BackgroundThe BelRAI Screener is a short-form assessment consolidating internationally validated interRAI items focusing on physical and psychological aspects of functioning and problems with activities of daily living. It was fully implemented in the Flemish home care setting as of June 2021. In a biopsychosocial model for developing a personalized and effective care plan social and contextual aspects are considered equally important to biomedical ones. Thus, a social supplement to the BelRAI Screener was collaboratively developed with stakeholders and tested to gather (...) additional information on the social context of community-dwelling adults with care needs.Objective and methodsTo examine the interrater reliability of the BelRAI Social Supplement in Flanders, Belgium, an observational study was conducted using a convenience sample. The method of simultaneous rating was used due to strict COVID-19 guidelines at the time and to minimize assessment burden. Fifty two community-dwelling adults requesting home care support were simultaneously assessed by two independent assessors during home visits. Interrater reliability was tested on all 80 items of the BelRAI Social Supplement using observed agreement, kappa coefficients, and intraclass correlation coefficients.ResultsThe kappa mean and median values for nominal items, show substantial agreement, while the kappa mean and median values for ordinal items were 0.81 and 0.90, which correspond to almost perfect agreement. Following the traditional cut-off points for the interpretation of the kappa statistic, reliability was almost perfect for 49% of all items, substantial for 33%, moderate for 8%, and poor for 10%. The majority of items with poor kappa value, showed a high observed agreement, reflecting homogeneity of the sample rather than poor agreement.ConclusionThe strength of kappa agreement for the items in this version of the BelRAI Social Supplement is generally substantial to almost perfect, with high proportions of observed agreement. COVID-19 restrictions had a large impact on the planning and execution of the home visits. A final optimization of the instrument and accompanying manual according to the findings will result in an improved version ready for nation-wide implementation. (shrink)

In this Introduction, we aim to introduce the reader to the basic topic of this book. As part of this, we explain why we are using two different expressions (‘conceptual engineering’ and ‘conceptual ethics’) to describe the topics in the book. We then turn to some of the central foundational issues that arise for conceptual engineering and conceptual ethics, and finally we outline various views one might have about their role in philosophy and inquiry more generally.

The coherence of autobiographical memories plays an important role in psychological well-being, as borne out by recent studies. This study aimed to advance this understanding by assessing whether coherence predicted depressive symptoms over time in adults. Further, it aimed to specify mediators through which this association might occur, namely psychological resources of self-esteem self-efficacy, meaning in life, and optimism. A sample of 160 participants completed surveys at three time-points spaced 1 week apart. The surveys contained measures of the perceived coherence (...) of life stories and autobiographical memories, psychological resources, and depressive symptoms. The results of a path analysis model, controlling for depressive symptoms at baseline, indicated that perceived causal coherence was the only unique predictor of later depressive symptoms, and that this occurred through positive self-concept, represented by self-esteem and self-efficacy. Limitations of the study include no examination of cultural background as a moderating factor and the short time-intervals. Overall, the findings provide further evidence that the perception of how events have unfolded and impacted on one's life and sense of self is particularly important in mitigating depressive symptoms. It extends on our understanding by showing this occurs through changes in self-concept. (shrink)

The main title and subtitle of this well-researched, lucidly written, and engaging book reflect the author's double-sided approach. On the one hand, David Edmonds uses individual life stories as a route of access to key philosophical, political, and sociocultural issues and trends in the first half of the twentieth century. On the other hand, in chronicling the broader history of the origins, aims, and legacy of the Vienna Circle, he shows how individual lives were caught up in—and shaped by—the (...) group's collective endeavor to "marry an old empiricism with the new logic", pioneered by thinkers such as Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell, Alfred North Whitehead, and Ludwig... (shrink)

Conceptual engineering and conceptual ethics are branches of philosophy concerned with questions about how to assess and ameliorate our representational devices (such as concepts and words). It's a part of philosophy concerned with questions about which concepts we should use (and why), how concepts can be improved, when concepts should be abandoned, and how proposals for amelioration can be implemented. Central parts of the history of philosophy have engaged with these issues, but the focus of this volume is on applications (...) to work in contemporary philosophy of language and mind, epistemology, gender and race theory, ethics, philosophy of science, and philosophical logic. This is the first volume devoted entirely to conceptual engineering and conceptual ethics. The volume explores the possibilities, benefits, problems, and applications of conceptual engineering and conceptual ethics. It consists of twenty chapters written by leading philosophers. (shrink)

In addition to considering sociocultural, political, economic, and ethical factors, effectively engaging socioscientific issues requires that students understand and apply scientific explanations and the nature of science. Promoting such understandings can be achieved through immersing students in authentic real-world contexts where the SSI impacts occur and teaching those students about how scientists comprehend, research, and debate those SSI. This triangulated mixed-methods investigation explored how 60 secondary students’ trophic cascade explanations changed through their experiencing place-based SSI instruction focused on the Yellowstone (...) wolf reintroduction, including scientists’ work and debates regarding that issue. Furthermore, this investigation determined the association between the students’ post place-based SSI instruction trophic cascade explanations and NOS views. Findings from this investigation demonstrate that through the place-based SSI instruction students’ trophic cascade explanations became significantly more accurate and complex and included more ecological causal mechanisms. Also, significant and moderate to moderately large correlations were found between the accuracy and contextualization of students’ post place-based SSI instruction NOS views and the complexity of their trophic cascade explanations. Empirical substantiation of the association between the complexity of students’ scientific explanations and their NOS views responds to an understudied area in the science education research. It also encourages the consideration of several implications, drawn from this investigation’s findings and others’ prior work, which include the need for NOS to be forefront alongside and in connection with science content in curricular standards and through instruction focused on relevant and authentic place-based SSI. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Parables of Narrative ImaginingDavid Herman (bio)Mark Turner. The Literary Mind. Oxford: Oxford UP, 1996.The literary mind? The literary mind? The literary mind? Any which way you parse it, the title of Mark Turner’s provocative, elegantly written study seems to beg important questions, assume things that do not by any means go without saying. First parse: is there in fact a literary (part of the) mind? That is, is (...) there some nondiscrete but semi-autonomous module of cognitive capacities required for using and understanding literary discourse—a module that takes information (as its input) from other modules, operates on that information in some way, then feeds the transformed information (as its output: “literature”) into yet other modules, which in turn take that information as their input? 1 Second parse: assume that there is some module involved in the production and interpretation of literary discourse. Then of what nature, exactly, are the operations performed within that module, and how do they operate on the input in a way that makes the output specifically literary? How precisely is literature born from this process or set of processes? Doesn’t this kind of account suffer from all the disadvantages (inexplicitness, for example) that it inherits from its parent model, the black-box explanation? Third parse: should we even be talking about “minds” at all in connection with literature and the study of literature? Hasn’t “The Intentional Fallacy” and everything that has happened since in the fields of critical and cultural theory—from Marxism and poststructuralism to New Historicism and cultural studies—taught us to center critico-theoretical discourse anywhere but in “the mind”? Hasn’t all this research exposed the mind (of the author, reader, subject, or postsubject, as the case may be) as a construct with more or less noxious political and cultural properties? Are not the discourses of and about the mind so many strategies of interpellation—vehicles by which ideology can work to implant the illusions of inviolable inwardness, unchanging essence, and predetermined identity within a subject that takes such imagined realities to be its real conditions of existence? 2Turner does not directly address any of these questions—at least in the way that I have framed them. That may be grounds for criticism: if you are using a title that can be construed as polemical, then the onus is on you to explain just how the title positions your work in a wider context of argumentation. But at the same time, Turner’s analysis reformulates the underlying problems to which some of my questions point, thus raising [End Page 20] other, equally important issues. Coming to terms with these other issues may change the way we ask questions about things like literature and the mind. Specifically, as part of a larger “cognitive revolution” now unfolding in social-scientific and humanistic disciplines ranging from linguistics to literary and narrative theory, Turner’s book provides ample reasons for not thinking the idea of mind tantamount to an ideology of mind. 3 After all, reducing mind to an ideology of inwardness leaves unexplained any number of basic facts about perception, cognition, and language processing. There is, for example, our ability to use “image schemata” such as motion along a path and bounded interior to make sense of events like milk being poured into a cup, on the one hand, and contained spaces like the ones inside bottles, heads, and houses, on the other hand [Turner 16]. Relying on such schemata, I don’t regularly try to pour wine into a cutting board or to measure, in miles per hour, the speed of an asparagus stalk as it sits on the kitchen counter.There is also—to invoke a slightly different cognitive-scientific vocabulary—our ability to make predictions about emergent situations and sequences of events on the basis of prior, stereotypical situations and sequences stored in the memory as knowledge representations sometimes called frames and scripts [see Schank and Abelson]. For example, the script associated with making a purchase guides me in my interaction with the person at a cash register, such that I can make seemingly effortless predictions about what this person wants me to do... (shrink)

The author’s stated goal in this well-researched, carefully argued, and illuminating book is to investigate the phenomenology of grief by addressing several key questions: “what do experiences of g...

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Time of the Magicians: Wittgenstein, Benjamin, Cassirer, Heidegger, and the Decade That Reinvented Philosophy by Wolfram EilenbergerDavid HermanTime of the Magicians: Wittgenstein, Benjamin, Cassirer, Heidegger, and the Decade That Reinvented Philosophy, by Wolfram Eilenberger, trans. Shaun Whiteside; 432 pp. New York: Penguin Press, 2020.Is it possible to write a deeply researched and technically precise contribution to the history of philosophy that reads like a gripping novel? Time of (...) the Magicians, originally published in German in 2018 as Zeit der Zauberer, convincingly demonstrates that this feat can indeed be accomplished. However, it may be achievable only by the rare expert who, like Wolfram Eilenberger, combines a thoroughgoing knowledge of the field, an unstinting commitment to recreating a public forum for philosophy, and a gift for the exposition—and dramatization—of philosophical debates, the broader circumstances in which they took place, and the motivations and aims of those who participated in them.The book, stylishly translated by Shaun Whiteside, begins by plunging us into the middle of things. Eilenberger provides snapshots of what his four focal thinkers were up to in 1929, before backtracking, in subsequent chapters, to cover key events in the decade that brought them to this point. Then, in the epilogue, he briefly sketches their post-1929 lives and careers. The book's readability is further enhanced by the way the text is broken up into short sections with eye-catching titles ("A Hut of One's Own," "Existential Health Check," "Self-Fashioning through Openness").The opening pages center on June 1929, when Ludwig Wittgenstein, having previously renounced his portion of his family's fortune and taught for several years at primary schools in rural Austria, undertook an oral defense of his doctoral thesis at the University of Cambridge at age forty. Wittgenstein's "thesis" just so happened to be Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, the influential, sometimes gnomic book he had published in 1921; and at the conclusion of the defense, the candidate is rumored to have said to his examiners, Bertrand Russell and G. E. Moore, "Don't worry, I know you'll never understand it."In fact, as Eilenberger discusses in a later chapter, by 1929 Wittgenstein's own thinking was no longer where it had been when he wrote the Tractatus. The [End Page 492] philosopher's primary concern had shifted away from identifying the logical structure of meaningful propositions; instead, he had become interested in how meaning emerges from the way language is used in particular, concrete contexts. Apropos the evolving nature of Wittgenstein's ideas, one of the funniest parts of the book describes the philosopher's meetings with members of the Vienna Circle, a group that, in seeking to reorient philosophy around the natural sciences, had come to see the Tractatus as a touchstone for their work. During his first meeting with the group, in 1927, Wittgenstein, instead of talking shop, recited poems by Indian poet Rabindranath Tagore, standing with his back turned to the audience. Later discussions did involve philosophy, but eventually, as Eilenberger puts it, although the "Vienna Circle had hoped for something that coincided with their ideal of objective research," they "were instead left to grapple with an extremely idiosyncratic style of thinking that, in both execution and results, seemed directly contrary to it" (p. 274).Meanwhile, a few months prior to Wittgenstein's defense of a thesis that no longer reflected his real tendencies of mind, two of Eilenberger's other focal thinkers, Ernst Cassirer and Martin Heidegger, engaged in a much-anticipated public debate at the Grand Hôtel Belvédère in Davos, Switzerland. When he first mentions it, Eilenberger furnishes just enough detail to whet readers' curiosity about this epochal contest between the eminent neo-Kantian Cassirer, whose reputation for encyclopedic erudition had just been sealed by the publication of the final volume of his masterwork, The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, and the considerably younger Heidegger, a one-time student of Edmund Husserl who had made a radical departure from Husserlian phenomenology in Being and Time.By the time readers return to the debate, some three hundred pages later, Eilenberger has provided a decade's worth of historical context, which casts a... (shrink)

SummarySubjecting to a detailed analysis Kant's diagnosis of dialectical error in the Transcendental Dialectic of the first Critique, the author posits that Kant's understanding of such error is, to the extent that it conflates the subjective‐objective, phenomenal‐noumenal, and regulative‐constitutive distinctions, fundamentally incoherent. The author argues not only that these three distinctions cannot on Kant's own terms be conflated, but also that Kant's treatment of dialectical error is further vitiated by circularity of argument: Kant proposes to explain the three distinctions by (...) means of the notion of transcendental error, which however the distinctions themselves were supposed to explain in the first place. After showing that Kant's diagnosis of dialectical error cannot be salvaged even by resorting to the Kantian concept of “transcendental subreption”, the author concludes that unless Kant could in some other way spell out the minimal conditions for dialectical error, Kant's very distinction between understanding and reason becomes difficult to justify. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Time of the Magicians: Wittgenstein, Benjamin, Cassirer, Heidegger, and the Decade That Reinvented Philosophy by Wolfram EilenbergerDavid HermanTime of the Magicians: Wittgenstein, Benjamin, Cassirer, Heidegger, and the Decade That Reinvented Philosophy, by Wolfram Eilenberger, trans. Shaun Whiteside; 432 pp. New York: Penguin Press, 2020.Is it possible to write a deeply researched and technically precise contribution to the history of philosophy that reads like a gripping novel? Time of (...) the Magicians, originally published in German in 2018 as Zeit der Zauberer, convincingly demonstrates that this feat can indeed be accomplished. However, it may be achievable only by the rare expert who, like Wolfram Eilenberger, combines a thoroughgoing knowledge of the field, an unstinting commitment to recreating a public forum for philosophy, and a gift for the exposition—and dramatization—of philosophical debates, the broader circumstances in which they took place, and the motivations and aims of those who participated in them.The book, stylishly translated by Shaun Whiteside, begins by plunging us into the middle of things. Eilenberger provides snapshots of what his four focal thinkers were up to in 1929, before backtracking, in subsequent chapters, to cover key events in the decade that brought them to this point. Then, in the epilogue, he briefly sketches their post-1929 lives and careers. The book's readability is further enhanced by the way the text is broken up into short sections with eye-catching titles ("A Hut of One's Own," "Existential Health Check," "Self-Fashioning through Openness").The opening pages center on June 1929, when Ludwig Wittgenstein, having previously renounced his portion of his family's fortune and taught for several years at primary schools in rural Austria, undertook an oral defense of his doctoral thesis at the University of Cambridge at age forty. Wittgenstein's "thesis" just so happened to be Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, the influential, sometimes gnomic book he had published in 1921; and at the conclusion of the defense, the candidate is rumored to have said to his examiners, Bertrand Russell and G. E. Moore, "Don't worry, I know you'll never understand it."In fact, as Eilenberger discusses in a later chapter, by 1929 Wittgenstein's own thinking was no longer where it had been when he wrote the Tractatus. The [End Page 492] philosopher's primary concern had shifted away from identifying the logical structure of meaningful propositions; instead, he had become interested in how meaning emerges from the way language is used in particular, concrete contexts. Apropos the evolving nature of Wittgenstein's ideas, one of the funniest parts of the book describes the philosopher's meetings with members of the Vienna Circle, a group that, in seeking to reorient philosophy around the natural sciences, had come to see the Tractatus as a touchstone for their work. During his first meeting with the group, in 1927, Wittgenstein, instead of talking shop, recited poems by Indian poet Rabindranath Tagore, standing with his back turned to the audience. Later discussions did involve philosophy, but eventually, as Eilenberger puts it, although the "Vienna Circle had hoped for something that coincided with their ideal of objective research," they "were instead left to grapple with an extremely idiosyncratic style of thinking that, in both execution and results, seemed directly contrary to it" (p. 274).Meanwhile, a few months prior to Wittgenstein's defense of a thesis that no longer reflected his real tendencies of mind, two of Eilenberger's other focal thinkers, Ernst Cassirer and Martin Heidegger, engaged in a much-anticipated public debate at the Grand Hôtel Belvédère in Davos, Switzerland. When he first mentions it, Eilenberger furnishes just enough detail to whet readers' curiosity about this epochal contest between the eminent neo-Kantian Cassirer, whose reputation for encyclopedic erudition had just been sealed by the publication of the final volume of his masterwork, The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, and the considerably younger Heidegger, a one-time student of Edmund Husserl who had made a radical departure from Husserlian phenomenology in Being and Time.By the time readers return to the debate, some three hundred pages later, Eilenberger has provided a decade's worth of historical context, which casts a... (shrink)

Analysts studying the nexus between language and ethnic identity have characterized ethnolinguistic ideologies as the deep structure of overt language practices. By contrast, this exploratory analysis argues for the advantages of shifting from a multi-level to a single-level explanatory model, consisting of interpretive frames and data (= aspects of sociocommunicative behavior) interpreted by way of those frames. The single-level model affords, arguably, a more unified treatment of people’s everyday inferences about ethnolinguistic identity, on the one hand, and research paradigms for (...) studying language as an ethnosemiotic resource, on the other hand. Yet the “singletiered” model does not void socioideological considerations. Instead, it assumes that a continuum stretches between (1) entrenched language prejudices, (2) efforts to use language theory to question or dislodge such prejudices, and (3) the moment-by-moment hypotheses and inferences in terms of which humans make sense of their conspecifics’ linguistic behavior, along with other ethnosemiotic cues. (shrink)

[Review] Mieke Roscher, André Krebber, and Brett Mizelle, editors. Handbook of Historical Animal Studies. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2021. 637 pp. In their introduction to the volume under review, ‘Writing History after the Animal Turn? An Introduction to Historical Animal Studies’, which uses Harriet Ritvo’s 2007 article ‘On the Animal Turn’ as a key reference point, the editors describe as follows the main goal of and broader rationale for the book: "the discourses of human-animal studies and historical animal studies, just (...) like all the other disciplines involved in the reevaluation of the lives of animals and our relationship with them, past and present, are not identical. Rather, they inform one another. What we aim at with this handbook, then, is to gather and make accessible the contribution of historical research to the field of human-animal studies as well as the contribution of human-animal studies to the study of history. History as a discipline and scholarly venture, in other words, can no [more] ignore animals than animal studies can history.". As the editors and also a number of the contributors underscore, however, to bring about this rapprochement between animal studies and history, it is not enough to study ‘the lives, experiences, and deaths of animals [as] a powerful lens to understand and explain human histories, ideas, and practices’, even if in the recording and interpretation of history humans remain ‘an omnipresent factor’. Rather, animals’ own histories must take centre stage, to the fullest extent possible – given that the discourse of historiography is inescapably mediated by human perspectives. (shrink)

Using Ian McEwan's 2007 novel On Chesil Beach as a case study, this paper seeks to enhance opportunities for dialogue between researchers in the cognitive sciences and scholars of story. More specifically, now that narrative alternatives to theories of mind have begun to shape debates about the nature and status of folk psychology, it is time to flesh out those alternatives by highlighting the action-modelling capacity built into the structure of stories. Narrative practices like McEwan's demonstrate how stories can be (...) used to configure and reconfigure characters'behaviour from different temporal, spatial, and evaluative standpoints, in the way that a complex molecule or architectural structure can be displayed and manipulated in virtual space with the help of an advanced computer graphics program. In turn, interpreting narrative as a system for building models of action underscores the relevance of narratology for the philosophy of mind -- and vice versa. (shrink)

As a broad concept, 'globalization' denotes the declining significance of national boundaries. At a deeper level, globalization is the proposition that nation-states are losing the power to control what occurs within their borders and that what transpires across borders is rising in relative significance. The Ethical Dimensions of Global Development: An Introduction, the fifth book in Rowman & Littlefield's Institute for Philosophy and Public Policy Studies series, discusses key questions concerning globalization and its implications, including: Can general ethical principles be (...) brought to bear on questions of globalization? Do economic development and self-government require a duty of care? Is economic destiny crucial to individual autonomy? This collection provides readers with current information and useful insights into this complex topic. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Approaches to DiscourseDavid HermanApproaches to Discourse, by Deborah Schiffrin; x & 470 pp. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers, 1994, $24.95.Surveying and implementing six approaches to discourse analysis—speech-act theory, interactional sociolinguistics, ethnography of communication, pragmatics, conversation analysis, and variation analysis—this book affords new perspectives on both formalist and functionalist paradigms for studying units of language beyond the sentence. Although written primarily for specialists in linguistics, Schiffrin’s book will also be (...) of interest to a wider audience, from rhetoricans and philosophers of language to cognitive scientists and literary and narrative theorists. To this reviewer’s knowledge, no other book so comprehensively and so skillfully summarizes the major issues facing analysts of discourse. Grounding each of the six approaches in the philosophical and disciplinary contexts from which it emerged, Schiffrin shows that no single approach can typify, let alone exhaustively characterize, multisentential segments [End Page 396] of language. Rather, the approaches are good for highlighting different—and differently salient—properties of discourse. What approach we should choose in a given instance depends largely on the kind of question that we are asking about discourse itself.One of the assumptions underlying and unifying Schiffrin’s analyses of discourse is that, above and beyond competence in the grammar of a language, human beings display broadly communicative competence. Humans traffic not in sentences but rather in utterances, i.e., sentence-tokens paired with the contexts in which those tokens are produced and interpreted. Utterances, not sentences, support inferences, license implicatures, such that we and our interlocutors are able to communicate far more than what we actually say to one another. (As Schiffrin notes on pp. 39–41, however, there is a lack of consensus about how best to characterize the notion of “utterance” itself.) Accordingly, discourse analysts should study “the way the communicative content of an utterance contributes to our understanding of relationships across utterances, or, alternatively,... the way relationships across utterances help us understand the form, function, or meaning of a single utterance” (p. 89). Schiffrin herself studies the communicative functions of utterances by isolating two common discourse phenomena—question-answer sequences and sequences of referring expressions—and then organizes her presentation of the six approaches around these phenomena. Thus speech-act theory, interactional sociolinguistics, and ethnography of communication prove especially useful for the study of questions and answers; meanwhile, (Gricean) pragmatics, conversation analysis, and variation analysis yield insights into the distribution of referring expressions across utterances.Particularly illuminating are the sample analyses that highlight the possibilities and limits of each of the six approaches. For example, in the chapter on speech-act theory and discourse (pp. 49–91), Schiffrin discusses the “multiple response options” made available by a given utterance. An utterance functioning as a question can be interpreted, and responded to, either as a request for information or as an offer (p. 75). Because speech acts perform more than one discourse function at a time, the illocutionary force of a given speech act is “sequentially emergent,” arising “only in relation to another prior act” (p. 78). Yet as Schiffrin demonstrates, what allows us to make decisions about the “sequential appropriateness” (p. 89) of a given response to a prior utterance has less to do with the constitutive rules of speech acts than the social meanings attaching to those acts. Speech-act theory has little to say about such meanings; at best, then, it provides a skeletal account of the configurations of utterances we intuitively identify as question-answer sequences. By contrast, interactional sociolinguistics, which Schiffrin traces back to the work of Erving Goffman and John J. Gumperz, affords a more “richly textured view of the contexts in which inferences about speakers’ meaning are situated” (p. 106). In speech-act theoretical terms, a response included in Schiffrin’s sample analysis figures [End Page 397] (ambiguously) both as a mere expansion of a prior utterance and also as an account explaining the very occurrence of that previous utterance (pp. 78–84). An interactional sociolinguistic approach more productively describes this same response in terms of a participant alignment that Schiffrin labels “speaking for another.” For Schiffrin, in comparison with the Austin-Searle tradition of speech-act analysis, the... (shrink)

Animal Studies Journal 2021 10: [Review] Peter Godfrey-Smith. Metazoa: Animal Life and the Birth of the Mind. New York: Farar, Straus and Giroux, 2020. 336 pp.

[Review Essay] Animal Worlds after Uexküll: Ed Yong. An Immense World: How Animal Senses Reveal the Hidden Realms Around Us. New York: Random House, 2022. 449 pp.

The author’s stated goal in this well-researched, carefully argued, and illuminating book is to investigate the phenomenology of grief by addressing several key questions: “what do experiences of g...