Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Internalism, Externalism, and Transcendental Idealism.Dan Zahavi - 2008 - Synthese 160 (3):355-374.
    The analyses of the mind–world relation offered by transcendental idealists such as Husserl have often been dismissed with the argument that they remain committed to an outdated form of internalism. The first move in this paper will be to argue that there is a tight link between Husserl’s transcendental idealism and what has been called phenomenological externalism, and that Husserl’s endorsement of the former commits him to a version of the latter. Secondly, it will be shown that key elements in (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   20 citations  
  • The Embodied Self-Awareness of the Infant: A Challenge to the Theory-Theory of Mind.Dan Zahavi - 2004 - In Dan Zahavi, T. Grunbaum & Josef Parnas (eds.), The Structure and Development of Self-Consciousness. John Benjamins.
    This was originally written and presented at the National Endowment for the Humanities Summer Seminar for College Teachers on Folk Psychology vs. Mental Simulation: How Minds Understand Minds, run by Robert Gordon at the University of Missouri - St. Louis, June-July 1999. It has been only lightly revised since, and should be considered a rough draft. Needless to say, the ideas herein owe a lot to what I learned at the seminar from Robert Gordon and the other participants, particularly Jim (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Empathy and Direct Social Perception: A Phenomenological Proposal. [REVIEW]Dan Zahavi - 2011 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (3):541-558.
    Quite a number of the philosophical arguments and objections currently being launched against simulation (ST) based and theory-theory (TT) based approaches to mindreading have a phenomenological heritage in that they draw on ideas found in the work of Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, Stein, Gurwitsch, Scheler and Schutz. Within the last couple of years, a number of ST and TT proponents have started to react and respond to what one for the sake of simplicity might call the phenomenological proposal (PP). This (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   106 citations  
  • Making Sense of Words.Gregory McCulloch - 1991 - Analysis 51 (2):73 - 79.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Is Thomas Reid a Direct Realist About Perception?Hagit Benbaji - 2009 - European Journal of Philosophy 17 (1):1-29.
    The controversy over the interpretative issue—is Thomas Reid a perceptual direct realist?—has recently had channelled into it a host of imaginative ideas about what direct perception truly means. Paradoxically enough, it is the apparent contradiction at the heart of his view of perception which keeps teasing us to review our concepts: time and again, Reid stresses that the very idea of any mental intermediaries implies scepticism, yet, nevertheless insists that sensations are signs of objects. But if sensory signs are not (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Philosphical 'Intuitions' and Scepticism About Judgement.Timothy Williamson - 2004 - Dialectica 58 (1):109–153.
    1. What are called ‘intuitions’ in philosophy are just applications of our ordinary capacities for judgement. We think of them as intuitions when a special kind of scepticism about those capacities is salient. 2. Like scepticism about perception, scepticism about judgement pressures us into conceiving our evidence as facts about our internal psychological states: here, facts about our conscious inclinations to make judgements about some topic rather than facts about the topic itself. But the pressure should be resisted, for it (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   106 citations  
  • Subjectivity and the First-Person Perspective.Dan Zahavi - 2007 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 45 (S1):66-84.
    Phenomenology and analytical philosophy share a number of common concerns, and it seems obvious that analytical philosophy can learn from phenomenology, just as phenomenology can profit from an exchange with analytical philosophy. But although I think it would be a pity to miss the opportunity for dialogue that is currently at hand, I will in the following voice some caveats. More specifically, I wish to discuss two issues that complicate what might otherwise seem like rather straightforward interaction. The first issue (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations