A Christian analysis of the moral conflicts that exist among physicians and health care institutions requires a detailed treatment of the ethical issues in managed care. To be viable, managed care, as with any system of health care, must be economically sound and morally defensible. While managed care is per se a morally neutral concept, as it is currently practiced in the United States, it is morally dubious at best, and in many instances is antithetical to a Catholic Christian ethics (...) of health care. The moral status of any system of managed care ought to be judged with respect to its congruence with Gospel teachings about the care of the sick, Papal Encyclicals, and the documents of the Second Vatican Council. In this essay, I look at the important conceptual or definitional issues of managed care, assess these concerns over against the source and content of a Catholic ethic of health care, and outline the necessary moral requirements of any licit system of health care. (shrink)

Following up on a 1989 paper on the subject, this essay revisits the question of ethical expertise in the court room. Informed by recent developments in the use of ethics experts, the authors argue 1) that the adversarial nature of court proceedings challenges the integrity of the ethicist's pedagogical role; 2) that the use of ethics experts as normative authorities remains dubious; 3) that clarification of the State's interest in “protecting the ethical integrity of the medical profession” is urgently required; (...) and 4) that the expertise of the ethicist may be more appropriately used in advising the legislature than in influencing the court. (shrink)

At the center of medical morality is the healing relationship. It is defined by three phenomena: the fact of illness, the act of profession, and the act of medicine. The first puts the patient in a vulnerable and dependent position; it results in an unequal relationship. The second implies a promise to help. The third involves those actions that will lead to a medically competent healing decision. But it must also be good for the patient in the fullest possible sense. (...) The physician cannot fully heal without giving the patient an understanding of alternatives such that he or she can freely arrive—together with the physician—at a decision in keeping with his or her personal morality and values. In today's pluralistic society, universal agreement on moral issues between physicians and patients is no longer possible. Nevertheless, a reconstruction of professional ethics based on a new appreciation of what makes for a true healing relationship between patient and physician is both possible and necessary. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Origins and Evolution of Bioethics: Some Personal ReflectionsEdmund D. Pellegrino (bio)AbstractBioethics was officially baptized in 1972, but its birth took place a decade or so before that date. Since its birth, what is known today as bioethics has undergone a complex conceptual metamorphosis. This essay loosely divides that metamorphosis into three stages: an educational, an ethical, and a global stage. In the educational era, bioethics focused on (...) a perceived “dehumanization” of medicine by the rising power of science and technology. Remedies were sought by introducing humanities, ethics, and human “values” into the medical curriculum. Ethics was one among the humanistic disciplines, but not the dominant one. In the second era, ethics assumed a dominant role as ever more complex dilemmas emerged from the rapid pace of biological research. As such dilemmas were applied to medical practice, the need for a more rigorous and more formal analysis of their moral status was clear. Philosophically-trained ethicists had an obvious role. They began to teach, write, and profoundly influence medical education and practice. In the third—and present—period, the breadth of problems has become so broad that ethicists must, themselves, draw on disciplines well beyond their expertise—e.g., law, religion, anthropology, economics, political science, psychology, and the like. The era of bioethics as a global enterprise is upon us. The original hope for humanizing medicine has not been overtly successful; however, much has been accomplished of value to patients, the profession, and society. Medical morality has been transformed into a formal, systematic study of a whole range of issues of the greatest significance to humanity. Now the major challenge is one of identity, or inter-relationships and connections between the theoretical and the practical. Bioethics has outgrown its beginnings.I have been invited to give a “personal recollection” of the early development of bioethics. Such invitations are notoriously hard to resist, but also problematic when they are the recollections of a participant [End Page 73] in the events to be described. We need only be reminded of the vagaries common to the plethora of memoirs on the book stands today. Few have escaped the perils of selective memory, self-promotion, or the settling of old scores. Yet their perils notwithstanding, memoirs may serve some useful purpose. They are the raw material—verbal kitchen middens so to speak—out of which historians can later sift fact from fancy. They enable “tribal elders” to give witness to the past from which the present can fashion some sense of continuity.I will organize my reflections around three very arbitrary time periods that represent my own way of thinking about the evolution of bioethics: (1) an era of “proto-bioethics” (1960–1972), (2) an era of philosophical bioethics (1972–1985), and (3) an era of global bioethics (1985-present). Each era, of course, overlaps with the others, and the dominant strand of each runs through the others as well.In the proto-bioethics period, the language of human values predominated; in the era of bioethics philosophically construed, it was the language of philosophical ethics; and in the era of bioethics globally construed, the social and behavioral sciences have gained greater prominence. In each period, interest in the traditional humanities other than philosophy waxed and waned. In the earlier years, religion and theology predominated. Beginning in the 1970s, philosophy took a dominant role. In the last two decades, other disciplines, like law, literature, and the social sciences, have exerted more and more influence (McNeur 1963; Pellegrino 1997; Barker 1987).I make no pretense here of writing any part of the formal “history” of bioethics. Works of this nature are beginning to appear (Rothman 1991; Jonsen 1998 ; Dell’Oro and Viafora 1996). Thomas McElhinney and I are preparing our own account of the work and influence of the Institute on Human Values in Medicine, one of the influential programs of the Society for Health and Human Values (Pellegrino and McElhinney, n.d.). Space limitations as well as prudence preclude any attempt to do justice to all the events, institutions, and people who have made the field of bioethics what it is today. I apologize for these omissions, for any unintentional lapses of... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Clinical Ethics: Balancing Praxis and TheoryEdmund D. Pellegrino (bio)When André Hellegers founded the Kennedy Institute, he envisioned a close collaboration between ethics and clinical practice. He even called for physician specialists whose expertise would be in both fields (Reich 1994, p. 324). A quarter of a century later, his vision and prediction have become realities. Clinical ethics is today a thriving entity with its own literature, practitioners, and (...) methodology.This clinical turn has, on the whole, been salutary. The abstractness of ethical theory has been tempered by the concreteness of clinical realities; clinicians have been helped to make bedside decisions even in the face of theoretical uncertainty and dissonance; and a variety of disciplines besides theology and philosophy have entered ethical discourse and enriched it.These advantages notwithstanding, clinical ethics has certain inherent traits that make it problematical. Some seek its norms in what “works” in practice or in paradigm cases (Jonsen and Toulmin 1988); others shape it to achieve consensus or satisfy the needs of public policy (Meilaender 1995); still others reduce bioethics to merely a method for the resolution of moral conflict. Rather than simply modulating theory by practice, clinical ethics can end up by repudiating theory entirely (Toulmin, in press). Taken to their logical conclusion, these tendencies make clinical ethics a species of the antifoundationalism that has strongly influenced moral philosophy in the last decade (Tollefsen 1995, pp. 3–18; Rockmore and Singer 1992). But antifoundationalism itself is a theory of ethics even though it supposedly denies the validity of any overarching theories.Antifoundationalism presents its own difficulties. For one thing it begs important questions that will not go away: for example, how do we know that a decision is a good one? what does it mean to say that a decision “works”? is the [End Page 347] outcome of a good decisional procedure itself a good decision? and to what extent are compromise and exigency admissible in moral decisions? Theoretical and “foundational” questions of this sort will not evaporate because they are ignored. They inevitably will be answered by begging the essential questions or grounding them solely in prelogical presuppositions.To avoid these difficulties, the advantages of clinical ethics must be retained without capitulation to the anti-theory bias of contemporary philosophy. This means that theory and practice must both be retained and be conceptually related to each other. To effect this we must take account of the long intellectual history of the relationship between the speculative and the practical intellect—i.e., between knowledge sought for its own sake and knowledge sought for some use beyond simply the possession of it (Lobkowicz 1967, pp. 78–81). Suffice it to say that medicine has long been the paradigm case for the union of theory and praxis. Relating them conceptually is an essential propaedeutic to any theory of moral praxis in medicine.The rest of this essay examines the inextricability of theory and practice in two of the three major branches of clinical ethics—the substantive and the professional. The third branch, procedural ethics—i.e., the ethics of the process of decision making—deals with informed consent, with respect for persons, professional colleagues, and families, and with the ethics of conflict resolution. Obviously, there are theoretical issues here as well. For want of space, procedural ethics will not be discussed, but it presents the same conjunction of theory and practice encountered in professional and substantive ethics.Substantive EthicsSubstantive ethics refers to the moral content rather than the process of moral decisions, to the moral status and permissibility of the specific clinical medical acts themselves—e.g., abortion, euthanasia, pre-implantation diagnosis, surrogate motherhood, withholding and withdrawing treatment, the physician as gatekeeper, and the like—the whole range of moral questions clinicians face in treating patients. Moral diversity and plurality on these issues is the most powerful force behind the dominance of procedural ethics. But, unfortunately, a morally valid decision-making procedure does not confer normative validity on the decision itself. Moral validity rests on questions that go beyond prevailing practices, on what we take to be the nature and moral status of persons, fetuses, and brain-damaged humans, the value or disvalue of... (shrink)

The moral authority for professional ethics in medicine customarily rests in some source external to medicine, i.e., a pre-existing philosophical system of ethics or some form of social construction, like consensus or dialogue. Rather, internal morality is grounded in the phenomena of medicine, i.e., in the nature of the clinical encounter between physician and patient. From this, a philosophy of medicine is derived which gives moral force to the duties, virtues and obligations of physicians qua physicians. Similarly, an ethic specific (...) to the other healing professions, law, teaching or ministry, can be derived from the specific ends to telos of each of these professions, which like medicine, are focused on a special type of human relationship. (shrink)

At the center of medical morality is the healing relationship. It is defined by three phenomena: the fact of illness, the act of profession, and the act of medicine. The first puts the patient in a vulnerable and dependent position; it results in an unequal relationship. The second implies a promise to help. The third involves those actions that will lead to a medically competent healing decision. But it must also be good for the patient in the fullest possible sense. (...) The physician cannot fully heal without giving the patient an understanding of alternatives such that he or she can freely arrive—together with the physician—at a decision in keeping with his or her personal morality and values. In today's pluralistic society, universal agreement on moral issues between physicians and patients is no longer possible. Nevertheless, a reconstruction of professional ethics based on a new appreciation of what makes for a true healing relationship between patient and physician is both possible and necessary. (shrink)

The article offers an approach to inquiry about, the foundation of medical ethics by addressing three areas of conceptual presupposition basic to medical ethical theory. First, medical ethics must presuppose a view about the nature of medicine. it is argued that the view required by a cogent medical morality entails that medicine be seen both as a healing relationship and as a practical art. Three ways in which medicine inherently involves values and valuation are presented as important, i.e., in being (...) aimed at the good of health, in being a cognitive art evaluating towards that good, and as a manifestation of a virtuous disposition concerning that good. Finally, a value ontology drawn from these considerations is seen as necessarily underlying medical ethics. A set of three such basic values are promoted as crucial: the value of health; the value of the individual patient; and the value of altruism that mediates the class of potential patients. (shrink)

Le projet de recherche collaborative intitulé TRACS ( Transatlantic Cultures. Cultural Histories of the Atlantic World 18th – 21st Centuries ) vise à élaborer une plate-forme numérique encyclopédique afin de mettre en œuvre une histoire des circulations culturelles dans l’espace atlantique à l’époque contemporaine dans une perspective pluridisciplinaire associant historiens, anthropologues, sociologues, géographes, musicologues, spécialistes de littérature, d’arts, de théâtre ou encore de cinéma. Si le premier objectif du projet est de décrypter l’économie complexe des échanges entre l’Europe, l’Afrique et (...) les Amériques entre la fin du XVIII et le début du XXI siècles en partant du postulat selon lequel le monde atlantique a été un laboratoire privilégié de la mondialisation culturelle, il propose également une réflexion sur les processus identitaires et les frontières qui ont contribué à l’établissement et à la reconfiguration des grandes aires culturelles, ainsi que sur les régimes circulatoires des pratiques, des savoirs et des représentations d’une rive à l’autre de l’océan sur le temps long des 250 dernières années. Pour mener à bien notre démonstration, nous aborderons trois aspects essentiels : le premier tient à la définition même de l’espace atlantique, à ses lignes de forces et à ses frontières ; le second concerne les temporalités de son histoire, longtemps restreinte à l’époque moderne ; le troisième relève des objets étudiés et de la spécificité de l’histoire culturelle, conçue comme une histoire sociale des représentations, des pratiques et des productions symboliques, face à des approches de nature géopolitique et aux Cultural Studies. (shrink)

Le projet de recherche collaborative intitulé TRACS ( Transatlantic Cultures. Cultural Histories of the Atlantic World 18th – 21st Centuries ) vise à élaborer une plate-forme numérique encyclopédique afin de mettre en œuvre une histoire des circulations culturelles dans l’espace atlantique à l’époque contemporaine dans une perspective pluridisciplinaire associant historiens, anthropologues, sociologues, géographes, musicologues, spécialistes de littérature, d’arts, de théâtre ou encore de cinéma. Si le premier objectif du projet est de décrypter l’économie complexe des échanges entre l’Europe, l’Afrique et (...) les Amériques entre la fin du XVIII et le début du XXI siècles en partant du postulat selon lequel le monde atlantique a été un laboratoire privilégié de la mondialisation culturelle, il propose également une réflexion sur les processus identitaires et les frontières qui ont contribué à l’établissement et à la reconfiguration des grandes aires culturelles, ainsi que sur les régimes circulatoires des pratiques, des savoirs et des représentations d’une rive à l’autre de l’océan sur le temps long des 250 dernières années. Pour mener à bien notre démonstration, nous aborderons trois aspects essentiels : le premier tient à la définition même de l’espace atlantique, à ses lignes de forces et à ses frontières ; le second concerne les temporalités de son histoire, longtemps restreinte à l’époque moderne ; le troisième relève des objets étudiés et de la spécificité de l’histoire culturelle, conçue comme une histoire sociale des représentations, des pratiques et des productions symboliques, face à des approches de nature géopolitique et aux Cultural Studies. (shrink)

Edmund D. Pellegrino and David C. Thomasma analyze the virtues that are especially relevant to the practice of good medicine. Their account of the virtues and medicine is complemented by Alasdair MacIntyre’s recent analysis of human development and the acquisition of the moral and intellectual virtues. These two accounts contribute toward analyzing the historical constitution of social practices and relationships in medicine. In particular, the moral and intellectual virtues characteristic of good medicine are acquired and exercised within those healing (...) relationships featured in Pellegrino’s and Thomasma’s phenomenology of medicine. Examining their account of medical practice in light of MacIntyre’s more recent work suggests, however, that their theory of the good of the patient and their understanding of the relation of virtue to altruism and self-interest stand in need of further development. (shrink)

In the Preface to his recent philosophy of biology (1988) and in his earlierGrowth of Biological Thought(1982), Ernst Mayr emphasized that recent progress in evolutionary biology is a result of conceptual clarification, not a consequence of improved measurements or better scientific laws. Although complete agreement on the meaning of key concepts is not essential for all communication in science (see Hull 1988, pp. 6-7,513), we likewise believe that conceptual clarification is perhaps the most important key to progress in community ecology. (...) In order to investigate some of the reasons that might explain why community ecology has been unable to arrive at a widely accepted general theory, in this essay we analyze “stability,” one of its most important foundational concepts. After reviewing the stability concept and sketching its associated problems, we assess the epistemological status of four difficulties with the concept. (shrink)

Con ocasión de la aparición de la edición española (2019) de la obra The Virtues in Medical Practice (1993) de Pellegrino y Thomasma, se ofrece un estudio pormenorizado y crítico de la parte teórica que la preside, en el que se puntualiza su objetivo, así como su contenido y el orden de los capítulos que la componen. Dicho estudio está precedido por tres acercamientos convergentes referidos al estado de la refl exión sobre ética médica al momento de la aparición (...) de la primera edición del libro, a su lugar en el conjunto de la obra escrita de E. Pellegrino, su autor principal, y al lugar de esta parte en la estructura de conjunto del libro. Para Pellegrino es fundamental dejar establecido desde el principio que la vida virtuosa es el principal recurso con el que cuenta el médico para contribuir a la sanación de su paciente. Por eso consagra el primer capítulo al concepto de virtud desde una perspectiva histórica. El siguiente capítulo estudia el vínculo entre virtudes, principios y deberes respondiendo al desafío de mostrar cómo se puede combinar la teoría de la virtud con elprincipialismo. La temática de la medicina como comunidad moral, sobre la que versa el tercer capítulo, se impone desde el momento en que las virtudes, los principios y los deberes de los médicos requieren de un soporte institucional adecuado para que su accionar se oriente sin desfallecer a los fines propios de la profesión. El capítulo cuarto estudia estos fi nes mostrando que no se reducen a la curación del paciente, sino que miran a su bien integral. Ante la vulnerabilidad del enfermo, la primera respuesta del profesional médico y de toda la comunidad a la que pertenece será la benefi cencia en la confianza. (shrink)

Many writers in various fields--philosophy, religion, literature, and psychology--believe that the question of the meaning of life is one of the most significant problems that an individual faces. In The Meaning of Life, Second Edition, E.D. Klemke collects some of the best writings on this topic, primarily works by philosophers but also selections from literary figures and religious thinkers. The twenty-seven cogent, readable essays are organized around three different perspectives on the meaning of life. In Part I, the readings assert (...) and defend the theistic view that without the existence of God--or faith in God--life has no significance or purpose. In Part II the selections deny this thesis, defending instead the humanistic alternative--that life has or can have meaning and worth without any theistic beliefs or commitment. In the final group of readings, contributors ask if the question of the meaning of life is in itself legitimate and significant. The volume also includes an introduction by the editor and a selected bibliography. This new edition adds essays by A. J. Ayer, Hazel Barnes, William Lane Craig, Owen Flanagan, Antony Flew, Thomas Nagel, Kai Nielsen, Philip L. Quinn, Arthur Schopenhauer, and Walter T. Stace. The only anthology of its kind, The Meaning of Life, Second Edition, is ideal for courses in introduction to philosophy and human nature. It also provides an accessible and stimulating introduction to the subject for general readers. (shrink)

Catalog of the collection of the Madamkhand Museum of Art, named after the wife of Batzhargalyn Batbai︠a︡r, businessman and member of the Mongolian Khural.