It turns out that you can teach an old dog—even a “dead dog,” as Lessing would describe Spinoza—new tricks. In Spinoza and German Idealism, we learn not only how Spinoza influenced the German Idealists, but also how they transformed and gave new life to the key concepts of his system. In this collection of fourteen essays, we see how Kant, Schleiermacher, Herder, Goethe, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, and Trendelenburg understood (and misunderstood) Spinoza’s conception of God, intellectual intuition, human freedom, and the (...) relation between the infinite and the finite—to name but a few of the topics treated in these pages—and also how they defined their own philosophical projects in response to Spinoza on those points. .. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Kant's Critique of Berkeley HENRY E. ALLISON THE CLAIMTHAT KANT'S IDEALISM,or at least certain strands of it, is essentially identical to that of Berkeley has a long and distinguished history. It was first voiced by several of Kant's contemporaries such as Mendelssohn, Herder, Hamann, Pistorius and Eberhard who attacked the alleged subjectivism of the Critique of Pure Reason. 1 This viewpoint found its sharpest contemporary expression in the notorious (...) Garve-Feder review to which Kant responded at length in the Prolegomena. In subsequent times it has been championed by Schopenhauer, and most nineteenth century German commentators on the relation between the two philosophers. 2 In addition, it has been, and continues to be, the prevailing view of the vast majority of British writers on Kant, including, with significant qualifications, Norman Kemp Smith. 3 This tradition continues despite the fact that Kant specifically, and in no uncertain terms, repudiated this identification in the Prolegomena and the second edition of the Critique. In both works he responds to the charges of subjectivism, and in so doing distinguishes his position from that of Berkeley, who in the eighteenth century was commonly regarded as a solipsist and denier of the "external world." 4 In contra-distinction to Kant's own critical or transcendental idealism, which explains the possibility of synthetic a priori knowledge within the realm of possible experience, Berkeley is characterized as a "dogmatic" or "visionary idealist." He is judged guilty of "degrading bodies to mere illusion" (B69), of regarding things in space as "merely imaginary entities" (B274), and of holding with all "genuine idealists" that: "all knowledge through the senses and experience is i Cf. Hans Vaihinger, Commentar zu Kant's Kritik der Reinen Vernunft (Stuttgart, Berlin, Leipzig, 1892), II, 494-505. Cf. Friederich Fredericks, Der Phainomenale Idealisraus Berkeley's und Kant's (Berlin, 1871); Robert Zimmerman, "Ober Kant's Widerlegung des Idealismus yon Berkeley" (Sitzungsberichte der Akademie der Wissenschaften, Vienna, Philox.-hist. Kl.), LXVIII (1871); Gustav Dieckert, tiber dos Verhiiltnis des Berkeleyschen ldealismus zu Kantischen Vernun]tkritik (Konitz, 1888). Tiffs is a consequence of the general British tendency to view Kant in phenomenalist terms. A typical recent example is found in P. F. Strawson, The Bounds of Sense (London, 1966). Kemp Smith in his Commentary to Kant's Critique o[ Pure Reason (2nd ed., rev., 1923) takes greaZ pains to distinguish between the subjectivist strand in Kant's thought, which is essentially identical to Berkeley's position, and the genuine critical doctrine which stands side by side with it in the text. 9 Cf. I-I.M. Bracken, The Early Reception of Berkeley's Materialism 1710-1733, rev. ed. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1965). [43] 44 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY nothing but sheer illusion, and only in the ideas of pure understanding is there truth" (374). 5 One of the chief reasons for the continuation of the Kant-Berkeley tradition is that these, and similar statements about Berkeley, which we find in these works and in Kant's correspondenc e with Beck, have not been taken very seriously by Kant's critics. They are usually dismissed as obvious misinterpretations, due to Kant's ignorance of Berkeley's actual writings, and of his reliance upon distorted second and third hand accounts of Berkeley's thought such as is to be found in Beattie. Furthermore, this view is often supported by the philological reflection that Kant did not read English, and that Berkeley's writings were not yet available in German translation. 6 The philological argument, however, loses much of its force when we consider that there was indeed a German translation of Berkeley's Dialogues, which although apparently unknown to nineteenth century scholars, was readily accessible to Kant. This is to be found, together with a translation of Collier's Clavis Universalis and critical analyses, in a work by the professor of philosophy at Rostock, Johann Christian Eschenbach, entitled: Samlung der vornehmsten Schri[tsteller die die tFirklichkeit ihres eignen K~rpers und der ganzen Ki~rperwelt leugnen (Rostock, 1756). Furthermore, in addition to this work, which was probably known to Kant, there is Berkeley's important Latin work, De Motu (1721), as well as French translations of many of... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:488 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY most extensive study of this aspect of Schelling's thought, at least until 1806. However, even if Schelling was not, as it is frequently stated, indifferent to the problems and the vicissitudes of politics, his theoretical thinking on this subject never went beyond temporary systematizations, to be given up, or modified, after a while. The author shows how Schelling, especially in this fieM, was influenced either (...) by his environment in general, or by some personalities he happened to contact: first his "republican" and francofile friends of the Ttibingen Stilt, afterwards the romantic circle of Jena, and, between 1801 and 1803, Hegel. The author studies in his first chapter, devoted tO the non-philosophic writings of the TUbingen period (1790-1795), not only Kant's and Herder's influence on Schelling, which are usually taken for granted, but also the impact of C. G. Heine and of other GSttingen scholars. This is a stimulating suggestion, showing the need for a more detailed study on the diffusion of the "historicocritical" method in circles, as the Ttibingen school, dominated rather by philosophical and theological than by philological and historical interests. In the following chapters, Schelling is closely related again to the intellectual history of his time; Schelling's relationship to the Aufkliirer Nicolai produces some surprises, and the same may be said about some new particulars (implementing F. Rosenzweig's and F. Bthm's research) on the close connection between Schelling and Htlderlin in 1795-1796. The fourth chapter is devoted to the correlation between theories on "natural philosophy" and moral political theories. The fifth concerns the philosophy of history and of government. This remarkable study, founded on sound scholarship, and conducted with a sharp historical mind, is to be recommended not only to students of Schelling, but to all those who have some interest in early XIXth Century German political thought. GIORGIO TONELLI State University of New York at Binghamton Gesammelte Werke, Vol. IV. By Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. Ed. Hartmut Buehner and Otto Ptggeler. (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1968. Pp. 622. DM 86.00) Despite the high reputation Germany has long enjoyed with regard to its scientifically reliable editions, up to this very moment, a historic-critical edition of the totality of Hegel's works has not existed. There were only provisional texts of single works available whose philological reliability differed in its sometimes doubtful variety. This is a rather strange fact, considering that Hegel died in 1831. It can be explained only by a phenomenon peculiar to this philosopher: at the peak of his fame, numerous students from all countries of the world attended Hegel's lectures, assiduously taking notes and frequently publishing as authentic what they had understood and jotted down. The philosopher was very generotis in authorizing various versions of his lectures and thus, the international market was swamped with quite incongruous editions of some of his writings at the moment of Hegel's death. Despite this rather confused state of affairs, distinguished scholars have tried, for BOOK REVIEWS 489 more than six decades, to bring order into the posthumous manuscripts of the philosopher, and these efforts were successful, but only to a certain extent. Next to the pioneering publications of Wilhelm Dilthey, Herman Nohl and Frans Rosenzweig, lesser known savants, in the first place, Georg Lasson and Johannes Hoffmeister have devoted many years of self-denying efforts to make /mportant parts of Hegel's manuscripts available to the public and looked for new possibilities to edit the large body of lectures. But the task proved too difficult for individual scholars. For this reason, the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, a government-sponsored organization, has commissioned the publication of an all-encompassing historic-critical edition of Hegel's works and arranged for the appointment of a senatorial commission for advising the editors of such a mammoth undertaking. Members of the commission were the aforementioned scholars (see title) and W. Wieland. The Ministry of Education of the State of Nordrhein-Westfalen has opened a research center, originally directed by F. Nicolin, since 1968 by O. Ptggeler. Thus the edition can now be published continuously. Before discussing the contents of volume four, the only volume hitherto published, let's take... (shrink)

NB: This paper has been largely displaced by my: “Externalism, Metasemantic Contextualism and Self-Knowledge”, in Goldberg, (ed.) Externalism, Self-Knowledge and Skepticism. New York: Oxford University Press, 2015, pp. 228-247. // -/- While straightforwardly ambiguous words like “bank” and obviously indexical words like “I” are unproblematically treated as referring to different things in different contexts, such variations are displayed by terms that seem neither ambiguous nor indexical. This paper will argue that traditional accounts of word meaning (in which a single fixed (...) meaning is attached to each entry in one’s ‘mental lexicon’) have problems accounting for how the referent of a non-ambiguous/non-indexical term can shift from context to context, while a moderate version of semantic holism can do so by understanding the comparative weight of the meaning-constitutive beliefs as itself something which can vary from context to context. (shrink)

This is a partial translation by Wade Baskin of the original French work Ecrits et Paroles (a 3 volume set, 665 pages) published between 1957 and 1959 by Henri Bergson. It includes the translation from Bergson’s introduction to a French ed. of De rerum natura, by Lucretius published in 1884 under the title: Extraits de Lucre`ce.

As dictums go, Hegel’s Doppelsatz—“what is rational is actual [wirklich]; and what is actual is rational”—has a nice ring to it, right up there with “existence precedes essence” and “revenge is a dish best served cold.” Still, it has long befuddled readers: what does it mean, and what does it suggest about Hegel’s worldview?Anyone looking for answers to these questions would do well to consult the essays in Wirklichkeit. Beiträge zu einem Schlüsselbegriff der Hegelschen Philosophie. The essays are grouped into (...) two sets of six, with the first tending toward theoretical, the second toward practical issues in Hegel. Their gravitational center is the Logic’s technical concept of Wirklichkeit—“the unity of essence and... (shrink)

The Heisenberg quantum mechanical conception of nature is extended and applied to the brain Strict adherence to the principle of parsimony and to quantum thinking produces naturally on the basis of an overview of brain operation compatible with the information provided by the brain sciences a uni ed description of the physical and mental aspects of nature that can account in principle for the full content of felt human experience..