In Philosophy Within Its Proper Bounds, Edouard Machery argues that resolving many traditional and contemporary philosophical issues is beyond our epistemic reach and that philosophy should re-orient itself toward more humble, but ultimately more important intellectual endeavors, such as the analysis of concepts.

In a recent paper, Joshua Knobe (2019) offers a startling account of the metaphilosophical implications of findings in experimental philosophy. We argue that Knobe’s account is seriously mistaken, and that it is based on a radically misleading portrait of recent work in experimental philosophy and cultural psychology.

In this article, we present evidence that in four different cultural groups that speak quite different languages there are cases of justified true beliefs that are not judged to be cases of knowledge. We hypothesize that this intuitive judgment, which we call “the Gettier intuition,” may be a reflection of an underlying innate and universal core folk epistemology, and we highlight the philosophical significance of its universality.

La problématique des rapports entre l’agriculture et le capitalisme resurgit à intervalles réguliers, et suscite des controverses entre des chercheurs se réclamant, de près ou de loin, de Marx et de ses continuateurs. Des deux côtés de la Manche, la fin des années 1960 et le début des années 1970 constituent un moment important de redécouverte, de discussion et de réinterprétation des travaux marxistes sur la question paysanne et agraire. Pourtant, le débat en France à cette époque tranche nettement avec (...) celui qu’on peut observer au sein du « peasants seminar » de la School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) de Londres. Ce regain d’intérêt pour la paysannerie et l’agriculture s’accompagna en Angleterre d’une relecture des thèses classiques de Marx, d’Engels, de Lénine ou encore de Kautsky. Il ne s’agissait pas de « jeter le bébé marxiste avec l’eau du bain », comme ce fut le cas en France, mais bien de prolonger et d’enrichir l’analyse marxiste classique et de l’actualiser dans un contexte marqué par les luttes anticoloniales, la remise en cause du « productivisme », et la remise en question du modèle soviétique. (shrink)

Grau and Pury (Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 5, 155–168, 2014) reported that people’s views about love are related to their views about reference. This surprising effect was however not replicated in Cova et al.’s (in press) replication study. In this article, we show that the replication failure is probably due to the replication’s low power and that a metaanalytic reanalysis of the result in Cova et al. suggests that the effect reported in Grau and Pury is real. We then (...) report a large, highly powered replication that successfully replicates Grau and Pury 2014. This successful replication is a case study in the challenges involved in replicating scientific work, and our article contributes to the discussion of these challenges. (shrink)

Theories of reference have been central to analytic philosophy, and two views, the descriptivist view of reference and the causal-historical view of reference, have dominated the field. In this research tradition, theories of reference are assessed by consulting one's intuitions about the reference of terms in hypothetical situations. However, recent work in cultural psychology has shown systematic differences between East Asians and Westerners, and some work indicates that this extends to intuitions about philosophical cases. In light of these findings on (...) cultural differences, two experiments were conducted which explored intuitions about reference in Westerners and East Asians. Both experiments indicate that, for certain central cases, Westerners are more likely than East Asians to report intuitions that are consistent with the causal-historical view. These results constitute prima facie evidence that semantic intuitions vary from culture to culture, and that paper argues that this fact raises questions about the nature of the philosophical enterprise of developing a theory of reference. (shrink)

<P>Experimental philosophy is one of the most active and exciting areas in philosophy today. In <EM>Current Controversies in Experimental Philosophy</EM>, Elizabeth O’Neill and Edouard Machery have brought together twelve leading philosophers to debate four topics central to recent research in experimental philosophy. The result is an important and enticing contribution to contemporary philosophy which thoroughly reframes traditional philosophical questions in light of experimental philosophers’ use of empirical research methods, and brings to light the lively debates within experimental philosophers’ intellectual community. (...) Two papers are dedicated to the following four topics:</P> <P></P> <UL> <LI>Language (Edouard Machery & Genoveva Martí)</LI> <LI>Consciousness (Brian Fala, Adam Arico, and Shaun Nicols & Justin Sytsma)</LI> <LI>Free Will and Responsibility (Joshua Knobe & Eddy Nahmias and Morgan Thompson)</LI> <LI>Epistemology and the Reliability of Intuitions (Kenneth Boyd and Jennifer Nagel & Joshua Alexander and Jonathan Weinberg).</LI></UL> <P></P> <P>Preliminary descriptions of each chapter, annotated bibliographies for each controversy, and a supplemental guide to further controversies in experimental philosophy (with bibliographies) help provide clearer and richer views of these live controversies for all readers.</P> <P></P> <P> </P>. (shrink)

Le Sur la manière dont l’embryon reçoit l’âme, souvent appelé Ad Gaurum du nom de son dédicataire Gauros, est un traité qui fut longtemps attribué au médecin philosophe Galien (IIe siècle apr. J.‑C.) mais qui, depuis la fin du XIXe siècle, est attribué au philosophe néoplatonicien Porphyre (IIIe siècle apr. J.‑C.). En voici une admirable traduction commentée, précédée d’une riche introduction. P. 7-9, un avant-propos de L. Brisson souligne le caractère collectif de ce livre et donne les référ...

I am grateful for Joshua Alexander and Jonathan Weinberg’s, Avner Baz’s and Max Deutsch’s insightful comments on Philosophy Within Its Proper Bounds. I have lea.

Over recent years, the psychology of concepts has been rejuvenated by new work on prototypes, inventive ideas on causal cognition, the development of neo-empiricist theories of concepts, and the inputs of the budding neuropsychology of concepts. But our empirical knowledge about concepts has yet to be organized in a coherent framework. -/- In Doing without Concepts, Edouard Machery argues that the dominant psychological theories of concepts fail to provide such a framework and that drastic conceptual changes are required to make (...) sense of the research on concepts in psychology and neuropsychology. Machery shows that the class of concepts divides into several distinct kinds that have little in common with one another and that for this very reason, it is a mistake to attempt to encompass all known phenomena within a single theory of concepts. In brief, concepts are not a natural kind. Machery concludes that the theoretical notion of concept should be eliminated from the theoretical apparatus of contemporary psychology and should be replaced with theoretical notions that are more appropriate for fulfilling psychologists' goals. The notion of concept has encouraged psychologists to believe that a single theory of concepts could be developed, leading to useless theoretical controversies between the dominant paradigms of concepts. Keeping this notion would slow down, and maybe prevent, the development of a more adequate classification and would overshadow the theoretical and empirical issues that are raised by this more adequate classification. Anyone interested in cognitive science's emerging view of the mind will find Machery's provocative ideas of interest. (shrink)

This chapter shows that the experimental philosophy has much to offer to philosophy of science by reviewing the existing experimental‐philosophy work in the philosophy of science and by defending it against an important criticism. A natural way of extending experimental philosophy methods to the philosophy of science is to survey scientists’ judgments. The chapter presents two projects in the philosophy of science that can benefit from such surveys: analyzing the scientific concepts found in particular scientific communities and studying scientific cognition. (...) It explains how surveying lay people's judgments can bear on issues in the philosophy of science. The chapter examines the possible contributions of bibliometric, ethnographic and cliometric methods to the philosophy of science. Ethnographic methods are particularly useful to study the social structure of science, the nature and role of social norms in the production of scientific knowledge, and the discovery heuristics at work in everyday scientific practice. (shrink)

Many philosophers hold that experts’ semantic intuitions are more reliable and provide better evidence than lay people’s intuitions—a thesis commonly called “the Expertise Defense.” Focusing on the intuitions about the reference of proper names, this article critically assesses the Expertise Defense.

Benjamin et al. Nature Human Behavior 2, 6–10 proposed decreasing the significance level by an order of magnitude to improve the replicability of psychology. This modest, practical proposal has been widely criticized, and its prospects remain unclear. This article defends this proposal against these criticisms and highlights its virtues.

This article examines whether people share the Gettier intuition (viz. that someone who has a true justified belief that p may nonetheless fail to know that p) in 24 sites, located in 23 countries (counting Hong Kong as a distinct country) and across 17 languages. We also consider the possible influence of gender and personality on this intuition with a very large sample size. Finally, we examine whether the Gettier intuition varies across people as a function of their disposition to (...) engage in “reflective” thinking. (shrink)

Although cognitive scientists have learned a lot about concepts, their findings have yet to be organized in a coherent theoretical framework. In addition, after twenty years of controversy, there is little sign that philosophers and psychologists are converging toward an agreement about the very nature of concepts.Doing without Concepts(Machery 2009) attempts to remedy this state of affairs. In this article, I review the main points and arguments developed at greater length inDoing without Concepts.

The paper was read at the Colloquium ‘Après Maréchal’ , organised in memory of the philosopher J. Maréchal. In the first half of the paper the author develops the fundamental tenet of Maréchal’s philosophy: an attempt to go beyond the philosophy of Kant by using the transcendental method. The author bears witness of this attempt by criticising and transforming the transcendental method itself. For unavoidably the question arises in what way transcendental philosophy can justify a philosophical reflection. In the second (...) half of the paper experiences are described which suggest that other ways than the transcendental method and reflection are to be explored if philosophical research is to be fruitful: the experiences of faith, evil, culture, art and of the individual person. A new kind of reflection seems necessary, less intellectual and more “biological”, where thinking and life are linked together, allowing us to talk about such a thing as a “physical faith”. (shrink)

The paper was read at the Colloquium ‘Après Maréchal’ , organised in memory of the philosopher J. Maréchal. In the first half of the paper the author develops the fundamental tenet of Maréchal’s philosophy: an attempt to go beyond the philosophy of Kant by using the transcendental method. The author bears witness of this attempt by criticising and transforming the transcendental method itself. For unavoidably the question arises in what way transcendental philosophy can justify a philosophical reflection. In the second (...) half of the paper experiences are described which suggest that other ways than the transcendental method and reflection are to be explored if philosophical research is to be fruitful: the experiences of faith, evil, culture, art and of the individual person. A new kind of reflection seems necessary, less intellectual and more “biological”, where thinking and life are linked together, allowing us to talk about such a thing as a “physical faith”. (shrink)

La justice prédictive a pour objet de dire ce qui pourrait être jugé en se fondant sur ce qui a déjà été jugé. Elle repose ainsi sur l’exploitation des bases de données de jurisprudence en cours de développement. Conçue pour éclairer les personnes sur l’issue probable d’un litige, elle pourrait avoir pour effet premier de dissuader des personnes de recourir à un juge pour régler un litige dont la solution apparaîtrait prévisible. Elle ne peut se substituer à l’acte de juger, (...) qui consiste à rendre une décision motivée en fait et en droit sur la base d’éléments ayant pu être débattus contradictoirement. Elle pourrait toutefois enrichir les débats judiciaires et contribuer à définir et préciser l’équilibre entre prévisibilité et imprévisibilité nécessaire à l’exercice de la justice. (shrink)

Le problème public de l’exclusion du logement est régulé depuis les années 1980 par une action publique d’urgence : l’urgence sociale. Un de ces dispositifs centraux, l’hébergement, fonctionnait avant 2007 sur une temporalité spécifique : l’aide ponctuelle, qui fragmente l’habitat des plus précaires et qui fragilise leur rapport à l’avenir. C’est en ce sens que l’urgence sociale peut être conceptualisée comme une chronopolitique. En raison des conséquences épuisantes qu’elle a sur ses « bénéficiaires », cette chronopolitique a fait l’objet d’une (...) mobilisation revendiquant un droit à la continuité de l’habitat. Une écologie temporelle, prenant la forme d’une durée de séjour adaptée aux besoins singuliers des hébergés, est inscrite dans le droit par la loi Dalo. Mais ce droit est encore ineffectif, et les raisons s’en retrouvent aux différents niveaux de l’action publique : les gestionnaires de places se voient souvent contraints de partager temporellement le bien rare en donnant sa chance à tout le monde ; la rareté des places d’hébergement est entretenue par l’État central qui cherche ainsi à limiter l’appel d’air des précaires ; les travailleurs sociaux ressentent un désarroi face aux manières d’habiter inconditionnellement un hébergement à durée indéterminée. La possibilité d’habiter durablement dans un lieu garanti par des institutions et en dehors du marché du logement souffre d’une faible légitimité. (shrink)

Machery et al. reported some preliminary evidence that intuitions about reference vary within and across cultures, and they argued that if real, such variation would have significant philosophical implications. In a recent article, Genoveva Martí argues that the type of intuitions examined by Machery and colleagues is evidentially irrelevant for identifying the correct theory of reference, and she concludes that the variation in the relevant intuitions about reference within and across cultures has not been established.To substantiate this criticism, Martí draws (...) a distinction between two types of intuitions: metalinguistic intuitions and what we will call ‘linguistic’ intuitions. Metalinguistic intuitions are judgements about the semantic properties of mentioned words, while, if we understand Martí correctly, linguistic intuitions are judgements about the individuals described in the actual and possible cases used by philosophers of language. These judgements would be expressed by sentences using words rather than mentioning them. An example might clarify this distinction. In Kripke's Gödel case, the judgement that the proper name ‘Gödel’ refers to Gödel and not to Schmidt is a metalinguistic intuition, since it is about the reference of the proper name ‘Gödel’; by contrast, the judgement that in this case Gödel should not have claimed credit for the incompleteness theorem is a linguistic intuition. Because Martí holds that only linguistic intuitions provide evidence for determining how reference is fixed and because Machery and colleagues used a question that elicited metalinguistic intuitions, she concludes that the variation in the relevant intuitions about reference …. (shrink)

This article develops a new, general account of replication. I argue that a replication is an experiment that resamples the experimental components of an ori...

In this précis, I review the main points and arguments developed at greater length in Doing without Concepts, and I explain why eliminating the notion of concept would contribute to the progress of the psychology of higher cognition.

The question, ‘Is cognition linguistic?' divides recent cognitive theories into two antagonistic groups. Sententialists claim that we think in some language, while advocates of non linguistic views of cognition deny this claim. The Introspective Argument for Sententialism is one of the most appealing arguments for sententialism. In substance, it claims that the introspective fact of inner speech provides strong evidence that our thoughts are linguistic. This article challenges this argument. I claim that the Introspective Argument for Sententialism confuses the content (...) of our thoughts with their vehicles: while sententialism is a thesis about the vehicles of our thoughts, inner speech sentences are the content of auditory or articulatory images. The rebuttal of the introspective argument for sententialism is shown to have a general significance in cognitive science: Introspection does not tell us how we think. (shrink)

This article examines whether people share the Gettier intuition (viz. that someone who has a true justified belief that p may nonetheless fail to know that p) in 24 sites, located in 23 countries (counting Hong-Kong as a distinct country) and across 17 languages. We also consider the possible influence of gender and personality on this intuition with a very large sample size. Finally, we examine whether the Gettier intuition varies across people as a function of their disposition to engage (...) in “reflective” thinking. (shrink)

The present research examines whether identity essentialism, an important component of psychological essentialism, is a fundamental feature of human cognition. Across three studies (Ntotal = 1723), we report evidence that essentialist intuitions about the identity of kinds are culturally dependent, demographically variable, and easily malleable. The first study considered essentialist intuitions in 10 different countries spread across four continents. Participants were presented with two scenarios meant to elicit essentialist intuitions. Their answers suggest that essentialist intuitions vary dramatically across cultures. Furthermore, (...) these intuitions were found to vary with gender, education, and across eliciting stimuli. The second study further examined whether essentialist intuitions are stable across different kinds of eliciting stimuli. Participants were presented with two different scenarios meant to elicit essentialist intuitions—the “discovery” and “transformation” scenarios. Their answers suggest that the nature of the eliciting stimuli influences whether or not people report essentialist intuitions. Finally, the third study demonstrates that essentialist intuitions are susceptible to framing effects. Keeping the eliciting stimulus (i.e., the scenario) constant, we show that the formulation of the question eliciting a judgment influences whether or not people have essentialist intuitions. Implications of these findings for identity essentialism and psychological essentialism, in general, are discussed. (shrink)

" Descartes ne qualifie sa cosmologie que sous le modeste diminutif d'une "fable du monde". Ceci peut s'interpréter comme l'aveu d'une impuissance de la raison à atteindre l'authentique fabrique du monde. Mais avant d'être une fiction dénuée de toute vérité, une fable est d'abord un récit, comme celui que l'Ecriture propose au premier livre de la Genèse. Nous enquêtons ici sur le commentaire cartésien de la Genèse, texte perdu, mais suffisamment avancé pour que Descartes envisageât, en 1640, de le soumettre (...) à l'approbation de la Sorbonne. Qu'y aurait-il montré? Qu'en concevant le mouvement comme une séparation réciproque des parties de l'étendue, il se conformait à la lettre au récit mosaïque de la création. Descartes s'appuie sur une lecture précise de la Genèse, mais une lecture si originale et si peu orthodoxe qu'il doit presque aussitôt renoncer à en faire une caution pour sa philosophie naturelle. Nous enquêtons donc moins sur cet In Genesim, que sur les raisons de sa disparition. ". (shrink)

L’autobiographie intellectuelle du Discours de la méthode fait reposer la vocation philosophique de Descartes sur un événement, souvent associé à la découverte des « fondements de la science admirable », le 10 novembre 1619. L’article rapporte ici cet événement à l’injonction à « l’étude de soi » prescrite par les premières pages de la Sagesse de Charron. Il montre ensuite les similitudes entre la structure narrative du récit cartésien (le voyage, la halte, le choix du chemin, la mathesis comme « (...) chemin sûr ») et les auto-fictions narratives publiées par le mathématicien Caspar Grünewald entre 1617 et 1619. Enfin, il montre que le « désir d’apprendre à distinguer le vrai d’avec le faux » réécrit, sans lyrisme ni fioritures, le récit séminal du placard de la licence en droit (1616), où le récit de la vocation entrecroisait poétiquement les références mythologiques et théologiques. (shrink)

Experimental philosophers often seem to ignore or downplay the significance of demographic variation in philosophically relevant judgments. This article confirms this impression, discusses why demographic research is overlooked in experimental philosophy, and argues that variation is philosophically significant.

En partant de la référence énigmatique de Husserl à Tönnies dans le manuscrit « Esprit commun I » de 1921, il s’agit, au sein de cet article, de montrer que la possibilité pour Husserl d’envisager un examen direct d’un concept particulier de la sociologie (celui de communauté) indique qu’il n’envisage pas la fondation des sciences de façon transcendantale, mais qu’il l’aborde comme une tentative de clarification d’un concept fondamental d’une science empirique. Bien que cette entreprise de clarification du concept de (...) communauté ne cherche pas à se substituer aux analyses du monde social des sociologues, on verra que sa mise en œuvre donne l’occasion à Husserl de rappeler que la phénoménologie constitue une ressource épistémologique essentielle pour surmonter la crise des sciences modernes, notamment parce qu’elle force le scientifique (en l’occurrence le sociologue) à être attentif à la conformité de son discours à la manière dont l’objet qu’il étudie lui est donné. (shrink)

On ne retrouve nulle part dans l’œuvre de Proudhon la notion d’intérêt général, ni en termes positifs ni en termes négatifs. Ce n’est pas, je pense, que Proudhon refusait le terme en tant que tel, mais il prêtait à mon avis trop à confusion avec la notion de volonté générale de Rousseau, envers qui il était très critique. Je pense que nous retrouvons néanmoins chez Proudhon plusieurs façons de concevoir l’intérêt général, qu’il assimile, me semble-t-il, au problème de l’unité : (...) nous verrons qu’il estime qu’il existe de fausses unités et une réelle unité. Il est important de noter que Proudhon, dans son premier mémoire, se réclame de l’anarchisme. Il récuse donc le qualificatif de monarchiste, de démocrate, etc., mais revendique celui de républicain dans la mesure où il désigne la chose publique. (shrink)

Ce texte a déjà paru dans Tracés. Revue de Sciences humaines, n° 4, 2003. Nous remercions Édouard Gardella de nous avoir autorisé à le reproduire ici. Pour un cheminement vers la notion de « self » (Goffman) Là où l'âme prétend s'unifier, là où le Moi s'invente une identité ou une cohérence, le généalogiste part à la recherche du commencement – des commencements innombrables […]. Suivre la filière complexe de la provenance, […] c'est découvrir qu'à la racine de ce (...) que nous connaissons et de ce que nous sommes, (...) - Sociologie – Nouvel article. (shrink)

The title and blurb suggest that this book makes a case for eliminating concepts. The suggestion is misleading, however. What Machery really does is multiply them.Here is his characterization of what concepts are. He says that a concept is ‘a body of knowledge about x that is stored in long-term memory and that is used by default in the processes underlying most, if not all, higher cognitive competences when these processes result in judgements about x’. He holds that people represent (...) categories through exemplars, prototypes and theories, that these types of representations really exist, and that they all count as concepts according to the above characterization.Machery offers an interesting new take on the concept research undertaken by cognitive psychologists over the past three or four decades. Psychology textbooks tend to classify the main theories of concepts as follows. They draw a contrast between the ‘classical definition’ theory and late 20th century ‘probabilistic’ theories. They distinguish, within the probabilistic camp, between ‘prototype-based’ theories and ‘exemplar-based’ theories, and they admit a further family of ‘theory–theories’, according to which a concept of x is a mini-theory about x. Within each camp, different specific …. (shrink)