My target is Kenny’s claim that if God can be thought not to be in the same manner as men or phoenixes, then God too is an essence/existence composite. I argue that our ignorance about the existence of the phoenix and our ignorance about God do not have the same bases and so they do not lead to the same conclusion, namely, a distinction between thing and existence in both cases. The notion of the phoenix is existence neutral because it (...) is reflective of conceptual notes that have to be existence neutral in order to be in existential multiplicities. Our notion of subsistent existence is not existence neutral but it is composed of a formed intention of existence that gives it an independence from the context of the second operation in which it was formed. The first case leads to a situation involving a distinction between essence and existence. Knowledge of the existence of the phoenix adds something over and beyond the essence of the phoenix. In the second case, knowledge of the existence of subsistent existence does not do that because existence is what the formed intention here is of. What knowledge of subsistent existence adds does not belong to it. It belongs to us. It adds our second operation knowledge of the esse of sensible things and our reasoning from that to subsistent existence. (shrink)

This article explores the strategies available for defending Aquinas’s view of existence in the context of contemporary analytic philosophy. The rival view of existence prevalent among contemporary analytic philosophers is subject to serious objections. At the same time, the main contemporary analytic objections to Aquinas’s view can be adequately answered. The widespread use of “exist(s)” to ascribe existence to individuals and objects provides good reason to think that such use makes sense, and analogies like those of Aquinas can help to (...) illustrate the commonsense meaning of “exist(s)” to those who doubt it. The truth of Aquinas’s view of existence as a real property of individuals or objects can be defended at least in principle by appealing to its descriptive and explanatory usefulness. In addition to Aquinas’s own uses of it, there are a number of areas in contemporary analytic metaphysics where his view of existence could likely be of use, such as contemporary essentialism, substance-attribute ontology, and the revival of ontological pluralism. (shrink)

This paper attempts to show that Charles Taylor’s persuasive and expansive phenomenology, developed primarily in his Sources of the Self, ultimately depends upon an ontology of the human person that remains undeveloped, as he often admits. His fundamentalphilosophical claims stand finally as postulates of practical reason, which nevertheless depend upon a dialogical practice that is grounded in the dialogical nature of the human person. This phenomenological and ethical approach raises persistent epistemological and metaphysical questions. What Taylor does not admit, and (...) what this paper will propose in his stead, is that a more systematic metaphysics in the existential Thomist tradition can help support philosophically both his explicit and implicit ontological claims regarding the nature of the human person. (shrink)

_Integrated Truth and Existential Phenomenology: A Thomistic Response to Iconic Anti-Realists in Science_ relates existential phenomenology to a modal reasoning for establishing a Thomistic integration of objective truths in science, theology, ethics, art and politics.

This book critically assesses arguments for the existence of the God of classical theism, develops an innovative account of objects’ persistence, and defends new arguments against classical theism. The authors engage the following classical theistic proofs: Aquinas’s First Way, Aquinas’s De Ente argument, and Feser’s Aristotelian, Neo-Platonic, Augustinian, Thomistic, and Rationalist proofs. The authors also provide the first systematic treatment of the ‘existential inertia thesis’. By connecting the thesis to relativity theory and recent developments in the philosophy of physics, (...) and by developing a variety of novel existential-inertia-friendly explanations of persistence, they mount a formidable new case against classical theistic proofs. Finally, they defend new arguments against classical theism based on abstract objects and changing divine knowledge. The text appeals to students, researchers, and others interested in classical theistic proofs, the existence and nature of God, and the ultimate explanations of persistence, change, and contingency. (shrink)

“Existential risks” are risks that threaten the destruction of humanity’s long-term potential: risks of nuclear wars, pandemics, supervolcano eruptions, and so on. On standard utilitarianism, it seems, the reduction of such risks should be a key global priority today. Many effective altruists agree with this verdict. But how should the importance of these risks be assessed on a Christian moral theory? In this paper, I begin to answer this question – taking Thomas Aquinas as a reference, and the risks (...) of anthropogenic extinction as an example. I’ll suggest that on a Thomist framework, driving ourselves extinct would constitute a complete failure to fulfil our God-given nature, a radical form of hubris, and a loss of cosmological significance. So the reduction of such risks seems vital for Thomists, or Christians more broadly. Indeed, I end with the thought that these considerations are not parochially Christian, or indeed specifically religious: everyone with a similar view of mankind – as immensely valuable yet fallen and fragile – should agree that existential risks are a pressing moral concern. (shrink)

In this article I provide a Thomistic truthmaker principle. Although Aquinas himself never provides a truthmaker principle, he does say things that show he thought many truths require truthmakers, or, in other terms, that truths have an ontological grounding. That truths are somehow grounded or explained by reality is an important aspect of Thomistic thought. The principle I provide could be affirmed by someone with Thomistic tendencies: it is consistent with Aquinas’ thought and makes sense of some peculiar aspects of (...) his writings. In what follows, I will argue that a Thomistic truthmaker principle should require all truths about being to have a truthmaker at any time that they are about. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that Maritain rejects any attempt to reduce ethics to a set of moral rules that can be derived from natural law. Rather, in his work we find a nuanced account of the virtue of prudence, which applies the precepts of the natural law to particular situations. We also find him insisting that the appropriate animation of ethical action springs not from the law, but from love. Maritain’s metaphysical existentialism leads him to insist that the natural (...) law is never sufficient to meet the exigencies of determining action. Accordingly, the authentically metaphysical basis of his ethics is thoroughly existential (in the Thomistic sense) and must include the prudential governance that guides human action, because an account of human nature and its ends only informs us of the range of possibilities for human goodness, without showing how to actually achieve them. In arguing for this claim I begin by situating Maritain’s ethical discussion in the context of his metaphysics. I then explore his understanding of natural law and its limitations when it comes to governing action. Finally, I explain the place of prudence as the virtue that applies the natural law to the particular. From this the role of existence and love as the interconnected basis for the foundations of ethics in Maritain’s thought is made clear. (shrink)

In declaring that «existence as existence corresponds to being as such, and pertains to its intrinsic significance», Suárez accords to existence a preeminence perhaps not ascribed to it by any Scholastic philosopher. Conceptually distinct, existence and essence are really identical, their identity indicated by the term essentia realis, or «existent essence.» Being is at once unitary in meaning and dyadic; it denotes existence that is both actual and aptitudinal . «Actual» existence is realized extra-mentally, while the «aptitudinal» is existence insofar (...) it is intelligible to the mind, prescinding from but not denying any extra-mental realization. The terminology that Suárez employs is distinctly his own. Gilson, however, reads him Thomistically, and so interprets his essentia realis as a kind of Thomist reified concept affirming the preeminence of essence. More recent commentators, influenced by Heidegger, see in the Suarezian essentia realis no more than cogitabilitas. (shrink)

In this powerfully argued book, Knasas engages a debate at the heart of the revival of Thomistic thought in the twentieth century. Richly detailed and illuminating, his book calls on the tradition established by Gilson, Maritain, and Owen, to build a case for Existential Thomism as a valid metaphysics. Being and Some Twentieth-Century Thomists is a comprehensive discussion of the major issues and controversies in neo-Thomism, including issues of mind, knowledge, the human subject, free will, nature, grace, (...) and the act of being. Knasas also discusses the Transcendental Thomism of Maréchal, Rahner, Lonergan, and others as he builds a carefully articulated case for completing the Thomist revival. (shrink)

In this powerfully argued book, Knasas engages a debate at the heart of the revival of Thomistic thought in the twentieth century. Richly detailed and illuminating, his book calls on the tradition established by Gilson, Maritain, and Owen, to build a case for Existential Thomism as a valid metaphysics.Being and Some Twentieth-Century Thomists is a comprehensive discussion of the major issues and controversies in neo-Thomism, including issues of mind, knowledge, the human subject, free will, nature, grace, and (...) the act of being. Knasas also discusses the Transcendental Thomism of Maréchal, Rahner, Lonergan, and others as he builds a carefully articulated case for completing the Thomist revival. (shrink)

Since Vatican II a new breed of Thomism has emerged on the scene, in effect superseding the two streams of neo-Thomistic thought which blossomed in the wake of Leo XIII’s encyclical Aeterni Patris, namely, Aristolelian Thomism, a movement which remains within the conceptual horizon of form and matter, and Existential Thomism, which insists upon pushing beyond hylomorphism to the ontological depth dimension of the actus essendi, the nonformal act responsible for suffusing the composite being with real (...) existence. Taking its inspiration from Kant, the ascendancy of Transcendental Thomism seemed to be the logical response to the inadequacies of neo-Thomism, mired as it was in naive realism and furthermore incapable of rising to the Infinite Being on the basis of a scrutiny of finite sensible composites. But this transformation of the Thomistic landscape, Knasas warns us, “is a disaster for Thomism itself”. We would be better off to return to the Existential Thomism proffered by Gilson, Maritain, and Owens. (shrink)

I argue that the essence that is actualized by existence is the essence that is a determinate nature in an individual and not the essence absolutely considered. This essence in individuals has a potential being that is actualized by existence. This thesis has important consequences for the essence/existence distinction in Thomas Aquinas.

This article aims to show that our acceptance or non-acceptance of certain facts is influenced by our adoption of a philosophical world-picture as a kind of background knowledge on the basis of which one decides what does or does not exist, and what is true or false. For this purpose, I discuss the positions of the existential Thomists, as well as those of Wittgenstein and Abel, while also occasionally invoking the work of Putnam and Fleck. To begin with, it (...) is demonstrated that philosophical facts are accepted on the basis of a world-picture that is itself a tangle of facts, values, and theories exhibiting varying degrees of generality. Whether we embrace them or not is thus not determined by any sort of direct experience. There are no neutral philosophical facts. Our world-picture suggests what sort of facts we are prepared to accept, and what methods we use to explain them. It is on precisely this that the heuristic role played by world-pictures in “creating” philosophical facts depends. (shrink)

In his 2010 article, ‘Secular Spirituality and the Logic of Giving Thanks’, John Bishop recalls a striking theme in a recent address by Richard Dawkins in which he appeared to enthusiastically endorse the appropriateness of a ‘naturalised spirituality’ that involved ‘existential gratitude’, and this led him to investigate the notion of a naturalised or secular spirituality with particular reference to Robert Solomon’s Spirituality for the Skeptic (2002). This essay looks to pick up on Bishop’s engagements with both Dawkins and (...) Solomon, but to extend the conversation well beyond them in order to defend the credibility and integrity of secular spirituality in its movement of ontological gratitude. In this way it looks to offer a first sketch of what might be termed a ‘hermeneutics of ontological gratitude’. To this end – and via a distinction between gratitude for existence and life – the essay considers Dawkins’ argument and Solomon’s work in further detail, before turning to consider various other perspectives on the problem including Kenneth Schmitz’s existential Thomist notion of ontological contingency, Hannah Arendt’s concept of primary natality, and Emmanuel Levinas’ sketch of the self in its interiority and economy. My claim is that any serious naturalistic spirituality needs to take into account not only a gratitude for one’s existence per se, but for the whole context of individual and collective being. (shrink)

One of the most important theses of Existential Thomism is that contingent things are composed of essence and existence. The thesis is immediately supplemented by a proviso that these components are not parts in the regular sense of the word. Essence and existence are not extended pieces of the thing which can be detached from it. They are inseparable aspects of the thing wherein inseparability is understood as a sort of dependence. In my paper I analyze the thesis (...) of the inseparability of existence. For me this is untenable. I argue that this inseparability blocks up the essential function ascribed by Thomists to existence: the function of making the thing real. Thus to save this function we are forced to export existence to outside the thing. It contradicts our deep belief that existence is the most intimate aspect of the thing. Therefore the Thomistic analysis of existence seems to be invalid. (shrink)

W kontekście wielości pojęć osoby i ich znaczenia dla sposobu organizowania przez człowieka życia jednostkowego i społecznego, sprawą kluczową jest zwrot w kierunku realistycznego pojęcia osoby. W niniejszym studium przeprowadzono krytyczną analizę kilku wybranych relacjonalnych koncepcji osoby z pozycji tomizmu egzystencjalnego. W efekcie przeprowadzonej analizy potwierdzono założoną hipotezę, iż wybrane relacjonalne koncepcje osoby mają charakter aprioryczny, jednakże tylko w odniesieniu do istoty osoby. Studium odpowiada na pytanie, dlaczego analizowane koncepcje nie wyjaśniają samej istoty realnej osoby ludzkiej, a tylko wskazują na (...) jej cechy rozpoznawcze, opisując egzystencję i drogi spełniania się osoby. In search of a realistic concept of person In the context of the multiplicity of concepts of the person and their importance for the way in which man organizes his individual and social life, a turn toward a realistic concept of the person is crucial. In this study, a critical analysis of several selected relational concepts of the person from the position of existential Thomism is carried out. As a result of the analysis, the assumed hypothesis was confirmed that the selected relational conceptions of the person are a priori, however, only with regard to the essence of the person. The study answers the question of why the analysed concepts do not explain the very essence of the real human person, but only point to its identifying features, describing the existence and ways of fulfilment of person. (shrink)

The recent Catholic philosophical tradition on the human person has tried to articulate the irreducibility of the human person to anything non-personal, and to synthesize all of the best of what has been said on the human person. Recently, a debate has arisen regarding the concrete existence and relationality of persons. I analyze these debates, and show how both sides of these debates can be synthesized into a view on which human persons are both subsistent beings and identical to certain (...) relations. First, I examine those strands of recent Catholic tradition that defend the concreteness and relationality of the person, drawing on some Existential Thomists and phenomenologists; in connection with this, I consider the ideas of the beauty and mysterium of persons. Second, I examine the opposing view, drawing on some traditional Thomists and personalists. Finally, I show how the scholastic notion of transcendental relations can reconcile these views. (shrink)

In answer to jordan's "disputed questions" the reasons why gilsonianism has been chosen as interlocutor are clarified; the analogous character of the "transcendental sense" of essence and the "primary sense" (first analogate) of essence ((1) "essence of and in really existing beings," (2) ideal and immutable eide, (3) essence of the absolute, real and eternal being) are further elucidated. The main arguments in the essay for "ideal essences" are further explained and the main charges answered by the speculative attempt to (...) reconcile clearly given ideal "essences" with a divine being (subject of philosophical proof) which is not limited by "ideas" like plato's demiourg. Existential thomism (gilson) is credited with having referred to an unmistakably given important metaphysical "principle": existence, which is then wrongly "absolutized," while jordan's "absolutized" "esse" is suspected to refer to no single original datum; the limitation implied in "essence" seems to be held on the basis of a "concoction" of existence, being and essence. (shrink)

The article considers one of the most significant concepts in Aristotelian philosophy: the concept of substance and its interpretation in the works of existential Thomists. The emphasis is placed on the fact that the doctrine of substance is first and foremost to be considered in the context of the identification of the subject of scientific knowledge and in the context of the way of knowing this subject. In order to illustrate the epistemological realism, which, according to Thomists, inheres in (...) Aristotle’s philosophy the article analyzes the previous philosophers’ views on the true subject of scientific knowledge. This subject is individual being, which forms the basis of philosophical understanding of things, as a subject of scientific knowledge. It should be noted that the method of constructing of Aristotle’s science general theory is finding reasons why something is just what it is from the viewpoint of necessity. Krąpiec believes that the way Aristotle comes to the formation of the four causes is related to the specificity of the question διὰ τί. This analysis through causes allows us to understand that each single entity has a composite structure. Furthermore, Aristotle considers substance as a logical and grammatical category and as a main category in the ontological sense, as the mode of the initial being of things. Therefore, categories reflect the actual structure of things, namely the way of its existence on the essential and accidental levels. The very substance itself is recognizable only through the accidents associated with it and represents itself through them. However, the substance precedes its accidents in three meanings: ontological, definitive, and epistemological. (shrink)

Although the notion of order is everywhere in the thought of Thomas Aquinas, especially in major claims about the starting point of the natural knowledge of God and the final end of the cosmos, works on the metaphysics of Aquinas have not commonly discussed order in an explicit way. After making a point about existential Thomism, the purpose of this paper is to thematize order for our consideration, provide an elementary sketch of a metaphysics of order, and show (...) how the theme of order figures into topics such as the natural knowledge of God, the final end of the cosmos, and wisdom. (shrink)

One thing that becomes apparent in this exchange is that each of the positions emerges based on differences in fundamental philosophical commitments. An existential Thomist has a very well-defined and sufficiently “thick” view of being at the heart of his metaphysical system. Van Inwagen rejects such views of being in favor of a “thin” view. This issue is addressed and clarified. Craig takes issue with the way the term “moderate-realism” has been explicated, whether or not the idea of existence (...) in the intellect is coherent, and whether the Thomistic solution offers any real advantages over nominalist ones. In this response, I continue to demonstrate the cogency and advocate the superiority of Aquinas’s position. (shrink)

My first article, back in 1989! Thanks, forever, Ralph McInerny. Here I take issue with John F.X. Knasas, a strong supporter of the existential Thomism of Etienne Gilson and Joseph Owens. Knasas's desire to sequester Thomas away from allowing the discipline of natural philosophy to arrive at a fully immaterial reality through its proper demonstrative methods seemed to me to be at odds with Thomas's text.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Satori:Toward a Conceptual AnalysisAvery M. FoutsOne of the significant points of division between Zen Buddhism and Western thought is the status of the law of noncontradiction.1 In the West, no matter what our ontology, we have overwhelmingly regarded this law as indubitable. For example, Aristotle insists in his Metaphysics that the law of noncontradiction is the most certain of all first principles, the fabric of any significant assertion since (...) any significant assertion can be distinguished from its contradictory.2 In the East, however, Zen Buddhists tend to view this law as provisional, and this presents formidable barriers to communication with the West. At particular issue is the interpretation of satori, the abrupt and momentary Enlightenment experience within the Rinzai school of Zen.The West can learn much from Zen about the subtleties of unhealthy contradictions in consciousness. To this end, satori and the liberation found therein are phenomenological facts worthy of the deepest respect by the West. The problem, however, is that satori seems to demand an interpretation that is irrational according to Western canons of rationality. In light of this, the purpose of this paper is to interpret satori in a way that eases this purported irrationality. A first step is taken toward reconciling Zen and the West by accepting the challenge posed by D. T. Suzuki:The position assumed by the Zen masters is this. They leave the logical side of the business to the philosopher, and are content with conclusions drawn from their own inner experiences. They will protest, if the logician attempts to deny the validity of their experience, on the ground that it is up to the logician to prove the fact by the instruments which he is allowed to use. If he fails to perform the work satisfactorily—that is, logically to confirm the experience—the failure is on the side of the logician, who has now to devise a more effective use of his tools.3In the first section, the logic of the Zen experience is examined through the writings of Suzuki, traditionally regarded as the best expositor of Zen to the West and one who specifically deals with the present theme. While Suzuki does not represent the whole of Zen, he nonetheless "stands in the first rank of the cultural bridge builders between Asia and the West during the twentieth century."4 In the second section, the notion of "intentional identity," the nondualism inherent in cognition, [End Page 101] is elucidated with the help of certain existential Thomists. There is a paradox intrinsic to intentional identity that is just as paradoxical as anything Suzuki claims. I contend that it is this paradox that lies at the heart of satori, and the fact that it has been recognized in the West provides the foundation for the reconciliation. In the third section, it is shown that the first-person subject possesses a prereflective self-consciousness in first-order experience of an external object. This allows us to insert a subject-object dualism into satori, all the while agreeing with Suzuki that the latter experience transcends reflection. In the fourth section, all of the above elements are brought together to provide a conceptual analysis of satori in which rationality is maintained, on the one hand, and the integrity of the experience is maintained, on the other.Illogical ZenIn the Zen tradition, the Absolute, if the term may be used, is nondual; therefore, any affirmation of the Absolute in the form of A as opposed to not-A is to sunder its sacred unity because in the Absolute there are no distinctions whatsoever. For this reason, even though the experience of the Absolute is positive in nature, any attempt to express the truth that lies therein must in the final analysis be by negation, a "not this," a "not that."The problem is that the Absolute of which Zen Buddhists speak encompasses things finite such that the distinctions made in everyday life are something less than the way things really are. This is particularly troublesome when it comes to things considered numerically distinct—for example, this table and that book. This table and that book are each what it is... (shrink)

This collection’s basic theme and thesis, explained by Curtis L. Hancock, “A Critique of Social Construct Theory” and “A Counterfeit Choice,” is that the seeds of contemporary relativism were sown by modern philosophy, primarily Descartes himself, its founder. Following a lead from Gilson, these authors pursue the benefits of classical realism and existential Thomism compared with the Cartesian legacy of subjectivism in modern philosophy. Indeed, Peter Redpath, “Why Descartes was not a Philosopher,” explains why Descartes may not be (...) a philosopher at all, if the significance of the term be properly considered as a love of wisdom and a search for true being. As Maritain coined the phrase, he is an “ideosopher,” in pursuit of the effective idea and rhetorical success, not the contemplation of being. Christopher Cullen, “Transcendental Thomism: Realism Rejected,” argues that the attempt by Karl Rahner, Joseph Donceel, and others to absorb the Cartesian and Kantian approach into Thomism has not proved successful. Robert Geis, “Descartes’s Res: An Interactionist Difficulty,” explains how the objectifying of mind as a thing sets up insoluble difficulties; he argues that a more adequate account is found in Aristotle. Donald DeMarco, “Descartes, Mathematics and Music,” traces out the effect in music when the physical is reduced to the mathematical. The imposition of a uniform method leads to a distortion of what musicians do. William J. Fossati, “Maximum Influence from Minimum Abilities: La Mettrie and Radical Materialism,” traces the Cartesian heritage of reductionism through Julien Offroy de Le Mettrie to the most contemporary attempts to explain human beings as mere biological organisms. (shrink)

This textbook combines Father Klubertanz' Introduction to the Philosophy of Being and Father Holloway's Natural Theology in a new two-part abridgement, appropriate for single semester courses in general metaphysics and natural theology. The standpoint of both the authors is roughly that of existential Thomism, and the continuity between the work of each within the book is notable. The first part contains the revisions to be found in the second edition of Father Klubertanz' volume.—C. V.

This compact and somewhat dense study seeks to probe several root ideas in Tillich’s thought, in the conviction that Tillich "is pre-eminent as ‘healer’ of rankling modern wounds—mental, moral, spiritual." In pursuing his aim, Professor Anderson views Tillich ironically, though not uncritically, from the standpoint of existential Thomism. Five pairs of ideas in Tillich’s thought provide the outline of the book. Symbol and faith as ultimate concern: "Tillichian symbols are objectively grounded analogies, revalatory of aspects of reality otherwise (...) opaque to us." Faith, a total act "wherein all the elements of one’s personality are ’synthesized’ and ‘transcended'," is expressible only in terms of revelatory analogies. The philosophy-theology duality: Both philosophy and theology are concerned with the meaning of Being, but they differ in three ways: philosophy probes the meaning of Being in itself, while theology considers its meaning for us; the attitude of the philosopher is intellectually detached, whereas that of the theologian is "personally committed in virtue of loving concern"; the content expressed by philosophy is "intelligible structure," whereas that of theology is "spiritual significance." Tillich’s conception of the philosophy of religion is dealt with in this context. Reason and Revelation: Ontological reason is a faculty for apprehending actual existence; technical reason is concerned with discovering means for ends. The divorce of these two functions of reason during the last one hundred years has been disastrous. By giving a truth which is both certain and of ultimate concern, revelation can reconcile the conflicts which reason experiences. Revelation is the unveiling of man’s personal ultimate concern in terms of symbols and myths. Anything can be the conveyor of revelation, since every being participates in Being-itself. Being and God: Being-itself is the Ground of Being, the Power of Being, the ineffable God. Though no thinker can avoid making God an object of knowledge, God transcends the subject-object structure. Being and Love: For Tillich, life is "being in actuality," and "love is the moving power of life," "the drive towards the unity of the separated." The highest form of love is agape, love of persons, and above all of God, for their own sake. All of this is well-trodden ground. However, Professor Anderson’s synthesis is careful, and his critical remarks are often helpful. His emphasis on the pervasiveness of love in Tillich’s understanding of being, reason, and faith, adds a dimension to which other commentators have paid less attention.—H. F. (shrink)

Both of these eminently theoretical books by a prominent metaphysician compel the reader to put aside many discussions one has heard from the standpoints of empiricism, Kantianism, and positivism. In fact, Seifert aims at a new foundation of classical metaphysics on the basis of “phenomenological realism,” a position he defends against the so-called “existential Thomism” of Étienne Gilson. Seifert points out the fundamental character of a correct distinction between “being” and “essence” for contemporary metaphysics with reference to Gilson’s (...) understanding of the criticism by Aquinas of the Anselmian thesis “existence as a predicate”. For Gilson, Aquinas’s proposition that God is objectively esse tantum means that the essence of God consists simply in “existing” without disposing of an essence of His own. Seifert suggests that the correct meaning of this expression implies God’s full possession of being and essence so as to exclude every form of nonbeing. Consequently, God’s full possession of being and essence can only be. (shrink)

St. Thomas Aquinas has always considered intelligence a potency higher than the will, absolutely speaking. That being said, and in my view, the existential primacy of the will in the act of freedom (particularly in choosing the existential end) is also indisputably Thomistic, as Cornelio Fabro has shown. This paper endeavors to explain Aquinas' doctrine on the absolute primacy of the intellect and thus show that these two primacies can be affirmed coherently, that is, the intellect’s absolute primacy (...) and the will’s existential primacy. Firstly, I will explain the reasoning St. Thomas Aquinas uses in the Summa to justify the absolute primacy of the intellect over the will. Secondly, I will explore some parallel texts, in order to shed light on my interpretation of the Summa and expand our view regarding this and related doctrinal points. Thirdly, I will offer a brief study of Fabro’s position, one in which his concerns regarding the intellect’s absolute primacy are taken into account and carefully considered. (shrink)

Undoubtedly, American Thomists owe a major share of their confident historical outlook to the writings of Professor Gilson whose latest work is formally concerned with the relative merits of Thomism and other important systems. This is not a new preoccupation with him, since a whole series of earlier books testify to his abiding interest in this problem. But he has now made a fresh exploration of the entire territory in the light of his revised view of the mind of (...) St. Thomas. During the war years, Gilson prepared a new edition of his pioneer study, Le Thomisme, in which the existential character of Thomistic wisdom is placed in high relief. St. Thomas regards God as the supreme and self-subsistent act of existing and the creative source of finite beings, whose highest act is also that of existing. This has a definite effect upon Thomistic metaphysics, since it involves a conception of being as something more than essence or nature. Both essence and existence are constitutive principles of being, and hence the science of being must be directed as well to the existential act. (shrink)

Undoubtedly, American Thomists owe a major share of their confident historical outlook to the writings of Professor Gilson whose latest work is formally concerned with the relative merits of Thomism and other important systems. This is not a new preoccupation with him, since a whole series of earlier books testify to his abiding interest in this problem. But he has now made a fresh exploration of the entire territory in the light of his revised view of the mind of (...) St. Thomas. During the war years, Gilson prepared a new edition of his pioneer study, Le Thomisme, in which the existential character of Thomistic wisdom is placed in high relief. St. Thomas regards God as the supreme and self-subsistent act of existing and the creative source of finite beings, whose highest act is also that of existing. This has a definite effect upon Thomistic metaphysics, since it involves a conception of being as something more than essence or nature. Both essence and existence are constitutive principles of being, and hence the science of being must be directed as well to the existential act. (shrink)

The study of being was one of the main preoccupations of Gilson's scholarly and intellectual life. Being and Some Philosophers is at once a testament to the persistence of these concerns and an important landmark in the history of the question of being. The book charts the ways in which being is translated across history, from unity in Plato and substance in Aristotle to essence in Avicenna and the act of existence in Aquinas. It examines the vicissitudes of essence and (...) existence in Suarez and Christian Wolff, in Hegel and Kierkegaard, in order to uncover the metaphysical and existential foundations of modern thought. And yet Being and Some Philosophers remains not so much an historical investigation (although it could only have been written by a scholar steeped in the history of philosophy) but, in the words of its author, "a philosophical book, and a dogmatically philosophical one at that." Its passionate vigour has proven, over many years, at once fresh and provocative. Indeed, the appendix to this revised edition contains critiques of the book by two Thomists as well as Gilson's replies to their objections. (shrink)

A faithful but undoctrinaire Thomist, Piemontese claims to uncover the basic "existential" structures holding in all properly philosophical activity. Attention to the three basic structures of interiority, critical restlessness, and contemplation allows him to put off the "objective" question of the "essence" of philosophy. The author exposes strongly the great need for genuine mutual questioning among the varieties of systematic thought.--C. D.

Feser (2017) presents and defends five proofs of the existence of God. Each proof is in two stages: the first stage proves the existence of something which, in the second stage, is shown to possess an appropriate range of divine attributes. Each proof is given two presentations, one informal and one formal. In this paper, I critically examine two premises from one of Feser's five first stage proofs. I provide reasons for thinking that naturalists reject both of these premises. In (...) my view, this enough to show that the proof fails: it fails to advance considerations that decide between theism and important competing positions. (shrink)