Psychologism in logic is the doctrine that the semantic content of logical terms is in some way a feature of human psychology. We consider the historically influential version of the doctrine, Psychological Individualism, and the many counter-arguments to it. We then propose and assess various modifications to the doctrine that might allow it to avoid the classical objections. We call these Psychological Descriptivism, Teleological Cognitive Architecture, and Ideal Cognizers. These characterizations give some order to the wide range of modern views (...) that are seen as psychologistic because of one or another feature. Although these can avoid some of the classic objections to psychologism, some still hold. (shrink)

THINKER is an automated natural deduction first-order theorem proving program. This paper reports on how it was adapted so as to prove theorems in modal logic. The method employed is an indirect semantic method, obtained by considering the semantic conditions involved in being a valid argument in these modal logics. The method is extended from propositional modal logic to predicate modal logic, and issues concerning the domain of quantification and existence in a world's domain are discussed. Finally, we look at (...) the very interesting issues involved with adding identity to the theorem prover in the realm of modal predicate logic. Various alternatives are discussed. (shrink)

Topics discussed include Aristotle's semantics, individuation, essentialism, causation, & being. Contents: The Aporematic Approach to Primary Being in Metaphysics Z. Aristotle's Semantics & a Puzzle Concerning Change. Aristotle & Individuation. Singular Statements & Essentialism in Aristotle. What is Aristotle's Theory of Essence?. Aristotle on the Proximate Efficient Cause of Action. Causes as Necessary Conditions: Aristotle, Alexander of Aphrodisias & J.L. Mackie.

The Law of Non-Contradiction - that no contradiction can be true - has been a seemingly unassailable dogma since the work of Aristotle. It is an assumption challenged from a variety of angles in this collection of original papers. Twenty-three of the world's leading experts investigate the 'law', considering arguments for and against it and discuss methodological issues that arise. The result is a balanced inquiry into a venerable principle of logic, one that raises questions at the very centre of (...) logic itself. (shrink)

Defending Life is arguably the most comprehensive defense of the pro-life position on abortion - morally, legally, and politically - that has ever been published in an academic monograph. It offers a detailed and critical analysis of Roe v. Wade and Planned Parenthood v. Casey as well as arguments by those who defend a Rawlsian case for abortion-choice, such as J. J. Thomson. The author defends the substance view of persons as the view with the most explanatory power. The substance (...) view entails that the unborn is a subject of moral rights from conception. While defending this view, the author responds to the arguments of thinkers such as Boonin, Dworkin, Stretton, Ford and Brody. He also critiques Thomson's famous violinist argument and its revisions by Boonin and McDonagh. Defending Life includes chapters critiquing arguments found in popular politics and the controversy over cloning and stem cell research. (shrink)

The ascendancy of Christian activism in bioethical policy debates has elicited a number of responses by critics of this activism. These critics typically argue that the public square ought to embrace Secular Liberalism, a perspective that its proponents maintain is the most just arrangement in a pluralist society, even though SL places restraints on Christian activists that are not placed on similarly situated citizens who hold more liberal views on bioethical questions. The author critiques three arguments that are offered to (...) defend SL: the golden rule contract argument, the secular reason argument, and the err-on-the-side-of-liberty argument. The author concludes that each of these arguments fail to support SL. (shrink)

The purpose of this essay is to offer support for the substance view of persons, the philosophical anthropology defended by Patrick Lee in his essay. In order to accomplish this the author presents a brief definition of the substance view; argues that the substance view has more explanatory power in accounting for why we believe that human persons are intrinsically valuable even when they are not functioning as such, why human persons remain identical to themselves over time, and why it (...) follows from these points that the unborn are human persons; and responds to two arguments that attempt to establish the claim that the early human being is not a unified substance until at least fourteen days after conception. (shrink)

Catholics and Evangelical Protestants often find themselves on the same side on a variety of issues in bioethics. However, some Evangelicals have expressed reluctance to embrace the natural law reasoning used by Catholics in academic and policy debates. In this article, I argue that the primary concerns raised by Evangelicals about natural law reasoning are, ironically, concerns expressed by and intrinsic to the natural law tradition itself. To show this, I address two types of Protestant critics: the Frustrated Fellow Traveler (...) and the Solo Scripturist. (shrink)

Claims of religious conscience that run counter to prevailing cultural trends are increasingly met with bewilderment and disbelief. The author argues that this should not surprise us given the ways in which the rational and liturgical status of religious beliefs and practices are widely misunderstood and misrepresented by jurists and legal philosophers. To make this point the author discusses some recent arguments found in court cases as well as in legal scholarship on religion. He encourages Catholic philosophers—who typically do not (...) work in this area--to enter the fray by contributing to the jurisprudential literature that touches on issues of faith, reason, and religious liberty. (shrink)

This essay is a review of Edward Feser’s Aquinas: A Beginner’s Guide. In the first part, the author summarizes the book’s five chapters, drawing attention to Feser’s application of Aquinas’s thought to contemporary philosophical problems. Part 2 is dedicated to Feser’s Thomistic analysis of Intelligent Design. The author explains Feser’s case and why Aquinas’s “Fifth Way,” which is often labeled a “design argument,” depends on a philosophy of nature that ID’s methods implicitly reject.

This article responds to Giubilini and Minerva’s article ‘After birth abortion: why should the baby live?’ published in the Journal of Medical Ethics. They argue for the permissibility of ‘after-birth abortion’, based on two conjoined considerations: (1) the fetus or newborn, though a ‘potential person’, is not an actual person, because it is not mature enough to appreciate its own interests, and (2) because we allow parents to terminate the life of a fetus when it is diagnosed with a deformity (...) or fatal illness because of the burden it will place on the child, parent, family or society we should also allow parents to do the same to their newborn, since it is no more a person than the fetus. The author critiques this case by pointing out (a) the metaphysical ambiguity of potential personhood and (b) why the appeal to burdens is irrelevant or unnecessary. (shrink)

Although the notion of physician value neutrality in medicine may be traced back to the writings of Sir William Osler, it is relatively new to medicine and medical ethics. We argue in this paper that how physician value neutrality has been cashed out is often obscure and its defense not persuasive. In addition, we argue that the social/political implementation of neutrality, Political Liberalism, fails, and thus, PVN's case is weakened, for PVN's justification relies largely on the reasoning undergirding PL. For (...) these reasons, we conclude that PVN has no philosophical or ethical warrant and thus should be abandoned. We suggest that the physician present to her patients some type of statement or creed that would give them an idea of where she stands on important axiological issues and how these stands are cashed out clinically. (shrink)

We share Minkoff et al.’s (2024) concern regarding the potential disavowal of pregnant patients’ right to refuse medical interventions, without or against their explicit consent, aimed at preservin...

In her ground-breaking 1971 article, “A Defense of Abortion,” Judith Jarvis Thomson argues that even if one grants to the prolifer her most important premise—that the fetus is a person—the prolifer’s conclusion, the intrinsic wrongness of abortion, does not follow. However, in her 1995 article, “Abortion: Whose Right?,” Thomson employs Rawlsian liberalism to argue that even though the prolifer’s view of fetal personhood is not unreasonable, the prochoice advocate is not unreasonable in rejecting it. Thus, because we should err on (...) the side of liberty, the right to abortion is vindicated. In this article, I argue that Thomson’s latter reliance on Rawlsian thinking suggests a way of re-reading her earlier essay that casts doubt on whether she really grants the dominant prolife account of unborn human life. (shrink)

This article critically assesses an account of religious liberty often associated with several legal and political philosophers: Ronald Dworkin, John Rawls, and Christopher Eisgruber and Lawrence Sager. Calling it the Religion as Comprehensive Doctrine approach, the author contrasts it with an account often attributed to John Locke and the American Founders Thomas Jefferson and James Madison, the Two Sovereigns approach. He argues that the latter provides an important corrective to RCD’s chief weakness: RCD eliminates from our vision those aspects of (...) religious belief and practice that most conventional religious believers would consider essential to their faith. (shrink)

As this quotation indicates, the development of Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics over the years has been characterized by a tension arising from the desire both to differentiate his thought from Hegel’s and to identify with it in an abiding spirit of agreement. The effect has been a noteworthy shift of emphasis in Gadamer’s relationship to Hegel as he has moved from a “profiling” stance in Wahrheit und Methode to one of appropriation in his more recent essays. My goal here is to (...) examine this shift of emphasis and to reflect on its philosophical significance. This will be done in three stages: first, we shall examine the way Gadamer “profiles” himself against Hegel in Wahrheit und Methode by highlighting different shades of meaning that emerge from the notion that “the true is the whole” when that notion is rethought “from the center of language”; second, we shall revisit with Gadamer the “neighborhood of the great teacher of concrete universality, Hegel,” in order to appropriate the enduring significance of this Hegelian theme for hermeneutics as an evocation of the way reason works in history to achieve freedom; and finally, we shall reflect upon the way in which the thinking of Hegel and Gadamer “belong-together” in their relation of difference amid identity, and upon the significance this has for our own thinking regarding the way in which the questions of truth and freedom belong-together in human existence. (shrink)

As this quotation indicates, the development of Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics over the years has been characterized by a tension arising from the desire both to differentiate his thought from Hegel’s and to identify with it in an abiding spirit of agreement. The effect has been a noteworthy shift of emphasis in Gadamer’s relationship to Hegel as he has moved from a “profiling” stance in Wahrheit und Methode to one of appropriation in his more recent essays. My goal here is to (...) examine this shift of emphasis and to reflect on its philosophical significance. This will be done in three stages: first, we shall examine the way Gadamer “profiles” himself against Hegel in Wahrheit und Methode by highlighting different shades of meaning that emerge from the notion that “the true is the whole” when that notion is rethought “from the center of language”; second, we shall revisit with Gadamer the “neighborhood of the great teacher of concrete universality, Hegel,” in order to appropriate the enduring significance of this Hegelian theme for hermeneutics as an evocation of the way reason works in history to achieve freedom; and finally, we shall reflect upon the way in which the thinking of Hegel and Gadamer “belong-together” in their relation of difference amid identity, and upon the significance this has for our own thinking regarding the way in which the questions of truth and freedom belong-together in human existence. (shrink)

In this paper I will critically analyze the first part of David Hume’s argument against miracles, which has been traditionally referred to as the in-principle argument. However, unlike most critiques of Hume’s argument, I will (1) present a view of evidential epistemology and probability that will take into consideration Hume’s accurate observation that miracles are highly improbable events while(2) arguing that one can be within one’s epistemic rights in believing that a miracle has occurred. As for the proper definition of (...) a miracle, I offer the following, which I believe most religious people generally mean when they call an event miraculous: "A miracle is a divine intervention that occurs contrary to the regular course of nature within a significant historical-religious context". Although I am fully aware that this definition has its detractors, it will merely function in this paper as a working definition so that we can come to grips with Hume’s argument. This definition has been. (shrink)

Discusses Derrida as a religious thinker, reading Dante’s Commedia and Derrida’s religious writings together.

_Discusses Derrida as a religious thinker, reading Dante’s Commedia and Derrida’s religious writings together._.

Essays from both the left and right examine the wide range of issues surrounding the debates over political correctness and multiculturalism.