite weak. This article suggests (...) that the best avenue would be a third approach: the establishment of a new international organization, preferably under the U.N. umbrella. (shrink)

|347| Introduction À titre provisoire, commençons par déterminer l’objet de notre enquête, en le prenant tel qu’il nous est donné. Le matérialisme historique intervient dans le contexte gnoséologique du marxisme ; or ce dernier n’apparaît pas comme une théorie scientifique, comme un système de vérités dont le sens résiderait uniquement dans leur exactitude en tant que connaissances, mais comme une théorie de l’agir social, de l’acte historique. Le marxisme est la théorie de la révolution prol...

Existential-Ontologie und historischer Materialismus bei Herbert Marcuse, von A. Schmidt.--Das Ganze und das ganz Andere; zur Kritik der reinen revolutionären Transzendenz, von W.F. Haug.--Technik und Eindimensionalität; eine Version der Technokratiethese? Von C. Offe.--Technologische Rationalität und spätkapitalistische ökonomie, von J. Bergmann.--Die geschichtliche Dimension des Realitätsprinzips, von H. Berndt und R. Reiche.--Marcuse and the New Left in America, by P. Breines.--Ausgewählte Bibliographie der Schriften Herbert Marcuses (p. 155-[161]).

The purpose of the current study was to apply and evaluate a procedure to elicit expert judgments about correlations, and to update this information with empirical data. The result is a face-to-face group elicitation procedure with as its central element a trial roulette question that elicits experts' judgments expressed as distributions. During the elicitation procedure, a concordance probability question was used to provide feedback to the experts on their judgments. We evaluated the elicitation procedure in terms of validity and reliability (...) by means of an application with a small sample of experts. Validity means that the elicited distributions accurately represent the experts' judgments. Reliability concerns the consistency of the elicited judgments over time. Four behavioral scientists provided their judgments with respect to the correlation between cognitive potential and academic performance for two separate populations enrolled at a specific school in the Netherlands that provides special education to youth with severe behavioral problems: youth with autism spectrum disorder (ASD), and youth with diagnoses other than ASD. Measures of face-validity, feasibility, convergent validity, coherence, and intra-rater reliability showed promising results. Furthermore, the current study illustrates the use of the elicitation procedure and elicited distributions in a social science application. The elicited distributions were used as a prior for the correlation, and updated with data for both populations collected at the school of interest. The current study shows that the newly developed elicitation procedure combining the trial roulette method with the elicitation of correlations is a promising tool, and that the results of the procedure are useful as prior information in a Bayesian analysis. (shrink)

Idealism has always struggled against the hedonistic trends in philosophy which see the goal of existence in the happiness of the individual and which identify happiness with pleasure. Idealism insists that happiness is a subjective concept which makes man dependent upon chance and accident. Happiness, it holds, does not lead beyond the particular interests of the individual, whereas the progress of mankind, reason in history, demands the subordination of particular interests to the whole. So long as happiness is defined as (...) the state of satisfaction of the isolated individual, it must remain an abstract concept. It expresses the condition that the satisfaction of one individual within an antagonistic society is only possible at the expense of another. The essential relationships between men cannot be permeated with happiness when the life process of society is driven on by work for the sake of profit and mere self-preservation» when the destiny of the individual is shaped by the blind mechanism of the market. Only brief moments of immediate pleasure are possible. To the extent that hedonism holds firmly to the subjective demand for happiness in the face of the demands of a reified world, it expresses a materialist protest. This protest, however, is itself imprisoned within the antagonistic society, in that it is concerned with the satisfaction of the isolated individual.But the concept of happiness points beyond the isolation of the subject. His personal pleasure and satisfaction is not necessarily happiness, his immediate interest is not necessarily his real interest. The content of happiness is to be approached through a consideration of its truth. The needs and satisfactions of the individual are not given once and for all, but are determined by the social relationships in which they arise. Until now they have borne the stigma of universal injustice and lack of freedom. The disciplining of the masses for the modern labor process has brought with it corporal and spiritual atrophy, suppression, and incapacity for happiness. Real happiness presupposes a transformed organization of society, in which the realization of individual potentialities will no longer be diverted by internalization and no longer made meaningless by competition. In its real form, happiness is identical with freedom. It ceases to be merely a subjective feeling and becomes the real constitution of mankind.Les doctrines hédonistes de la philosophie, qui voyaient dans le bonheur le but de l’existence individuelle et qui confondaient le bonheur avec le plaisir, ont toujours été combattues par l’idéalisme. On leur opposait que le bonheur est un principe subjectif, qui soumet les hommes à l’arbitraire et au hasard. Le bonheur ne saurait être l’essentiel, car le bonheur ne mène pas au delà des intérêts particuliers des individus. Le progrès de l’humanité, la raison dans l’histoire exigent la subordination des intérêts particuliers à l’universel. Si longtemps que le bonheur est déterminé comme l’état de satisfaction de l’individu isolé, il reste un concept abstrait. Il dénote un état de fait : dans la société antagoniste, la satisfaction de l’individu n’est possible qu’aux dépens des autres. Le travail en vue du profit et de l’intérêt strictement personnel est constitutif du procès social, la destinée de l’individu dépend des mécanismes aveugles du marché : dans ces conditions toutes les relations entre les hommes ne peuvent être fondées sur le bonheur. Pour celui-ci ne subsistent que le loisir et la jouissance immédiate. Dans la mesure où l’hédonisme maintient la prétention subjective au bonheur, face aux exigences de l’universalité devenue chose, il représente une protestation matérialiste. Mais la protestation reste elle-même liée à la société contradictoire dès lors qu’elle s’arrête à la satisfaction de l’individu isolé. Le concept de bonheur dépasse l’isolement du sujet. La joie, le consentement de celui-ci n’est pas encore bonheur, son intérêt immédiat n’est pas encore son intérêt authentique. Il est légitime de poser à propos du contenu du bonheur la question de vérité. Besoins et satisfactions des individus ne sont point encore données ultimes, ils sont constitués par les rapports sociaux dans lesquels ils apparaissent. Jusqu’à ce jour dans l’histoire, les besoins portent la marque de la non-liberté et de l’injustice générales. Pour former les masses à la discipline moderne du travail, on les a mutilées physiquement et psychiquement, on les a condamnées à refouler leurs désirs. Onlesarendues dans une large mesure incapables de jouissance. Le bonheur réel suppose une forme autre de la société dans laquelle l’accomplissement des possibilités individuelles ne sera plus détourné par l’intériorisation, ni privé de sens par la concurrence. En sa figure véritable, le bonheur est identique à la liberté, il cesse d’être un état affectif purement subjectif et devient la constitution réelle de l’humanité. (shrink)

Dans cet ouvrage, Herbert Spencer propose une exploration approfondie de la psychologie, explorant les principes fondamentaux qui sous-tendent notre perception et notre compréhension du monde qui nous entoure. Ce livre est un classique de la psychologie moderne et une lecture indispensable pour les étudiants et les professionnels. This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work is in the "public domain in the (...) United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG: Der Autor versucht das regressive Erleben vieler Patienten und Analytiker, die zu Beginn der Sitzung in unbewusste Prozesse eintauchen und zum Ende wieder auftauchen, mit dem Konzept der Mikroregression zu erfassen. Im Kontrast zu destruktiven Regressionsprozessen arbeitet er ihre Eigenart als integrative Regression heraus, als Funktionsmodus, der im Dienst des Ichs und der Therapie steht. Dabei verbindet er die Eigenart der formalen Regression und des Träumens aus der Freud’schen Psychoanalyse mit der Haltung des »dreaming« aus der Bion-Tradition. Mikroregressionen drücken (...) sich in Primärprozess-Denken aus, in sinnlichen Bildern, intensiven Emotionen, Inszenierungen und Körpererleben. Sie fördern den Auftrieb des Unbewussten und bewirken folgende Effekte: 1. Der Kontakt zu verdrängten und traumatischen Erinnerungsspuren wird erleichtert. 2. Nonverbale Erfahrungen inszenieren sich im intersubjektiven Feld und regen die emotionale Verarbeitungsfunktion des Analytikers an. 3. Symbolisierungsprozesse werden angestoßen und führen zu Gestaltungen eines analytischen Dritten. Ein klinisches Beispiel dient der Veranschaulichung dieser Vorgänge. (shrink)

Vieles deutet darauf hin, dass das 21. Jahrhundert die Epoche des Gehirns werden könnte - samt einer wissenschaftlichen und kulturellen Revolution. Die anstehenden Veränderungen im Zusammenhang mit Künstlicher Intelligenz und der aufstrebenden Weltanschauung des Transhumanismus werfen die grundsätzliche Frage auf, ob ein System in der Lage ist, sich selbst zu durchschauen. In einer essayistischen Aufschlüsselung dieser Problematik widmet sich Herbert M. Hurka der Selbstthematisierung des Gehirns und zeigt: Mit jeder Äußerung, gleich in welchem Medium, betreibt das Gehirn in einer (...) selbstreferentiellen Schleife immer auch aktiv seine Selbsterforschung - und bleibt dabei als Subjekt der Erkenntnis immer auch ihr Objekt. (shrink)