Erythropoietin (EPO), long appreciated as the chief endocrine regulator of red blood cell formation, is now recognized to exert many additional functions outside the bone marrow. Thus, the quest is on to define the full range of EPO functions in the physiology and pathology of non‐hematopoietic tissues. Two recent studies in man and mice have highlighted the importance of the mammalian skin as one peripheral tissue with a previously unsuspected role in EPO biology; both, as a target and as a (...) source of EPO. In addition, the skin has been proposed to function as an oxygen sensor. The present hypothesis essay critically reviews the currently available evidence for this and provides a unifying theoretical scenario for intracutaneous EPO functions and for a potential role of the skin in the control of EPO production. Mainly, we propose that the skin itself directly contributes to the up‐regulation of EPO plasma levels in response to hypoxia. (shrink)

Max Horkheimer, the founder of the critical theory of the ‘Frankfurt School’, died in July 1973. In his essay dedicated to this great thinker, sociologist and philosopher, the author attempts to uncover the theoretical roots of this critical thinking in the philosopher's early work. He analyses Horkheimer's early commitment to the cause of the victims of social, economic and political oppression as well as all systems that trample on the freedom and dignity of the individual and that discriminate against and (...) persecute minorities. He also pays special attention to Horkheimer's struggle against the authoritarian state, against totalitarianism as well as anti-Semitism. (shrink)

This paper is concerned with reasonings that purport to explain why certain organisms have certain traits by showing that their actual design is better than contrasting designs. Biologists call such reasonings 'functional explanations'. To avoid confusion with other uses of that phrase, I call them 'design explanations'. This paper discusses the structure of design explanations and how they contribute to scientific understanding. Design explanations are contrastive and often compare real organisms to hypothetical organisms that cannot possibly exist. They are not (...) causal but appeal to functional dependencies between an organism's different traits. These explanations point out that because an organism has certain traits, it cannot be alive if the trait to be explained were replaced by a specified alternative. They can be understood from a mechanistic point of view as revealing the constraints on what mechanisms can be alive. (shrink)

This paper reviews the debate on the notion of biological function and on functional explanation as this takes place in philosophy. It describes the different perspectives, issues, intuitions, theories and arguments that have emerged. The author shows that the debate has been too heavily influenced by the concerns of a naturalistic philosophy of mind and argues that in order to improve our understanding of biology the attention should be shifted from the study of intuitions to the study of the actual (...) practice of biological inquiry. (shrink)

I argue that there are at least four different ways in which the term ‘function’ is used in connection with the study of living organisms, namely: function as activity, function as biological role, function as biological advantage, and function as selected effect. Notion refers to what an item does by itself; refers to the contribution of an item or activity to a complex activity or capacity of an organism; refers to the value for the organism of an item having a (...) certain character rather than another; refers to the way in which a trait acquired and has maintained its current share in the population. The recognition of a separate notion of function as biological advantage solves the problem of the indeterminate reference situation that has been raised against a counterfactual analysis of function, and emphasizes the importance of counterfactual comparison in the explanatory practice of organismal biology. This reveals a neglected problem in the philosophy of biology, namely that of accounting for the insights provided by counterfactual comparison. (shrink)

Continuous reducibilities are a proven tool in Computable Analysis, and have applications in other fields such as Constructive Mathematics or Reverse Mathematics. We study the order-theoretic properties of several variants of the two most important definitions, and especially introduce suprema for them. The suprema are shown to commutate with several characteristic numbers.

This handbook explores the ways biomedicine and pop culture interact while simultaneously introducing the reader with the tools and ideas behind this new field of enquiry. From comic books to health professionals, from the arts to genetics, from sci-fi to medical education, from TV series to ethics, it offers different entry points to an exciting and central aspect of contemporary culture: how and what we learn about scientific knowledge and its representation in pop culture. Divided into three sections the handbook (...) surveys the basics, the micro-, and the macroaspects of this interaction between specialized knowledge and cultural production: After the introduction of basic concepts of and approaches to the topic from a variety of disciplines, the respective theories and methods are applied in specific case studies. The final section is concerned with larger social and historical trends of the use of biomedical knowledge in popular culture. Presenting over twenty-five original articles from international scholars with different disciplinary backgrounds, this handbook introduces the topic of pop culture and biomedicine to both new and mature researchers alike. The articles, all complete with a rich source of further references, are aimed at being a sincere entry point to researchers and academic educators interested in this somewhat unexplored field of culture and biomedicine. (shrink)

We show that a computable function $f:\mathbb R\rightarrow \mathbb R$ has Luzin’s property if and only if it reflects $\Pi ^1_1$ -randomness, if and only if it reflects $\Delta ^1_1$ -randomness, and if and only if it reflects ${\mathcal {O}}$ -Kurtz randomness, but reflecting Martin–Löf randomness or weak-2-randomness does not suffice. Here a function f is said to reflect a randomness notion R if whenever $f$ is R-random, then x is R-random as well. If additionally f is known to have (...) bounded variation, then we show f has Luzin’s if and only if it reflects weak-2-randomness, and if and only if it reflects $\emptyset '$ -Kurtz randomness. This links classical real analysis with algorithmic randomness. (shrink)

Although machine learning has been successful in recent years and is increasingly being deployed in the sciences, enterprises or administrations, it has rarely been discussed in philosophy beyond the philosophy of mathematics and machine learning. The present contribution addresses the resulting lack of conceptual tools for an epistemological discussion of machine learning by conceiving of deep learning networks as ‘judging machines’ and using the Kantian analysis of judgments for specifying the type of judgment they are capable of. At the center (...) of the argument is the fact that the functionality of deep learning networks is established by training and cannot be explained and justified by reference to a predefined rule-based procedure. Instead, the computational process of a deep learning network is barely explainable and needs further justification, as is shown in reference to the current research literature. Thus, it requires a new form of justification, that is to be specified with the help of Kant’s epistemology. (shrink)

Dieses Buch schlägt - unter dem Titel "synthetischer Materialismus" - einen neuen Weg zur Klärung des Geist-Materie-Problems vor. Ausgangspunkt ist die These, dass wir als Betrachter der Welt frei sind, dieselben Gegenstände in unterschiedlich komplexe raum-zeitliche Zusammenhänge einzuordnen, und dass sich daraus unterschiedliche Möglichkeiten der Klassifikation von Gegenständen ergeben können: Wenn wir von "Lebewesen", "Handlungssubjekten" und "Personen" sprechen, und ihnen psychische Phänomene zuschreiben, nutzen wir den Umstand, dass die Konstellationen von Kohlehydraten, Eiweißen, Wasser und Nukleinsäuren, die jene Entitäten auch sind, (...) in einer besonderen Weise mit Teilen ihrer Vergangenheit, Gegenwart und Zukunft in Verbindung gebracht werden können. Der synthetische Materialismus vermag so zu zeigen, dass es zwischen einem ausschließlich "materialistischen" Verständnis der Welt und jenen Sichtweisen, innerhalb derer wir manche Komplexe von materiellen Phänomenen als Individuen mit ihnen selbst bewussten Empfindungen, Absichten und Überzeugungen verstehen, Übergänge gibt, die methodisch-wissenschaftlich nachvollzogen werden können und die nicht zu nutzen töricht wäre. (shrink)

This article deals with a type of functional explanation, viability explanation, that has been overlooked in recent philosophy of science. Viability explanations relate traits of organisms and their environments in terms of what an individual needs to survive and reproduce. I show that viability explanations are neither causal nor historical and that, therefore, they should be accounted for as a distinct type of explanation.

This contribution investigates the idea that an act of signification can be understood in terms of the self-referentiality that is typical of the biological organization. The capacity of a living being to interpret and appreciate its own environment can be understood as being grounded in its ability to perform self-referential experiences. We may call this the living being’s capacity of sense. In any act that generates sense, it is possible to distinguish a process of signification from its outcome, but such (...) a distinction between logical levels inevitably demands an external observer’s point of view. Hence, the concept of ‘subjectivity’ can be defined in terms of an absence of such distinction between logical levels. This absence is considered pivotal both for the self-referential organization of the living and for the generation of sense. A case example from the field of psychotherapy is added to illustrate the distinction as well as the non-distinction between logical levels of description. (shrink)

We define and investigate a family of local–global principles for fields involving both orderings and p-valuations. This family contains the PAC, PRC and PpC fields and exhausts the class of pseudo classically closed fields. We show that the fields satisfying such a local–global principle form an elementary class, admit diophantine definitions of holomorphy domains, and their orderings satisfy the strong approximation property.

Exploration of the political roles firms play in society is a flourishing stream within corporate social responsibility research. However, few empirical studies have examined multiple levels of political CSR at the same time from a critical perspective. We explore both how the motivations of managers and internal organizational practices affect a company’s choice between competing CSR approaches, and how the different CSR programs of corporate and civil society actors compete with each other. We present a qualitative interpretative case study of (...) how a French children’s clothing retailer develops CSR practices in response to accusations of poor working conditions and child labor in its supply chain. The company’s CSR approach consists of superficial practices, such as supplier audits by a cooperative business-organized nongovernmental organization and philanthropic activities, which enable managers to silence more radical alternative models defended by other NGOs, activists, and trade unions. By this approach, the core business model based on exploitative low-cost country sourcing remains intact through self-regulated CSR. Through the case study, we develop a framework of dynamism in competing CSR programs. We discuss the implications of our study for CSR researchers, company managers, and policy makers. (shrink)

The work [11] deals with questions of first-order definability in algebraic function fields. In particular, it exhibits new cases in which the field of constant functions is definable, and it investigates the phenomenon of definable transcendental elements. We fix some of its proofs and make additional observations concerning definable closure in these fields.

I argue that there are at least four different ways in which the term ‘function’ is used in connection with the study of living organisms, namely: function as activity, function as biological role, function as biological advantage, and function as selected effect. Notion refers to what an item does by itself; refers to the contribution of an item or activity to a complex activity or capacity of an organism; refers to the value for the organism of an item having a (...) certain character rather than another; refers to the way in which a trait acquired and has maintained its current share in the population. The recognition of a separate notion of function as biological advantage solves the problem of the indeterminate reference situation that has been raised against a counterfactual analysis of function, and emphasizes the importance of counterfactual comparison in the explanatory practice of organismal biology. This reveals a neglected problem in the philosophy of biology, namely that of accounting for the insights provided by counterfactual comparison. (shrink)

Following Mayr (1961) evolutionary biologists often maintain that the hallmark of biology is its evolutionary perspective. In this view, biologists distinguish themselves from other natural scientists by their emphasis on why-questions. Why-questions are legitimate in biology but not in other natural sciences because of the selective character of the process by means of which living objects acquire their characteristics. For that reason, why-questions should be answered in terms of natural selection. Functional biology is seen as a reductionist science that applies (...) physics and chemistry to answer how-questions but lacks a biological point of view of its own. In this paper I dispute this image of functional biology. A close look at the kinds of issues studied in biology and at the way in which these issues are studied shows that functional biology employs a distinctive biological perspective that is not rooted in selection. This functional perspective is characterized by its concern with the requirements of the life-state and the way in which these are met. (shrink)

The spectrum of methods (cf. Osterhoudt 1974) and the modes of thought that are used to analyse the world of sports are enormous. However, in international contexts, the range of philosophical reflections often seems to be reduced to a dichotomous structure, i.e. the analytical and the phenomenological approach. While the analytical position is linked to Anglo-Saxon countries, the phenomenological tradition is ascribed to continental philosophers. In this paper, firstly, I will address this seeming dichotomy of the continental and the Anglo-Saxon (...) positions ? being well aware of the problems of such generalisations. Secondly, I will sketch some key aspects of the phenomenology of movement and, especially, the phenomenological methodology from a German/French/Dutch perspective. Thirdly, I will focus on the existentialist interpretation of sports and how the existential philosophy is rooted in the phenomenological tradition. And finally, I will outline some advantages and limitations of the phenomenological method. (shrink)

The article discusses Sartre’s the o retical conversion towards Marxism and historical ma t e r ialism. It emphasizes, however, that this conversion has ne v e r implied abandoning certain existentialist conc e p t s. In the Critique of dialectical reason Sartre aimed at defining a new dialectics, in which the subjective and ex i stential dimension is part of the process of economic, political and social transformation.

We show that a computable function $f:\mathbb R\rightarrow \mathbb R$ has Luzin’s property if and only if it reflects $\Pi ^1_1$ -randomness, if and only if it reflects $\Delta ^1_1$ -randomness, and if and only if it reflects ${\mathcal {O}}$ -Kurtz randomness, but reflecting Martin–Löf randomness or weak-2-randomness does not suffice. Here a function f is said to reflect a randomness notion R if whenever $f$ is R-random, then x is R-random as well. If additionally f is known to have (...) bounded variation, then we show f has Luzin’s if and only if it reflects weak-2-randomness, and if and only if it reflects $\emptyset '$ -Kurtz randomness. This links classical real analysis with algorithmic randomness. (shrink)

ExcerptAndrei S. Markovits, The Passport as Home: Comfort in Rootlessness. Foreword by Michael Ignatieff. Budapest: Central European University Press, 2021. Pp. 328. The Passport as Home: Comfort in Rootlessness is the autobiography of the well-known American political scientist Andrei S. Markovits and was published in 2021 by Central European University Press. After the 328 pages of text in American English, readers will recognize the author’s great fondness not only for analytical political science, sports, Italian opera, the Beatles, the Rolling Stones, (...) and the Grateful Dead, but also for different languages—Romanian, Hungarian, German, and English—and will enjoy Markovits’s beautiful style and the many linguistic nuances and subtleties the book offers. (shrink)

Common sense supposes that general terms, which are negative, non-referring or contradictory, may be quite understandable, i.e. meaningful. But attempts to give a theoretical explanation of this fact very oftenly came to the conclusion, that this must be false. This paper tries to show that Leibniz - thanks to his new understanding of ideas and notions - has been able to resolve a great part of meaning paradoxes, which are the consequences of that contradiction. The paper includes a comparison of (...) Leibniz's position with that of some other philosophers, especially that of Aristode and Locke. (shrink)

Arno Bammé geht es in diesem Buch darum, die sozialhistorischen Wurzeln der gegenwärtigen Problematik im Verhältnis Natur/Gesellschaft/Wissenschaft/Technik deutlich zu machen. Ausgangspunkt seiner Argumentation ist David Bloors Edinburgh Strong Programme, demzufolge auch der”hard core“der Wissenschaft sozialen Ursprungs ist. Sein Ziel ist es, der tatsächlichen historischen Entwicklung, die sehr chaotisch verlaufen ist, soziologisch eine Struktur zu geben - in Form dreier Zäsuren, wobei das Wechselverhältnis von Wissenschaft, Technik und Gesellschaft im Vordergrund steht.

Nice i Bergson spadaju medju glavne autore koji ispituju socio-afektivne uslove i istorijsku evoluciju pravde. Ali oni to cine na dva radikalno razlicita nacina, cija nespojivost, kako izgleda, jos nije dovoljno istaknuta: Nice objasnjava pravdu izdvajajuci socio-afektivne elemente koji su se medjusobno povezali da bi proizveli nesto takvo kao sto je "pravda", dok Bergson posmatra evoluciju pravde kao niz razlikovanja u prirodi. To Bergsona navodi da utvrdi temeljno razlikovanje izmedju dve pravde, jedne koja je visa i druge koja je niza, (...) jedne "otvorene" a druge "zatvorene", tamo gde Nice misli da zadovoljava monisticki zahtev postavljajuci jednu jedinu pravdu. Mozda se, ipak, Niceu moze uputiti Bergsonov prigovor da je "iznova sastavio evoluciju od fragmenata onoga sto je evoluiralo", i, bez sumnje, u svakom slucaju treba suprotstaviti Niceov postupak, koji je izvesna "genealogija", Bergsonovom postupku, koji je odista, "geneza". (shrink)

This paper deals with some formal properties of objects that are supposed to be internal to persons, that is, mental structures and mental functions. Depending on the ways of talking about these internal objects, they will appear different. Two types of discourse will be presented, to be called the realist and the nominalist discourses, and for eachdiscourse I will focus upon the construction of `self'.The realist discourse assumes an identity between the person and his construction of himself. I will illustrate (...) this discourse in terms of Descartes' ideas on himself as a `thinking substance'. The nominalist discourse assumes an impossibility to attain this identity, and instead to imply a complementarity between the person and his self-construction. I will illustrate this discourse in terms of the problems both William James and Sartre discerned when a conscious person chases after his own consciousness (termed `judging thought' and `pour-soi' respectively). (shrink)

There are currently two different views about the relation between philosophy and the empirical sciences. One of them – the “Quinean” view – holds that there is only a difference in degree: both are trying to gain insights in parts of the world, but philosophy, in opposition to the empirical sciences, which deal with concrete parts of the world, tries to find out insights of a very general type. The other view – which has a century old history, beginning with (...) Socrates/Plato and ending, in a certain sense, with the late Wittgenstein – holds that philosophy and the empirical sciences are separated by a sharp categorical difference: Empirical sciences deal with parts of the world, and philosophy deals with concepts, that is with our habits of distinguishing and classifying things, which enable us to deal empirically with the world. This paper tries to develop some arguments in favour of the second view, and, furthermore, tries to suggest some implications of this view. One of these implications is that there are three special tasks of philosophy as a concept-reflecting enterprise: the descriptive, the explanatory and the critical. It is remarkable to see that within these aims empirical insights come again to play a certain, although limited role. (shrink)

Quine, em seu livro Philosophy of Logic, identifica lógica com lógica de primeira ordem e defende a concepçáo segundo a qual a completude é uma propriedade necessária dos sistemas lógicos. O objetivo deste trabalho é discutir a argumentaçáo de Quine e mostrar que suas idéias a respeito da natureza da lógica apresentam diversos problemas tanto conceituais, como técnicos.

Auf die Rede von Begriffen und vergleichbaren Entitäten, so behauptet Quine, könne man verzichten. Mit einer solchen Einstellung handelt Quine sich jedoch Schwierigkeiten ein, die z.B. an seinem Konzept des Setzens von Gegenständen sowie an seinem Verständnis von Existenzaussagen sichtbar werden (§ 1 und 2). Im Hintergrund jener Einstellung steht ein unzureichendes Verständnis der Funktion von Begriffen (§ 3). Zudem hat Quine bisher nicht zur Kenntnis genommen, daß Wittgenstein in seiner Spätphilosophie Vorschläge zum Verständnis der Rede von Begriffen entwickelt hat, (...) welche es erlauben, zahlreiche Defizite des neuzeitlichen Verständnisses von Begriffen zu beheben (§ 4). (shrink)