This article examines Gadamer's claim that language is fundamentally metaphorical from the perspective of Ricoeur's complementary analysis of metaphor. I argue that Gadamer's claim can only be understood in relation to a broader understanding of metaphor in which metaphor is not regarded as secondary to literal meaning. From this context one is better able to understand the connection Gadamer makes between language and ontology, which is found in his statement "Being that can be understood is language.".

In this article is presented a reading of Heidegger in relation to the conception of desire, and its relation to various terms he uses frequently. I argue that the genesis of desire lies in the gap between the fullness of possibility and the poverty of actualization; that inauthentic desire aims at presence, possession, actualization (always insufficient); and that authentic desire aims at the conservation of the possibility-character of being. I also pay attention to the temporality of desire; to the analogy (...) between Kant's emphasis on respect for the law one has freely postulated and Heidegger's emphasis on Dasein's subjection to the possibilities it projects; to possibility as original abundance; and, in principle, to the turning in which desire is evoked in the event of granting, rather than simply produced in the act of projection. Special attention is paid on the German word 'Verlangen', which is related etymologically to the English 'long for', which stands for wanting something very much. But the word is also connected to the word 'long' which is important to get a grip on the notion of desire in Heidegger. (shrink)

The leading question of this article is the way Gadamer interpreted Schleiermacher. Already in Truth and Method Gadamer interpreted Schleiermacher trough the eyes of Dilthey. This resulted in the idea that Schleiermacher was interested in restoring the original meaning of a text. Gadamer never abandoned this psychological interpretation of Schleiermacher. This is a result from the fact that Gadamer did not involve Schleiermacher’s dialectic in his hermeneutics. Because of this Gadamer never mentioned the kinship between Schleiermacher and his own theory (...) of interpretation. In Schleiermacher dialectic and hermeneutics are connected in the same way text constitution and text interpretation are connected. The art of speaking and of understanding are joined together in such a way that they imply each other. They are linked to each other like speaking and hearing . This means that a text is always the result of both. The other, the reader, the interpreter is already there in the constitution of the text. Schleiermacher writes, as a predecessor of Gadamer, in his Dialektik “The more a text is dialogic, the more complete it is” . In this way constitution and interpretation of a text are dependent on each other. By emphasizing the dialogical structure of our knowledge, Schleiermacher opens the way to a broader insight into the world. Through dialogue we can go beyond the limits of our selves and attain a relative universality. We learn to see things from different points of view. We can find traces of this in Gadamer’s hermeneutics, but Gadamer was not able to see that. (shrink)

In this book, internationally recognized scholars in philosophical hermeneutics discuss various aspects of language and linguisticality. The translations of Hans-Georg Gadamer's two recent essays provoke a preliminary discussion on the philosopher's polemic claim in Truth and Method—"Being that can be understood is language." Topics addressed by the contributors include the relationship of rituals to tradition and the immemorial; the unity of the word; conversation; translation and conceptuality; and the interrelationship between the art of writing and linguisticality. This work is of (...) critical importance to anyone interested in Gadamer's claims regarding the boundaries of language, the transition from the prelinguistic to linguistic realms, and the role of rituals in this transition. (shrink)

This paper poses the question of how to understand Heidegger’s notion of the holy in its relevance to a phenomenology of religion. I show that the holy is connected with Heidegger’s notion of the “whole” as it is analysed in anxiety, boredom, and wonder. Insofar as there is no experience of the whole in our time, there is also no experience of the holy. The notion of the whole and the holy are linked with Heidegger’s analysis of the contemporary era, (...) which is a time in which the gods have fled. Religions have a history because the way that the holy appears is connected with the openness of the situation in which it appears. The notion of the holy is therefore historical because it is taken up into the destiny and historicity of being. As long as there is no hierophany, there is no understanding of the gods in a religion. (shrink)

In topical philosophy of religion the word 'given' plays an important role. However the meaning of this word is ambiguous. The word refers not only to the factual reality (datum) but also to what is given as a gift to someone (donum). This ambiguity leads toan unclear mixture of philosophical and religious positions. Therefore an analysis of such mixture is necessary. The main question of this analysis is how faith and religion on the one hand, and ontology and reason on (...) the other hand, influence each other? Isn'tit so that in the religious domain nobody can be convinced with and by rational means? In the first section, the question on the reality of the ultimate meaning as the momentfrom where man is motivated to lead his life, is explored. In the second section the idea is developed that philosophical insights are meaningful with regard to religious meaning only if they are referred back to religious faith. In the third section the question posited is whether philosophical reflection does not loose its original motivationalcontext if it isn't referred back to its original point of departure. This analysis is worked out against the background of I. Verhack's book: De mens en zijn onrust. Over het raadsel van de beweging. (shrink)

Gezeigt wird wie Heideggers Denken des Seins interpretiert werden kann als sein Denken des Verlangens. Es wird darauf hingewiesen dass beim frühen Heidegger Begriffe wie „ὂρµξις“ und „Wille“ anwesend sind, und bestimmt werden als Bewegung der Transzendenz im Entwurf auf Möglichkeit als Möglichkeit. Auch wird gezeigt dass Begriffe wie „das Ungenügende“ und „der Überfluss“ im Entwurf auf Möglichkeiten eine Bedeutung haben. Im eigentlichen Entwurf auf Möglichkeit ist der Überfluss an Möglichkeiten unüberholbar. Dagegen ist die Neugier eine Bewegung die das Mögliche (...) nicht sein lässt‚ sondern das Mögliche nur noch als Wirklichkeit begehrt. Beim späteren Heidegger wird das Sein verstanden als Mögen. Dieses Mögen wird ausgelegt als Verlangen weil das Mögen enerseits eine Zuneigung ist und andererseits das Austragen der Differenz ist. Gezeigt wird wie beim späteren Heidegger der eigentliche Entwurf auf Möglichkeit substantiviert wird als Mögen des Seins. Um diese Zuneigung zu dem Sein anzudeuten braucht Heidegger Begriffe wie „Lange-Zeit“‚ „Langen“‚ „Langmut“‚ und „Langeweile“. Diese Wörter sind verwandt mit dem Wort „Verlangen“ das ursprünglich „differre“ bedeutet. (shrink)

In his very early work, Heidegger was already fascinated by the problem of time, which became more and more radicalized in his thinking. The experience of time, and its connection to the status of philosophical concepts, forms the background of Heidegger’s reading of Paul in his 1920-21 lecture course, 'Introduction to the Phenomenology of Religion.' In discussing the peculiarity of philosophical concepts, Heidegger points out that their uncertainty is by no means accidental, but is in fact endemic to them. This (...) amounts to a definitive step away from the Platonic, Cartesian and Hegelian tradition and its ideal of certainty. In this article the author begins by presenting Heidegger’s description of the phenomenon of time. Then he presents his reformulation of the status of philosophical concepts, and he ends by showing how this is present in Heidegger’s analysis of the letters of Saint Paul. Especially in Heidegger’s interpretation of the letters to the Thessalonians, he shows how the actualization of factical life is understood on the basis of the ‘parousia,’ the second coming of Christ. An essential moment of the orientation of factical life appears in the articulation of the actualization of the lived life; this is historicality. The meaning of human existence appears in existence as historicality. The way in which factical life lives time is the actualization of historicality. (shrink)

In this article the author presents a comment on Ludwig Heyde’s last book. This book on autonomy, transcendence and mortality was published a few days before he died. Heyde analyses the concept of autonomy, transcendence and mortality from a philosophical point of view. He especially pays a lot of attention to the notion of mortality. Here, he tends to strengthen the Kantian postulate of immortality by giving it an ontological claim. But what kind of “being” can we ascribe to what (...) on the other side of death counts for the immortals? Isn’t this a question about the relation between philosophy and religion? Many philosophers tend to approach religion in a reductionistic way. By their point of departure they ignore beforehand the specific religious aspects of life. But isn't it the task for philosophy to approach religion in such a way that religion preserves its specificity? To achieve this, maybe it is also necessary to ascribe ontological claims to religious truth. With his concept of transcendence Heyde approaches religion not in a reductionistic way. However the question remains whether philosophy can do justice to religious truth. Since religion is, as Heyde says in the beginning of his study, sui generis, can philosophy ever do justice to it? Or is religion neutralised by philosophy beforehand? This book therefore, leaves us behind with the question: can philosophy do justice to religion? (shrink)

The question of the sense or meaning of religious behavior is something different from praying or religious activity itself. If one wants to understand religious activity (or if someone wants to explain his actions), one speaks from a distanced concern with regard to this activity or behavior. In a certain sense, activity must be postponed in order to produce an interpretation. The thinking way of giving an account is a different activity, another act, than the act (in this case the (...) religious act) to which the reflecting act of thinking refers. In the first part of this paper, the question is posed as to how religious activity can be understood in terms of hermeneutic reflection. Thisquestion arises from the insight that the rationality of onto-theological thinking is no longer able to understand religious behavior. The second part poses the question as to whether religious activity can be understood from the perspective of a hermeneutical reason. (shrink)