A partir da hipótese de que a inteligência artificial como tal não representaria o fim da supremacia humana, uma vez que, na essência, a IA somente simularia e aumentaria aspectos da inteligência humana em artefatos não biológicos, o presente artigo questiona sobre o risco real a ser enfrentado. Para além do embate entre tecnofóbicos e tecnofílicos, o que se defende, então, é que as possíveis falhas de funcionamento de uma inteligência artificial – decorrentes de sobrecarga de informação, de (...) uma programação equivocada ou de uma aleatoriedade do sistema – poderiam sinalizar os verdadeiros riscos existenciais, sobretudo quando se considera que o cérebro biológico, na esteira do viés da automação, tende a assumir de maneira acrítica aquilo que é posto por sistemas ancorados em inteligência artificial. Além disso, o argumento aqui defendido é que falhas não detectáveis pela provável limitação de controle humano quanto ao aumento de complexidade do funcionamento de sistemas de IA representam o principal risco existencial real. Palavras-chave: Inteligência artificial, risco existencial, superinteligências, controle humano. (shrink)

J. M. E. McTaggart famously divided time into two time series, which he entitled A-series and B-series. Although he was proponent of neither of them, his division initiated a discussion as to which of the series is prior or real. This paper follows Clifford Williams’s claim that these series are not as distant as their proponents argue they are. It demonstrates their translatability in the case of examples from temporal logic and natural language. It argues that, if there are any (...) deep-rooted differences between these two series, they are only metaphysical. These metaphysical differences could be overcome by focusing on logic or natural language. These two series of time are also used in computer science and in the development of Artificial Intelligence. However, no attempt at unifying them has been suggested in these fields of study. J. M. E. McTaggart rozdělil čas na dvě časové série, A-série a B-série. Třebaže nebyl zastáncem žádné z nich, jeho rozdělení podnítilo diskuzi, která z těchto časových sérií je přednější nebo jediná skutečně reálná. Tento článek navazuje na názor Clifforda Williamse, že tyto časové série nejsou tak rozdílné, jak tvrdí jejich zastánci. V článku je demonstrována jejich přeložitelnost na příkladech z temporální logiky a přirozeného jazyka. Článek dále tvrdí, že jestliže je zde nějaký hluboce zakořeněný rozdíl mezi těmito dvěma sériemi, pak je pouze metafyzický. Tyto metafyzické rozdíly mohou být překonány, zaměříme-li se na logiku a přirozený jazyk. Tyto dvě časové série jsou také použity v informatice a rozvoji umělé inteligence, třebaže v těchto oborech dosud nebyly navrženy žádné pokusy o jejich propojení. (shrink)

This paper delves into AI development’s historical and philosophical dimensions while highlighting the symbiotic relationship between philosophy and AI from a technological perspective: philosophy furnishes foundational concepts, and AI supplies practical tools. The paper posits neurosymbolic AI as a solution to present challenges, sparking discussions encompassing both technical and philosophical considerations. Advocating a multidisciplinary approach calls for merging empirical AI insights with philosophy and cognition science to enrich our comprehension of intelligence and propel AI forward.

e understanding of the etiology and pathogenesis of these psyc hiatric disorders such as schizophrenia and depression is still n ot completely clear. At present, there is a lack of objective ne urobiological markers that can be used in clinical routine work such as clinical diagnosis, curative effect evaluation and progn osis evaluation of psychiatric disorders. Therefore, it is of great clinical significance to find biomarkers to improve the diagnos is level and evaluate the curative effect. Electroencephalogram (EEG) is a (...) non-invasive technique to record the potential activi ty of biological brain, through which researchers can analyze th e mechanisms underlying psychiatric disorders. In addition, mac hine learning can be used to further verify the role of these el ectrophysiological indicators in clinical diagnosis and curative e ffect evaluation of psychiatric disorders. The goal of this resear ch topic is to advance research on neurobiomarkers and EEG/ MEG-based diagnostic methods for mental disorders. We hope to conduct in-depth research on the pathogenesis and diagnostic measures of mental diseases such as schizophrenia and depressi ve disorder through EEG/MEG, in order to improve the perfor mance of artificial intelligence for mental diseases diagnosing.Under this research theme, the following is a brief overview of nine published articles, which respectively studied the diagnosis, The work in this special issue may fall into three categories of research: 1) method... (shrink)

More and more people around the world are using computer (video) games. The development of the gaming industry means increasing of its complexity in all aspects. Not only is the content represented in games continuously differentiating, but we also see the increasing diversity among their creators, users, researchers and the public. This article aims to draw attention to the possibility of using the concept of social capital in ludologists’ research as well as in improving the quality of games and of (...) the cooperation between social environments related with games. Social capital is understood here as a potential of interactions embedded in interpersonal ties and social norms, which can bring advantages for individuals, groups and societies. The author takes a closer look on: the main features of this multi-dimensional category; significant differences between human, social and cultural capital; as well as the positive and negative influences of social capital. ** Z gier komputerowych (wideo) korzysta coraz więcej ludzi na całym świecie. Rozwój branży gier oznacza wzrastającą jej złożoność we wszystkich płaszczyznach. Nie tylko stale różnicują się treści przedstawiane w grach, ale też rośnie zróżnicowanie ich twórców, użytkowników, badaczy i opinii publicznej. Celem artykułu jest zwrócenie uwagi na możliwość wykorzystania koncepcji kapitału społecznego w badaniach ludologów oraz w podnoszeniu jakości gier i współpracy między środowiskami związanymi z grami. Kapitał społeczny jest tu rozumiany jako potencjał współdziałania osadzony w powiązaniach międzyludzkich i normach społecznych, który może przynosić korzyści osobom, grupom i społeczeństwom. Przybliżone zostały: główne cechy tej wielowymiarowej kategorii; istotne różnice między kapitałem ludzkim, społecznym i kulturowym; oraz pozytywne i negatywne skutki oddziaływania kapitału społecznego. (shrink)

This paper is devoted to discuss a general tendency in contextualism which is known as "radical contextualism". In the first part I state the well known paradox of semantic holism, as discussed in philosophy of language: if meaning is holistic there is no possibility to share any meaning. In the second part I present the different answers to this paradox, from atomism to different forms of holism. In the third part I give a criticism of the traditional interpretation of Wittgenstein (...) as a supporter of global holism. I stress some similarities between Wittgenstein's thought and Multi Context theories in artificial inteligence. In the last part I give some argument against a rigid interpretation of "local holism": I claim the need to give restrictions to local holim and to develop a study of the connections between "default" properties and high level rules which are studied in Multi−Context theories. (shrink)

W sytuacjach, gdy powinniśmy mieć do czynienia ze wzajemnym oświecaniem, w rzeczywistości często spotykamy się z obopólnym oporem między kognitywistyką a fenomenologią, gdzie ta druga rozumiana jest jako podejście metodologiczne, po raz pierwszy zarysowane przez Husserla. Filozofowie umysłu, z pierwszych szeregów kognitywistów, niejednokrotnie czynią lekceważące gesty w stosunku do fenomenologii, oparte na myleniu fenomenologii z niewykwalifikoną introspekcją psychologiczną (np. Dennett, 1991). Z kolei wielu fenomenologów podlega mylnemu wrażeniu, że kognitywistyce nie udało się wyjść poza tradycyjne modele komputacyjne (DSSI – „dobra (...) staromodna sztuczna inteligencja” (GOFAI - „good old fashioned artificial inteligence”)). Odrzucają oni kognitywistykę, zarzucając jej nadmierny redukcjonizm, uniemożliwiający wyjaśnienie doświadczenia czy świadomości. O ile taki opór nie dziwi w przypadku tych, którzy znają i bronią antynaturalistycznego stanowiska Husserla, o tyle jest niezwykle zaskakujący w przypadku tych, którzy znają dzieła Merleau-Ponty’ego. Badania tego ostatniego łączyły bowiem analizy fenomenologiczne z rozważaniami pochodzącymi z nauk empirycznych, takich jak psychologia i neurologia, i to na długo, zanim kognitywistyka została skonstruowana jako model do uwzględniania tylko tych aspektów psychologii i neurologii, które skupiają się na doświadczeniu poznawczym. Zostawiając przykład Merleau-Ponty’ego, filozofowie po obu stronach stopniowo zdali sobie sprawę, że fenomenologia może być bezpośrednio przydatna do naukowego zrozumienia poznania. Wcześniej niejednokrotnie nawet sami naukowcy empiryczni dochodzili do tego wniosku i to pomimo filozofów. Dobry przykład stanowią tutaj badania Franisco Vareli z neurofenomenologii (Varela, 1996). (shrink)

Resumen Este artículo examina el papel de la ficción como laboratorio mental, que ayuda al filósofo a plantear y discutir los diferentes análisis creados en el campo de la filosofía de la mente. De manera particular se enfoca en algunos de los cuentos que Daniel Dennett ha contado acerca del problema de la conciencia. Es por eso que este artículo también intenta responder preguntas como: ¿Cuál es la relación entre la conciencia y el Centro de Gravedad Narrativo propuesto por Dennett? (...) ¿La mente está hecha de historias? ¿Puede haber un uso semántico en el habla de una inteligencia artificial que no posee experiencia corporal del mundo? Palabras clave: ficción; cuerpo; mente; conciencia; self; creencias; semántica. Fiction, Body and Mind: The Dennett CaseThis paper examines the role of fiction as a mental laboratory that helps the philosopher to pose and discuss the various analyses created in the philosophy of mind. It focuses particularly on some of the tales that Daniel Dennett has told about the problem of consciousness. That is why this paper also attempts to answer questions such as: What is the relation of consciousness to Dennett’s Center of Narrative Gravity? Is the mind made of stories? Can there be a semantic use in speech of an artificial inteligence that does not have a bodily experience of the world? Keywords : Fiction; Body; Mind; Consciousness; Self; Beliefs; Semantics. (shrink)

Mind transfer is the most important concept of transhumanists. Its tech­nological implementation is to copy and transfer the human mind to a computer, by exact mapping of all neural connections in the human brain and their precise copying in a computer simulation. The idea of mind transfer also brings some dangers, related to the denial of human nature, the placing of hopes for future life in digital spaces and the liberation from the limitations imposed on man by his biological structure. (...) Transhumanists believe that in order to achieve mind transfer, various technologies defined by the acronym NBIC currently available, should be used. The very dynamic development of these technologies in recent years, and in particular the latest AI algorithms seem to be very fast approaching the moment when practical mind transfer will be possible. The paper contains a very brief description of these technical capabilities with the necessary short commentary on their ethical aspects. (shrink)

The problems of transhumanism cannot be considered in isolation from the very rapidly changing advancements of modern technology which has become an immanent part of the modern scientific paradigm and is beginning to affect all people more and more. Focusing the discussion on epistemological and ethical issues alone, while identifying the utopian assumptions of the transhumanism ideology, does not allow to create any useful tools that could restrain the negative phenomena in the world of technoscience. Understanding certain technological concepts developed (...) in environments sensitive to the transhumanist ideas requires appropriate expertise. Many of them touch on the most important aspects of Christian anthropology. In order to understand them properly, it is necessary to investigate the most important results of scientific research carried out in the last few years in the largest scientific laboratories. (shrink)

La investigación científica trae consigo múltiples cuestiones, que este libro analiza centrándose en dos grandes corrientes metodológicas: el pragmatismo y el pluralismo. En el primero destacan autores como Nicholas Rescher, que tiene un capítulo en el libro, y en lo segundo hay cada vez más partidarios, muchos de los cuales reconocen el papel de Patrick Suppes en el giro para deslindarse del monismo metodológico, que fue dominante durante un buen número de años. Mediante la reflexión filosófico-metodológica se profundiza en el (...) libro en los procedimientos de investigación, que es la fase inicial para resolver problemas científicos, y en los métodos, que siguen después, dotados mayor grado de rigor que propician la sistematicidad en la indagación de lo real (sea natural, social o artificial). Por un lado, quien investiga ha de seguir los procesos para estudiar adecuadamente su objeto y poder resolver los problemas que plantea ese estudio; y, por otro lado, la realidad a conocer ha de ser inteligible mediante los recursos epistemológicos, de uso de procesos de investigación y de los materiales adecuados, bien sea para la observación o para la investigación. (shrink)

Book Description (Blurb): Cognitive Design for Artificial Minds explains the crucial role that human cognition research plays in the design and realization of artificial intelligence systems, illustrating the steps necessary for the design of artificial models of cognition. It bridges the gap between the theoretical, experimental and technological issues addressed in the context of AI of cognitive inspiration and computational cognitive science. -/- Beginning with an overview of the historical, methodological and technical issues in the field of (...) Cognitively-Inspired Artificial Intelligence, Lieto illustrates how the cognitive design approach has an important role to play in the development of intelligent AI technologies and plausible computational models of cognition. Introducing a unique perspective that draws upon Cybernetics and early AI principles, Lieto emphasizes the need for an equivalence between cognitive processes and implemented AI procedures, in order to realise biologically and cognitively inspired artificial minds. He also introduces the Minimal Cognitive Grid, a pragmatic method to rank the different degrees of biologically and cognitive accuracy of artificial systems in order project and predict their explanatory power with respect to the natural systems taken as source of inspiration. -/- Providing a comprehensive overview of cognitive design principles in constructing artificial minds, this text will be essential reading for students and researchers of artificial intelligence and cognitive science. (shrink)

The aim of this exploratory paper is to review an under-appreciated parallel between group agency and artificial intelligence. As both phenomena involve non-human goal-directed agents that can make a difference to the social world, they raise some similar moral and regulatory challenges, which require us to rethink some of our anthropocentric moral assumptions. Are humans always responsible for those entities’ actions, or could the entities bear responsibility themselves? Could the entities engage in normative reasoning? Could they even have rights (...) and a moral status? I will tentatively defend the (increasingly widely held) view that, under certain conditions, artificial intelligent systems, like corporate entities, might qualify as responsible moral agents and as holders of limited rights and legal personhood. I will further suggest that regulators should permit the use of autonomous artificial systems in high-stakes settings only if they are engineered to function as moral (not just intentional) agents and/or there is some liability-transfer arrangement in place. I will finally raise the possibility that if artificial systems ever became phenomenally conscious, there might be a case for extending a stronger moral status to them, but argue that, as of now, this remains very hypothetical. (shrink)

Reuben Hersh confided to us that, about forty years ago, the late Paul Cohen predicted to him that at some unspecified point in the future, mathematicians would be replaced by computers. Rather than focus on computers replacing mathematicians, however, our aim is to consider the (im)possibility of human mathematicians being joined by “artificial mathematicians” in the proving practice—not just as a method of inquiry but as a fellow inquirer.

Recent decades have witnessed tremendous progress in artificial intelligence and in the development of autonomous systems that rely on artificial intelligence. Critics, however, have pointed to the difficulty of allocating responsibility for the actions of an autonomous system, especially when the autonomous system causes harm or damage. The highly autonomous behavior of such systems, for which neither the programmer, the manufacturer, nor the operator seems to be responsible, has been suspected to generate responsibility gaps. This has been the (...) cause of much concern. In this article, I propose a more optimistic view on artificial intelligence, raising two challenges for responsibility gap pessimists. First, proponents of responsibility gaps must say more about when responsibility gaps occur. Once we accept a difficult-to-reject plausibility constraint on the emergence of such gaps, it becomes apparent that the situations in which responsibility gaps occur are unclear. Second, assuming that responsibility gaps occur, more must be said about why we should be concerned about such gaps in the first place. I proceed by defusing what I take to be the two most important concerns about responsibility gaps, one relating to the consequences of responsibility gaps and the other relating to violations of jus in bello. (shrink)

Use of argumentation methods applied to legal reasoning is a relatively new field of study. The book provides a survey of the leading problems, and outlines how future research using argumentation-based methods show great promise of leading to useful solutions. The problems studied include not only these of argument evaluation and argument invention, but also analysis of specific kinds of evidence commonly used in law, like witness testimony, circumstantial evidence, forensic evidence and character evidence. New tools for analyzing these kinds (...) of evidence are introduced. (shrink)

Standard notions in philosophy of mind have a tendency to characterize socio-cognitive abilities as if they were unique to sophisticated human beings. However, assuming that it is likely that we are soon going to share a large part of our social lives with various kinds of artificial agents, it is important to develop a conceptual framework providing notions that are able to account for various types of social agents. Recent minimal approaches to socio-cognitive abilities such as mindreading and commitment (...) present a promising starting point from which one can expand the field of application not only to infants and non-human animals but also to artificial agents. Developing a minimal approach to the socio-cognitive ability of acting jointly, I present a foundation for future discussions about the question of how our conception of sociality can be expanded to artificial agents. (shrink)

Recently, biologists and computer scientists who advocate the "strong thesis of artificial life" have argued that the distinction between life and nonlife is important and that certain computer software entities could be alive in the same sense as biological entities. These arguments have been challenged by Sober (1991). I address some of the questions about the rational reconstruction of biology that are suggested by these arguments: What is the relation between life and the "signs of life"? What work (if (...) any) might the concept of "life" (over and above the "signs of life") perform in biology? What turns on scientific disputes over the utility of this concept? To defend my answers to these questions, I compare "life" to certain other concepts used in science, and I examine historical episodes in which an entity's vitality was invoked to explain certain phenomena. I try to understand how these explanations could be illuminating even though they are not accompanied by any reductive definition of "life.". (shrink)

The aim of this thesis is to advance a philosophically justifiable account of Artificial Moral Agency (AMA). Concerns about the moral status of Artificial Intelligence (AI) traditionally turn on questions of whether these systems are deserving of moral concern (i.e. if they are moral patients) or whether they can be sources of moral action (i.e. if they are moral agents). On the Organic View of Ethical Status, being a moral patient is a necessary condition for an entity to (...) qualify as a moral agent. This view claims that because artificial agents (AAs) lack sentience, they cannot be proper subjects of moral concern and hence cannot be considered to be moral agents. I raise conceptual and epistemic issues with regards to the sense of sentience employed on this view, and I argue that the Organic View does not succeed in showing that machines cannot be moral patients. Nevertheless, irrespective of this failure, I also argue that the entire project is misdirected in that moral patiency need not be a necessary condition for moral agency. Moreover, I claim that whereas machines may conceivably be moral patients in the future, there is a strong case to be made that they are (or will very soon be) moral agents. Whereas it is often argued that machines cannot be agents simpliciter, let alone moral agents, I claim that this argument is predicated on a conception of agency that makes unwarranted metaphysical assumptions even in the case of human agents. Once I have established the shortcomings of this “standard account”, I move to elaborate on other, more plausible, conceptions of agency, on which some machines clearly qualify as agents. Nevertheless, the argument is still often made that while some machines may be agents, they cannot be moral agents, given their ostensible lack of the requisite phenomenal states. Against this thesis, I argue that the requirement of internal states for moral agency is philosophically unsound, as it runs up against the problem of other minds. In place of such intentional accounts of moral agency, I provide a functionalist alternative, which makes conceptual room for the existence of AMAs. The implications of this thesis are that at some point in the future we may be faced with situations for which no human being is morally responsible, but a machine may be. Moreover, this responsibility holds, I claim, independently of whether the agent in question is “punishable” or not. (shrink)

본 연구는 최근 주목 받고 있는 AI에 적용 가능한 윤리적 접근법이 타당한지를 검토해 보고자 한다. 이러한 검토는 우선 AI가 과연 윤리적일 수 있는가 하는 근본적인 물음에서 부터 어떻게 기술적으로 AMA(인공 도덕행위자)를 구현 가능한가 하는 방법론의 검토를 동시에 요한다. 이는 다시 AMA가 과연 자율적인 개체로서 인식될 수 있는지에 대한 문제 와 지속적으로 논의되고 있는 AMA 관련 윤리적 접근법 또한 포함한다. 필자는 이와 관련 된 여러 논의들을 검토하고 각각의 논의들이 가진 특징 및 한계점을 분석하고자 한다. 이 러한 모든 검토들은 AMA의 근본적인 한계를 (...) 드러내려는 필자의 의도로 수렴된다. 필자는 근본적으로 AI가 자율적인 도덕행위자가 될 수 없고, 바로 이 때문에 어떤 이상적인 AMA 로도 AI가 가져올 수 있는 위험을 막을 수 없다고 주장한다. 필자는 이것이 한나 아렌트가 말한 ‘사유행위’와 같은 선상에서 비판 가능한 문제라고 생각하며 논의를 마무리 짓고자 한다. (shrink)

ABSTRACTWhile over the last few decades AI research has largely focused on building tools and applications, recent technological developments have prompted a resurgence of interest in building a genuinely intelligent artificial agent – one that has a mind in the same sense that humans and animals do. In this paper, I offer a theoretical and methodological framework for this project of investigating “artificial minded intelligence” that can help to unify existing approaches and provide new avenues for research. I (...) first outline three desiderata that a framework for AMI research should satisfy. In Section 1, I further motivate the desiderata as well as the need for a new framework. Section 2 develops a general methodological approach, the “generative methodology,” and Section 3 develops a version of this methodology, the “Competence Framework for AI research”. (shrink)

Operating universities under pandemic conditions is a complex undertaking. The Artificial University responds to this need. TAU is a configurable, open-source computer simulation of a university using a contact network based on publicly available information about university classes, residences, and activities. This study evaluates health outcomes for an array of interventions and testing protocols in an artificial university of 6,500 students, faculty, and staff. Findings suggest that physical distancing and centralized contact tracing are most effective at reducing infections, (...) but there is a tipping point for compliance below which physical distancing is less effective. If student compliance is anything short of high, it helps to have separate buildings for quarantining infected students, thereby gracefully increasing compliance. Hybrid in-person and online classes and closing fitness centers do not significantly change cumulative infections but do significantly decrease the number of the infected at any given time, indicating strategies for “flattening the curve” to protect limited resources. Supplementing physical distancing with centralized contact tracing decreases infected individuals by an additional 14%; boosting frequency of testing for student-facing staff yields a further 7% decrease. A trade-off exists between increasing the sheer number of infection tests and targeting testing for key nodes in the contact network. There are significant advantages to getting and acting on test results quickly. The costs and benefits to universities of these findings are discussed. Artificial universities can be an important decision support tool for universities, generating useful policy insights into the challenges of operating universities under pandemic conditions. (shrink)

Following a boom in investment and overinflated expectations in the 1980s, artificial intelligence entered a period of retrenchment known as the “AI winter.” With advances in the field of machine learning and the availability of large datasets for training various types of artificial neural networks, AI is in another cycle of halcyon days. Although medicine is particularly recalcitrant to change, applications of AI in health care have professionals in fields like radiology worried about the future of their careers (...) and have the public tittering about the prospect of soulless machines making life‐and‐death decisions. Medicine thus appears to be at an inflection point—a kind of Groundhog Day on which either AI will bring a springtime of improved diagnostic and predictive practices or the shadow of public and professional fear will lead to six more metaphorical weeks of winter in medical AI. (shrink)

Artificial womb technology for extracorporeal gestation of human offspring (ectogenesis or ectogestation) has profound ethical, sociological and religious implications for Muslim communities. In this article we examine the usage of the technology through the lens of Islamic ethico-legal frameworks specifically the legal maxims (al-Qawaid al-Fiqhiyyah) and higher objectives of Islamic law (Maqaṣid al-Shariah). Our analysis suggests that its application may be contingently permissible (halal) in situations of dire need such as sustaining life and development of extremely premature newborns, for (...) advancing fetal medicine and avoiding maternal co-morbidities during fetal treatment, and for enabling motherhood for women without functional wombs, or who face grave medical risks in pregnancy. However, its application may be proscribed (haram) for enabling healthy women to avoid pregnancy and childbirth, or to achieve parenthood equity. Specification of these views to particular policy, legal contexts and Fatwa will require multidisciplinary Shariah-based bioethical deliberations between jurists, policymakers, and scientists. (shrink)

We explicate representational content by addressing how representations that ex- plain intelligent behavior might be acquired through processes of Darwinian evo- lution. We present the results of computer simulations of evolved neural network controllers and discuss the similarity of the simulations to real-world examples of neural network control of animal behavior. We argue that focusing on the simplest cases of evolved intelligent behavior, in both simulated and real organisms, reveals that evolved representations must carry information about the creature’s environ- ments (...) and further can do so only if their neural states are appropriately isomor- phic to environmental states. Further, these informational and isomorphism rela- tions are what are tracked by content attributions in folk-psychological and cognitive scientific explanations of these intelligent behaviors. (shrink)

Sequential transformative design of research :224–235, 2015; Groleau et al. in J Mental Health 16:731–741, 2007; Robson and McCartan in Real world research: a resource for users of social research methods in applied settings, Wiley, Chichester, 2016) allows testing a group of theoretical assumptions about the connections of artificial intelligence with culture and education. In the course of research, semiotics ensures the description of self-organizing systems of cultural signs and symbols in terms of artificial intelligence as a special (...) set of algorithms. This approach helps to consider the arguments proposed by Searle :417–457, 1980) against ‘strong’ artificial intelligence. Searle :417–457, 1980) believes that artificial or machine intelligence cannot fully emulate the processes of the human mind. Machine intelligence shows own inevitable weakness. This is non-autonomous tool for computations and data operating. In fact, this tool cannot provide insight into real cognitive conditions. After Lotman and Uspensky, authors expand the meaning of artificial intelligence. The authors identify a cultural type of ‘strong’ artificial intelligence or ‘self-increase of Logos’ in terms by Lotman and Uspensky. The interpretation of human intelligence as imitation of machine intelligence makes possible such immersion of artificial intelligence in culture. The authors reveal a case of self-organizing autonomous generation, encoding, decoding, reception, storage, and transmission of social information in the field of physical training. From the empirical studies it is clear that the organization of collective activities without external control ensures the development of positive emotions and social orientations. Interest in autonomous behavior provides the formation of educational and cognitive motives. As a special set of algorithms, these motives are the most promising and favorable for personal development. (shrink)

The application of machine learning and artificial intelligence in healthcare domains has received much attention in recent years, yet significant questions remain about how these new tools integrate into frontline user workflow, and how their design will impact implementation. Lack of acceptance among clinicians is a major barrier to the translation of healthcare innovations into clinical practice. In this systematic review, we examine when and how clinicians are consulted about their needs and desires for clinical AI tools. Forty-five articles (...) met criteria for inclusion, of which 24 were considered design studies. The design studies used a variety of methods to solicit and gather user feedback, with interviews, surveys, and user evaluations. Our findings show that tool designers consult clinicians at various but inconsistent points during the design process, and most typically at later stages in the design cycle. We also observed a smaller amount of studies adopting a human-centered approach and where clinician input was solicited throughout the design process. A third of all studies reported on clinician trust in clinical AI algorithms and tools. The surveyed articles did not universally report validation against the “gold standard” of clinical expertise or provide detailed descriptions of the algorithms or computational methods used in their work. To realize the full potential of AI tools within healthcare settings, our review suggests there are opportunities to more thoroughly integrate frontline users’ needs and feedback in the design process. (shrink)

An amplitude controllable hyperjerk system is constructed for chaos producing by introducing a nonlinear factor of memristor. In this case, the amplitude control is realized from a single coefficient in the memristor. The hyperjerk system has a line of equilibria and also shows extreme multistability indicated by the initial value-associated bifurcation diagram. FPGA-based circuit realization is also given for physical verification. Finally, the proposed memristive hyperjerk system is successfully predicted with artificial neural networks for AI based engineering applications.

I thank Jane Sedlakova and Manuel Trachsel for their work on situating conversational artificial intelligence’s (CAI) potential role in psychotherapy. In their article, Sedlakova and Trachsel argue...

Research and activism have increasingly denounced the problematic environmental record of the infrastructure and value chain underpinning artificial intelligence (AI). Water-intensive data centres, polluting mineral extraction and e-waste dumping are incontrovertibly part of AI’s footprint. In this article, I turn to areas affected by AI-fuelled environmental harm and identify an ethics of resistance emerging from local activists, which I term ‘elemental ethics’. Elemental ethics interrogates the AI value chain’s problematic relationship with the elements that make up the world, critiques (...) the undermining of local and ancestral approaches to nature and reveals the vital and quotidian harms engendered by so-called intelligent systems. While this ethics is emerging from grassroots and Indigenous groups, it echoes recent calls from environmental philosophy to reconnect with the environment via the elements. In empirical terms, this article looks at groups in Chile resisting a Google data centre project in Santiago and lithium extraction (used for rechargeable batteries) in Lickan Antay Indigenous territory, Atacama Desert. As I show, elemental ethics can complement top-down, utilitarian and quantitative approaches to AI ethics and sustainable AI as well as interrogate whose lived experience and well-being counts in debates on AI extinction. (shrink)

Artificial intelligence (AI) is the ability of a digital computer or computer-controlled robot to perform tasks commonly associated with intelligent beings. Artificial intelligence can be both a blessing and a curse, and potentially a double-edged sword if not carefully wielded. While it holds massive potential benefits to humans—particularly in healthcare by assisting in treatment of diseases, surgeries, record keeping, and easing the lives of both patients and doctors, its misuse has potential for harm through impact of biases, unemployment, (...) breaches of privacy, and lack of accountability to mention a few. In this article, we discuss the fourth industrial revolution, through a focus on the core of this phenomenon, artificial intelligence. We outline what the fourth industrial revolution is, its basis around AI, and how this infiltrates human lives and society, akin to a transcendence. We focus on the potential dangers of AI and the ethical concerns it brings about particularly in developing countries in general and conflict zones in particular, and we offer potential solutions to such dangers. While we acknowledge the importance and potential of AI, we also call for cautious reservations before plunging straight into the exciting world of the future, one which we long have heard of only in science fiction movies. (shrink)

The article describes the possibilities of using and modifying existing machine learning technologies in the field of natural language processing for the purpose of designing a system for automatically generating control and test tasks (CTT). The reason for such studies was the limitations in generating theminimumrequired amount ofCTtomaintain student engagement in game-based learning formats, such as quizzes, and others. These limitations are associated with the lack of time resources among training professionals for manual generation of tests. The article discusses the (...) applied research of the Large Language Model (LLM) and Generative pre-trained transformer (GPT) technologies for the development of a system for automatic generation of tests for the purpose of its implementation in the BoxBattle gamified learning platform. The result of such applied research can be a system for automatic generation of tests, which will reduce the time for developing tests. As a result, this will allow teachers to free up time to implement a personalized approach to teaching and develop students’soft skills. (shrink)

Artificial Intelligence is supposed to perform tasks autonomously, make competent decisions, and interact socially with people. From a psychological perspective, AI can thus be expected to impact users’ three Basic Psychological Needs, namely autonomy, competence, and relatedness to others. While research highlights the fulfillment of these needs as central to human motivation and well-being, their role in the acceptance of AI applications has hitherto received little consideration. Addressing this research gap, our study examined the influence of BPN Satisfaction on (...) Intention to Use an AI assistant for personal banking. In a 2×2 factorial online experiment, 282 participants watched a video of an AI finance coach with a female or male synthetic voice that exhibited either high or low agency. In combination, these factors resulted either in AI assistants conforming to traditional gender stereotypes or in non-conforming conditions. Although the experimental manipulations had no significant influence on participants’ relatedness and competence satisfaction, a strong effect on autonomy satisfaction was found. As further analyses revealed, this effect was attributable only to male participants, who felt their autonomy need significantly more satisfied by the low-agency female assistant, consistent with stereotypical images of women, than by the high-agency female assistant. A significant indirect effects model showed that the greater autonomy satisfaction that men, unlike women, experienced from the low-agency female assistant led to higher ITU. The findings are discussed in terms of their practical relevance and the risk of reproducing traditional gender stereotypes through technology design. (shrink)