This article presents hospitality as a pivotal value in the context of increasing diversity that characterises the complex relations in which leadership emerges. After reviewing the concept of Otherness in philosophy, the notion of hospitality as developed by Richard Kearney in relation to his philosophy of religion is introduced. The case of Nobel Peace Prize Laureate Chief Albert Luthuli is then presented as a biographical leadership study from the African context to illustrate how hospitality as open response to radical Otherness (...) may inspire collaboration and foster positive change. The article then addresses ways in which the notions of hospitality and Otherness present new opportunities to leadership studies for responding to the relational challenges of the globalised world. Amidst an increased scholarly focus on relationality and the need for relational intelligence, globalisation routinely confronts leaders and their followers with radical Otherness. Through dialogue between theology, philosophy of religion and leadership studies and by presenting a case from the African context, the article offers in print what is called for in the global context, namely an open response to the alterity of the Other that enables collaboration amidst increasing diversity. CONTRIBUTION: Proceeding from a transdisciplinary engagement, the article illustrates that leadership studies stood to benefit from dialogue with theology and philosophy of religion, which offers ways of addressing the Otherness that characterise the globalised context of leadership. (shrink)

Philosophers often claim that humility is a dependent virtue: a virtue that depends on another virtue for its value. I consider three views about this relation: Specific Dependence, Unspecific Dependence, and Fittingness. I argue that, since humility cannot uniquely depend on another virtue, and since this uniqueness is desirable, we should reject Specific and Unspecific Dependence. I defend a Fittingness view, according to which the humble person possesses some objectively good quality fitting for humility. I show beyond Slote’s original characterization (...) of the dependence relation that, even if humility’s value depends on having objectively good qualities, humility itself can be one such quality. So, humility can depend on itself. I call this view Bootstrapped Fittingness. (shrink)

Unveiling the Past—Preparing the Conditions for Human Beings to Live in the Midst of One Another Again? A Response From Living in Northern Ireland Content Type Journal Article Category Symposium Pages 333-335 DOI 10.1007/s11673-011-9334-y Authors Derick Wilson, University of Ulster, School of Education, Coleraine, Co. Londonderry, BT52 1SA UK Journal Journal of Bioethical Inquiry Online ISSN 1872-4353 Print ISSN 1176-7529 Journal Volume Volume 8 Journal Issue Volume 8, Number 4.

This paper contains a completeness proof for the system ILW, a rather bewildering axiom system belonging to the family of interpretability logics. We have treasured this little proof for a considerable time, keeping it just for ourselves. Johan’s ftieth birthday appears to be the right occasion to get it out of our wine cellar.

We prove that all extensions of Heyting Arithmetic with a logic that has the finite frame property possess the de Jongh property.

The utterance “I am humble” is thought to be paradoxical because a speaker implies that they know they are virtuous or reveals an aim to impress others – a decidedly non-humble aim. Such worries lead to the seemingly absurd conclusion that a humble person cannot properly assert that they are humble. In this paper, I reconstruct and evaluate three purported paradoxes of humility concerning its self-attribution, knowledge and belief about our own virtue, and humility's value. I argue that humility is (...) not genuinely paradoxical and that these puzzles do not have meaningful implications for its conceptual analyses. I instead offer error theoretical explanations of humility's apparent paradoxicality. (shrink)

Current management of people with prolonged disorders of consciousness is failing patients, families and society. The causes include a general lack of concern, knowledge and expertise; a legal and professional framework which impedes timely and appropriate decision-making and/or enactment of the decision; and the exclusive focus on the patient, with no legitimate means to consider the broader consequences of healthcare decisions. This article argues that a clinical pathway based on the principles of the English Mental Capacity Act 2005 and using (...) time-limited treatment trials could greatly improve patient management and reduce stress on families. There needs to be early and continuing use of formal best interests meetings, starting between 7 and 21 days after onset of unconsciousness. The treatment options need to evolve as the clinical state and prognosis becomes more certain. A formal discussion of treatment withdrawal should occur when the upper bound of predicted recovery falls below a level the patient would have considered acceptable, and it should always be discussed when the condition is considered permanent. Any decision to stop treatment should be contingent on a formal second opinion from an independent expert who should review the clinical situation and expected prognosis, but not the best interests decision. The article also asks how, if at all, the adverse effects on the family and the resource implications of long-term care of people left in a prolonged state of unconsciousness should be incorporated in the process. (shrink)

We prove that all extensions of Heyting Arithmetic with a logic that has the finite frame property possess the de Jongh property.

Psychological situationism is the view that our behavior is ordered by external features of situations as opposed to robust character traits. Philosophical situationists have taken this claim to be conservatively revisionary for ethics; on their view, situationism problematizes only character, not any essential features of our ethical deliberation. Little has been said, however, about how these revisions motivate situationists’ claim that we ought to redirect our attention from cultivating virtues to managing situational influences on behavior. Virtue theorists have typically responded (...) to situationists by arguing that skill-based practical wisdom—the exercise of which underwrites all other virtues—can be appropriately sensitive to situational influences. Following this response, discussions about the prescriptive consequences of situationism have largely resulted in a stalemate. In this paper, I argue that situationism faces a dilemma: it is either too conservative to be ethically revisionary or too radical to inform our ethical deliberation. I argue that both horns of this dilemma are unacceptable. Thus, we should reject situationist revisions to our ethical deliberation, and conclude that situationism is not conservatively revisionary for ethics. (shrink)

Philosophers often characterize modesty as a disposition that primarily or exclusively involves individual attitudes about one’s worth in relation to others. Borrowing from William James, I offer an interpersonal view of modesty that requires an emotional disposition sensitive to causing others offense based upon one’s self-presentation. On this view, modesty is a trait with the following three necessary features: (1) the modest person, A, endorses a norm of self-presentation M, (2) A is justified in believing that another person, B, endorses (...) M, and (3) A is emotionally disposed to avoid offending B by violating M. These conditions account for the variety of modesty norms about one’s merits and achievements, personal objects, and traditional modesty norms in dress and self-presentation. (shrink)

Most jurisdictions require a patient to consent to any medical intervention. Clinicians ask a patient, ‘Given the pain and distress associated with our intervention and the predicted likelihood of this best-case outcome, do you want to accept the treatment?’ When a patient is incapable of deciding, clinicians may ask people who know the patient to say what the patient would decide; this is substituted judgement. In contrast, asking the same people to say how the person would make the decision is (...) substituted interests.1 The UK Mental Capacity Act 2005 uses the latter approach, and my comments appertain to that approach. When a patient lacks capacity, the question facing clinicians is, ‘Given the likely outcome of this treatment plan for the patient’s life in the long term, would the patient decide to accept the plan?’ This answer depends on the patient’s wishes, values and other factors they would use when deciding. The proposed development of an algorithm involves the following:2. (shrink)

Solovay's 1976 completeness result for modal provability logic employs the recursion theorem in its proof. It is shown that the uses of the recursion theorem can in this proof replaced by the diagonalization lemma for arithmetic and that, in effect, the proof neatly fits the framework of another, enriched, system of modal logic so that any arithmetical system for which this logic is sound is strong enough to carry out the proof, in particular $\text{I}\Delta _{0}+\text{EXP}$ . The method is adapted (...) to obtain a similar completeness result for the Rosser logic. (shrink)

A definition is given for formulae $A_1,\ldots,A_n$ in some theory $T$ which is formalized in a propositional calculus $S$ to be (in)dependent with respect to $S$. It is shown that, for intuitionistic propositional logic $\mathbf{IPC}$, dependency (with respect to $\mathbf{IPC}$ itself) is decidable. This is an almost immediate consequence of Pitts' uniform interpolation theorem for $\mathbf{IPC}$. A reasonably simple infinite sequence of $\mathbf{IPC}$-formulae $F_n(p, q)$ is given such that $\mathbf{IPC}$-formulae $A$ and $B$ are dependent if and only if at least (...) on the $F_n(A, B)$ is provable. (shrink)

Professor Charles Foster1 argues that the recent decision by the Supreme Court2 on the process of making decisions about medical treatment in people who lack capacity due to a prolonged disorder of consciousness is fostering medical paternalism. He considers that the judgment shows ‘ deference to the guidelines of various organisations ’ and then that ‘ The guidance has effectively become a definitive statement of the relevant obligations,’ concluding that ‘ This usurps the function of the law.’ Healthcare teams make (...) all decisions concerning medical care provided; no-one else can. Both the clinicians themselves, and any guidance provided to them, must comply with the Mental Capacity Act 2005.3 Lady Black’s judgment makes clear that ‘ The basic protective structure is established by the MCA 2005 ’ and that the associated Code of Practice4 ‘ contains valuable guidance ’. She specifically highlights that the decision-maker must ensure that ‘ account has been taken of the patient’s previously expressed wishes and those of people close to him, as well as the opinions of other medical personnel. The MCA 2005 requires this to happen, and is reinforced by the professional guidance available to doctors.’ The Act says: ‘ He must consider, so far as is reasonably ascertainable— 1. the person’s past and present wishes and feelings (and, in …. (shrink)

Solovay's 1976 completeness result for modal provability logic employs the recursion theorem in its proof. It is shown that the uses of the recursion theorem can in this proof be replaced by the diagonalization lemma for arithmetic and that, in effect, the proof neatly fits the framework of another, enriched, system of modal logic (the so-called Rosser logic of Gauspari-Solovay, 1979) so that any arithmetical system for which this logic is sound is strong enough to carry out the proof, in (...) particular I0+EXP. The method is adapted to obtain a similar completeness result for the Rosser logic. (shrink)

To the standard propositional modal system of provability logic constants are added to account for the arithmetical fixed points introduced by Bernardi-Montagna in [5]. With that interpretation in mind, a system LR of modal propositional logic is axiomatized, a modal completeness theorem is established for LR and, after that, a uniform arithmetical completeness theorem with respect to PA is obtained for LR.

The problem of Uniqueness and Explicit Definability of Fixed Points for Interpretability Logic is considered. It turns out that Uniqueness is an immediate corollary of a theorem of Smoryski.

The commons have emerged as a key notion and underlying experience of many efforts around the world to promote justice and democracy. A central question for political theories of the commons is whether the visions of social order and regimes of political economy they propose are complementary or opposed to public goods that are backed up by governmental coordination and compulsion. This essay argues that the post-Marxist view, which posits an inherent opposition between the commons as a sphere of inappropriable (...) usage and statist public infrastructure, is mistaken, because justice and democracy are not necessarily furthered by the institution of inappropriability. I articulate an alternative pluralist view based on James Tully’s work, which discloses the dynamic interplay between public and common modes of provision and enjoyment, and their civil and civic orientations respectively. Finally, the essay points to the Janus-faced character of the commons and stresses the co-constitutive role of public goods and social services for just and orderly social life while remaining attentive to the dialectic of empowerment and tutelage that marks provision by government. (shrink)

The modal completeness proofs of Guaspari and Solovay (1979) for their systems R and R – are improved and the relationship between R and R – is clarified.

The problem of Uniqueness and Explicit Definability of Fixed Points for Interpretability Logic is considered. It turns out that Uniqueness is an immediate corollary of a theorem of Smoryński.

Michael Oakeshott’s account of political economy is claimed to have found its ‘apotheosis under Thatcherism’. Against critics who align him with a preference for small government, this article points to Oakeshott’s stress on the indispensability of an infrastructure of government-provided public goods, in which individual agency and associative freedom can flourish. I argue that Oakeshott’s account of political economy invites a contestatory politics over three types of public goods, which epitomize the unresolvable tension he diagnosed between nomocratic and teleocratic conceptions (...) of the modern state. These three types are the system of civil law, the by-products of the operation of civil law and public goods which result from policies. The article concludes that Oakeshott offers an important corrective to political theories which favour either market mediation or radical democratic governance of the commons as self-sustaining modes of providing and enjoying goods. (shrink)

In this paper the system IL for relative interpretability is studied.

Michael Oakeshott’s account of political economy is claimed to have found its ‘apotheosis under Thatcherism’. Against critics who align him with a preference for small government, this article poin...

To the standard propositional modal system of provability logic constants are added to account for the arithmetical fixed points introduced by Bernardi-Montagna in [5]. With that interpretation in mind, a system LR of modal propositional logic is axiomatized, a modal completeness theorem is established for LR and, after that, a uniform arithmetical (Solovay-type) completeness theorem with respect to PA is obtained for LR.

It is shown that for arithmetical interpretations that may include free variables it is not the Guaspari-Solovay system R that is arithmetically complete, but their system R –. This result is then applied to obtain the nonvalidity of some rules under arithmetical interpretations including free variables, and to show that some principles concerning Rosser orderings with free variables cannot be decided, even if one restricts oneself to usual proof predicates.

This first chapter contains an introduction to modal logic. In section 1.1 the syntactic side of the matter is discussed, and in section 1.2 the subject is approached from a semantic point of view.

THE PURPOSE OF THE PRESENT EXPOSITION is to put forward an interpretation of Locke's and Hooker's conception of the finding of the law. The topics which will be examined are the knowledge and content of the different types of law and, above all, the standard of the good law. That Locke and Hooker used the same language, to a large extent, in treating the concept of law can be seen immediately in a comparison of Locke's Essays on the Law of (...) Nature, Two Treatises on Government, and Essay on Human Understanding with the first book of Hooker's Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity. This similarity facilitated Locke's recourse to Hooker's texts when he wanted to strengthen some of the arguments of the Second Treatise. But is the use of similar language not deceptive in the present case? Do terms used in 1690 intend the same meaning as they did when used in 1660? After nearly four decades of conflicting interpretations of Locke's political and philosophical texts, one can hardly expect to offer a new answer. This analysis will explore the similarity within the framework of a traditional, natural law interpretation of Locke. We shall find that, in Hooker's Laws and Locke's Two Treatises, we are faced with the same pattern of exposition concerning natural law and its source. Following this path of inquiry represents a decision to put aside, for the time being, the influential but highly problematic suggestion that Locke wished to deceive his readers in the exposition of some of the most central parts of his political theory. (shrink)

Following A.N. Whitehead’s rhythm of education, the author provides a guide for parents and educators on raising children to thrive in times of tempestuous change. Each chapter presents exemplary educational events rich in context, and then draws on seminal research to ground her recommendations in a robust theoretical foundation.

It is shown that for arithmetical interpretations that may include free variables it is not the Guaspari-Solovay system R that is arithmetically complete, but their system R⁻. This result is then applied to obtain the nonvalidity of some rules under arithmetical interpretations including free variables, and to show that some principles concerning Rosser orderings with free variables cannot be decided, even if one restricts onself to "usual" proof predicates.

Standard unary modal logic and binary modal logic, i.e. modal logic with one binary operator, are shown to be definitional extensions of one another when an additional axiom |$U$| is added to the basic axiomatization of the binary side. This is a strengthening of our previous results. It follows that all unary modal logics extending Classical Modal Logic, in other words all unary modal logics with a neighborhood semantics, can equivalently be seen as binary modal logics. This in particular applies (...) to standard modal logics, which can be given simple natural axiomatizations in binary form. We illustrate this in the logic K. We call such logics binary expansions of the unary modal logics. There are many more such binary expansions than the ones given by the axiom |$U$|⁠. We initiate an investigation of the properties of these expansions and in particular of the maximal binary expansions of a logic. Our results directly imply that all sub- and superintuitionistic logics with a standard modal companion also have binary modal companions. The latter also applies to the weak subintuitionistic logic WF of our previous papers. This logic doesn’t seem to have a unary modal companion. (shrink)

The leopoldistic version of the events before Berchtesgaden - politically the most important period in the Question Royale during the occupation - is from the start till the end historically not grounded. The known facts prove that the King was absolutely not passive in political matters. He doesn't reject the proposal for a meeting with Hitler. Already on May 31 he declares to agree in principle to meet the Führer. On June 26 he again expresses this willingness. In October he (...) sends his sister Marie-José, crownprincess of Italy, to Hitler, collecting the requested invitation for a meeting. The meeting Hitler-Leopold III at Berchtesgaden reveals not only a humanitarian, but also an indeniable political character.There is too great a difference between the leopoldistic version and the facts - as far as known at this moment and from limited sources. One is inclined to ask oneself if the editors of the Whitebook and of the report of the Servais-commission, had knowledge of all the facts, which normally should have been at their disposal. If the answer is no, than one has to assume «a secret of the King». (shrink)

In 1995 Visser, van Benthem, de Jongh, and Renardel de Lavalette introduced NNIL-formulas, showing that these are exactly the formulas preserved under taking submodels of Kripke models. In this article we show that NNIL-formulas are up to frame equivalence the formulas preserved under taking subframes of frames, that NNIL-formulas are subframe formulas, and that subframe logics can be axiomatized by NNIL-formulas. We also define a new syntactic class of ONNILLI-formulas. We show that these are the formulas preserved in monotonic (...) images of frames and that ONNILLI-formulas are stable formulas as introduced by Bezhanishvili and Bezhanishvili in 2013. Thus, ONNILLI is a syntactically defined set of formulas axiomatizing all stable logics. This resolves a problem left open in 2013. (shrink)