L'écologie cherche à connaître les conditions d'existence des organismes par rapport à leur milieu physique et biotique.D'une part elle étudie les exigences des organismes envers le milieu et leurs adaptations à celui-ci; d'autre part, elle recherche comment le milieu influe sur les organismes. Or, puisque chaque être vivant fait partie du milieu des autres et que sa présence et son activité modifient le milieu physique et biotique pour lui-même comme pour les autres, l'écologie est amenée à considérer en général les (...) interactions entre les facteurs constitués par les organismes ainsi que par les agents inorganiques.Toutefois, la complexité de ces interactions est telle qu'à leur analyse physico-chimique s'opposent des difficultés partiellement insurmontables. La raison en est que les multiples facteurs écologiques n'agissent pas isolément, mais en combinaison dans l'espace et dans le temps. Il en résulte des états d'équilibre relatif dont seule l'expérience multiséculaire de la nature nous révèle l'aboutissement avec certitude. Aussi bien l'écologiste qui veut en tenir compte commence-t-il ses recherches par le relevé qualitatif et quantitatif des groupements biologiques spontanés. Le chercheur les reconnaît à la constance relative de leur composition, dans les divers endroits où ils sont réalisés, constance résultant de l'équilibre relatif entre les facteurs. C'est exactement pour de tels groupements queMöbius à créé le terme de biocénose. Ainsi la biocénotique peut être considérée comme la propédeutique d'une écologie justement conçue; elle ne serait que préparatoire et provisoire si la Science pouvait un jour entièrement éclaircir le jeu des forces écologiques.Enfin en essayant de bien situer l'écologie dans le cadre des disciplines biologiques voisines, il est utile d'avoir présent à l'esprit l'ébauche suivante d'un nouveau système de la biologie:Dans mes „Analyses et synthèses biocénotiques” , j'ai discuté la conception d'Agrell, qui se base sur des stations-types préétablies. Depuis,Agrell a consacrédeux articles polémiques à soutenir que ses „Bestandestypen” s'identifient aux groupements écologiques tels que je le conçois.Il n'en est rien.Dans l'idée d'Agrell, tous les relevés provenant d'un même type de stations font a priori partie d'un même „Bestandestyp”. La conséquence en est que certaines espèces en réalité vicariantes, c'est-à-dire ne cohabitant jamais -Tetracanthella wahlgreni etFolsomia brevicauda, par exemple — se trouvent réunies, sur le papier, dans une même „communauté”. Au contraire, dans mon système, les relevés faits dans un certain type de stations sont classés tantôt dans un groupement , tantôt dans un autre , d'après leur composition faunistique servant d'indicateur. Cette différence explique amplement les discordances qu'Arell relève entre mes indices d'abondance-fréquence et les siens, discordance prouvant une fois de plus que les „Bestandestypen” et les groupements ne sont pas la même chose.Agrell qualifie de résidu l'un de mes groupements. Or, rien n'est plus résiduel queson Bestandestyp 2, qui représente l'ensemble de 7 stations sur 10, celles qui restent après avoir retranché les 3 stations de milieux extrêmes.Agrell reproche à ma méthode de laisser inclassables certains relevés dépourvusd'espèces vicariantes. Cela n'est-il pas préférable au classement de force de relevés, fragmentaires et aux calculs hasardeux basés sur des unités hétérogènes?Enfin,Agrell estime que le choix des espèces caractéristiques est subjectif. J'ai: montré qu'il ne l'est ni plus ni moins que celui des caractères spécifiques en taxonomie.Oekologie, Ethologie, Biogeographie und Biocoenotik werden noch häufig miteinander verwechselt. Diese Disziplinen lassen sich an Hand des Schemas unterscheiden, das in vorstehenden Schlussfolgerungen wiedergegeben ist. Dieses Schema ist zugleich ein Beitrag zu einem neuen, dreidimensionalen System der Biologie.Speziell wird auf den methodischen Unterschied zwischen Oekologie und Biocoenotik eingegangen. Die Biocoenotik kann als eine unentbehrliche Vorstufe der Oekologie angesehen werden, insofern sie die natürliche Vergemeinschaftung der Organismen als ein grossartiges, von der Natur selbst eingesetztes Experiment betrachtet. Ihre Aufgabe ist es, dass Ergebnis dieses Experiments zu beschreiben. Die Lebensgemeinschaften, die sie dabei unterscheidet, sind gekennzeichnet durch ihre häufig wiederkehrende, einigermassen konstante Zusammensetzung, entsprechend den relativen Faktoren-Gleichgewichten, welche sich im Laufe der Jahrhunderte einstellen. Die Lebensgemeinschaften sind aber viel leichter zu erfassen als die Faktoren-Gleichgewichte und deren biologische Bedeutung. Ihre Abgrenzung erfolgt, — wie in der Taxonomie diejenige der Arten — auf Grund objektiver Diskontinuitäten. Letztere gründen sich in der Biocoenotik auf die sich ökologisch ersetzenden Arten. Sie sind die Prüfsteine für die Grundeinheiten der Biocoenotik: die Biocoenosen.] Soweit die Organismen einer Biocoenose aufeinander einwirken, stellen sie gleichzeitig einen Konnex dar; und soweit sie in ihren Ansprüchen oder Anpassungen übereinstimmen, gehören sie auch zum gleichen Lebensformen-Typ. Es ist praktisch, drei Grössenordnungen von Biocoenosen zu unterscheiden: Synusien, Assoziationen und Biome. (shrink)

Filosofi og pædagogik er gamle fæller, og der er et overlap mellem filosofiens historie og pædagogikkens historiske litteratur. Store tænkere som Platon, Aristoteles, Augustin, Descartes, Locke, Rousseau, Kant, Hegel, Schleiermacher, Herbart og Dewey hører hjemme begge steder. I den pædagogiske filosofi kan almene teoretiske og praktisk filosofiske spørgsmål udforskes systematisk og historisk. Gennem diskussioner af sådanne spørgsmål kan man forholde sig mere nysgerrigt, bevidst, begrundet og kritisk til pædagogisk praksis såvel som til pædagogisk teori, empiri og undervisningsteknologi. -/- Fællesskabet er (...) ikke uproblematisk. Pædagogik er ikke filosofi, og pædagogisk filosofi ikke kun pædagogik. Både didaktik og almen pædagogik kan komme i konflikt med pædagogisk filosofi. Hvordan kan almene pædagogiske spørgsmål overhovedet belyses filosofisk, og hvad betyder de for filosofien selv? En pædagogisk filosofisk tilgang forandrer kanon i både pædagogik og filosofi. Udvalget af nøgletekster ændres. Emner, der er værd at diskutere, forskydes. Nye forskningsspørgsmål og prioriteringer viser sig. Et pædagogisk perspektiv på filosofiens udvikling vil fremhæve dens bidrag til at forstå ’den pædagogiske problem- og fænomenverden’, ligesom et filosofisk perspektiv på pædagogikken vil flytte – eller rettere udvide – fokus med hensyn til dens idéhistorie såvel som dens aktuelle teoretiske praksis. Som i al anden filosofi kan man i den pædagogiske filosofi diskutere teoretiske og praktiske, såvel som poetiske og æstetiske spørgsmål; men det er typisk med en særlig vinkel, nemlig den pædagogiske. Man kan således diskutere erkendelse, viden og sandhed, ligeså vel som man kan undersøge ret, retfærdighed og skønhed. Ofte vil det være med en særlig tvist. Den pædagogiske filosofi kan vise sig som særegen både ved sin særlige position og ved at relatere sig til det pædagogiske som genstandsfelt. Hvad denne position og dette genstandsfelt egentlig er, er der dog ingen enighed om. Det kan ikke engang siges at være udelukkende pædagogisk defineret, og derfor må den pædagogiske filosofi forholde sig åbent til begge dele. Studier i pædagogisk filosofi indbyder til denne drøftelse. (shrink)

Hermann J. Cloeren - Otto Friedrich Gruppe 1804-1876: Philosoph, Dichter, Philologe - Journal of the History of Philosophy 43:3 Journal of the History of Philosophy 43.3 367-369 Ludwig Bernays, editor. Otto Friedrich Gruppe 1804–1876: Philosoph, Dichter, Philologe. Freiburg: Rombach, 2004. Pp 279. Paper, € 39,90. Two hundred years after his birth, Otto Friedrich Gruppe is commemorated in essays by American and European scholars. Contributions in English, French, German, and Italian treat diverse aspects of Gruppe's life and work. While Gruppe's (...) son, Otto Gruppe, in his time a well-known philologist, considered his father's best work to be his poetry, O. F. Gruppe's great-grandson, Dr. Ludwig Bernays, the editor of this volume, wisely chose a more encompassing approach. The present review considers contributions dealing with Gruppe's philosophical writings. The essays dealing with Gruppe as a poet, journalist, philologist, and secretary of the Königliche Akademie der Künste have to be considered elsewhere... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:A Response to Marja Heimonen, “Justifying the Right to Music Education”Hermann J. KaiserFirst of all I would like to thank Marja Heimonen for her paper on a central problem not only for music education as practice but also for the theory of music education. She gives a very clear and convincing answer to a permanently irritating question: How do we justify music education within an ensemble of competing (...) subjects struggling to get a place within the school curriculum. And she does it in a rather uncommon way, that is, by means of legal philosophy. I think her arguments provoke several questions worthy of serious discussion. Some of these questions I shall try to indicate.The first question relates to the right to (music) education. Referring to the Nordic countries she states, "Their legal systems are based on enacted acts and statutes not only protecting the citizens against criminal acts but also securing their rights to receive a certain amount and standard of services the state is obliged to provide" and she continues: "Education is one of the basic rights in Nordic societies." I am interested very much in the wording by which these constitutions declare the right to education respectively to music education. The German constitution, for example, says only, but very bluntly that the entire schooling system stands under control of the state. That means, in connection with compulsory schooling, education at school means no right but a compulsion. (I shall come back to this point later.)The second question relates to the issue of internal versus external goods or instrumental versus self-justifying aims. In her attempt to justify music education Heimonen makes a distinction between internal and external goods, instrumental and self-justifying aims. I wonder if this distinction—though it is very common in theories of action and of value—really refers to different facts; perhaps [End Page 213] it is only a difference in perspectives. I will transform this problem into a question thus: Are aims and values emphasizing a person's well-being really not instrumental with regard to this person? The well-being aims look to me to be necessarily connected to self-justifying aims. Aims, values, activities, facts, situations, and so on, generating well-being, are always instrumental with regard to a person's well-being. What else should they be?On the other hand, are so-called external goods and instrumental aims not self-justifying aims as well, again from the point of view of the person concerned? Are not aims which favor the training of a future professional (so called instrumental aims) self-justifying with regard to this person since they contribute very much to his or her well-being? Thus music educators should not hesitate to demonstrate the real individual, social, economical, and so on, benefit of music education to the society concerned very energetically.The third question arises around the implicit theories of the teacher, the school, and the function of music education as set forth by Heimonen in her paper. Heimonen compares the structure of the (music) teacher's situation with that of a judge. She says:The judge has to operate between the tensions of different interests in the framework of the law consisting of written regulations and the tradition of previous cases that have been solved.... The judge works within a "legal puzzle" just as the music teacher operates in a "musical puzzle": both of them have to think holistically as they try to achieve the best possible solutions in a particular situation, and both of them have to act innovatively and creatively in their practice.Here the question arises as to whether the "musical puzzle" is really the corresponding moment to the "legal puzzle" or whether it is the "music-pedagogical puzzle." I think it is the latter. But the teacher does not have—like the judge "his" legal system—a framework of written regulations and he never is in the situation just to apply rules on different cases. That is to say, one cannot reduce educational activities to making decisions on the basis of right or wrong, good or bad. But even if one would acknowledge an identical structure of the... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:A Response to David Carr, “The Significance of Music for the Promotion of Moral and Spiritual Value”Iris M. YobDavid Carr has addressed a question that has been lurking in philosophical literature for centuries and, I might add, in our collective intuition as well: Just what is the connection between music and the moral and spiritual life? And as we have come to expect from his work, he brings a (...) new perspective to this perennial question in his answer. First he traces a line of thinking since Plato about music and the ordering of the soul, he touches on the role of music and the other arts in exploring the complexities of the moral imperative as it is lived out in human lives, and returns at the end to give a new take on the old Platonic idea of ordering of the soul. Just maybe, he suggests, the detachment, however temporary, "from the trials and tribulations that beset us in the day to day rough and tumble of human practical affairs" "in the interests of some more balanced perspective" on spiritual and moral matters "might be easier to achieve in the contemplation and appreciation of great works of 'music alone.'"This conclusion does not lay claim to more than what is perfectly reasonable. Allowing oneself to be immersed in a great work of music or art or architecture or dance may very well provide that distance from every day life where one might [End Page 209] re-center and refocus, refresh and renew one's outlook on the world. Such an engagement with an artwork can interrupt the patterns of thinking and acting that might have become increasingly thoughtless and ego-centric. It can be a re-creation in the true sense of the word. Paul Tillich, one of the great twentieth century religious philosophers, tells of an experience he had during the First World War where he served as a chaplain in the German army. On a brief leave from the front he visited Kaiser Friedrich Museum in Berlin and stood entranced before Botticelli's "Madonna and Child with Singing Angels." The moment was spiritually transformative, he tells us, lifting his spirits beyond the mud and grime of the battlefield to contemplate life and meaning on a different plane altogether. The experience enabled him to return to duty with renewed inner strength and calm.1 I believe this is a rather powerful and compelling example of what Carr is talking about.In coming to his conclusion, Carr is relying on the particularly difficult case of "music alone," that is, music that does not have words, title, or any other kind of representative function. In other words his argument does not depend on any didactic nature or morally or spiritually directive intent of the music. Rather, it is centered on music that ostensibly is not about anything. This is musical sound composed and performed for the appreciation of what it is in itself. And yet, in providing distance from the every day world, according to Carr, it can give expression to "realms of spiritual experience that lie beyond the sensual and empirical." Here we enter the world of the metaphorical and symbolic, what Rudolf Otto would call the "irrational" or "superrational," or the realm of the Holy. While Carr does not state this explicitly I would go so far as to say that this realm of the wordless and sacred is where the spiritual and the moral are grounded and from where they draw their power.Against this background, I would like to ask how does "music alone," in the sense intended by Carr and Peter Kivy from whom he borrowed the term bring about this effect? We are unable now to ask Tillich what it was that gave the Botticelli its impact for him, but it is curious that what it did for him it most likely did not do for all the other soldiers from the front who happened upon it the way he did. Tillich would most likely explain its effect by resorting to his theory of symbols, because after all this painting does have a literal meaning that might very well have inspired him. But... (shrink)

The redundant-signals paradigm (RSP) is designed to investigate response behavior in perceptual tasks in which response-relevant targets are defined by either one or two features, or modalities. The common finding is that responses are speeded for redundantly compared to singly defined targets. This redundant-signals effect (RSE) can be accounted for by race models if the response times do not violate the race model inequality (RMI). When there are violations of the RMI, race models are effectively excluded as a viable account (...) of the RSE. The common alternative is provided by co-activation accounts, which assume that redundant target signals are integrated at some processing stage. However, ‘co-activation’ has mostly been only indirectly inferred and the accounts have only rarely been explicitly modeled; if they were modeled, the RSE has typically been assumed to have a decisional locus. Yet, there are also indications in the literature that the RSE might originate, at least in part, at a non-decisional or motor stage. In the present study, using a distribution analysis of sequential-sampling models (ex-Wald and Ratcliff Diffusion model), the locus of the RSE was investigated for two bimodal (audio-visual) detection tasks that strongly violated the RMI, indicative of substantial co-activation. Three model variants assuming different loci of the RSE were fitted to the quantile reaction time proportions: a decision, a non-decision, and a combined variant both to vincentized group as well as individual data. The results suggest that for the two bimodal detection tasks, co-activation has a shared decisional and non-decisional locus. These findings point to the possibility that the mechanisms underlying the RSE depend on the specifics (task, stimulus, conditions, etc.) of the experimental paradigm. (shrink)

Looking for goal-relevant objects in our various environments is one of the most ubiquitous tasks the human visual system has to accomplish. Visual search is guided by a number of separable selective-attention mechanisms that can be categorized as bottom-up driven – guidance by salient physical properties of the current stimuli – or top-down controlled – guidance by observers' “online” knowledge of search-critical object properties. In addition, observers' expectations based on past experience also play also a significant role in goal-directed visual (...) selection. Because sensory environments are typically stable, it is beneficial for the visual system to extract and learn the environmental regularities that are predictive of the target stimulus. This perspective article is concerned with one of these predictive mechanisms: statistical context learning of consistent spatial patterns of target and distractor items in visual search. We review recent studies on context learning and its adaptability to incorporate consistent changes, with the aim to provide new directions to the study of processes involved in the acquisition of search-guiding context memories and their adaptation to consistent contextual changes – from a three-pronged, psychological, computational, and neurobiological perspective. (shrink)