En este artículo pretendo probar que en el pensamiento de Francisco Antonio Encina existe una reflexión sobre la comprensión. Esa reflexión, a diferencia de lo que han sostenido algunos autores, tiene un talante filosófico, en el sentido de que en ella se exponen pertinentemente los polos entre los que se realiza la comprensión, los extremos hacia los que puede inclinarse la actividad comprensiva y las condiciones básicas que ha de reunir una comprensión de los asuntos humanos calificable como pertinente, adecuada (...) o correcta. (shrink)
Resumen: En este artículo pretendo probar que en el pensamiento de Francisco Antonio Encina existe una reflexión acerca de la comprensión. Esa reflexión, a diferencia de lo que han sostenido algunos autores, tiene un talante filosófico, en el sentido de que en ella se exponen pertinentemente los polos entre los que se realiza la comprensión, los extremos hacia los que puede inclinarse la actividad comprensiva y las condiciones básicas que ha de reunir una comprensión de los asuntos humanos calificable como (...) pertinente, adecuada o correcta.: In this article, I intend to prove that at the foundation of Francisco Antonio Encina’s thought there is a reflection on human understanding. This reflection, unlike what some authors have argued, has a philosophical scope. In it are exposed, in a relevant manner: the poles between which understanding is made; the extremes toward which comprehensive activity can lean; and the basic conditions that must be met by an understanding of human affairs that can be qualified as pertinent, adequate or correct. (shrink)
The article approaches Salomon Maimon’s reinterpretation of the notions of the thing in itself and the given within the framework of criticism. For Maimon they do not refer to a transcendence that is directly unattainable by knowledge. In this attempt, he tries to explain the given on the basis of the action of constitutive understanding. With this, he triggers the passage from transcendental Kantian philosophy to the idealism of Fichte. Nonetheless, his position faces the subsequent problem of explaining how the (...) constitution of the given from understanding (infinite) can become compatible with the criticism it takes on. On affirming that an uncognoscible item is the basis of knowledge, namely, infinite understanding, he set aside the explanation of knowledge in terms of what is revealed in it and in doing so would be resorting to external uncognoscible conditions. (shrink)
One of the problems in post-Kantian discussions is the way in which the self procures access to itself. Kant rejects intellectual intuition in human knowledge. Nonetheless, he supposes an access of the self to itself as subject in all conscious knowledge. It is then fitting to ask how this access can occur. Because, if the self is to be taken precisely as subject, in other words as an activity that knows objects, this knowledge of the self should be of a (...) different kind to that in which all the objects already constituted by that activity are known. Fichte or Schelling are usually taken to be the first to have addressed and tried to solve this problem. But Salomon Maimon had already done so in 1789 and had proposed a solution based on intellectual intuition. The aim of this article is to reconstruct Maimon’s arguments, evaluate his proposal, and specifically show that his attempt is the first in which the Kantian problem is addressed and a solution put forward. (shrink)
RESUMEN En este trabajo intento determinar, a partir de textos escogidos de todas las épocas de la producción teórica de Carl Schmitt, de qué manera este autor entiende la comprensión jurídica y de qué manera este modo de comprensión tiene alcances generales para la comprensión práctica. En la medida en que el derecho tematiza las condiciones y los polos de la comprensión, la posición del jurista se distancia tanto de la inclinación hacia el polo ideal, que Schmitt identifica con la (...) racionalidad tecnológica, cuanto de la inclinación hacia el polo real, que Schmitt liga a ciertas formas del romanticismo y el pensamiento teológico. RESUMO Neste artigo, tento determinar, a partir de textos selecionados de todos os períodos da produção teórica de Carl Schmitt, como esse autor entende a compreensão jurídica e como esse modo de compreensão tem alcance geral para a compreensão prática. Na medida em que o direito estuda as condições e os polos de compreensão, a posição do jurista distancia-se da inclinação para o polo ideal, que Schmitt identifica com a racionalidade tecnológica, bem como da inclinação para o polo real, que Schmitt conecta com certas formas de romantismo e pensamento teológico. (shrink)
De acordo com as interpretações mais conhecidas (por exemplo, Hofmann, Strauss, Löwith ou Kuhn), o pensamento jurídico e político de Carl Schmitt mantém distância de Aristóteles. Este artigo tem a intenção de mostrar que a concepção de direito de Schmitt, apesar de ser desenvolvida em um contexto diferente, contém semelhanças significativas com o entendimento de direito em Aristóteles. Para mostrar essa proximidade, considera-se especialmente a noção de totalidade presente no conceito aristotélico de polis, que implica que a unidade política é (...) o principal modo de se realizar o direito. According to mostly known interpretations (e.g.: Hofman, Strauss, Löwith or Kuhn), the legal and political thought of Carl Schmitt keeps distance from Aristotle's. This article intends to show that Schmitt's concept of law, despite developed in a different context, holds significant likelihood with Aristotle's comprehension of law. With the Purpose of building this proximity, the notion of entirety present in the Aristotelic concept of polis implies that political unit is the main way to accomplish law. (shrink)
A wide-ranging, collection focusing on the practical philosophy of Williams, with many chapters on politically relevant themes and many trying to assess the importance and influence of Williams. With contributions by Roman Altshuler, Mathieu Beirlaen, Thom Brooks, Jonathan Dancy, Jennifer Flynn, Lorenzo Greco, Chris D. Herrera, James Kellenberger, Colin Koopman, Stephen Leach, Esther Abin, Nancy Matchett, Jeff McMahan, Sarah Pawlett, Jonathan Sands-Wise, Robert Talisse, and Owen Ware.
Despite the prominence of healthcare-relatedconcerns in public debate, the ground remainsinfertile for the idea of conscripting citizensinto medical research. Reluctance to entertainthe thought of a system where nearly everyonecould be selected for service might reflectuncertainty about what the project wouldinvolve. There might also be a fear that themore crucial issue is how to protect researchsubjects within current, voluntary systems. Nodoubt reluctance to explore a system ofuniversal service results from the common hopethat each of us might avoid research in anycapacity besides (...) researcher. A system of fullcivic participation might, however, avoid manyof the usual objections. Ethics regulations,including informed-consent guidelines, couldfor the most part remain in force. Though thesystem would compel people to serve, it couldremain responsive to principles of autonomy andjustice if it centered on broad publiceducation, community representation, and alottery-type selection process. The systemcould draw from the largest possiblecross-section of society, and offer conscriptsthe widest possible range of service. In thisway, a compulsory system might reconcile theexpectations about healthcare with researchneeds. (shrink)
Discussion about values education has begun to dominate the educational policy agenda in a number of countries over the last 5 years. Of particular relevance are questions on what to teach, how and why. This discussion seems to be more prominent among those countries undergoing vigorous political, economic and social change. In the last few years, Mexico has intensified its active search for democracy and invigorated its march toward modernisation. Both of these intentions have proven to have important influences on (...) the values the Mexican state and educational policy makers see as necessary to be transmitted via education. Simultaneously, Mexican identity, which has evolved relatively consonant with the aims of a centralised and hierarchical state and in line with the principles of the 1910 Revolution, is being continuously challenged by internal as well as external forces. In this article we describe a study designed to understand the approaches to Mexico's values education as a particular instance of a larger comparative project to explore values education in a globally dynamic context. After describing Mexico's political economy, we present the current policy and approaches to values education in general and in the regions included in the Mexican study in particular. We present the findings from a survey to policy makers and educational élites and show regional differences and similarities. We discuss findings from other country contexts to contrast them with the Mexican findings in selected areas. We conclude with a discussion on how this study may help initiate a policy dialogue on values education in Mexico. (shrink)
Recently much interest has been shown in the notion of intelligible species in the thought of Thomas Aquinas. Intelligible species supposedly explain humanknowing of the world and universals. However, in some cases, the historical context and the philosophical sources employed by Aquinas have been sorely neglected. As a result, new interpretations have been set forth which needlessly obscure an already controversial and perhaps even philosophically tenuous doctrine. Using a recent article by Houston Smit as an example of a novel and (...) anachronistic modern interpretation of Aquinas’s abstractionism, this paper shows that Aquinas follows the intentional transference of Averroes who proposes a genuine doctrine of abstraction of intelligibles from experienced sensible particulars. The paper also shows that Aquinas uses the doctrine of primary and secondary causality from the Liber de causis when he asserts that human abstractive powers function only insofar as they are a participation in Divine illumination. (shrink)
A well-known thought experiment has us ponder a lottery system that selects one person as the source of transplantable organs for two others. The organs are forcibly harvested and the “donor” dies, whereas the other two patients live. The Survival Lottery is supposed to get at the distinction between killing and letting die, but it is also a challenge to beliefs about moral duties: what are my obligations if my life could be used to save yours and another person's as (...) well? A less extreme version of this thought experiment might have us imagining that officials of the public healthcare system would devise a similar lottery in the aftermath of a large-scale medical emergency. We could imagine that a natural disaster or an attack using biological weapons, for example, has so diminished the ability to provide public health care that in some communities, officials might consider implementing a lottery. To avoid the concerns about outright killing of selectees, officials might offer a wide range of participation in medical practice and research, not just organ allocation. Officials could ensure that no significant risks are involved, and selectees could in various ways be compensated. Would it be possible to ethically justify this “Healthcare Lottery” on the grounds that it was a temporary, yet necessary, infringement on autonomy? (shrink)
Although deceptive psychology experiments receive less attention than some forms of medical research, they pose similar moral challenges. These challenges mainly concern the use of human subjects and intentional deception. Psychologists provide an argument to justify this deception. But what is an essentially utilitarian argument too often includes faulty comparisons and dubious accounts of risks and benefits. Commentators in other areas of humansubject research might examine this argument and the assumptions behind it. Bioethics commentators seem especially well-positioned for this task.
Technology and terminology often detract from a reasoned appraisal of the euthanasia option, especially in those discussions that argue for euthanasia's incorporation into a beneficence-based medical model. “Beneficent euthanasia,” assuming there is such a thing, poses special challenges to the traditional provider-patient relationship. These challenges argue for well-defined limits of beneficence and a more equitable distribution of responsibility between participants. We should not allow technology and terminology to generate an unrealistic portrayal of patient death and its ramifications. Participants need to (...) acknowledge their roles in the decision to kill and the obligations that those roles entail. Perhaps we can reach ethical consensus concerning euthanasia by first reasserting our span of control over the technology that can extend the near-death period and by openly discussing euthanasia's implications. (shrink)
Boxers and healthcare workers alike should be able to exercise their rightsAlthough there are calls elsewhere to ban boxing, the Australian Medical Association advocates a less restrictive rule. Professional boxers would submit to brain scans and MRIs—but what to do with the results of such tests? Critics say that boxers should decide which risks they take, but boxers are not the only ones in the debate. Healthcare workers understandably want some say in which risks people take, because the hospital is (...) where boxers go when injuries occur . These issues of ethics and obligation are not made easier to resolve by the many disputed comparisons in this debate. Is boxing like other risk taking behaviour? Are physicians like other public employees? Until such questions are answered, a compromise would have check ups made mandatory, without forcing boxers to act on any knowledge gained.There is no shortage of comparisons in the debate over boxing. Boxing, we hear, is like fast food: dangerous yes, but it does offer some benefits. No, the opposing side contends, boxing is like a pistol duel: once considered sophisticated, it is now just a ritualistic violence. Perhaps boxing is like smoking: inform boxers of the risks and let them at it. Then again, if boxing is like smoking, people who do not realise how dangerous it is need protection from it. Depending on who you listen to, boxing is an expression of individualism and personal sacrifice—the next best thing to running your own country—or it illustrates the danger in letting concern for autonomy overstretch the social fabric. And so the comparisons continue, without really convincing anyone. Not surprisingly, reformist proposals that could include mandatory brain scans for boxers are viewed as intrusive …. (shrink)
In pseudo-patient study (PPS), fieldworkers cloak their identities and intentions and pose as This enables them to observe the practice of healthcare from within a naturalistic, nonreactive research setting. Rosenhan and his assistants conducted the most famous PPS, where they faked symptoms of schizophrenia so that they could gain admittance to a mental-health facility and observe the treatment that genuine patients were receiving. More subtle pseudo-patients might arrange over the phone, after reporting varying levels of health insurance. Others might provide (...) dummy lab specimens or test a physician's response to technical questions. A few genuine patients have transformed their legitimate stays in the hospital into fieldwork, transforming themselves into disguised participant-observers. (shrink)
A focus of criticism on methodological and ethical grounds, the undercover or `covert' approach to fieldwork persists as a useful technique in certain settings. Questions remain about the credibility of the published findings from such work. Covert researchers nearly always protect the anonymity of their subjects and locations. Other researchers cannot validate the covert researcher's claims, yet ethical guidelines often insist that researchers demonstrate the benefits that derive from a covert study. If researchers cannot show that their studies will prove (...) beneficial, ethical standards will weigh against the study, on the presumption that the omission of informed consent should be counterbalanced by the scientific rewards of the research. An attempt to open the results to greater peer investigation might place subjects at risk of unwanted notoriety or even danger. There does not seem to be a way that covert research can meet ethical guidelines unless we adjust our conceptions of research, ethics, or both. Key Words: fieldwork ethnography research ethics informed consent. (shrink)
Collections tend to the hazardous. The present volume illustrates the pitfalls as well as the successes of the genre. Fifteen contributions uneven in quality and disparate in theme are here placed under the serendipitous umbrella of “Hispanic Philosophy.”.
The State against Public Service ? the Hidden Side of Endogenous Growth Models of endogenous growth are generally considered to be endowed with the following properties : 1. A macro-dynamisation of the general Walrasian equilibrium ; 2. A rupture with the Solow paradigm ; 3. A capacity to identify the forces which are currently driving technical progress and growth, by way of an increase in externalities and yields ; 4. A rehabilitation of state-intervention, particularly in the social field ; 5. (...) A capacity to effect a rapprochement between the neo-classical and heterodox paradigms. The article, arguing that such positions, which have given rise to a consensus, are seriously flawed, casts light on the latter’s « hidden side », in particular the ambiguities lurking at the heart of its redefinition of the role of the State. (shrink)
The purpose of this article is making a critical revision of the field of communication –understood as a field of research and reflection– and the way its existence has been tried to be legitimated since the postwar period. Our stance holds that, even though it is possible to find relatively linear and continuous narratives to understand communication, what is regarded here is reaching comprehension of the fragmentation and language games brought together in it. Besides, the core problem does not rely (...) on the consolidation of a linear and scientific epistemological narrative, but on the manner discourse is articulated, giving place to such narratives turning around their political charges and not the supposed scientific value attributed to them. (shrink)