Seeing Wittgenstein Anew is a collection which examines Ludwig Wittgenstein's remarks on the concept of aspect-seeing, showing that it was not simply one more topic of investigation in Wittgenstein's later writings but rather a pervasive and guiding concept in his efforts to turn philosophy's attention to the actual conditions of our common life in language. The essays in this 2010 volume open up novel paths across familiar fields of thought: the objectivity of interpretation, the fixity of the past, the acquisition (...) of language, and the nature of human consciousness. Significantly, they exemplify how continuing consideration of the interrelated phenomena of aspect-seeing might produce a fruitful way of doing philosophy in a new century. (shrink)

La philosophie contemporaine est tiraillée entre deux pôles apparemment inconciliables, que sont la littérature et les sciences dures. Une possibilité de réconciliation et de fusion est pourtant envisageable en remontant à Descartes, qui ne voit pas, dans son traité du Monde, de discontinuité entre philosophie et science et qui utilise la fable et la fiction pour exposer une vérité scientifique universelle. Or, cette vérité est exposée par des moyens (la déréalisation expérimentale du monde, la géométrisation de l’espace, la force d’un (...) esprit qui s’exprime par un « je », l’analogie, qui permet d’expliquer l’homme) qui sont aussi ceux qu’emploient des artistes modernes comme Marcel Proust et Stanley Kubrick. En confrontant le Monde de Descartes à À la recherche du temps perdu de Proust et à 2001 : l’Odyssée de l’espace de Kubrick et de Clarke, il est possible de montrer la fraternité des œuvres malgré leurs différences d’époques, de styles et de buts et de souligner l’unité de leur prétention à la vérité, qu’elle soit scientifique, artistique ou philosophique. Les différences entre les disciplines fusionnent dans les œuvres, qui ont toujours pour finalité de refaire le réel à l’image de l’entendement humain, pour mieux pouvoir l’expliquer. (shrink)

My paper is the outcome of a puzzlement concerning the absence of a word in Dewey and a refinement of a disagreement with Stanley Cavell. It also is motivated by my recognition (nearly thirty-five years after the publication of The Phenomenological Sense of John Dewey: Habit and Meaning)1 of how much more remains to be said regarding habit, drama, and the dramatic in Dewey's pragmatism. Clarification of the convergence of these seemingly disparate elements requires a brief introduction to each (...) of them. I will start with the disagreement with Stanley Cavell.The disagreement goes back a number of years, but it began to loom larger in my thinking while I was writing The Grace and the Severity of the Ideal: John Dewey .. (shrink)

The Theater Is always Dying traces the resilience of live theatrical performance in the face of competing performative forms like cinema, television and contemporary streaming services on personal, hand-held devices and focuses on theater’s ability to continue as a significant cultural, community and intellectual force in the face of such competition. To echo Beckett, we might suggest, then, that theater may be at its best at its dying since its extended demise seems self-regenerating. Whether or not you “go out of (...) the theatre more human than when you went in”, as Ariane Mnouchkin suggests, or whether you’ve had a sense that you’ve been part of, participated in a community ritual, a Dionysia, or whether or not you’ve felt that you’ve been affected by a performative, an embodied intellectual and emotional human experience may determine how you judge the state of contemporary theater. You may not always know the answer to those questions immediately after the theatrical encounter, or ever deliberately or consciously, but something, nonetheless, may have been taking its course. You may emerge “more human than when you went in”. (shrink)

Why has peace been often unjust, and why has justice been more belligerent than peaceful? Frequently, peace or armistice has served only to put a temporary end to violence, and has left some or all sides feeling dissatisfied. Peace has also been an imposition on the part of the victors of conflict to the end of some notion of order, thus leaving the affected common people to draw their own conclusions without ever being consulted. It is for this reason that (...) justice is often more properly envisioned as the image of a fighter with his sword rather than a balancing scale. In this chapter, Hoffman explores the complexity of how peace and justice might be wedded in international relations, and gives the reader sound starting points for thinking about this conceptual approach. (shrink)

This chapter critically examines various proposals for liability of a person to defensive harm. Drawing on the idea that there is an important relationship between a person’s liability to be harmed and the enforceable duties that she incurs as a result of posing a threat to others, it demonstrates that no simple account of liability will be successful. As there are many considerations that bear on the duties that a person has, there are many considerations which bear on a person’s (...) liability to be harmed. This general claim is supported through a demonstration both that culpability without causation can ground liability, and that causal contribution without culpability can ground liability. (shrink)

In this bracing book, Fish argues that there is no realm of higher order impartiality--no neutral or fair territory on which to stake a claim--and that those ...

A number of years ago we argued that Hartshorne’s psychicalism and his doctrine of divine memory are incompatible with contemporary big bang cosmology. Theodore Walker has responded to our objection by arguing that our understanding of psychicalism is flawed and that Hartshorne’s metaphysics has the resources for accommodating what the big bang theory says about the origin and fate of the universe. In the present article we attempt to show that Walker’s defense of Hartshorne fails.

In Rhetoric as a Posthuman Practice, Casey Boyle—or rather, the habitual practice referred to as Casey Boyle—participates in rhetorical studies' recurring concern with relations between humanism and posthumanism. Boyle's posthumanist project crafts another space within the field to think about what rhetoric is, what it does, and what it may become. Rhetoric as a Posthuman Practice recalls the purpose of rhetorical education in the Isocrates and Quintilian traditions—"to become a certain kind of person", but with a posthuman return: Whereas classical (...) rhetorical education aimed at ethically stable character formation—the humanist subject—Boyle's posthuman practice enacts character as in-formation... (shrink)

Stem-cell nomenclature is in a muddle! So-called stem cells may be self-renewing or emergent, oligopotent (uni- and multipotent) or pluri- and totipotent, cells with perpetual embryonic features or cells that have changed irreversibly. Ambiguity probably seeped into stem cells from common usage, flukes in biology's history beginning with Weismann's divide between germ and soma and Haeckel's biogenic law and ending with contemporary issues over the therapeutic efficacy of adult versus embryonic cells. Confusion centers on tissue dynamics, whether stem cells are (...) properly members of emerging or steady-state populations. Clarity might yet be achieved by codifying differences between cells in emergent populations, including embryonic stem and embryonic germ (ES and EG) cells in tissue culture as opposed to self-renewing (SR) cells in steady-state populations. BioEssays 28: 301–308, 2006. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)