En este trabajo nos proponemos acercarnos a la noción del conocimiento simbólico en la obra de Gottfried Leibniz, rastreándola en diversos textos de su autoría en que se encuentra diseminada. Comenzamos con la importante distinción entre idea y concepto, que separa el planteo de nuestro autor de las formulaciones de otros como Descartes, Malebranche y Spinoza. Seguimos con la clasificación de los tipos de conceptos que el filósofo de Leipzig lleva acabo, en la que divide a los conceptos simbólicos de (...) los intuitivos. Abordamos después las ventajas epistemológicas que presenta el pensamiento simbólico frente al pensamiento verbal, analizando sus funciones cognitivas y su rol en diferentes tipos de sistemas semióticos. Continuamos asentando el simbolismo epistemológico dentro de una teoría general de la representación, que sostiene cierto isomorfismo entre las esferas del lenguaje, el pensamiento y la realidad. Finalmente, fundamentamos ontológicamente esta analogía representativa estructural en la noción leibniziana de expresión y la vinculamos con el perspectivismo monadológico, poniendo de relieve su cercanía con algunos planteos fenomenológicos y hermenéuticos de nuestros días. (shrink)

On many currently live interpretations, quantum mechanics violates the classical supposition of value definiteness, according to which the properties of a given particle or system have precise values at all times. Here we consider whether either metaphysical supervaluationist or determinable-based approaches to metaphysical indeterminacy can accommodate quantum metaphysical indeterminacy (QMI). We start by discussing the standard theoretical indicator of QMI, and distinguishing three seemingly different sources of QMI (S1). We then show that previous arguments for the conclusion that metaphysical supervaluationism (...) cannot accommodate QMI, due to Darby 2010 and Skow 2010, are unsuccessful, in leaving open several supervaluationist responses. We go on to provide more comprehensive argumentation for the negative conclusion. Here, among other results, we establish that the problems for supervaluationism extend far beyond the concern that is the focus of Darby's and Skow's discussions (according to which a supervaluationist approach is incompatible with the orthodox interpretation, in light of the Kochen-Specker theorem) to also attach to common understandings of other interpretations on which there is QMI (S2). We then argue that a determinable-based account can successfully accommodate all three varieties of QMI (S3). We close by observing the positive mutual bearing of our results on the coherence and intelligibility of both quantum mechanics and metaphysical indeterminacy (S4). (shrink)

This paper explores quantum indeterminacy, as it is operative in the failure of value‐definiteness for quantum observables. It first addresses questions about its existence, its nature, and its relations to extant quantum interpretations. Then, it provides a critical discussions of the main accounts of quantum indeterminacy.

In Calosi and Wilson (Phil Studies 2019/2018), we argue that on many interpretations of quantum mechanics (QM), there is quantum mechanical indeterminacy (QMI), and that a determinable-based account of metaphysical indeterminacy (MI), as per Wilson 2013 and 2016, properly accommodates the full range of cases of QMI. Here we argue that this approach is superior to other treatments of QMI on offer, both realistic and deflationary, in providing the basis for an intelligible explanation of the interference patterns in the double-slit (...) experiment. We start with a brief overview of the motivations for QMI and for a determinable-based account of MI (§1). We then apply a developed 'glutty' implementation of determinable-based QMI to the superposition-based QMI present in the double-slit experiment, and positively compare the associated explanation of double-slit interference with that available on a metaphysical supervaluationist account of QMI (§2). We then present and respond to objections, due to Glick (2017) and Torza (2017), either to QMI (§3) or to our specific account of QMI (§4); in these sections we also positively compare our treatment of double-slit interference to that available on Glick's deflationary treatment of QMI. We conclude with some dialectical observations (§5). (shrink)

Monism is roughly the view that there is only one fundamental entity. One of the most powerful argument in its favor comes from quantum mechanics. Extant discussions of quantum monism are framed independently of any interpretation of the quantum theory. In contrast, this paper argues that matters of interpretation play a crucial role when assessing the viability of monism in the quantum realm. I consider four different interpretations: modal interpretations, Bohmian mechanics, many worlds interpretations, and wavefunction realism. In particular, I (...) extensively argue for the following claim: several interpretations of QM do not support monism at a more serious scrutiny, or do so only with further problematic assumptions, or even support different versions of it. (shrink)

The paper address the question of whether quantum mechanics (QM) favors Priority Monism, the view according to which the Universe is the only fundamental object. It develops formal frameworks to frame rigorously the question of fundamental mereology and its answers, namely (Priority) Pluralism and Monism. It then reconstructs the quantum mechanical argument in favor of the latter and provides a detailed and thorough criticism of it that sheds furthermore new light on the relation between parthood, composition and fundamentality in QM.

Resumen: Este artículo postula que el mejor modo de leer la Relectio de Indis de Francisco de Vitoria es considerar que no solo se trata de un texto que pertenece al género de análisis político. Para fundar esta hipótesis de lectura la investigación discurre en tres niveles: analiza el contexto de producción del texto; fija las características de los textos de análisis político y propone un autor y lector modelos de la Relectio. La conclusión de la investigación distingue entre interpretación (...) y uso del texto, y sostiene que la interpretación de la Relectio exige que el lector empírico conozca los tres niveles de análisis, mientras que el uso del texto exige considerar que él trata un conjunto de soluciones a problemas perennes en las sociedades: los dilemas interculturales.: This article postulates that the best way of reading Francisco Victoria’s Relectio of Indis is having in mind that it not only is about a text which belongs to the political analysis genre. To support this reading hypothesis, the investigation proceeds in three levels: First, it analyzes the context of production of the text; second, it sets the features of the texts of political analysis and; third, it proposes an author and model reader of the Relectio. The conclusion of the investigation distinguishes between interpretation and the use of text as well as it holds that the interpretation of the Relectio demands the empiric reader to know the three levels of analysis, whereas the use of the text demands him to deal with a set of solutions to perennial problems in societies: intercultural dilemmas. (shrink)

Este trabajo se propone discutir el concepto kantiano de Ilustración en un triple aspecto: 1) la noción de saber implícita en el uso del lema sapere aude, referida no al conocimiento , sino a una noción de razón que culmina en la sabiduría (Weisheit.

Kant ha subrayado el carácter problemático del auto-conocimiento en el campo de la antropología y la psicología: desde sus primeras obras insistió en la imposibilidad de conocer con certeza, sobre la base de las acciones, la disposición moral subjetiva, la única que da a la acción un valor moral. Esta dificultad no se atenúa cuando el juicio moral es dirigido sobre el sujeto mismo. A los problemas cognitivos se añade una tendencia al auto-engaño que está activa en toda la vida (...) moral. Si se mantiene la importancia de este argumento, puede emerger una caracterización de la Gesinnung que la distingue de cualquier “intención” subjetiva. Aquella puede ser concebida más bien como una estructura “objetiva”, independiente de la conciencia subjetiva y análoga a una idea regulativa, que obliga a interpretar las acciones morales sobre la base de un principio que es necesario asumir, pero que no es posible conocer. (shrink)

The paper presents different arguments against the necessity of mereological universalism. First, it argues that they are examples of a much more general argumentative structure. It then contends that some of these arguments cannot be resisted by distinguishing different variants of universalism that have been recently proposed in the literature—in contrast with recent suggestions to the contrary. Finally, it provides different ways to resist such contingentist arguments on behalf of universalists.

The present study investigated the mediating role of conceptions of learning in the relationship between metacognition and academic outcomes among middle school students. The self-report ‘Learning Conceptions Questionnaire’ (LCQ) and ‘Metacognitive questionnaire on the method of study’ (QMS) were administered to 136 middle school students and their academic outcomes were collected. Correlation analyses revealed that within metacognition only self-assessment was positively correlated with academic outcomes. Mediation analysis indicated that a conception of learning as internal attribution of success and failure was (...) significantly involved as mediator in the relationship between metacognition and academic achievements. The present study permitted to advance our knowledge about the relationship between metacognition and academic achievements and it opened the way to practical implications. (shrink)

The paper presents different arguments against the necessity of mereological universalism. First, it argues that they are examples of a much more general argumentative structure. It then contends that some of these arguments cannot be resisted by distinguishing different variants of universalism that have been recently proposed in the literature—in contrast with recent suggestions to the contrary. Finally, it provides different ways to resist such contingentist arguments on behalf of universalists.

This article discusses the account of Kant's view of concept formation that Alberto Vanzo has put forward in "Kant e la formazione dei concetti" (Trento: Verifiche, 2012).

A generalization of gauge theory in which the gauge potential1-form is replaced by a p-form is studied. Charged particles are then replaced by elementary extended objects of dimension p−1. It is shown that this extension is compatible with space-time locality only if the gauge group is U(1). A source which is a closed p−1 surface has zero total charge and corresponds to a particle-antiparticle pair. Its quantum rate of production in an external uniform field is evaluated semiclassically. The analog of (...) the Dirac magnetic pole is constructed. It is another extended object, of dimension n−p−3, where n is the dimension of space-time. The “electric” and “magnetic” charges obey the Dirac quantization condition. This condition is derived in two different ways. One method makes use of local gauge patches and the other brings in singular gauge transformations. A topological mass term is introduced and it is shown that it can coexist with a magnetic pole when n=2p+1, provided the topological mass is quantized. (shrink)

Am 26. Dezember 2005, einen Tag vor seinem 74. Geburtstag, starb Silvestro Marcucci, Erster Vorsitzender der „Società Italiana di Studi Kantiani“, sowie Begründer und Herausgeber der Zeitschrift „Studi kantiani“. Sein Tod kam gänzlich unerwartet in einer Zeit, da er, seit dem 31. Oktober 2005 frei von akademischen Verpflichtungen, seine wissenschaftliche Tätigkeit fortsetzte, vielleicht mit noch größerer Freude und mehr Engagement als zuvor. Die letzten Wochen seines Lebens waren mit dem Gedanken an der Organisation des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses 2010 erfüllt, der (...) nach dem Beschluss der Kant-Gesellschaft im Oktober 2005 von der Società di studi kantiani in Pisa veranstaltet werden wird. Marcucci trug wie kaum ein anderer dazu bei, der italienischen Kant-Forschung, die ohnehin schon lange internationale Anerkennung gewonnen hat, ein prägnantes Profil zu verleihen: er hatte die Fähigkeit, die zahlreichen italienischen Forscher einem intensiveren wissenschaftlichen Austausch und dadurch zu neuen Leistungen zuzuführen. (shrink)

The aim of the paper is to discuss the basic concepts developed in Ferraris’ book Documentalità, in particular the first two items of the conceptual triad trace-registration-inscription. The alleged priority of icnology on semiotics can hardly be justified; due to the overlooking of the notions of rule and code, the law of the production of traces remains obscure. On the other hand, the notion of registration as presence of traces in the mind conflicts whit some of our knowledge about the (...) brain and cannot avoid a logical circularity, since the trace is defined as something which can exist only if a mind is recognizing it as such. (shrink)

Resumen Este artículo estudia la transformación de las bases del escepticismo antiguo en el pensamiento agustiniano; para presentar el proceso se parte de la crisis que supuso la ruptura con experiencia maniquea, se distingue su preocupación y consideración sobre el modo y los límites del conocimiento y se analiza la función de la imagen mítica de Proteo en Contra Académicos; esta imagen permite ponderar la capacidad de la representación mítica como contrafuerte del carácter discursivo del saber humano. Mediante este recurso, (...) san Agustín afirma que la razón no puede quedar aislada de otros modos complementarios de comprensión, hace propio el núcleo de la actitud escéptica y amplía la noción de racionalidad para la filosofía cristiana.This paper studies the transformation of the foundations of ancient skepticism in Augustinian thought; to present the process we start from the crisis that led to the break with Manichaean experience, we distinguished their concern and consideration about the mode and limits of knowledge and analyzed the function of Proteo's mythical image in Contra academicos; this image allows us to weigh the capacity of mythical representation as a buttress of the discursive character of human knowledge. Through this resource, St. Augustine affirms that reason cannot be isolated from other complementary modes of understanding, appropriates the core of the skeptical attitude and broadens the notion of rationality for Christian philosophy. (shrink)

RESUMENLa filosofía del último Schelling presenta elementos decisivos para una ontología de la libertad. Hay dos temas que en el último Schelling llevan precisamente al desarrollo de la ontología de la libertad, encabezada por Luigi Pareyson: el éxtasis de la razón, a la que dio una interpretación profunda el mismo Pareyson y la estructura de la libertad de Dios, en cuya configuración yo también he insistido. El éxtasis es la interrupción del desarrollo de la razón, que llega a sus límites (...) y está fundada desde el ser – en el ser que la precede, y que escapa de su poder. Desde aquí Schelling intenta elaborar una concepción compleja y no siempre lineal de la libertad de Dios, ya como libertad de la creación, ya –más originariamente– como libertad frente a su propio ser. En este intento Schelling no alcanza a liberarse completamente de la tradición metafísica del principio de necesidad. La ontología de la libertad se libera de éste considerando la libertad no sólo como inicio, sino tambien como elección entre ser y no ser. De esta manera, por un lado, lo originario escapa radicalmente a la necesidad y, por el otro lado, precisamente porque su ser es elegido en una alternativa, la suya no es una simple autoposicion, que sucumbe a la necesidad, sino la posición de algo otro de sí, el ser, respecto al cual puede ejercer su libre poder.PALABRAS CLAVEDIOS, LIBERTAD, ONTOLOGÍA, RAZÓN, EXTASISABSTRACTThe philosophy of the last Schelling presents decisive insights for an ontology of freedom. Particularly two themes of the last Schelling lead to the ontology of freedom proposed by Luigi Pareyson: the ecstasy of reason of which Pareyson himself gave a profound interpretation and the structure of God’s freedom on the configuration of which I insisted too. Ecstasy is the interruption of the development of reason, which comes to its limits and is founded by the being, which is beyond reason’s power. From here, Schelling tries to process a complex and not always linear conception of God’s freedom both as freedom of creation and, more originally, as freedom of his own being. In this attempt Schelling does not depart completely from the metaphysical tradition of the principle of necessity. The ontology of freedom thinks freedom not only as a beginning, but as a choice between being and not being. In this way, on the one hand the absolute origin escapes radically from the necessity and on the other hand, just because its being is chosen within an alternative, its position of the being is not a simple self-position, which would succumb to the necessity, but the position of something different from itself: the being with regard to which it can exercise its free power.KEY WORDSGOD, FREEDOM, ONTOLOGY, REASON, ECSTASY. (shrink)