Berkeley's Idealism both advances Berkeley scholarship and serves as a useful guide for teachers and students.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Changing Theories of Undergraduate Theatre Studies, 1945–1980Anne Berkeley (bio)IntroductionThe history of theatre study in American undergraduate education is a story of prodigious quantitative success. Although it took two centuries to secure the right to perform plays at American colleges, it took only eighty years for the curriculum to grow from a few isolated courses at the turn of the twentieth century to well over 14,000 in the 1970s.1 By (...) far the steepest growth occurred during the unprecedented expansion of higher education between 1945 and 1979. But academic theatre's meteoric rise after the war years conceals more problematic qualitative achievements. Throughout its ascendancy, vexing questions persisted concerning the quality, standards, and evaluation of theatre programs. In academic journals and books, theorists explored with alacrity broad opportunities for educational theatre in the university. But they also bickered constantly about objectives and practices and their role in academe, ultimately providing a decidedly ambivalent assessment of accomplishment.According to Oscar G. Brockett, the fundamental questions are, What place, if any, should theatre have in a university? and, For what are students being educated?2 This study traces answers to these questions given by scholars and educators between 1945 and 1979.3 It explores the connections between the scholarship about theatre studies and the programs that developed, what scholars and educators wanted it to become, and what it became in the context of liberal arts education. These years are important because they are the golden age of higher education, a time of unprecedented expansion. Following World War II the G.I. Bill greatly increased student enrollment, and academic and research programs surged. At this time, the [End Page 57] university's governing interests were established by the politics of the Cold War, and the desire to surpass the Soviet Union at everything motivated the expansion of higher education.4 The National Defense Education Act of 1958 and the Higher Education Facilities Act of 1963 (legislation made possible by a prosperous economy) injected vast financial resources into program development, and federal programs such as the National Endowment for the Humanities (NEH) and the National Endowment for the Arts (NEA) were established.An earlier study of theatre curriculum between, roughly, the Civil War and the Second World War provides a useful background against which to interpret the data for this later period.5 From the earlier study we learn that academic theatre suffered from religious hostility for two centuries but that by the end of the nineteenth century there were extracurricular dramatic clubs and productions. The emergence of the modern research university brought with it the expansion and diversification of knowledge, the differentiation of the colonial college's general curriculum into discrete disciplines, and the departmentalization of the curriculum. As principles and aims for liberal arts education, and the bachelor of arts degree, began to take shape, reconstruction of the curriculum included the introduction of departments of speech and literature, which included dramatic curricula.6 Academic theatre first began in classical and later modern language departments as a way of teaching literature in another language; later speech and English departments added courses in oral interpretation and playwriting.After George Pierce Baker opened the theatre department at Yale in 1925, theatre became an autonomous field of study in increasing numbers of universities. During this early period several developments took place: curriculum for theatrical studies developed out of extra-curricular theatre, theatre was identified and justified as a humanistic study, the seeds were planted for the university's eventual role in nonprofit and professional regional theatres, and the study of theatre as a legitimate academic discipline was developed. During this period, too, most theorists argued that theatre was one of the liberal arts and should be taught as part of the humanities. Late in the period there developed a small but increasingly vocal group of scholars and teachers who began to argue that theatre departments should teach technical skills of theatrical performance as well as humanistic inquiry. Thus was born the so-called craft or culture dichotomy: should educational theatre emphasize the crafts of performance or the humanism that prevailed in general (unspecialized) liberal study?The Forties and Fifties: The Curriculum Diversifies... (shrink)

This book is available either individually, or as part of the specially-priced Arguments of the Philosphers Collection.

He assesses the validity of this self-description and considers why Berkeley might have chosen to align himself with a commonsense position.Pappas shows how ...

Like Descartes, Locke, and Berkeley before him, Hume propounds a theory of the external world or of what, in his case, is better called belief in the existence of body. The success or failure of his discussion rests not on any conclusion reached about the status of this belief—its reasonableness or unreasonableness, its truth or falsity--but only on whether, in accordance with his purpose of providing a “science of MAN,” his explanation of why we have the belief is convincing. Furthermore, (...) Hume identifies two versions of the belief: an ordinary or “vulgar” version that we all hold until we confront the arguments that demonstrate its falsity and a “philosophical” version that we are driven to by those arguments but that has no rational foundation. This chapter analyzes Hume’s treatment of both versions and offers an internal criticism as well as some criticism from the standpoint of contemporary analytic philosophy. (shrink)

Berkeley asserts that (a) the mind perceives ideas, (b) the mind is wholly distinct from its ideas, and (c) the alleged distinction between (i) the perceiving of an idea and (ii) the idea perceived, is a bogus one. in this paper, the author does the following. first, he gives textual justification for his claim that berkeley did in fact hold each of the theses (a)-(c). he then shows that (a), (b), and (c) together constitute an inconsistent triad of propositions. then (...) he gives berkeley's reasons for asserting (b) and (c) and assesses the merits of these reasons. finally, he indicates the most plausible moves berkeley might make to extricate himself from inconsistency. (shrink)

A number of commentators on the work of berkeley have maintained that berkeleyan minds are related to ideas by the relation of inherence. Thus, Ideas are taken to inhere in minds in something like the way that accidents were supposed to inhere in substances for the aristotelian. This inherence account, As I call it, Is spelled out in detail and critically evaluated. Ultimately it is rejected despite its considerable initial plausibility.

Berkeley claims idealism provides a novel argument for the existence of God. But familiar interpretations of his argument fail to support the conclusion that there is a single omnipotent spirit. A satisfying reconstruction should explain the way Berkeley moves between first person singular and plural, as well as providing a powerful argument, once idealism is accepted. The new interpretation offered here represents the argument as an inference to the best explanation of a shared reality. Consequently, his use of the first (...) person must be taken as ‘exemplary’ rather than ‘Cartesian’. This explains the freedom of movement in the text between singular and plural. However, it also reveals Berkeley as side-stepping sceptical doubt. (shrink)

"Berkeley's Analysis of Perception" is an internal analysis of the development and consequences of Berkeley's interpretation of the perceptual process. It seeks to show that the implications of Berkeley's understanding of perception lead to conclusions later formulated in phenomenalistic theories of perception.

In both the Principles and the Three Dialogues, Berkeley claims that he wants to uncover those principles which lead to scepticism; to refute those principles; and to refute scepticism itself. This paper examines the principles Berkeley says have scepticial consequences, and contends that only one of them implies scepticism. It is also argued that Berkeley’s attempted refutation of scepticism rests not on his acceptance of the esse est percipi principle, but rather on the thesis that physical objects and their sensible (...) qualities are immediately perceived. (shrink)

I have previously argued that within an argument to show that we cannot perceive the causes of our sensations, Berkeley's Philonous conflates a psychological and an epistemic sense of 'immediately perceive', and uses the principle of perceptual immediacy (PPI), that whatever is perceived by the senses is immediately perceived. George Pappas has objected that Berkeley does not operate with either of these concepts of immediate perception, and does not subscribe to (PPI). But I show that Berkeley's argumentative strategy requires (...) him to use these two concepts, and that the concept of immediate perception Pappas attributes to Berkeley would weaken this strategy. I also defend attributing to Berkeley a slightly modified version of (PPI), on which it both serves his strategy and allows sense perception to incorporate what he calls 'suggestion'. (shrink)

First published in 1988. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

First Published in 1999. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

In this essay, the author analyses Berkeley’s conformity and inference argument against Locke’s theory of percep tion. Both arguments are not as decisive as traditionally has been perceived and fail to engage in Locke’s actual position. The main reason for this is that Berkeley does not see that Locke’s position is compatible with the non-inferential nature of perceptual knowledge.

In this essay, the author analyses Berkeley’s conformity and inference argument against Locke’s theory of percep tion. Both arguments are not as decisive as traditionally has been perceived and fail to engage in Locke’s actual position. The main reason for this is that Berkeley does not see that Locke’s position is compatible with the non-inferential nature of perceptual knowledge.

First published in 1999. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

'the whole work is remarkably fresh, vivid and attractively written psychologists will be grateful that a work of this kind has been done ... by one who has the scholarship, science, and philosophical training that are requisite for the task' - Mind This renowned three-volume collection records chronologically the steps by which psychology developed from the time of the early Greek thinkers and the first writings on the nature of the mind, through to the 1920s and such modern preoccupations as (...) criminal and animal psychology. It is only in relatively recent times that psychology has been considered an empirical science independent of philosophy. Brett's account is thus concerned with the broadest definition of psychology, taking in such philosophical aspects as the relation of mind and body, thought processes, etc. For each period he gives an account of the state of the sciences which influenced psychology, the state of psychology itself, the influence psychology had on other areas, and the applications of psychological theories. Examining a huge range of figures, he describes their attitudes on fundamental questions and their contribution to the progress of the subject, as well as the history of the different methods of inquiry. The thinkers he discusses range from Aristotle, Democritus, Socrates, Plato, and Xenocrates to Proclus, the Arabian teachers, Magnus, Duns Scotus, and Ockham from Galileo, Descartes, Gassendi, and Cudworth to Locke, Berkeley, Condillac, and Kant from Reid, Stewart, Herbart, and Schopenhauer to Bain, Spencer, Mill and Darwin. Surprisingly clear and easy to read, Brett's account succeeds in illuminating the nature of psychology as well as its history. It remains a classic overview of the subject from its broad roots in philosophy through to the independent empirical science of the modern era. --a scarce work, rarely found as a complete set --a classic work - all historians of psychology and philosophy should have A History of Psychology. (shrink)

Exchanges in the nineteenth century between Sir William Hamilton, James Frederick Ferrier and the French philosopher Victor Cousin are crucial to understanding contemporary efforts to preserve the continuity of the Scottish philosophical tradition on the part of those alive to new themes emanating from Kant and philosophy in Germany. Ferrier's strategy aimed at re-invigorating Descartes and Berkeley by drawing on elements in Adam Smith's social philosophy. But the promising steps taken in this direction in Ferrier's essays on consciousness were seriously (...) undermined, in Cousin's view, by the aprioristic character of his Institutes, in which he abandoned the careful empirical method characteristic of Scottish philosophy as practiced by Reid. (shrink)

I argue that philonous gives two versions of the argument from perceptual relativity--One for the secondary qualities and another for the primary. Further, Both versions ultimately turn on the epistemological assumption that every case of perceiving, Regardless of the conditions of observation, Is a case of "knowing" the character of some "object". This assumption is made in order to avoid a vicious regress that arises when one tries to understand how perceptual knowledge is possible.

First published in 1999. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Abstract General Ideas in Hume George S. Pappas Hume followed Berkeley in rejecting abstract general ideas; that is, both of these philosophers rejected the view that one could engage in the operation or activity ofabstraction — a kind ofmental separation ofentities that are inseparable in reality —as well as the view that the alleged products of such an activity — ideas which are intrinsically general — really exist. (...) What has not been clear to commentators on either of these two philosophers has been why they each were so opposed to abstraction and abstract general ideas. The provision of an answer to this question is the main thrust of this paper. The nature of the question should be clarified at the outset. I am notasking the psychological question, whatwere BerkeleyandHume's actual intentions when they were moved to reject abstraction and abstract general ideas. Though I regard this question as one of great interest and importance, I am presently aiming to answer a somewhat different one, viz., what role, what philosophical role, does the rejection of abstraction and abstract general ideas play in the philosophies ofBerkeley and Hume? The answer to this latter question is apt to have some bearing on the right way to answer the first question; but, for present purposes, it is important to keep the two questions distinct. The maincontentionofthe paperis thattherejectionofabstraction and abstract general ideas lies at the very heart of the philosophy of Berkeley, and that pretty much the same may be said for Hume. Berkeley's defense ofa kind ofidealism stands or falls with the success ofhis attack on abstract general ideas, and Hume's critique ofinfinite divisibility in matters pertaining to space and time, along with his destructive critique ofvarious metaphysical notions, crucially depends on the successful denial of abstract general ideas. I. Berkeleyan Idealism Berkeley's most extended treatment of abstract ideas comes in the introduction to the Principles ofHuman Knowledge, first published in 1710. However, since he does not take up the topic in any systematic way later in the same book, nor in the Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Phihnous (1713), it has seemed to many commentators that Berkeley's attack on abstract ideas is a local matter, one having only to do with issues concerning language use and a somewhat isolated criticism of Locke. That this is the wrong way to look at things is Volume XV Number 2 339 GEORGE S. PAPPAS perhaps best indicated by a couple of passages from the Principles. In section 5 ofthat work Berkeley says: If we thoroughly examine this tenet it will, perhaps, be found at bottom to depend on the doctrine of abstract ideas. For can there be a nicer strain of abstraction than to distinguish the existence of sensible objects from there being perceived, so as to conceive them existing unperceived? The tenet Berkeley is here referring to is to the effect that sensible objects such as trees and chairs exist independently ofperception. This allusion is made clear when we notice that in the immediately preceding passage Berkeley says: It is indeed an opinion strangely prevailing among men that houses, mountains, rivers, and in a word all sensible objects, have an existence, natural or real, distinct from their being perceived by the understanding. But, with how great an assurance and acquiescence soever this Principle may be entertained... whoever shall find in his heart to call it in question may... perceive it to involve a manifest contradiction. For, what are the aforementioned objects but the things we perceive by sense? and what do we perceive besides our own ideas or sensations? and is it not plainly repugnant that any one of these, or any combination of them, should exist unperceived? (Principles 4) The claim that sensible objects exist independently ofall perception is the very denial of Berkeley's esse is percipi thesis regarding such objects. For the latter thesis holds that each sensible object is such that it exists if and only if it is perceived. So, in the first-quoted passage from Principles 5, Berkeley is saying that the denial of esse is percipi 'depends on' the doctrine of abstract ideas. Surely, the esse is percipi thesis is part ofthe core ofBerkeley's... (shrink)

Philosophical accounts of perception in the tradition of Kant and Reid have generally supposed that an event of making a judgment is a key element in every perceptual experience. An alternative very austere view regards perception as an event containing nothing judgmental, nor anything conceptual. This account of perception as nonconceptual is discussed first historically as found in the philosophies of Locke and (briefly) Berkeley, and then examined in the contemporary work of Chisholm and Alston.