Donald Trump’s speeches and messages are characterized by terms that are commonly referred to as “thick” or “emotive,” meaning that they are characterized by a tendency to be used to generate emotive reactions. This paper investigates how emotive meaning is related to emotions, and how it is generated or manipulated. Emotive meaning is analyzed as an evaluative conclusion that results from inferences triggered by the use of a term, which can be represented and assessed using argumentation (...) schemes. The evaluative inferences are regarded as part of the connotation of emotive words, which can be modified and stabilized by means of recontextualizations. The manipulative risks underlying the misuse and the redefinition of emotive words are accounted for in terms of presuppositions and implicit modifications of the interlocutors’ commitments. (shrink)

(2002). Emotive meaning and Christian mysteries in Berkeley’s Alciphron. British Journal for the History of Philosophy: Vol. 10, No. 3, pp. 401-411. doi: 10.1080/09608780210143218.

ABSTRACTUsing authentic textual data from written personal narratives, we investigate how individuals with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder, Obsessive Compulsive Disorder, and Tourette Syndrome mediate their emotive and sensory experiences through language. Our study reveals that experiential comparisons of different kinds feature prominently as means of conveying such experiences. We identify a number of meaning domains that are recruited in correspondences between sources and targets, including motion and force, and detail how sensory modalities, bodily sensations, and emotions are exploited to (...) evoke emotive/sensory responses in readers. We conclude that comparative construal is a significant communicative strategy precisely because it elicits familiar situational meanings capable of evoking vicarious experiences in readers. By considering texts from actual uses of language in natural situations, our research sheds new light on how emotive/sensory... (shrink)

Within a digital corpus of 20 Italian post-unification conduct books, UAM CorpusTool is used to perform a manual annotation of 13 emotive rhetorical figures as indices of “shown” emotion. The analysis consists in two text mining tasks: classification, which identifies emotive figures using the 13 categories, and clustering, which identifies groups, i.e. clusters where emotive figures co-occur. Emotive clusters mainly discuss diligence and parsimony—personal values linked to self-improvement for which reader agreement is not taken for granted. (...) In this corpus they function as “moving” values, that is, values acting recurrently as contexts for “argued” emotion. (shrink)

Originally published in 1968, this book traces the development of the emotive theory of ethics from its outline by Ogden and Richards in The Meaning of Meaning to the elaborate presentation by Stevenson in Ethics and Language. Attention is paid to the positive features of the ethical theory whilst the author also shows how a more adequate view can be reached through critical reflection on it.

Book Review Emotive Language in Argumentation by Fabrizio Macagno and Douglas Walton New York: Cambridge UP. 9781107676657. Review by MICHAEL A. GILBERT Department of Philosophy York University 4700 Keele St, Toronto, ON M3J 1P3 [email protected].

Moritz Geiger’s 1911 article on the consciousness of feeling, entitled “Das Bewusstsein von Gefühlen,” was an object of study for Husserl in a series of manuscripts recently published in Studien zur Struktur des Bewusstseins II. Gefühl und Wert (1896–1925) (2020). Geiger’s article and Husserl’s remarks on it received attention from Métraux (1975), but, more recently, an increasing number of publications have been devoted to the topic (Averchi, 2015a, 2015b; Crespo, 2015; Quepons, 2017; Marcos del Cano, 2023). These new publications identify (...) a central area of disagreement between the two authors concerning the nature of emotive consciousness, i.e., the mode in which affective states relate to their objects. For Geiger, emotions are directed toward their objects but are not regarded as intentional and, in certain forms of consciousness, can even lose their relation to their objects. By contrast, for Husserl, intentionality is an intrinsic feature of emotive consciousness. The aim of this paper is to place the authors’ disagreement in a broader historical context and to show that it reveals profound differences between their respective ontologies of the mind and the place of feeling within it. -/- . (shrink)

This paper analyzes selected examples of uses of argumentation tactics that exploit emotive language, many of them criticized as deceptive and even fallacious by classical and recent sources, including current informal logic textbooks. The analysis is based on six argumentation schemes, and an account of the dialectical setting in which these schemes are used. The three conclusions are (1) that such uses of emotive language are often reasonable and necessary in argumentation based on values, (2) but that they (...) are defeasible, and hence need to be seen as open to critical questioning (3) and that when they are used fallaciously, it is because they interfere with critical questioning or conceal the need for it. The analysis furnishes criteria for distinguishing between arguments based on the use of emotive words that are reasonable tools of persuasion, and those that are fallacious tactics used to conceal and distort information. (shrink)

This article attempts to evaluate emotive meanings across languages and cultures expressed and elicited semiotically from viewers. It investigates the challenges of subtitling emotive feelings in the American filmHomeless to Harvard(2003) into Arabic. It adopts Paul Thibault’s (2000. The multimodal transcription of a television advertisement: Theory and practice. In Anthony Baldry (ed.),Multimodality and multimediality in the distance learning age, 311–385. Campobasso: Palladino Editore) method of multimodal transcription and Feng and O’Halloran’s (2013. The multimodal representation of emotion in film: (...) Integrating cognitive and semiotic approaches.Semiotica197(1/4). 79–100) framework of the multimodal representation of emotion to formulate strategies for subtitling emotion from English into Arabic. Additionally, Feng and O’Halloran’s (2013) framework is adapted to show how stylistic choices (e.g., cinematography, music, soundtracks, etc.) and semiotic expressions can elicit emotion from viewers. The social semiotic model is employed to investigate how emotive representation is realized through verbal and non-verbal items. The findings showed that the filmmakers had properly used stylistic choices and various semiotic techniques to elicit emotion from the viewer derived from the emotion of the film’s heroine. (shrink)

Lewis S. Feuer shows that the gestation of the hypotheses of original-minded scientists, such as Darwin, Einstein, or Bohr, is in large part a subconscious process. Scientists try to project upon the world structural laws that, beside fitting the given physical realities, will also realize their own emotional longings among alternative worldviews. Repeatedly, too, in examining the standpoints of philosophical figures ranging from Spinoza, Descartes, Kant, and Mill to contemporary figures such as Einstein, Lovejoy, and Hook, Feuer illumines how sociological (...) antipathies project themselves into scientific divergences. Feuer delves into the bearing of emotive beliefs such as pacifism, socialism, anti-Semitism, upon the formation of concurrent worldviews, often fixations of scientific belief, held with the same passion in science as in religion. (shrink)

There are different groups in society who may be considered vulnerable, for example those experiencing mental or physical health issues, learning disabilities, prisoners or children. There are, however, other groups in society who may also be regarded as vulnerable, such as those who are bereaved. Vulnerability in relation to the bereaved occurs as a result of experiencing a normal life event, death or a loss. In this situation vulnerability may be transient and, depending upon the management of the bereavement, generally (...) temporary. Unlike the aforementioned groups, participants required for this type of research (bereavement, death and dying) are able to consent themselves into projects, and the capacity to do so is not an issue. Undertaking research with those who may be considered vulnerable into sensitive, emotive topics such as death and dying can create difficulties for the National Research Ethics Service (NRES), making it difficult to get approval for such studies. It appears that the ethical issues are concerned with not wishing to cause distress to participants when asked for research purposes to recollect what for some may have been emotionally challenging and traumatic events. The article offers a narrative, reflective account of the above from several perspectives: being employed as a contract researcher in a university; having experience of being an active member of a National Health Service Research Ethics Committee; and later assuming the role of full-time postgraduate (PhD) student requiring ethical approval to undertake research with what may be considered a vulnerable group involving a sensitive and emotive topic. Valuable insights from participants – their views on participation in an emotive research project and good practice in research having been explored via questionnaire – are highlighted and discussed. (shrink)

This article treats the public display of emotion as social performance. The concept of "emotive performance" is developed to highlight the overlooked quality of performativity in the social use of emotion. We argue that emotive performance is reflexive, cultural, and communicative. As an active social act, emotive performance draws from the cultural repertoire of interpretative frameworks and dominant narratives. We illustrate the utility of the concept by analyzing two episodes of unrehearsed emotive performances by two well-known (...) politicians, Bill Clinton and Jiang Zemin. The two cases demonstrate how emotion can be analyzed as a domain in which culturally specific narratives and rhetorics are used to advance the situational agenda of actors. The concept opens up a more expansive research agenda for sociology. It pushes sociologists to pay greater attention to people's experiences, interpretations, and deployments of emotions in social life. (shrink)

Scheler developed the fundamentals of his theory of emotions and values wanting to overcome the common-sensical empiricist and the critical rationalist approaches to ethics. Both refused that there are laws of essence as regards the character, deployment, evolution, and interconnection/opposition of the emotions and their relatedness to values. Scheler distinguished between mere feeling states and the intentional feelings of something (principally of values). Moreover, he claimed that a normative inner organization of intentional emotive phenomena can be discovered. Thus, a (...) corresponding phenomenological ethics of values, based on the ‘rationality’ of the emotive life itself, appears possible for the first time. After a comprehensive elucidation of Scheler’s and phenomenology’s approach to the matter, I critically reconstruct in some detail Scheler’s analysis of emotions as intentional experiences. I examine the way in which Scheler understands intentionality and the way in which he silently applied it in the case of emotive experiences. He articulates three relevant proposals. Intentional feeling functions are turned toward feeling states as their intentional objects. He also suggests that, e.g., a snow-covered mountain, whose beauty has amazed someone, is also an intentional correlate of this amazement as intentional feeling. Scheler finally maintains his fundamental thesis that values are the intentional objects of intentional emotive phenomena. However, he does not develop a clear and coherent analysis of how the three candidates for the place of the intentional object of an emotion intermingle or are otherwise interconnected. In the end, I survey some other closely related problems, regarding his understanding of reduction and of the status of values, and attempt to trace them all back to Scheler’s phenomenological realism. This examination, however, shows that we can use the latter’s analyses as preparation for a demythologized, this time, concrete phenomenological theory of emotions and values, in the direction of a future critical transcendental and persuasive phenomenological praxeology. (shrink)