The structure of the thermal equilibrium state of a weakly interacting Bose gas is of current interest. We calculate the density matrix of that state in two ways. The most effective method, in terms of yielding a simple, explicit answer, is to construct a generating function within the traditional framework of quantum statistical mechanics. The alternative method, arguably more interesting, is to construct the thermal state as a vector state in an artificial system with twice as many degrees of freedom. (...) It is well known that this construction has an actual physical realization in the quantum thermodynamics of black holes, where the added degrees of freedom correspond to the second sheet of the Kruskal manifold and the thermal vector state is a state of the Unruh or the Hartle–Hawking type. What is unusual about the present work is that the Bogolubov transformation used to construct the thermal state combines in a rather symmetrical way with Bogolubov's original transformation of the same form, used to implement the interaction of the nonideal gas in linear approximation. In addition to providing a density matrix, the method makes it possible to calculate efficiently certain expectation values directly in terms of the thermal vector state of the doubled system. (shrink)

Do we remember what pain feels like? Investigations into this question have sometimes led to ambiguous or apparently contradictory results. Building on research on pain memory by Rohini Terry and colleagues, I argue that this lack of agreement may be due in part to the difficulty researchers face when trying to convey to their study's participants the type of memory they are being tasked with recalling. To address this difficulty, I introduce the concept of 'qualitative memory', which, arguably, is the (...) sort of memory we have of what red looks like yet lack with respect to pain. I also briefly address a number of consequences the acknowledgment of qualitative memory would potentially have for philosophy, arguing that if we fail to have qualitative memories of certain sensations, such as pain, the standard philosophical accounts of experience, rational choice, and the sources of moral action may all need revision. (shrink)

В книге собраны статьи по актуальным вопросам политической теории, которые находятся в центре дискуссий отечественных и зарубежных философов и обществоведов. Книга имеет полемический характер и предназначена всем.

This chapter contains sections titled: I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X.

Recent observations of ultra high energy cosmic rays and gamma rays suggest that there are small violations of Lorentz symmetry. If there were no such violations, then the GZK cut off would hold and cosmic rays with energy ∼1020 eV or higher would not be reaching the earth. However some such events seem to have been observed. This has lead to phenomenological models in which there is a small violation of the Lorentz symmetry or the velocity of light. However recent (...) approaches which no longer consider a differentiable spacetime manifold already predict such violations. Similarly there are other theoretical reasons which also point to this. We briefly discuss some of these approaches and observe that Lorentz Symmetry violations can be tested by data from NASA’s GLAST satellite due for launch. (shrink)

The paper offers an interpretation of thesis 6.01. The treatment touches upon variables, identity, elementary propositions, internal relations. Klammerausdrücke, and operations. Wittenstein's notations are found not to cover the particular form of definition by induction that is used at 6 and 6.01. It is concluded that Wittgenstein's ability to design of a formal system of logic does not match his outstanding logico-philosophical insight.

This article argues that in Pindar's epinicians first-person statements may occasionally be made in the persona of the chorus and the athletic victor. The speaking persona behind Pindar's first-person statements varies quite widely: from generic, rhetorical poses—a laudator, an aoidos in the rhapsodic tradition (the “bardic first person”), an Everyman (the “first person indefinite”)—to strongly individualized figures: the Theban poet Pindar, the chorus, the victor. The arguable changes in the speaker's persona are not explicitly signalled in the text. This can (...) lead to significant ambiguities concerning the identity of the speaker (“blurred quotation,” “indeterminate speech boundaries”). The lack of a concern always to distinguish clearly the primary from the secondary narrators relates to a desire to confuse diegetic and mimetic forms; the practice of the fifth-century choral lyric poets in this regard is compared to that of other ancient Greek writers. The main challenge is to indicate how it is possible, in theory and in practice, for the athletic victor to be identified as the speaker when this is not explicitly signalled in the text; and, if this is possible, to suggest how it is possible for an audience to recognize when the speaking persona subsequently reverts to laudator or poet. An attempt is made to consider whether any formal, structural, or thematic tendencies can be observed in those passages in choral lyric where the chorus or the victor are tacitly introduced as speaking personae: such effects, it is argued, occur especially when links of ritual or genealogy enable the ode to “zoom” from the mythical past to the present occasion of the performance. The main passages discussed in the article are Pind. P.8.56–60, P.9.89–92, N.7.85, Pae. 2.73–79, and Bacch. 3.84–85. But the phenomena discussed are related broadly to other phenomena in Greek literature, in Latin poetry, and, especially, in Cicero's forensic oratory. (shrink)

Do we remember what pain feels like? Investigations into this question have sometimes led to ambiguous or apparently contradictory results. Building on research on pain memory by Rohini Terry and colleagues, I argue that this lack of agreement may be due in part to the difficulty researchers face when trying to convey to their study’s participants the type of memory they are being tasked with recalling. To address this difficulty, I introduce the concept of ‘qualitative memory’, which, arguably, is the (...) sort of memory we have of what red looks like yet lack with respect to pain. I also briefly address a number of consequences the acknowledgment of qualitative memory would potentially have for philosophy, arguing that if we fail to have qualitative memories of certain sensations, such as pain, the standard philosophical accounts of experience, rational choice, and the sources of moral action may all need revision. (shrink)