Thomas Kuhn is mostly known for his contributions to the philosophy of science. However, it was chiefly to investigations in philosophy of language that he dedicated the last part of his career. The aim of this paper is to present a systematic view of Kuhn’s main ideas on this subject. I start by describing his theory of concept, in particular what he says about kind terms. Such terms, acquired in blocks that form contrast sets or “taxonomies,” are learned through ostensible (...) definitions. Next, I analyze Kuhn’s concepts of “meaning” and “truth.” Finally, I discuss a second type of kinds terms, not fully investigated by him, which is learned together with scientific laws. Resumo Thomas Kuhn é conhecido principalmente por suas contribuições para a filosofia da ciência. No entanto, foi em grande medida à filosofia da linguagem que ele dedicou a última parte de sua carreira. O objetivo deste artigo é apresentar uma visão sistemática das principais ideias de Kuhn sobre esse assunto. Começo descrevendo sua teoria do conceito, em particular o que ele diz sobre termos para espécie. Tais termos, aprendidos em blocos que formam conjuntos de contraste ou “taxonomias”, são aprendidos através de definições ostensivas. Em seguida, analiso as concepções de Kuhn de “significado” e “verdade”. Finalmente, discuto um segundo tipo de termo para espécies, não totalmente investigado por ele, que é aprendido junto com as leis científicas. (shrink)

Entrevista com Martin Jay (Universidade de Berkeley, Califórnia), por Bruna Della Torre e Eduardo Altheman.

In some recent articles, Cobreros, Egré, Ripley, & van Rooij have defended the idea that abandoning transitivity may lead to a solution to the trouble caused by semantic paradoxes. For that purpose, they develop the Strict-Tolerant approach, which leads them to entertain a nontransitive theory of truth, where the structural rule of Cut is not generally valid. However, that Cut fails in general in the target theory of truth does not mean that there are not certain safe instances of Cut (...) involving semantic notions. In this article we intend to meet the challenge of answering how to regain all the safe instances of Cut, in the language of the theory, making essential use of a unary recovery operator. To fulfill this goal, we will work within the so-called Goodship Project, which suggests that in order to have nontrivial naïve theories it is sufficient to formulate the corresponding self-referential sentences with suitable biconditionals. Nevertheless, a secondary aim of this article is to propose a novel way to carry this project out, showing that the biconditionals in question can be totally classical. In the context of this article, these biconditionals will be essentially used in expressing the self-referential sentences and, thus, as a collateral result of our work we will prove that none of the recoveries expected of the target theory can be nontrivially achieved if self-reference is expressed through identities. (shrink)

When discussing Logical Pluralism several critics argue that such an open-minded position is untenable. The key to this conclusion is that, given a number of widely accepted assumptions, the pluralist view collapses into Logical Monism. In this paper we show that the arguments usually employed to arrive at this conclusion do not work. The main reason for this is the existence of certain substructural logics which have the same set of valid inferences as Classical Logic—although they are, in a clear (...) sense, non-identical to it. We argue that this phenomenon can be generalized, given the existence of logics which coincide with Classical Logic regarding a number of metainferential levels—although they are, again, clearly different systems. We claim this highlights the need to arrive at a more refined version of the Collapse Argument, which we discuss at the end of the paper. (shrink)

Recently, it has been proposed to understand a logic as containing not only a validity canon for inferences but also a validity canon for metainferences of any finite level. Then, it has been shown that it is possible to construct infinite hierarchies of "increasingly classical" logics—that is, logics that are classical at the level of inferences and of increasingly higher metainferences—all of which admit a transparent truth predicate. In this paper, we extend this line of investigation by taking a somehow (...) different route. We explore logics that are different from classical logic at the level of inferences, but recover some important aspects of classical logic at every metainferential level. We dub such systems meta-classical non-classical logics. We argue that the systems presented deserve to be regarded as logics in their own right and, moreover, are potentially useful for the non-classical logician. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to show that it’s not a good idea to have a theory of truth that is consistent but ω-inconsistent. In order to bring out this point, it is useful to consider a particular case: Yablo’s Paradox. In theories of truth without standard models, the introduction of the truth-predicate to a first order theory does not maintain the standard ontology. Firstly, I exhibit some conceptual problems that follow from so introducing it. Secondly, I show that (...) in second order theories with standard semantics the same procedure yields a theory that doesn’t have models. So, while having an ω- inconsistent theory is a bad thing, having an unsatisfiable theory of truth is actually worse. This casts doubts on whether the predicate in question is, after all, a truthpredicate for that language. Finally, I present some alternatives to prove an inconsistency adding plausible principles to certain theories of truth. (shrink)

The concept of _substructural logic_ was originally introduced in relation to limitations of Gentzen’s structural rules of Contraction, Weakening and Exchange. Recent years have witnessed the development of substructural logics also challenging the Tarskian properties of Reflexivity and Transitivity of logical consequence. In this introduction we explain this recent development and two aspects in which it leads to a reassessment of the bounds of classical logic. On the one hand, standard ways of defining the notion of logical consequence in classical (...) logic naturally induce substructural logics when admitting more than two truth values; on the other hand, these substructural logics give rise to hierarchies of _metainferences_ that can be used to approximate classical logic at different levels. (shrink)

O presente estudo tem por objetivo contribuir para o projeto de reatualização da Filosofia do Direito hegeliana inaugurado por Axel Honneth, mas de um modo indireto: meu interesse aqui não é investigar tópicos específicos da Filosofia do Direito, nem mesmo examinar a teoria do reconhecimento como proposta por Honneth, mas iniciar uma caminhada no sentido de tornar explícitos os pressupostos ontológicos carregados por tal projeto de reatualização.

In different papers, Carnielli, W. & Rodrigues, A., Carnielli, W. Coniglio, M. & Rodrigues, A. and Rodrigues & Carnielli, present two logics motivated by the idea of capturing contradictions as conflicting evidence. The first logic is called BLE and the second—that is a conservative extension of BLE—is named LETJ. Roughly, BLE and LETJ are two non-classical logics in which the Laws of Explosion and Excluded Middle are not admissible. LETJ is built on top of BLE. Moreover, LETJ is a Logic (...) of Formal Inconsistency. This means that there is an operator that, roughly speaking, identifies a formula as having classical behavior. Both systems are motivated by the idea that there are different conditions for accepting or rejecting a sentence of our natural language. So, there are some special introduction and elimination rules in the theory that are capturing different conditions of use. Rodrigues & Carnielli’s paper has an interesting and challenging idea. According to them, BLE and LETJ are incompatible with dialetheia. It seems to show that these paraconsistent logics cannot be interpreted using truth-conditions that allow true contradictions. In short, BLE and LETJ talk about conflicting evidence avoiding to talk about gluts. I am going to argue against this point of view. Basically, I will firstly offer a new interpretation of BLE and LETJ that is compatible with dialetheia. The background of my position is to reject the one canonical interpretation thesis: the idea according to which a logical system has one standard interpretation. Then, I will secondly show that there is no logical basis to fix that Rodrigues & Carnielli’s interpretation is the canonical way to establish the content of logical notions of BLE and LETJ. Furthermore, the system LETJ captures inside classical logic. Then, I am also going to use this technical result to offer some further doubts about the one canonical interpretation thesis. (shrink)

Since the early 1980s, logical theories of belief revision have offered formal methods for the transformation of knowledge bases or “corpora” of data and beliefs. Early models have dealt with unconditional acceptance and integration of potentially belief-contravening pieces of information into the existing corpus. More recently, models of “non-prioritized” revision were proposed that allow the agent rationally to refuse to accept the new information. This paper introduces a refined method for changing beliefs by specifying constraints on the relative plausibility of (...) propositions. Like the earlier belief revision models, the method proposed is a qualitative one, in the sense that no numbers are needed in order to specify the posterior plausibility of the new information. We use reference beliefs in order to determine the degree of entrenchment of the newly accepted piece of information. We provide two kinds of semantics for this idea, give a logical characterization of the new model, study its relation with other operations of belief revision and contraction, and discuss its intuitive strengths and weaknesses. (shrink)

Resumen: La tolerancia es un privilegio de los poderosos. Una persona puede tolerar sólo si tiene el poder para interferir con aquello que objeta. En este artículo analizaré las circunstancias en las que alguien tiene el poder para tolerar. Argumentaré que la respuesta debe incorporar consideraciones tanto prácticas como metafísicas. Específicamente, defenderé que alguien tiene el poder para tolerar cuando sus propiedades fundan tal poder en la situación práctica en que ella se encuentra, según es caracterizada por sus intereses prácticos. (...) Al hacerlo criticaré el análisis del mencionado poder realizado por Glen Newey. (shrink)

This article tries to delineate the proposition that to Feuerbach nature is an autonomous and independent being that comes first in comparison to the spirit. To him, material nature, that exists in its qualitative differentness, independent from thinking, is the original source, the immediate, not deductible, uncreated fundament of all real existence, that exists and consists in itself, when put vis-a-vis the spirit. Feuerbach sets nature against the spirit, for it is his understanding that nature is not a pure other (...) that only through the spirit was set as nature, but as the first source, the objective material reality that exists outside reason and is given to man by means of his senses as fundament and essence of his life. Therefore, one is dealing first with that essence (light, air, water, fire, plants, animals etc) without which man does not exist or could be thought of as existing. To Feuerbach nature is all objects and essences put together. Under this condition it is possible to conceive nature as guarantor of externality itself as if it could exist independently from us, an entity that is unaware of itself and which exists in itself and by itself; for this reason it shall not be seen as something which it is not, i.e., neither divine nor human. Nature always existed, i.e., it exists in itself and has only meaning in itself; it is itself, i.e., it has no mystical essence, it does not hide behind it any absolute being whether human, divine, transcendental or ideal. (shrink)

The logics of formal inconsistency are logics tolerant to some amount of contradiction, but in which some versions of explosion still hold. The main result of this paper is a reconstruction of two such logics in the dialogical framework. By doing so, we achieve two things. On the one hand, we provide a formal approach to argumentative situations where some contradictions may occur while keeping the idea that there may still be situations in which some propositions are ‘safe’ in the (...) sense of immunity to the contradictions. On the other hand, we open a new line of study on these logics, in the context of the game-theoretical approach to semantics born in the 1960s, with various interesting perspectives, some of which are discussed at the end of this article. (shrink)

Semantic paradoxes pose a real threat to logics that attempt to be capable of expressing their own semantic concepts. Particularly, Curry paradoxes seem to show that many solutions must change our intuitive concepts of truth or validity or impose limits on certain inferences that are intuitively valid. In this way, the logic of a universal language would have serious problems. In this paper, we explore a different solution that tries to avoid both limitations as much as possible. Thus, we argue (...) that it is possible to capture the naive concepts of truth and validity without losing any of the valid inferences of classical logic. This approach is called the Buenos Aires plan. We present the logic of truth and validity, $$\mathsf {STTV}_{\omega }$$ based on the hierarchy of logics $$\textsf{ST}_{\omega }$$, whose validity predicate has the same semantic conditions as the material conditional. We argue that $$\mathsf {STTV}_{\omega }$$ is capable of blocking the problematic results while keeping the deductive power of classical logic as much as possible and offering an adequate semantic theory. On the other hand, one could object that it is not possible to reason with $$\mathsf {STTV}_{\omega }$$ because it is not closed under its logical principles. We respond to this objection and argue that the local characterization of validity shows how to make inferences using the logic $$\textsf{ST}_{\omega }$$. (shrink)

El propósito de este ensayo es presentar una lectura de los pasajes principales en los que Aristóteles deja ver qué comprende por πειραστική: una noción que los intérpretes consideran que él recortó sobre el perfil filosófico de Sócrates y su élenchos. Frente a una cantidad de dificultades presentadas por perspectivas influyentes, argumentaré que no hay razones para considerar que Aristóteles habría diferenciado la peirástica de la dialéctica ni por la forma de sus silogismos ni porque sus puntos de partida tengan (...) una naturaleza diferente de los éndoxa. Por el contrario, defenderé la tesis de que la peirástica puede ser vista como un cierto conocimiento experto que en la práctica se hace manifiesto como un momento refutatorio exitoso de la dialéctica filosóficamente aplicada: aquel en el cual la dialéctica stricto sensu se vuelve reluctante a la pérdida del rumbo en la búsqueda de los principios del conocimiento experto que representa la amenaza sofística de la sabiduría aparente sobre un asunto dado. Intentaré mostrar cómo parte de la actividad – dialéctica a los ojos de Aristóteles – de Sócrates se ajustaba a varios requerimientos de su arte inferencial de Tópicos. Sugeriré que ello no significa que Aristóteles haya edificado la peirástica sobre el élenchos socrático, sino que parte de la actividad de Sócrates ha sido utilizada como evidencia filosófica de sus propias concepciones dialécticas fundamentales. (shrink)

My aim in this paper is to examine some of the distinctive facets of human action in Spinoza’s philosophy and show their intrinsic connection with each other. By analyzing in detail how Spinoza addresses different aspects of human action in his main work, the Ethics, it is possible to notice that for him free human agency implies two interrelated features: on the one hand, the adequate knowledge of the causes that determine it, and, on the other hand, a growing capacity (...) to impact with greater power the scenarios in which it takes place. Thus, in contrast with quietist and passive readings, I show in the following that the two aforementioned characteristics are part of the Spinozian philosophical conception of agency as such. By pursuing this line of thought, it is also possible to establish a link—not always noticed in the secondary literature—with some of the central lines of thought contained in the Theological-Political Treatise. In discussing these theses, I advance the idea that the Spinozian conception of human agency involves a serious readjustment of the metaphysical vision of the agent, a change in her conduct and ethical practices, and an altogether different conception of politics and religion. (shrink)

In the first part of this essay, I develop the argument that Michel Foucault's work should be read with geographical and topological ideas in mind. I argue that Foucault's archeology and genealogy are fundamentally determined by spatial, topological, geographical, and geometrical metaphors and concepts. This spatial dimension of genealogy is explicitly related to racism and the regimes that domesticate agents through the practices, institutions and ideologies of racialization. The second part offers a genealogical reading of US history and spatiality in (...) terms of its racial institutions. I suggest that if we want to read the US geographies of topographies and cartographies of racism in a Foucauldian manner, then we must focus on plantations, ghettos, and prisons as the spaces‐institutions‐geographies that consolidated the racial matrix of US polity. My goal is to acculturate Foucauldian racial genealogy to the US racial matrix, and, conversely, to read US geo‐history in terms of racializing spatialities. (shrink)

RESUMO Este estudo tem por objetivo compreender o processo criativo durante a gênese textual de títulos em histórias inventadas por alunos recém-alfabetizados. A partir da perspectiva teórico-metodológica oferecida pela Genética Textual, dentro de uma abordagem linguístico-enunciativa, analisamos as relações associativas constituídas na recuperação de informações advindas das memórias semântica e episódica desses alunos. Tomamos como unidade de análise o diálogo face a face, estabelecido durante um processo de produção textual colaborativa, no contexto ecológico da sala de aula. Nossa análise, qualitativa (...) e microgenética, permitiu mapear o modo como ideias e elementos linguísticos são articulados de forma imprevisível e inusitada, formando redes associativas, tanto por semelhanças semânticas, quanto por semelhanças sonoras. As redes associativas indicam que a criatividade se dá entre o reconhecimento do jogo de linguagem e, ao mesmo tempo, preservação das propriedades do gênero textual e da unidade de sentido do manuscrito escolar em construção. ABSTRACT This study aims to understand the creative process during the textual genesis of titles in stories invented by newly literate students. Based on the theoretical-methodological perspective offered by Textual Genetics, within a linguistic-enunciative approach, we analyze the associative relations constituted in the retrieval of information from the semantic and episodic memories of these students. We take as a unit of analysis the face to face dialogue, established during a collaborative textual production process, in the ecological context of the classroom. Our qualitative and microgenetic analysis allowed us to map the way ideas and linguistic elements are articulated in an unpredictable and unusual way, forming associative networks, both by semantic and sound similarities. The associative networks indicate that creativity occurs between the recognition of the language set while preserving the properties of the textual genre and the unity of meaning of the school manuscript under construction. (shrink)

O sentido da paciência costuma ser assumido imediatamente como aquilo que é preciso ter para se alcançar uma meta. Ela seria, então, o meio para um fim. De outro modo, no discurso edificante de Kierkegaard de 1843, a paciência aparece como um caminho que se encaminha para si mesmo como forma de aquisição da alma em detrimento do mundo. Para o autor, a paciência é o pressuposto da vida, e a alma é o que precisa ser adquirido a cada vez (...) através do exercício desse pressuposto elementar. (shrink)

Cognition is meant as the process of acquiring knowledge from the world. This process is supposed to happen within agents, which build such knowledge with the purpose to use it to determine their actions on the world. Following Peircean ideas, we postulate that such knowledge is encoded by means of signs. According to Peirce, signs are anything that can be used to represent anything else. Also, for Peirce, to represent means to be able to generate another sign, called the interpretant (...) of the original sign, which still holds the same power of interpretability, I.e, its power to be transformed into a new sign, holding this same power. This happens through a process called semiosis, the process by which a sign is transformed into an interpretant. This whole process is performed with the aim of subsidizing the agent in deciding its behavior. So, even though the semiosis process has the power to continue infinitely, it usually stops whenever the generated interpretant brings enough information in order for the agent to effectively act in the world. We take signals to be the substract of signs. Signals are any physical property, which can be measured and captured by the agent, by means of its sensors. This includes any kind of internal memory the agent is able to have access, in order to operate. In this sense, signs can be both in the world and within the own agent’s mind. We understand an agent’s mind as the agents’ control system. In either case, signals can be abstracted as numbers. Not simply numbers, but numbers coming from specific sensors or specific memories. Using ideas from Peircean philosophy, in this work we postulate a pathway, in which signals, collected by either sensors or memory, can be organized in such a way that they can be effectively used as knowledge, in order for an agent to be able to decide its actions on the world, on the pursuit of its internal motivations. We postulate that agents identify and create a model of the world based on possibilities, existents, and laws, and based on this model, they are able to decide an action that maximizes the chance for the world to gain a shape, which the agents intend for it to be. This theory is postulated particularly for the case of artificial autonomous agents, meant to be constructed by engineering artifacts. (shrink)

Cognition is meant as the process of acquiring knowledge from the world. This process is supposed to happen within agents, which build such knowledge with the purpose to use it to determine their actions on the world. Following Peircean ideas, we postulate that such knowledge is encoded by means of signs. According to Peirce, signs are anything that can be used to represent anything else. Also, for Peirce, to represent means to be able to generate another sign, called the interpretant (...) of the original sign, which still holds the same power of interpretability, I.e, its power to be transformed into a new sign, holding this same power. This happens through a process called semiosis, the process by which a sign is transformed into an interpretant. This whole process is performed with the aim of subsidizing the agent in deciding its behavior. So, even though the semiosis process has the power to continue infinitely, it usually stops whenever the generated interpretant brings enough information in order for the agent to effectively act in the world. We take signals to be the substract of signs. Signals are any physical property, which can be measured and captured by the agent, by means of its sensors. This includes any kind of internal memory the agent is able to have access, in order to operate. In this sense, signs can be both in the world and within the own agent’s mind. We understand an agent’s mind as the agents’ control system. In either case, signals can be abstracted as numbers. Not simply numbers, but numbers coming from specific sensors or specific memories. Using ideas from Peircean philosophy, in this work we postulate a pathway, in which signals, collected by either sensors or memory, can be organized in such a way that they can be effectively used as knowledge, in order for an agent to be able to decide its actions on the world, on the pursuit of its internal motivations. We postulate that agents identify and create a model of the world based on possibilities, existents, and laws, and based on this model, they are able to decide an action that maximizes the chance for the world to gain a shape, which the agents intend for it to be. This theory is postulated particularly for the case of artificial autonomous agents, meant to be constructed by engineering artifacts. (shrink)

Some recent literature [Hicks, M. T. and van Elswyk. P., (2015) pp. 433-443, 2015; Bhogal, H. (2017), pp. 447-460] has argued that the non-Humean conceptions of laws of nature have a same weakness as the Humean conceptions of laws of nature. That is, both conceptions face an explanatory circularity problem. The argument is as follows: the Humean and the non-Humean conceptions of laws of nature agree that the law statements are universal generalisations; thus, both conceptions are vulnerable to an explanatory (...) circularity problem between the laws of nature and their instances. In this paper, I argue that Armstrong’s necessitarian view of laws of nature is invulnerable to this explanatory circularity problem. (shrink)

RESUMO: Não há, no pensamento de Marx, uma elaboração sistemática acerca da religião, embora haja uma crítica a ela enquanto crítica social das condições materiais de existência, que é o fundamento dela. Para Marx, a religião, entendida especificamente como superstição, idolatria, “ópio”, a qual conforma o homem e embaraça a sua consciência, deve ser negada, mas não se trata pura e simplesmente de um desprezo, de uma proibição ou perseguição à religião, nem tampouco de uma negação em geral a ela, (...) uma vez que ela é uma questão privada e deve ser respeitada, mas de desvelar o véu religioso presente na sociedade e no seu ordenamento político, no Estado, que oculta a exploração e a opressão humana. A crítica à religião como crítica da realidade social, da qual ela nasce e é expressão ideal, contribui, de certa forma, para a emancipação social do homem. ABSTRACT: it is not to be found in Marx’s thought a systematic elaboration concerning religion, although there is indeed a critical appraisal of it as a result from his social critique of material conditions of human existence which is its foundation. In Marx’s perception, religion is understood specifically as superstition, idolatry, “opiate”, something that pushes man to accommodation and twists his conscience, and as such should be dismissed, this act being not, however, a mere refusal, prohibition or persecution, or a wide negation of it, considering that it is a private issue and as such should be respected, but as an effort to cast off the religious veil covering society and its political ordainment commanded by the State, and hides exploitation and oppression of human beings. Critique of religion as an evaluation of social reality, from which religion derives, is an ideal proposition that to a certain extension contributes to the social emancipation of men. (shrink)

State of art paper on the topic laws of nature, around the problem of identification what is to be a law of nature. The most prominent theories of contemporary philosophical literature are discussed and analysed, such as: the simple regularity theory, from Hume; the Mill-Ramsey-Lewis best systems theory; the Dretske-Tooley-Armstrong theory of laws as relations among universals; Ellis’s essentialist theory; Cartwright’s theory of laws as ceteris paribus laws; the anti-reductionist theories of Lange, Maudlin and Carroll, the anti-realist theories of Mumford, (...) van Fraassen and Giere; etc. (shrink)

Esta sección temática constituye la segunda discusión sobre el desafío de la adopción de reglas lógicas publicado en Análisis Filosófico. Al igual que la primera, esta colección de artículos puede verse como el resultado de la colaboración internacional que durante más de dos décadas hemos mantenido entre el Saul Kripke Center (SKC) y el IIF-SADAF-CONICET. Y más precisamente, entre Saul, Romina y el grupo de lógica de Buenos Aires (BA-Logic). Visitas, seminarios, workshops, proyectos internacionales, y fundamentalmente mucho afecto y pasión (...) por los problemas filosóficos fundamentales han marcado este proceso. Tanto Romina como Saul han apoyado sistemáticamente los esfuerzos desde Argentina para producir conocimiento en el área de lógica. Ambos han estado involucrados no solo institucionalmente en el apoyo al desarrollo de nuestro grupo, sino también a nivel personal. Fueron muchos los momentos que compartimos juntos. Muchos recuerdos e historias. Es importante destacar, solo para mencionar un simple aspecto de nuestras historias comunes, que Saul participó activamente en el proceso de elaboración de la propuesta de ambos números, en la lectura de gran parte del material, e incluso como réferi de algunos trabajos. Saul y Romina asistieron por Zoom a varias reuniones en el marco de los seminarios que generaron parte del material aquí publicado. Recuerdo la alegría de Saul, sus comentarios y la sorpresa de muchos de los participantes de ver aparecer en sus pantallas al filósofo más importante del mundo y uno de los más importantes de la historia. Para ellos quizás era Kripke, para mi ya era Saul. Nos hubiera gustado celebrar juntos. Podría haber sido en Buenos Aires o en Nueva York. Lamentablemente, ya no podrá ser. Aunque también es cierto que esta sección temática es una manera de volver a reunirnos y de expresar el profundo agradecimiento que todos los integrantes del BA-Logic tenemos por Saul. Te vamos a extrañar… Ya te estamos extrañando…. (shrink)

In the Work that she presented at the 40th Annual Meeting of the Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy, 7 March 2013, in Galloway, New Jersey, Sassen most tellingly began her keynote with a reflection on method. She spoke of “Before Method.” She spoke of the need to step back, and suspend our extant methods. Emergent social orders, or what she called, in her massive and transformational text Territory, Authority, Rights: From Medieval to Global Assemblages, the emergence of new (...) assemblages, requires that we rethink our old categories, or that we try to assess their usefulness or allow ourselves to countenance their obsolescence. The “before method,” and the invitation to step back, to bracket, or to .. (shrink)

La reapertura del mundo textual de La araucana no se reduce a que sirva de modelo para la escritura de otros textos que refieren la guerra de Arauco sino a que inaugura una serie textual que incluye, también, el "juego al trocado" relativo a empresas españolas fracasadas -no dignas de canto o de memoria- así como el triunfo de los indígenas sobre los españoles. Se trata de una serie que promueve una reescritura y discusión del canon épico y de sus (...) formantes irresueltos, que se prolonga intermitentemente en la literatura chilena. Tal situación puede ser examinada ventajosamente con una categoría analítica como es "el discurso de la conquista". The reaperture of the textual world of La araucana is not reduced to its service as a model to other texts which refer to the Arauco war but to the innauguration of a textual series that includes, also, the "juego de trocado" relative to the unsuccessful Spanish initiatives --not worthy of song or memory-- but also the triumph of the indigenous people over the Spaniards. This series promotes a rewriting and discussion of the epic canon and of its unresolved formants, which is prolonged, intermittently, in Chilena literatura. Said situation can be examined advantageously with an analytic category such as "the conquest discourse". (shrink)

En este trabajo, me propongo discutir la plausibilidad de la tesis de que es posible captar las características modales del concepto intuitivo de consecuencia a través de un concepto de consecuencia definido generalizando sobre interpretaciones. Desde mi perspectiva, las argumentaciones que han ofrecido aquellos que, como Ray, quieren salvar el salto de lo general a lo modal, mostrando que hay suficientes interpretaciones como para representar las características modales de la noción preteórica de consecuencia, poseen un mismo tipo de limitación. La (...) misma es producto de la imposibilidad de contar con una interpretación de los cuantificadores suficientemente general como para abarcar sin restricción contextual alguna, la totalidad de las interpretaciones. Al mismo tiempo, sostengo que estos problemas están emparentados con los límites expresivos propios de la estrategia que intenta ofrecer una teoría matemática precisa del concepto de interpretación por medio de algún tipo de cuantificación sobre estructuras (sean estas conjuntistas o no). Por eso, tales límites expresivos no tienen que ver especialmente con los rasgos modales propiamente dichos del concepto de consecuencia, sino con la cuantificación irrestricta que el análisis requeriría para ser adecuado. (shrink)

According to Etchemendy, in attempting to offer an analysis of the modal features of the intuitive concept of logical consequence, Tarski has committed a modal fallacy. In this paper, I consider the thesis according to it is posible to analyze the modals properties of concept of logical consequence through of a generalization on set-theoretical interpretations. As is known, some philosophers have tried to argue for the transit from the general to the modal by showing that there are enough settheoretic interpretations (...) so as to be able to represent the modal features of the intuitive concept of consequence. As is also known, those people have encountered a lot of difficulties. In the present paper, I will try to show that those problems are related not with the specific possibility of accounting for the modal features by means of a set-theoretic notion of model but with the possibility of coming up with a precise mathematical theory for the concept of interpretation, and, as such, they can be solved by way of appealing to the usual solutions to this problem. (shrink)

In this paper I criticize Comesaña's point of view on Putnam's model-theoretic argument. I claim that there is an interesting point made by the argument that Comesaña has not taken into account: if we want our semantic assertions to be at ali justified, the externalist claim according to which justification requires the God 's Eye View has to be given up.

En este artículo, me propongo exponer algunas dificultades relacionadas con la posibilidad de que la Teoría de Modelos pueda constituirse en una Teoría General de la Interpretación. Específicamente la idea que sostengo es que lo que nos muestra la Paradoja de Orayen es que las interpretaciones no pueden ser ni conjuntos ni objetos. Por eso, una elucidación del concepto intuitivo de interpretación, que apele a este tipo de entidades, está condenada al fracaso. De manera secundaria, muestro que no hay algún (...) supuesto conjuntista que sea imprescindible para que surja la mencionada paradoja: sólo se necesita que las interpretaciones sean objetos. Voy a argumentar que si las interpretaciones son objetos, tal como lo supone la posibilidad de cuantificar sobre las mismas para poder dar una caracterización satisfactoria de consecuencia lógica, la au-toaplicación (como un caso de aplicación de los recursos semánticos de la teoría de modelos para encontrar una interpretación con máxima generalidad) es imposible. Finalmente, discuto cada una de las dos soluciones que el propio Orayen imaginó frente a su paradoja, y muestro que cada una posee diferentes dificultades.In this paper, I intend to present some problems to construe the Model Theory as a Theory of Interpretation. Specifically, I am going to defend that, according to the Paradox of Orayen, interpretations can not be neither set nor object. Thus, an explication of the intuitive concept of interpretation that appeals to these types of entities will be condemned to failure. Secondary, I will show that there is not any like-set assumption indispensable to get rise to that paradox: only all is needed is the assumption that interpretations are objects. I am going to argue that if interpretations are objects, as it is assumed by the possibility of quantifying over interpretations in order to offer an satisfactory characterization of logical consequence, self-application (as a case of application of semantics resources of the Model Theory for finding a interpretation with absolute generality) is not possible. Eventually, I will discuss both of the solutions provided by Orayen to his paradox and I will support that both have different difficulties. (shrink)

En Paradojas, Paradojas y mas Paradojas se analiza de modo claro y preciso un problema fundamental: Que es una paradoja y cual es su importancia en la filosofia contemporanea? El libro pone al alcance del lector no especializado una seleccion de las paradojas mas conocidas e inquietantes, y realiza un analisis y discusion que permite que el lector pueda tener una comprension profunda de ellas y de las alternativas que surgen frente a ellas. Las paradojas son un fenomeno multidisciplinario: la (...) verdad, la racionalidad, el conocimiento, la justificacion y el infinito son algunos de los conceptos que en diferentes campos del saber han sido afectados por ellas. (shrink)