This is a book about Aristotle's philosophy of language, interpreted in a framework that provides a comprehensive interpretation of Aristotle's metaphysics, philosophy of mind, epistemology and science. The aim of the book is to explicate the description of meaning contained in De Interpretatione and to show the relevance of that theory of meaning to much of the rest of Aristotle's philosophy. In the process Deborah Modrak reveals how that theory of meaning has been much maligned. This is a (...) major reassessment of an underestimated aspect of Aristotle that will be of particular interest to classical philosophers, classicists and historians of psychology and cognitive science. (shrink)

Deborah K. W. Modrak - Aristotle and Other Platonists - Journal of the History of Philosophy 44:2 Journal of the History of Philosophy 44.2 315-317 Lloyd P. Gerson. Aristotle and Other Platonists. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2005. Pp. ix + 335. Cloth, $49.95. This book is a heroic effort to defend the thesis that the Neoplatonists' embrace of Aristotle as another Platonist is well grounded in Aristotle's own texts and not a product of Neoplatonic eclecticism. If (...) this case can be made by a comprehensive treatment of Aristotelian texts and attention to the enormous body of secondary literature on the texts discussed, Gerson is determined to make it. The introduction establishes the ancient credentials of the attribution of Platonism to Aristotle and explores the notion of harmony at the heart of Neoplatonic interpretations of Aristotle's positions. The goal of the Neoplatonic exegete of Aristotelian texts, according to Gerson, is to harmonize what Aristotle says, including his criticisms of Platonic positions, with Platonism. After setting out the central tenets of Platonism as understood by the Neoplatonic proponents of harmonization in the relatively short first chapter, Gerson goes on in the bulk of the work to examine various Aristotelian texts as interpreted by the.. (shrink)

Volume 98, Issue 4, December 2020, Page 831-833.

Aristotle, pundits often say, has a 'nous'-body problem. The psychophysical account that succeeds in the case of other psychological faculties and activities, they charge, breaks down in the case of the intellect. One formulation of this difficulty claims that the definition of the soul given in 'De Anima' II.1 is incompatible with the account of 'nous' in 'De Anima' lll and elsewhere in the corpus. Indeed there are four psychological concepts that raise the 'nous'-body problem: the faculty for thought as (...) described in 'De Anima' III.4, the intellection of indivisible objects of thought in 'De Anima' III.6, the active intellect of 'De Anima' III.5 and the type of thinking likened to the activity of the divine mind in _Metaphysics<D> XII.6-8 and _Nicomachean Ethics<D> X.6-8. I consider each in turn and argue that Aristotle is on firmer ground here than is often believed. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 41.2 (2003) 267-268 [Access article in PDF] Myles Burnyeat. A Map of "Metaphysics" Zeta. Pittsburgh, PA: Mathesis Publications, 2001. Pp. x + 176. Paper, $25.00. Burnyeat's map is an ambitious attempt to establish two claims about Zeta: that Aristotle employs an unusual, non-linear form of argument in Zeta, and that the discussion in Zeta is on two levels, one abstract and "logical" and (...) another specific and "metaphysical." In addition to looking at Zeta, chapter by chapter, Burnyeat examines the other works that provide the context for Zeta—the Organon for the logical level of explanation and the rest of the Metaphysics for the metaphysical level. Burnyeat argues that Aristotle's metaphysical project culminates in the theology of'Lambda, for which the metaphysics of Zeta has prepared us. The goal is to "map" or sketch the evidence for these claims rather than provide definitive arguments for them.A brief introductory chapter presents the main themes of the book. This is followed by an even briefer chapter that sets out the four routes (or independent sections of Zeta), viz. Z 3; Z 4-6, 10-11 with Z 7-9, 12; Z 13-6; and Z 17 with H 1. On all four routes, a logical discussion moves to a metaphysical discussion of form and matter.The third chapter on "signposts" is the lengthiest of all and takes the reader through the chapters of Zeta in order. It is also the most map-like of the chapters, as it requires that the reader have a copy of the Metaphysics ready to hand. Burnyeat follows other commentators in treating Zeta 7-9 and Zeta 12 as later insertions; he does, however, argue that the former and probably the latter were added by Aristotle. Chapters 7-9 are integral to the argument of Zeta, as they provide a diachronic view of artifacts and substantial beings (37). [End Page 267] Rejecting the prominence assigned Z 13 by several recent commentators, Burnyeat reads Z 13 in context with chapters 14-6. "The task of Z 13-6 is to show how the idea that substantial being is a universal such as human leads eventually, after suitable refinements and restrictions, to the conclusion that substantial being is form" (54). Wrapping up the discussion of Zeta, Burnyeat concludes that the goal of Zeta's two-level approach has been to show how logical concepts should be used to search for form.This leads directly to a chapter on the Organon. Burnyeat argues that none of the treatises making up the Organon are metaphysical; all employ an abstract (logical) mode of analysis. Even if written at different times, these treatises belong together because they are all methodological. Since form and matter belong to the metaphysical level, in the Analytics Aristotle "follows a deliberate policy of excluding form and matter" (97).In the final chapter, Burnyeat returns to the Metaphysics and considers Zeta in the context of the other books. Three "chunks," viz. books ABGE, ZHQ, and MN are briefly surveyed. The topics of Zeta are then considered in relation to Lambda. Several chapters, viz. D1 and Z1; D3 and Z 7-9, are found to have the same concerns. Burnyeat concludes with a fanciful muqo~ (story) about a dying Aristotle hastily writing a culminating metaphysical treatise.Burnyeat gives us a map—a map to prompt questions; he does not attempt to delve into many of the interpretative puzzles that have exercised other interpreters of Zeta. Thus, this book stands as a helpful counterbalance to a certain kind of scholarship on Zeta. The two interpretative claims, however, that are at the heart of Burnyeat's enterprise stand in need of further justification. One of these, the non-linearity of Zeta, seems to be too weak to support substantive claims. Burnyeat defines non-linearity as holding when "it is not the case that the successive chapters build continuously upon the results of their predecessors" (4). He then cites a few examples of linearity, e.g., Physics II. Yet the vast majority of Aristotelian... (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Pre‐Socratics and Sophists Socrates Socrates and Plato Aristotle Hellenistic Philosophy Conclusion Bibliography.

For Plato, the crucial function of human cognition is to grasp truths. Explaining how we are able to do this is fundamental to understanding our cognitive powers. Plato addresses this topic from several different angles. In the Cratylus and Theaetetus, he attempts to identify the elemental cognitions that are the foundations of language and knowledge. He considers several candidates for this role, most notably, perception and simple meaning-bearing concepts. In the first section, we will look at Plato’s worries about semantic (...) instability and its epistemic consequences. The central role of basic cognitions in Plato’s account of knowledge in the Theaetetus will be explored in the second section. In the final section, the relevance of Plato’s conception of cognition to modern discussions in the philosophy of language and epistemology will be noted. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Socratic Dialogues Phaedo Republic Timaeus Theaetetus Sophist Philebus Seventh Letter and Definitions Overview Note.

The topic of equality comes up in a variety of contexts in Aristotle’s Politics from Book II to VII. The desire for equality with equals and superiority to inferiors seems to play an important explanatory role for Aristotle in determining the characteristics of the constitution of a state and being a significant causal factor in constitutional change. He distinguishes between types of equality, numerical and proportional, and equality relative to some interest and unqualified equality. Aristotle appeals to his conception of (...) equality in his explanation of the nature and types of democracy and oligarchy in the differentiation of the three types of good constitutions—monarchy, aristocracy and polity—and their less than ideal counterparts—tyranny, oligarchy and democracy—as well as in his analysis of political stability and constitutional change. Despite the complexity of his conception of equality and its political importance, Aristotle’s detailed descriptions of actual constitutions and constitutional changes seldom mention equality. How the desire for equality is explanatory or which type of equality is realized in a specific constitution is left to the reader to determine. The goal of this paper is to discover whether a coherent account of equality can be extracted, on Aristotle’s behalf, from what he does say. In the first two sections, we will look at the role equality plays in Aristotle’s descriptions of actual constitutions in Politics IV and V. The third section will examine the role equality plays in his design of an ideal constitution in Politics VII and VIII. We will conclude by summarizing the strengths and weaknesses of Aristotle’s approach to equality. (shrink)

Intended as an introduction to Aristotle's philosophy, this book succeeds in presenting and defending a unified conception of Aristotle's philosophy while at the same time making the discussion accessible to the student approaching the Aristotelian corpus for the first time. Taking Aristotle's mention of a distinctively human desire to understand as the starting point, Lear tackles the analysis of this desire from two perspectives--that of the object of understanding and that of the subject. The first perspective leads to the study (...) of Aristotle's physics and metaphysics, the latter to the study of his psychology and ethics. The discussion of each area centers on three or four topics; for instance, the topics for physics are change, infinity of space and time, and motion. From Zeno's arrow to incontinence, Lear manages to cover many of the questions that have exercised recent commentators on Aristotle's philosophy. Ultimately, both perspectives are seen to be different ways of looking at a single reality, namely, the actualization of essences in the mind reflecting on them. The final chapter with a mighty crescendo brings nature, man, and God together. As Lear explains, "'human mind contemplating form,' 'substantial form,' 'primary substance,' and 'God thinking himself' may be various ways of describing the same thing--form at the highest level of actuality". In the end, nature achieves its highest form in making itself intelligible and the human mind, its highest form in apprehending essences. (shrink)

This volume consists of twelve essays, mostly newly published, on a variety of topics in Aristotelian scholarship ranging from the theoretical to the practical and productive parts of the corpus. The volume divides the papers into one group addressing topics in Aristotle's metaphysics, physics, epistemology, biology, and logic on one hand, and his ethics, politics, poetics, and rhetoric on the other. The contributors include established scholars in ancient philosophy, such as Cynthia Freeland, Deborah Modrak, Martha Nussbaum, and Charlotte (...) Witt, and younger scholars such as Angela Curran, as well as those in disciplines outside ancient philosophy, including literature, law, and political science. The latter group of essays includes a chapter by Luce Irigaray on Book IV of Aristotle's Physics from her work, An Ethics of Sexual Difference (1993), Freeland's interpretation of Irigaray's essay, as well as papers on Aristotelian political emotion, the historiography of Aristotle's rhetoric, and his political anthropology from Texas Law Review (1992). The very range of methodological perspective that lends breadth to the volume presents difficulties for an overview, in light of which four papers were selected for detailed comment, those on Aristotle's logic, Freeland's essay on Irigaray's reading of Physics IV, Aristotelian virtue ethics, and Aristotelian political emotion. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Hypatia 17.4 (2002) 238-243 [Access article in PDF] Book Review Feminist Interpretations of Aristotle Feminist Interpretations of Aristotle. Edited by Cynthia A. Freeland. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1998. This volume consists of twelve essays, mostly newly published, on a variety of topics in Aristotelian scholarship ranging from the theoretical to the practical and productive parts of the corpus. The volume divides the papers into one group addressing (...) topics in Aristotle's metaphysics, physics, epistemology, biology, and logic on one hand, and his ethics, politics, poetics, and rhetoric on the other. The contributors include established scholars in ancient philosophy, such as Cynthia Freeland, Deborah Modrak, Martha Nussbaum, and Charlotte Witt, and younger scholars such as Angela Curran, as well as those in disciplines outside ancient philosophy, including literature, law, and political science. The latter group of essays includes a chapter by Luce Irigaray on Book IV of Aristotle's Physics from her work, An Ethics of Sexual Difference (1993), Freeland's interpretation of Irigaray's essay, as well as papers on Aristotelian political emotion, the historiography of Aristotle's rhetoric, and his political anthropology from Texas Law Review (1992). The very range of methodological perspective that lends breadth to the volume presents difficulties for an overview, in light of which four papers were selected for detailed comment, those on Aristotle's logic, Freeland's essay on Irigaray's reading of Physics IV, Aristotelian virtue ethics, and Aristotelian political emotion. Feminism and Aristotelian Logic While it is familiar to cite the inherent biases of theoretical disciplines like the social sciences and philosophy, it is less common to read how areas like mathematics and logic are similarly biased. It seems hard to see how a system of proof with rules, axioms, and formal notation is inherently biased against any one group. Yet feminists like Andrea Nye, Valerie Plumwood, and Luce Irigaray have criticized formal logic on the ground that it is antithetical to women's experience and interests. 1 In "Feminist Readings of Aristotelian Logic" (1998), Marjorie Hass takes on criticisms of Aristotle's logic, including three main objections: his logic is motivated by unequal relations of power, uses binary [End Page 238] truth-value, and ignores the concrete and the subjective in experience. In being thus characterized, Aristotle's logical theory represents a "gendered" way of reasoning, and should be avoided. Hass does well in replying to these objections with one exception. The first objection, that logic masks unequal power relations, is answered by Hass noting that logic and logical systems (in mathematics and philosophy) have arisen among various cultures and classes worldwide, and are not the domain of an elite group of men. Hass's further point that attaining logical skill can be liberatory to women needs to be underscored: it is surely politically loaded for feminists to argue that women cannot, or should not, do logic. Hass rightly responds to the third objection concerning the need for concrete experience on two grounds: first, for Aristotle the end of logical argument is in part the illumination of observed experience, not its dissolution, and second, that it is impossible to conceive of a language without any abstraction. We cannot construct a feasible language without abstract terms or categories, as Nye's criticism suggests.Hass's response to the second criticism, that bivalence is noxious, is correct but incomplete. The ground of this objection stems from the idea that in classical logic the laws of excluded middle and noncontradiction obtain such that given two contradictory propositions, only one can be true, and this fact implies inequality to feminist critics. But, as Hass points out, this objection does not acknowledge Aristotle's notion of contrariety in which both sentences are false—the point being that contrariety does not yield the same results as negation. Still, Hass admits, the "fluid" form of negation sought for by thinkers like Irigaray is not forthcoming in Aristotle's logic. 2 Here Hass overlooks what Aristotle has to say about future contingents in De Interpretatione 9, that statements about the future are neither true nor false: "it is not necessary that of every affirmation... (shrink)

Exploring the history of the concept of 'rationality', Deborah K. Hakes argues that feminism should seek to develop a virtue theory of rationality.

This book considers whether we can be epistemically responsible for undesirable beliefs, such as racist and sexist ones. The problem with holding people responsible for their undesirable beliefs is: first, what constitutes an “undesirable belief” will differ among various epistemic communities; second, it is not clear what responsibility we have for beliefs simpliciter; and third, inherent in discussions of socially constructed ignorance (like white ignorance) is the idea that society is structured in such a way that white people are made (...) deliberately unaware of their ignorance, which suggests their racial beliefs are not epistemically blameworthy. This book explores each of these topics with the aim of establishing the nature of undesirable beliefs and our responsibility for these beliefs with the understanding that there may well be (rare) occasions when undesirable beliefs are not epistemically culpable. (shrink)

The bias paradox emerges out of a tension between objectivism and relativism.If one rejects a certain the conception objectivity as absolute impartiality and value-neutrality (i.e., if all views are biased), how, then, can one hold that some epistemic perspectives are better than others? This is a problem that has been most explicitly dealt with in feminist epistemology, but it is not unique to feminist perspectives. In this paper, I wish to clearly lay out the nature of the paradox and the (...) various attempts to avoid it. I also intend to show why it is a problem for any epistemological view that rejects absolute objectivity. Finally, I wish to briefly outline a possible solution to the paradox, a solution that requires recognizing that rationality necessarily requires both objective and subjective elements. (shrink)

Examines criteria for settling on productive and situation-appropriate development projects.

While feminist philosophy has had much to say on the topic of reason, little has been done to develop a specifically feminist account of the concept. I argue for a virtue account of mind grounded in contemporary approaches to rationality. The evolutionary stance adopted within most contemporary theories of mind implicitly entails a rejection of central elements of Cartesianism. As a result, many accounts of rationality are anti-modern is precisely the sorts of ways that feminists demand. I maintain that a (...) virtue account of rationality can provide a satisfactory answer to Benhabib’s question in Situating of the Self: what concept of reason are we willing to defend? (shrink)

Epistemologists debate the nature of epistemic responsibility. Rarely do they consider the implications of this debate on assigning responsibility for undesirable beliefs such as racist and sexist ones. Contrary to our natural tendency to believe and to act as if we are responsible for holding undesirable beliefs, empirical evidence indicates that beliefs such as implicit biases are not only unconsciously held but are intractably held. That is, even when we become consciously aware of our biases, we have enormous difficulty changing (...) them and believing differently than we do. This paper considers five responses to epistemic involuntarism. It considers how each response provides or fails to provide a principled means for holding individuals epistemically responsible for their undesirable beliefs. The involuntaristic nature of at least some beliefs seems obvious, but, in the end, we can choose to cultivate epistemic virtues that can influence these beliefs. (shrink)