A penetrating and illuminating exchange of views between Richard Rorty, a highly influential and sometimes controversial philosopher, and seven of his most thoughtful critics, providing new insights into the impact of his work on contemporary American philosophy.

Life as a complicated process is composed of causal phenomena. But even if we know the reasons of all that happens in a living organism, we do not know what life really is. The problem of intercausal relation, of “causal structure” remains. The reason why a process takes place, must be found by analysis, causal structures are found by synthesis of the results of this analysis. Causal structures are characterized by two kinds of equilibrium: energetic and specific equilibrium. A state (...) of physical equilibrium is characterized by a minimum of free energy; a biological energetic equilibrium is an organized one, where the vital factors activate the production of energy by each other and force each other to limit that production to the necessary measure. A specific equilibrium is characterized by the properties of its factors, properties by which those factors act as a cause after having received a specific stimulation. Every factor possesses two specific properties, in accordance with the properties of two neighbouring factors, as a link between two other links in a chain . Both forms of equilibrium authorise us to speak of living systems as a “whole”. In the second part of this paper we treat the dynamic aspect of the functions of living systems as a “whole”. This dynamic aspect manifests itself in growth and probably in cortical functions. Blastomeres represent, when isolated, the “whole” of growing potentialities of a germe. In normal contact with each other they restrict themselves to produce a part of that “whole”, in harmony with that which other blastomeres produce. This harmonious restriction can be explained by interaction between all the blastomeres by which every blastomere suppresses in other blastomeres all that it will produce itself. Blastomeres must therefore act on other blastomees not according to their isolate “being”, but according to the influences which they undergo by all other blastomeres, that means according to their “rôle”. There must be a causal net of interaction between all the blastomeres and that net “as a whole” determines every step of growth. Such a net of relation determines also human history and sociology. Materialism only took account of isolated causes, vitalism only of the effect of the net of causal relations without understanding that such a net might be analysed. In reality there is neither materialism nor vitalism.La vie est un phénomène complexe, se composant de différents phénomènes causals, qui un jour peut-être seront réduits à la causalité physique et chimique. Cependant connaitre toutes les causes des phénomènes vitaux ne signifie pas connaître la vie. Le problème de la vie ne se borne pas aux rapports causals, mais implique surtout les rapports intercausals, c'est à dire l'harmonie ou l'équilibre de ses parties constituantes. La vie comme phénomène est provoquée par une „structure causale”. Tandis que les causes sont trouvées par l'analyse, les rapports intercausals doivent être recherchés par la synthèse, c'est-à-dire par la réconstruction de la réalité de l'organisme vivant en se servant des données analytiques. Le système vivant est en équilibre énergétique et spécifique. Les facteurs énergétiques sont interlacés de telle façon, qu'ils s'activent entre eux et qu'ils se forcent entre eux à se resteindre au développement de l'énergie nécessaire. Un équilibre physique c'est l'état d'énergie libre minimum, tandis que l'équilibre biologique c'est un état d'énergie organisée. Dans un équilibre spécifique on ne peut se borner aux effects causals se manifestant par un phénomène. Il faut décrire les rapports des propriétés spécifiques de tous les facteurs; ce sont ces propriétés qui leur permettent d'agir comme cause, lorsqu'-ils sont atteint d'une excitation spécifique. Les facteurs possèdent au moins deux propriétés spécifiques, adaptées à deux facteurs voisins, comme chaque anneau d'une chaine s'adaptant à deux anneaux voisins . Le fait que l'on trouve dans chaque individu ces deux formes d'équilibre nous donne le droit de créer le concept du „tout” par rapport auquel on peut constater l'harmonie de tous les tacteurs.C'est là le „tout statique”, reste encore le „tout dynamique” qui se manifeste par la croissance et probablement par les phénomènes se produisant dans l'écorce cérébrale, base des actes psychiques. Les parties représentent beaucoup de possibilités qui ne se réalisent pas; p.e. les blastomères peuvent représenter le „tout” de l'organisme, tandis qu'ils se borneront dans la croissance normale à la production d'une part de l'individu. Il y a une interaction entre tous les blastomères, de façon que, par la suppression ou par l'activation mutuelle, chaque partie réalise ce que lui laissent les autres et ce qui est en harmonie avec ce que produiront les autres. De cette façon il y aura de l'harmonie dans tout ce qui sera produit. Les parties agissent par cette interaction, non selon leur „être”, en tant que cellule isolée, mais selon leur „rôle” dans le „tout” du germe, rôle qui est déterminé par cette interaction mutuelle universelle. C'est cette interaction qui détermine le „patron causal”, responsable de chaque étappe de la coissance. Ainsi ce ne sont pas les facteus isolés, mais le réseau des rapports établis entre tous les facteurs, qui gouvernent les phénomènes de la croissance. Ce réseau, par activation ou par suppression, détermine à chaque instant les propriétés causales des parties, d'entre toutes les multiples possibilités. Les possibilités étant données dans les cellules, c'est le „tout” du réseau des rapports qui détermine la croissance. Le matérialisme n'a vu que les causes isolées, telles qu'ellés se manifestent dans les expériences des physiciens, grâce à la technique; le vitalisme n'a vu que le „tout”, sans tâcher de l'analyser afin de trouver à sa base le système causal compliqué, que nous avons tâché de décrire. Dans la réalité la théorie du causalisme ni celle du vitalisme le tiennent plus de bout. (shrink)

Herman J. Saatkamp’s _A Life of Scholarship with Santayana: Essays and Reflections_ gathers together his work of a lifetime. There are twenty-three pieces, in three sections: “Santayana and Philosophy,” “Editorship,” and “Genetic Concerns and the Future of Philosophy.”.

Scepticism and Animal Faith marks a turning point in Santayana’s philosophy leading to the development of his complete naturalism, and, if followed, leads to a decisive change in philosophical inquiry that was a century ahead of his time. Indeed, much of what Santayana explicates in this book is now central to inquiries in the social and biological sciences that attempt to understand human behavior. In short, he turns philosophy on its head. Before Santayana, philosophers often thought humans were distinct from (...) other animals because of their reasoning and their ability to act based on thinking through difficulties and then deciding to proceed in the most beneficial way. This approach was widely endorsed from Plato to American pragmatism. However, Santayana’s orientation is dramatically different focusing on animal faith and not human reason. He is a complete non-reductive naturalist.In this article, I examine the implications of Santayana turning to animal faith as a basis for understanding human action. To the surprise of his contemporaries, he no longer considered humans unique from other animals nor perhaps even more complicated in their interactions with their environment. Mental consciousness or spirit is a reflection, an after effect, of animals acting and responding in a physical environment. He suggests an analogy to the sound of music produced by an orchestra. Consciousness or spirit is not causal. For the most part it is momentary, lasting only so long as it is generated by our physical being, what he calls psyche. Hence, rather than being a philosopher who recognizes reason and mind as unique in causing human action, he notes that our actions, like that of all animals, are caused by our psyche’s physical interaction with its environment. Such a move abandons philosophy as a discipline focusing on reason as the basis for action. One might think this lessens the value of consciousness, but not for Santayana. Spirit is celebrational and to be cherished. Indeed, a principal goal of human life is to cultivate a spiritual life. Santayana’s naturalistic approach also leads to a distinct understanding of human cultures, their value, and the political structures involved in various human organizations. There is no hierarchy of best or better, only the reality of human societies serving their constituents in differing ways, much as we might describe the social structures of other animals. If the goal is to provide the greatest range of opportunities for the greatest number of people, one may find evidence that some societies enable more people to live well, but no one political structure is likely to accomplish that in all human environments. Even so, Santayana explores the natural values of charity and justice as central to human societies enabling individual humans to flourish. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Introduction Life and Publications Naturalism, Creative Imagination, and Pragmatism America Conclusion.

Larry Hickman has fostered his own analysis, explication and application of Dewey’s philosophy as well as overseen the critical edition of John Dewey’s works at the Center for Dewey Studies. In America our democracy is struggling, making Hickman’s scholarly work even more important. I attempt to explain some of Hickman’s use of Dewey’s philosophy to address current issues that include the roles of religion and education in American democracy. Much of Hickman’s pragmatic naturalism provides hope for democracy as a way (...) of life and as a governmental organization. But will that hope meet contemporary challenges in our society? I suggest some possible limitations to Dewey’s and Hickman’s views but highlight the central role both play in American philosophy. (shrink)

Includes chapters that address the selection of disciplines and thinkers that are grouped into: religious thought; individual thinkers in the narrative tradition, and two noteworthy themes in the area of business thought (specifically, management and organizational behaviour).

Die griechische Weltauffassung unterscheidet sich van der modernen durch den Gedanken der Begrenztheit des Weltalls, das sich dem spekulativen Blick seinem Wesen nach erschliesst. Die inPlaton's Timaios gipfelnde Kosmologie bestimmt das Weltall nach den Wesensgesichtspunkten der Endlichkeit, der Einzigkeit, der Lebendigkeit und der Vollkommenheit.Platon's Holismus bezieht die leblose und die lebende Natur unter die Idee des Lebens des Kosmos, dessen „Teile” die in der Erfahrung gegebenen Lebenserscheinungen sind. Sein von innen her und intuitiv aufgebautes Weltbild, das die Erscheinungen von oben (...) herab hierarchisch ordnet, tritt dem AtomismusDemokrits gegenüber, der in umgekehrtem Verfahren die höheren Strukturen auf den einen Baustoff aller Dinge reduziert. Der Gegensatz zum Holismus offenbart sich in allen Bestimmungen: fürDemokrit sind der Kosmoi unbegrenzt viele, es gibt nur Ansammlungen von Atomen, es fehlen Einzigkeit und Vollkommenheit, sowie ein Begriff des Lebens als des zentralen Geschehens.Die neuzeitliche Forschung verzichtet auf die spekulativen Bestimmungen des Ganzen, aber der bei den Griechen dogmatische Gegensatz holistischer und atomistischer Betrachtungsweise lebt fort als Gegensatz geistiger Einstellung. Der neuzeitliche Holismus ist ein empirischer, beschränkter, aber bei ihm liegt dieselbe Intuition des sich organisch gestaltenden Gesamtlebens zu Grunde wei beiPlaton. Nur wäre es, unrichtig, diesen Holismus als synthetisch zu bezeichnen. Synthetisches Denken erhebt sich immer auf analytischem Boden. Jede Synthese hat eine offene Grenze. Die Art aber, wie der Holismus die vereinzelten Lebenserscheinungen auf umfassendere Ganzheiten bezieht, ist eine intuitive. Das Band der Erscheinungen wird nicht durch äusseres Beziehen gestiftet, sondern geschaut nach Analogie einer inneren Erfahrung.Im Gegensatz zum Atomismus, der als real nur die Atome und deren Verhältnisse gelten lässt, erkennt der Holismus stufenartig aufgebaute Einheitsarten an, in denen die höheren die niedrigeren beherrschen, ohne sie zu Elementen herabzudrücken. Die Metaphysik, auf der Suche nach dem Zusammenhang zwischen dem Menschenleben und der Natur ist an der empirischen Aufweisung das Einzelne übersteigender Lebensverbände wie sie der Holismus zu Tage fordert aufs Höchste interessiert.The conception of the world with Greek thinkers generally differs from contemporary thought in the idea of the limitation of the world whose essence manifests itself to speculative thinking. The cosmology which culminates inPlato's Timaios attributes to the whole of being the properties of finiteness, uniqueness, life and perfection.Plato's holism subsumes inanimate and living nature under the idea of cosmic life, the “parts” of which are constituted by life-phenomena given in experience. His world-conception, constructed from within and intuitively, which ranges phenomena in descending order, is opposed to the atomism ofDemocritos which reduces the higher structures to the one equal material of all things. This opposition manifests itself in all essential points: toDemocritos there are worlds in infinite number, only accumulations of atoms are real, uniqueness and perfection are lacking as well as the idea of Life as a central reality.Modern research foregoes the attempt to determine the whole speculatively, but holistic and atomistic ways of thinking, after having been dogmatically applied by the Greeks, continue to exist as opposed types of mental attitude. Contemporary holism may be empirical and limited in application, but it is directed by the same intuition of life articulating itself organically as wasPlato's. It would be incorrect, however, to characterize holism as synthetical, since all synthetics is based upon analysis. The bounds of synthesis are never fixed ones, nor does it ever determine essence. Holism's way of subsuming single life-phenomena under more comprehensive wholes is an intuitional one, the connections which it creates between phenomena are not external ones, but apprehended intuitively in analogy to inner experience.—In distinction to atomism, which only admits as real atoms and their mutual relations, holism poses groups of unities, classified in grades, the higher of which dominate the lower, without debasing them to elements. As metaphysics is concerned to discover a connection between Nature and human life, it must be highly interested in the empirical demonstration, such as holism offers, of connections of life, surpassing individual being. (shrink)

Le rôle de la méthode. La question de l'origine de la méthode est une question philosophique. Théorie biologique de la méthode ; la méthode moyen de défense ; critique de cette théorie. Origine transcendantale de la méthode. Caractère spirituel de la méthode. Méthode et calcul; leur différence. La vоlоnté, caractéristique de la raison et facteur constitutif de la méthode. Caractère esthétique de la méthode.

The press environment created by abrupt transitions from government dominance to independence has created difficult ethical dilemmas for editors and publishers. Pursuit of earnings - without which a free marketplace of ideas is impossible - has forced leaders of media enterprises to make painful choices about employment, privacy, career training, distribution, pornography, and subsidy. Winnowing out the weak and inefficient is seen as both healthy and creative. Consensus on ethical guidelines will not come quickly. Political and economic changes occur more (...) rapidly than cultural ones. In all free countries, press management involves a delicate balancing of cultural and economic imperatives. In newly free countries achieving that balance is particularly difficult. (shrink)

This bibliographical checklist has its origins in a conflation of two previous bibliographies, those of Shohig Terzian and Ceferino Santos Escudero, S.J. These basic listings were considerably amplified by materials discovered during research for the complete critical edition of Santayana's work, and this bibliography remains an essential resource for Santayana scholars.

This article presents Mencius' concept of human dignity in the Chinese Confucian moral tradition, focused on the context of long-term care. The double nature of Mencius' notion of human dignity as an intrinsic quality of human beings qua being human is analyzed and contrasted with the dominant Western account of human dignity as grounded in personhood. Drawing on the heuristic force of an interview with an elder person in Hong Kong, the insights of the Mencian theory of human dignity are (...) used to provide a moral foundation for long-term care for elder persons in a context of diminishing personhood and shrinking autonomy. (shrink)

Fuijita claims that in spite of the growing interest in the last decades in the early writings of Hegel, not enough attention has been focused on their connection. He presents the phases in Hegel’s thought from his days at Tübingen, Bern, and Frankfurt to his new beginnings at Jena not as being in each case completely new, but rather as developments made possible on the basis of earlier positions prompted by the impulses received from friends and critics. Not only is (...) Schelling’s major role for Hegel’s development carefully outlined, but also the impact that Fichte, Herder, Hölderlin, Jacobi, Reinhold, and Spinoza had on Hegel. The way in which the book probes these different influences on Hegel and his critical reaction to them places it in the tradition of solid German Ph.D. theses with their penchant for close textual references and copious footnotes to provide evidence for the interpretive claims and to allow for critical comments on the secondary literature, chiefly works in German. Worth mentioning is the clarity of Fujita’s diction in presenting the complex issues of German idealist philosophy, which alone is no mean achievement for somebody whose mother tongue is not German. (shrink)

Abstract:John Lachs considers his major philosophical contributions to be his work on mediation, the love of life, and his explication of George Santayana's philosophical and literary outlooks. All three are undergirded by Lachs's effort to make philosophy relevant to people's lives. This article examines these three contributions with both a critical eye and an admiration for Lachs's efforts. The conclusion provides an assessment often missed in critiques of Lachs's work.

Fuijita claims that in spite of the growing interest in the last decades in the early writings of Hegel, not enough attention has been focused on their connection. He presents the phases in Hegel’s thought from his days at Tübingen, Bern, and Frankfurt to his new beginnings at Jena not as being in each case completely new, but rather as developments made possible on the basis of earlier positions prompted by the impulses received from friends and critics. Not only is (...) Schelling’s major role for Hegel’s development carefully outlined, but also the impact that Fichte, Herder, Hölderlin, Jacobi, Reinhold, and Spinoza had on Hegel. The way in which the book probes these different influences on Hegel and his critical reaction to them places it in the tradition of solid German Ph.D. theses with their penchant for close textual references and copious footnotes to provide evidence for the interpretive claims and to allow for critical comments on the secondary literature, chiefly works in German. Worth mentioning is the clarity of Fujita’s diction in presenting the complex issues of German idealist philosophy, which alone is no mean achievement for somebody whose mother tongue is not German. (shrink)