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  1. The Story of the Ghost in the Machine.Adam Toon - forthcoming - In Sonia Sedivy (ed.), Art, Representation and Make-Believe: Essays on the Philosophy of Kendall L. Walton. New York, NY, USA:
  2. Mentality and Object: Computational and Cognitive Diachronic Emergence.Ekin Erkan - 2020 - Cosmos and History : The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy 20 (2):296-356.
    Espousing non-reductive physicalism, how do we pick out the specific relevant physical notion(s) from physical facts, specifically in relation to phenomenal experience? Beginning with a historical review of Gilbert Ryle’s behaviorism and moving through Hilary Putnam’s machine-state functionalism and Wilfrid Sellars’ inferential framework, up to more contemporaneous computationalist- and cognitivist-functionalism (Gualtiero Piccinini), we survey accounts of mentality that countenance the emergence of mental states vide input- and output-scheme. Ultimately arriving at the conclusion that functionalism cannot account for problems such as (...)
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  3. Gilbert Ryle’s Adverbialism.Gabrielle Benette Jackson - 2020 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 28 (2):318-335.
    Gilbert Ryle famously wrote that practical knowledge (knowing how) is distinct from propositional knowledge (knowing that). This claim continues to have broad philosophical appeal, and yet there are many unsettled questions surrounding Ryle’s basic proposal. In this article, I return to his original work in order to perform some intellectual archeology. I offer an interpretation of Ryle’s concept of action that I call ‘adverbialism’. Actions are constituted by bodily behaviours performed in a certain mode, style or manner. I present various (...)
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  4. Why Behaviorism and Anti-Representationalism Are Untenable.Markus E. Schlosser - 2020 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 41:277–292.
    It is widely thought that philosophical behaviorism is an untenable and outdated theory of mind. It is generally agreed, in particular, that the view generates a vicious circularity problem. There is a standard solution to this problem for functionalism, which utilizes the formulation of Ramsey sentences. I will show that this solution is also available for behaviorism if we allow quantification over the causal bases of behavioral dispositions. Then I will suggest that behaviorism differs from functionalism mainly in its commitment (...)
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  5. Revaluing the Behaviorist Ghost in Enactivism and Embodied Cognition.Nikolai Alksnis & Jack Alan Reynolds - 2019 - Synthese 198 (6):5785-5807.
    Despite its short historical moment in the sun, behaviorism has become something akin to a theoria non grata, a position that dare not be explicitly endorsed. The reasons for this are complex, of course, and they include sociological factors which we cannot consider here, but to put it briefly: many have doubted the ambition to establish law-like relationships between mental states and behavior that dispense with any sort of mentalistic or intentional idiom, judging that explanations of intelligent behavior require reference (...)
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  6. Another Cartoon Portrait of the Mind From the Reductionist Metaphysicians--A Review of Peter Carruthers ‘The Opacity of Mind’ (2011) (Review Revised 2019).Michael Starks - 2019 - In Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century -- Philosophy, Human Nature and the Collapse of Civilization -- Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 4th Edition Michael Starks. Las Vegas, NV USA: Reality Press. pp. 236-264.
    Materialism, reductionism, behaviorism, functionalism, dynamic systems theory and computationalism are popular views, but they were shown by Wittgenstein to be incoherent. The study of behavior encompasses all of human life, but behavior is largely automatic and unconscious and even the conscious part, mostly expressed in language (which Wittgenstein equates with the mind), is not perspicuous, so it is critical to have a framework which Searle calls the Logical Structure of Rationality (LSR) and I call the Descriptive Psychology of Higher Order (...)
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  7. Mental States Are Like Diseases.Sander Verhaegh - 2019 - In Robert Sinclair (ed.), Science and Sensibilia by W. V. Quine: The 1980 Immanuel Kant Lectures. Palgrave-Macmillan.
    While Quine’s linguistic behaviorism is well-known, his Kant Lectures contain one of his most detailed discussions of behaviorism in psychology and the philosophy of mind. Quine clarifies the nature of his psychological commitments by arguing for a modest view that is against ‘excessively restrictive’ variants of behaviorism while maintaining ‘a good measure of behaviorist discipline…to keep [our mental] terms under control’. In this paper, I use Quine’s Kant Lectures to reconstruct his position. I distinguish three types of behaviorism in psychology (...)
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  8. Fictionalism and the Folk.Adam Toon - 2016 - The Monist 99 (3):280-295.
    Mental fictionalism is the view that, even if mental states do not exist, it is useful to talk as if they do. Mental states are useful fictions. Recent philosophy of mind has seen a growing interest in mental fictionalism. To date, much of the discussion has concerned the general features of the approach. In this paper, I develop a specific form of mental fictionalism by drawing on Kendall Walton’s work on make-believe. According to the approach I propose, talk of mental (...)
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  9. On the Logical Positivists' Philosophy of Psychology: Laying a Legend to Rest.Sean Crawford - 2014 - In Maria Carla Galavotti, Dennis Dieks, Wenceslao J. Gonzalez, Stephan Hartmann, Thomas Uebel & Marcel Weber (eds.), New Directions in Philosophy of Science. The Philosophy of Science in a European Perspective Vol. 5. Springer. pp. 711-726.
    The received view in the history of the philosophy of psychology is that the logical positivists—Carnap and Hempel in particular—endorsed the position commonly known as “logical” or “analytical” behaviourism, according to which the relations between psychological statements and the physical-behavioural statements intended to give their meaning are analytic and knowable a priori. This chapter argues that this is sheer legend: most, if not all, such relations were viewed by the logical positivists as synthetic and knowable only a posteriori. It then (...)
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  10. The Myth of Logical Behaviourism and the Origins of the Identity Theory.Sean Crawford - 2013 - In Michael Beaney (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the History of Analytic Philosophy. Oxford University Press.
    The identity theory’s rise to prominence in analytic philosophy of mind during the late 1950s and early 1960s is widely seen as a watershed in the development of physicalism, in the sense that whereas logical behaviourism proposed analytic and a priori ascertainable identities between the meanings of mental and physical-behavioural concepts, the identity theory proposed synthetic and a posteriori knowable identities between mental and physical properties. While this watershed does exist, the standard account of it is misleading, as it is (...)
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  11. In de ban van de metafysica: de identiteitstheorieën van Place, Smart en Armstrong.Allard Tamminga - 2009 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 71 (3):553-575.
    We investigate the genesis of metaphysical physicalism and its influence on the development of Place's, Smart's, and Armstrong's ideas on the relation between the mental and the physical. We first reconstruct the considerations that led Armstrong and Smart to a 'scientific' world view. We call 'metaphysical physicalism' the comprehensive theory on reality, truth, and meaning which ensued from this world view. Against the background of this metaphysical physicalism we study Armstrong's and Smart's analyses of secondary properties and the genesis of (...)
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  12. Philosophical Investigations, 4th Edition (Trans. Hacker and Schulte).Ludwig Wittgenstein - 2009 - Wiley-Blackwell.
  13. The Inner Life of a Rational Agent: In Defence of Philosophical Behaviourism.Rowland Stout - 2006 - Edinburgh University Press.
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  14. Realism About Behavior.José E. Burgos - 2004 - Behavior and Philosophy 32 (1):69-95.
    Behavior analysis emphasizes the study of overt animal (human and nonhuman) behavior as a subject matter in its own right. This paper provides a metaphysical foundation for such an emphasis via an elucidation of a thesis that I generically call "realism about behavior," where by "realism" I mean an assertion of mind-independent existence. The elucidation takes the form of a conceptual framework that combines a property-exemplification account of events with modal realism in the context of three opposing philosophies of mind: (...)
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  15. Behaviorism for New Psychology: What Was Wrong with Behaviorism and What is Wrong with It Now.P. Harzem - 2004 - Behavior and Philosophy 32 (1):5-12.
    The evolution of behaviorism from its explicit beginning with John B. Watson's declaration in 1913 to the behaviorisms of the present is considered briefly. Contributions of behaviorism to scientific psychology then and now are critically assessed, arriving at the conclusion that regardless of whether or not its opponents and proponents are aware, the essential points of behaviorism have now been absorbed into all of scientific psychology. It will assist the progress of the science of psychology if its focus now shifts (...)
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  16. Minding Behavior.Peter R. Killeen - 2004 - Behavior and Philosophy 32 (1):125-147.
    There is a conflict of interest in behaviorism between diction and content, between clean speech and effective speech, between what we say and what we know. This article gives a framework for speech that is both clean and effective, that respects graded validation of hypotheses, and that favors distinction over doctrine. The article begins with the description of SDT, a mathematical model of discrimination based on statistical decision theory, which serves as leitmotif. It adopts Skinner's distinction between tacts and mands, (...)
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  17. Behavior Is Abstraction, Not Ostension: Conceptual and Historical Remarks on the Nature of Psychology.Emilio Ribes-Iñesta - 2004 - Behavior and Philosophy 32 (1):55 - 68.
    In this paper I discuss (1) the nontechnical nature of the term "behavior"; (2) the need to revisit the Aristotelian concept of soul as the prime naturalistic subject matter of psychology; (3) the incompleteness of meaning when behavior is identified with movements or actions; (4) the implication of behavior in episodic and dispositional words and statements including mental terms; (5) that mental concepts are not learned by inner or outer ostension to physical properties of the speaker or of others; and (...)
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  18. Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind (1949): A Method and a Theory.Laird Addis - 2003 - In J. E. Gracia, G. M. Reichberg & B. N. Schumacher (eds.), The Classics of Western Philosophy: A Reader's Guide. Malden Ma: Blackwell.
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  19. The Classics of Western Philosophy: A Reader's Guide.Jorge J. E. Gracia, Gregory M. Reichberg & Bernard N. Schumacher (eds.) - 2003 - Wiley-Blackwell.
  20. Behaviorism.George Graham - 2003 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  21. Where Should We Look for the Mind?Guy Longworth - 2003 - Think 2 (5):45-50.
    Is your mind in your head? The answer, surprisingly, may be . Guy Longworth sets out the philosophical case for accepting that our minds extend much further into the world than that.
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  22. Behaviourism.Rowland Stout - 2003 - Think 2 (5):37-44.
    The central claim of philosophical behaviourism is this: what it is to be in a certain state of mind is to be disposed to behave in a certain way. Most philosophers think that this claim is obviously false. They also think it is offensive. They think it is offensive because it appears to reduce or eliminate what is most valuable to us – our minds. It puts the notion of behaviour in the place of mind, and so removes what distinguishes (...)
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  23. Reconsidering Ryle: Editor's Introduction.Anthony Chemero - 2002 - Electronic Journal of Anlaytic Philosophy 7.
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  24. Re-Introducing The Concept of Mind.Daniel Dennett - 2002 - Electronic Journal of Analytic Philosophy 7.
    _shazam!–_ the explosive generation of £100.03 of ordinary cash (minus a small quantity extracted by the bank) plus, perhaps, a few stray photons or quarks or gravity waves. He wonders: What kind of containers does the bank use to hold the anti-cash till the regular cash arrives? How are they insulated? Can you store cash and anti-cash in the same box and somehow prevent them from getting in contact? Might there be zombanks that only _seemed_ to store cash and anti-cash? (...)
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  25. What You Know When You Know How Someone Behaves.Rowland Stout - 2002 - Electronic Journal of Anlaytic Philosophy 7.
    [1] In chapter 2 of _The Concept of Mind_, “Knowing How and Knowing That”, and especially in the section on “Understanding and Misunderstanding”, Ryle rejects two approaches to the question of the interpretation of other minds that correspond quite closely with what are now called functionalism, or theory theory, and simulation theory. There is a painful irony here that the functionalist approach to the philosophy of mind, which developed in the late 60s and 70s, has widely been regarded as completely (...)
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  26. Galen Strawson and the Weather WatchersMind and World.Michael Smith & John McDowell - 1998 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (2):449.
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  27. Behaviourism.Alex Byrne - 1996 - In S. D. Guttenplan (ed.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell.
    Introductory texts in the philosophy of mind often begin with a discussion of behaviourism, presented as one of the few theories of mind that have been conclusively refuted. But matters are not that simple: behaviourism, in one form or another, is still alive and kicking.
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  28. Identifying Mental States: A Celebrated Hypothesis Refuted.Irwin Goldstein - 1994 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72 (1):46-62.
    Functionalists think an event's causes and effects, its 'causal role', determines whether it is a mental state and, if so, which kind. Functionalists see this causal role principle as supporting their orthodox materialism, their commitment to the neuroscientist's ontology. I examine and refute the functionalist's causal principle and the orthodox materialism that attends that principle.
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  29. A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind.Samuel Guttenplan (ed.) - 1994 - Cambridge: Blackwell.
    The philosophy of mind is one of the fastest-growing areas in philosophy, not least because of its connections with related areas of psychology, linguistics and computation. This _Companion_ is an alphabetically arranged reference guide to the subject, firmly rooted in the philosophy of mind, but with a number of entries that survey adjacent fields of interest. The book is introduced by the editor's substantial _Essay on the Philosophy of Mind_ which serves as an overview of the subject, and is closely (...)
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  30. Dennett’s Logical Behaviorism.Brian P. Mclaughlin & John O’Leary-Hawthorne - 1994 - Philosophical Topics 22 (1-2):189-258.
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  31. Dennett’s Logical Behaviorism.John O'Leary-Hawthorne - 1994 - Philosophical Topics 22 (1/2):189-258.
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  32. Reinterpreting Ryle: A Nonbehaviorist Analysis.Shelley M. Park - 1994 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 32 (2):265-90.
    This paper argues that the behaviorist label yields a caricature of Ryle's position in The Concept of Mind that cannot be adequately fleshed out by reference to the larger corpus of Rylean texts. On the interpretation of Ryle that I offer here, he is best characterized as an "ontological agnostic." Ryle's aim, I believe, is to develop a nondenotational theory of meaning for mental-conduct terms--a theory of meaning which does not presuppose any metaphysical or ontological theory and, hence, does not (...)
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  33. Reply to Jackson's "Block's Challenge".David M. Armstrong - 1993 - In John Bacon, Keith Campbell & Lloyd Reinhardt (eds.), Ontology, Causality and Mind: Essays in Honour of D.M. Armstrong. New York: Cambridge University Press.
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  34. Ontology, Causality and Mind: Essays in Honour of D M Armstrong.John Bacon, Keith Campbell & Lloyd Reinhardt (eds.) - 1993 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
    D. M. Armstrong is an eminent Australian philosopher whose work over many years has dealt with such subjects as: the nature of possibility, concepts of the particular and the general, causes and laws of nature, and the nature of human consciousness. This collection of essays explores the many facets of Armstrong's work, concentrating on his more recent interests. There are four sections to the book: possibility and identity, universals, laws and causality, and philosophy of mind. The contributors comprise an international (...)
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  35. Block's Challenge.Frank Jackson - 1993 - In Ontology, Causality and Mind: Essays in Honour of D M Armstrong. New York: Cambridge University Press.
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  36. Ontology, Causality and Mind: Essays in Honour of D M Armstrong.Frank Jackson - 1993 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
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  37. A Radical Behaviorist Methodology for the Empirical Investigation of Private Events.Ullin T. Place - 1993 - Behavior and Philosophy 20 (2):25-35.
    Skinner has repeatedly asserted that he does not deny either the existence of private events or the possibility of studying them scientifically. But he has never explained how his position in this respect differs from that of the mentalist or provided a practical methodology for the investigation of private events within a radical behaviorist perspective. With respect to the first of these deficiencies, I argue that observation statements describing a public state of affairs in the common public environment of two (...)
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  38. Behavioral Materialism, the Success of Folk Psychology, and the First-Person Case.Nathan Stemmer - 1993 - Behavior and Philosophy 20 (2):1-14.
  39. A Defense of Behaviorism.Mark Rowlands - 1991 - Behavior and Philosophy 19 (1):93-100.
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  40. Wittgenstein and Physicalism.Rudolf Haller - 1989 - Critica 21 (63):17-32.
  41. Witches and Behaviorists: A Reply to Robinson and Boyer.Max O. Hocutt - 1986 - Behavior and Philosophy 14 (1):97.
    Philosophical critics standardly read behaviorism as a program for defining the concepts of folk psychology in equivalent behavioral terms. This is a misreading. Behaviorism is a program for getting rid of ill-defined mentalistic terms in favor of better defined behavioral idiom. In short, it is a program not for conceptual analysis but for verbal reform. Therefore, criticizing behaviorists for failing to define mentalistic concepts is like criticizing opponents of the Spanish Inquisition for failing to define witchcraft.
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  42. Physicalist Thinking and Conceptions of Behaviour.Jennifer Hornsby - 1986 - In Philip Pettit & John McDowell (eds.), Subject, Thought, and Context. Oxford University Press.
  43. Behaviorism And Logical Positivism: A Reassessment Of The Alliance.Laurence D. Smith - 1986 - Stanford: Stanford University Press.
    ONE Introduction The history of psychology in the twentieth century is a story of the divorce and remarriage of psychology and philosophy. ...
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  44. True Christians and Straw Behaviorists: Remarks on Hocutt.David L. Boyer - 1985 - Behaviorism 13 (2):163-170.
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  45. Spartans, Strawmen, and Symptoms.Max O. Hocutt - 1985 - Behaviorism 13 (2):87-97.
    Behaviorism is belief that psychological states and traits are behavioral dispositions. This is normally interpreted by critics to mean that every person in state S is disposed to behave in way B. So interpreted, behaviorism is subject to the objection that there are spartans who feel pain but do not moan and groan. However, with few exceptions, behaviorists have not contended that everybody who is in a given state of mind necessarily behaves in the same obvious way. Instead, behaviorists have (...)
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  46. Logical Behaviorism and the Simulation of Mental Episodes.Dale Jacquette - 1985 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 6 (3):325-332.
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  47. A Widely Accepted but Nonetheless Astonishingly Flimsy Argument Against Analytical Behaviorism.David L. Boyer - 1984 - Philosophia 14 (1-2):153-172.
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  48. Wittgenstein and Behaviorism.C. Grant Luckhardt - 1983 - Synthese 56 (September):319-338.
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  49. Perhaps the Most Difficult Problem Faced by Behaviorism.Thomas Natsoulas - 1983 - Behaviorism 11 (April):1-26.
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  50. Verbal Behaviorism and Theoretical Mentalism: An Assessment of Marras-Sellars Dialogue.William A. Rottschaefer - 1983 - Philosophy Research Archives 9:511-534.
    Sellars’ verbal behaviorism demands that linguistic episodes be conceptual in an underivative sense and his theoretical mentalism that thoughts as postulated theoretical entities be modelled on linguistic behaviors. Marras has contended that Sellars’ own methodology requires that semantic categories be theoretical. Thus linguistic behaviors can be conceptual in only a derivative sense. Further he claims that overt linguistic behaviors cannot serve as a model for all thought because thought is primarily symbolic. I support verbal behaviorism by showing that semantic categories (...)
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