Jan Paweł II wielokrotnie odnosił się do relacji między Kościołem a sztuką. Dostrzegał, że dialog między Kościołem i sztuką wygasł lub został naznaczony sprzecznościami na przełomie XIX i XX wieku. W niniejszym studium koncentruję się na dwóch kluczowych kwestiach: czy Kościołowi potrzebna jest sztuka oraz czy sztuka potrzebuje Kościoła? Odpowiedź na drugie pytanie nie jest ewidentna i odnosi się do innej kwestii sformułowanej przez Jana Pawła II:,,Czy sztuka ulega ograniczeniu lub zostaje pozbawiona istotnego znaczenia, jeżeli pomija rzeczywistość Kościoła?”. Sztuka w (...) istocie potrzebuje Kościoła, jeśli ma lepiej rozumieć prawdziwe powołanie człowieka oraz jeśli ma rozumieć, że jej ostateczny cel nie tkwi w prezentacji tego, co złe i niemoralne. (shrink)

Building on our diverse research traditions in the study of reasoning, language and communication, the Polish School of Argumentation integrates various disciplines and institutions across Poland in which scholars are dedicated to understanding the phenomenon of the force of argument. Our primary goal is to craft a methodological programme and establish organisational infrastructure: this is the first key step in facilitating and fostering our research movement, which joins people with a common research focus, complementary skills and an enthusiasm to work (...) together. This statement—the Manifesto—lays the foundations for the research programme of the Polish School of Argumentation. (shrink)

Obóz Kultury 2.0 Mirosław Filiciak, Alek Tarkowski, Agata Jałosińska, Andrzej Klimczuk, Maciej Rynarzewski, Jacek Seweryn, Stunża M., D. Grzegorz, Marcin Wilkowski & Anna Orlik .

The author starts with the assumption that a popular idea, according to which a true sentence corresponds with reality, is adequate. Therefore, any adequate theory of truth has to account for it. It turns out, however, that it is the epistemic conception, not the correspondence one, that meets such a demand. In order to justify his claim, the author discusses Jacek J. Jadacki's theory of truth. Roughly speaking, the theory in question states that if a given sentence refers to (...) a certain state of affairs - that function a the sentence's semantic value - then the sentence is true if and only if the relevant state of affairs holds. In short, the theory defines the truth of a given sentence in terms of the holding of the state of affairs to which the sentence refers. It remains to be explained, therefore, what it is, for a given state of affairs to hold. The author considers three possible accounts of the holding of the state of affairs. According to the first one, the sentence's semantic value is either a mental representation or an ideal entity grasped in the subjective episode of understanding. Such a mental or ideal state of affairs holds if it has its real counterpart. The second ac-count is based on the idea that real states of affairs constitutes a subclass of all describeable states of affairs. A given state of affairs holds if and only if it belongs to this special class. According to the third interpretation, a holding state of affairs is the semantic value of a true sentence. The author argues that the first account gives rise to the suspect question on the nature of either the relation of mental representation or the relation of exemplification. The second account, in turn, seems to require a controversial assumption that existence is a property. Taking into account those and similar problems, we have no alternative but to embrace the third option, according to which a given state of affairs holds because it is the semantic value of a true sentence. The truth of a sentence, in turn, has to be conceived as its rational acceptability. (shrink)

From the initiative of the Institute of Philosophy of the Jesuit University Ignatianum in Krakow there was a debate last May that centred on a book by young author Filip Borek from the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology of the Polish Academy of Sciences, who is also a member of the board of the Polish Phenomenological Association. His book consists of a phenomenological interpretation of Vom Wesen der Wahrheit [On the Essence of Truth], an important work in which Heidegger explores (...) the essential connection between truth as correctness and freedom. In attendance were the following guests: Maria Gołębiewska (Polish Academy of Sciences), Paweł Korobczak (University of Wrocław), Daniel R. Sobota (Polish Academy of Sciences) and Jacek Surzyn (Jesuit University Ignatianum in Krakow), as well as the author himself. The debate was led by Magdalena Kozak (Jesuit University Ignatianum in Krakow). (shrink)

The previous volume of the series Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science at Warsaw University---entitled Imperatives from Different Points of View---was the first result of the project Theory of Imperatives and Its Applications realized by the group composed by Anna Brożek, Jacek Jadacki and Berislav Žarnić. The project was supported by the Foundation for Polish Science within the program Homing Plus. One of the most important points of this project was the International Symposium Imperatives in Theory and Practice which (...) took place in Warsaw, on the 18th and 19th May, 2012. The symposium was the meeting of many specialists in the domain of the theory of imperatives – from China, Croatia, Japan, Poland and The United States. Contents: Berislav Žarnić, Logical Root of Linguistic Commitment; Jacek Jadacki, Witwicki’s Square; Tomoyuki Yamada, On the Very Idea of Imperative Inference; Fengkui Ju, Semantics of Sentences in Mixed Moods of Indicative and Imperative; Piotr Kulicki & Robert Trypuz, Two Faces of Obligation; Bartosz Brożek, Types of Obligations; Anna Brożek, Functional Ambiguity of Imperatives; Anna Brożek, Logic of Prescriptions and Instruction; Aleksandra Horecka, Imperative Sentence as a Performative Sentence, which Refers to the Optative State of Affairs; Jakub Bazyli Motrenko, The Concept of Praxiological Directive; Maciej Witek, How to Establish Authority with Words: Imperative Utterances and Presupposition Accommodation; Wojciech Załuski, Remarks on the Lexical Order of Rawls’s Two Principles of Justice; Natalia Miklaszewska, Acts of Will as Convictions; Anna Brożek, Imperatives in the Gospel. (shrink)

Contents: Preface. SCIENTIFIC WORKS OF MARIA STEFFEN-BATÓG AND TADEUSZ BATÓG. List of Publications of Maria Steffen-Batóg. List of Publications of Tadeusz Batóg. Jerzy POGONOWSKI: On the Scientific Works of Maria Steffen-Batóg. Jerzy POGONOWSKI: On the Scientific Works of Tadeusz Batóg. W??l??odzimierz LAPIS: How Should Sounds Be Phonemicized? Pawe??l?? NOWAKOWSKI: On Applications of Algorithms for Phonetic Transcription in Linguistic Research. Jerzy POGONOWSKI: Tadeusz Batóg's Phonological Systems. MATHEMATICAL LOGIC. Wojciech BUSZKOWSKI: Incomplete Information Systems and Kleene 3-valued Logic. Maciej KANDULSKI: Categorial Grammars (...) with Structural Rules. Miros??l??awa KO??L??OWSKA-GAWIEJNOWICZ: Labelled Deductive Systems for the Lambek Calculus. Roman MURAWSKI: Satisfaction Classes - a Survey. Kazimierz _WIRYDOWICZ: A New Approach to Dyadic Deontic Logic and the Normative Consequence Relation. Wojciech ZIELONKA: More about the Axiomatics of the Lambek Calculus. THEORETICAL LINGUISTICS. Jacek Juliusz JADACKI: Troubles with Categorial Interpretation of Natural Language. Maciej KARPI??N??SKI: Conversational Devices in Human-Computer Communication Using WIMP UI. Witold MACIEJEWSKI: Qualitative Orientation and Grammatical Categories. Zygmunt VETULANI: A System of Computer Understanding of Texts. Andrzej WÓJCIK: The Formal Development of van Sandt's Presupposition Theory. W??l??adys??l??aw ZABROCKI: Psychologism in Noam Chomsky's Theory . Ryszard ZUBER: Defining Presupposition without Negation. PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE AND METHODOLOGY OF SCIENCES. Jerzy KMITA: Philosophical Antifundamentalism. Anna LUCHOWSKA: Peirce and Quine: Two Views on Meaning. Stefan WIERTLEWSKI: Method According to Feyerabend. Jan WOLE??N??SKI: Wittgenstein and Ordinary Language. Krystyna ZAMIARA: Context of Discovery - Context of Justification and the Problem of Psychologism. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to argue in favor of the view that some counterpossibles are false. This is done indirectly by showing that accepting the opposite view, i.e., one that ascribes truth to each and every counterpossible, results in the claim that every necessarily false theory has exactly the same consequences. Accordingly, it is shown that taking every counterpossible to be true not only undermines the value of debates over various alternative theories and their consequences, but also puts (...) into question the very possibility of such debates. In order to explicate this thesis, the close bond between counterpossibles and the so-called story prefix is explored. A number of possible responses to this criticism are also presented, and it is argued that none of them address the main problem. (shrink)

Europe is the community of nations which, in the favorable conditions of a small yet extremely diversified continent, took over and developed the legacy of Greco-Roman civilization transformed and enriched by Christianity. Philosophy, theology, liturgy, religion, national culture and tradition are still manifestations of this heritage. Europe is not merely a region or geographical location. It is an idea that expresses cultural and social ideals. The nature of Europeanness is not defined by race or place but by freedom and culture (...) in the broad sense. Latin Europe created a sphere of civilization. Though ridden by contrasts and differences, not merely an organic unity was established but also a unity of a spiritual kind by accentuating and merging of values all Europeans have in common. This was also made possible by Christianity whose ethos came to pervade a multiplicity of socio-cultural phenomena. (shrink)

It is not surprising for us that thought experiments are so popular among phi-losophers and among readers of some philosophical journals.

The kernel of this volume is an English translation of Jan Łukasiewicz’s classic work on the concept of cause (1906). It is the starting point for analytical considerations on causality of two generations of philosophers belonging to the tradition of the Lvov-Warsaw School.

Nina Emery and Christopher Hill proposed a pragmatic approach toward the debate about counterpossibles—i.e., counterfactuals with impossible antecedents. The core of this approach is to move the burden of the problem from the notion of truth value into the notion of assertion. This is meant to explain our pre-theoretical intuitions about counterpossibles while claiming that each and every counterpossible is vacuously true. The aim of this paper is to indicate a problematic aspect of this view.

The common view has it that there are two families of approaches towards the logical structure of impossible worlds – Australasian and North American. According to the first, impossible worlds are closed under the relation of logical consequence of one of the non-classical logics. The North American approach is more liberal, allowing for impossible worlds where no logic holds. After pointing out the questionable consequences of each view, I propose a third one. While this new perspective allows for worlds where (...) no logical consequence holds, it also imposes some constraints on what worlds are built upon. This renders the proposed view not as restrictive as the Australasian approach and not as liberal as the North American approach. Due to its intermediary nature, I have named this perspective ‘the Pacific’ approach. (shrink)

The subject of this article is the Principle of Characterization—the most controversial principle of Alexius Meinong’s Theory of Objects. The aim of this text is twofold. First of all, to show that Bertrand Russell’s well-known objection to the Principle of Characterization can be reformulated against contemporary unrestricted interpretations of it. Second, to propose an alternative formulation of this principle. This refers to the methodology of metaphysics and is based on the distinction between pre-theoretical and theoretical languages. The proposed formulation fits (...) well with every type of contemporary interpretation of the Theory of Objects and helps to overcome Russell’s criticism. (shrink)

This paper aims to introduce Meinongian Abstractionism (MA), i.e. a view on the metaphysics of truthmaking and modality. This approach is based on the notion of objectives—one of the key elements of Alexius Meinong’s Theory of Objects. In the light of it, worlds are interpreted in terms of sets of subsistent and non-subsistent objectives. This—along with Meinong’s characterization of objectives—provides a ground for possible as well as impossible worlds. One of the consequences of Meinongain Abstractionism is a reformulation of the (...) relation of truthmaking in modal terms. Importantly, this reformulation avoids the problem of too-coarse grained analysis of truthmakers. This makes MA a metaphysically–oriented supporter of the so-called ‘hyperintensional revolution.’. (shrink)

The subject of this article is the Principle of Characterization—the most controversial principle of Alexius Meinong’s Theory of Objects. The aim of this text is twofold. First of all, to show that Bertrand Russell’s well-known objection to the Principle of Characterization can be reformulated against contemporary unrestricted interpretations of it. Second, to propose an alternative formulation of this principle. This refers to the methodology of metaphysics and is based on the distinction between pre-theoretical and theoretical languages. The proposed formulation fits (...) well with every type of contemporary interpretation of the Theory of Objects and helps to overcome Russell’s criticism. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to show why the theories of impossible worlds do not fully solve the problem of counterpossibles, but merely shift it. Moreover, by making a distinction between two types of languages, we will show that some expectations about proper theory of counterfactuals might be too great.

The following logics are the most noteworthy from the perspective of the calculus of combinators: the Hilbert’s positive implicational logic , the Church’s weak theory of implication , the BCK-logic, and the BCI-logic. Their significance is due to a certain correspondence between combinators and implicational formulas . The first three logics mentioned have been immensely investigated but it was not so in case of the remaining one. The BCI-logics was mentioned by A. N. Prior in the second edition of his (...) Formal Logic of 1962 where it was credited to C. A. Meredith and dated in 1956 . A. (shrink)

Designed to help nursing students prepare for the NCLEX-RN licensure exam, the third edition of this exam assesses their knowledge and abilities before they take the Boards. The AssessTest is comprised of 265 questions that reflect the stand-alone format and distribution of content according to the NCLEX-RN test plan. A detailed computer evaluation analyses individual strengths and weaknesses to help students plan study time more effectively.

Examination dishonesty is a global problem that became particularly critical after the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic and the shift to remote learning. Academic research has often examined this phenomenon as only one aspect of a broader concept of academic dishonesty and as a one-dimensional construct. This article builds on existing knowledge and proposes a novel, two-factor model of examination misconduct, dividing it into individual and collective forms of dishonesty. A study conducted on a large sample of 462 Polish students (...) confirmed the psychometric quality of the new Examination Dishonesty Intention Scale (EDIS) and the superiority of the two-factor model over the unidimensional model. In addition, we tested the psychological correlates of both types of academic dishonesty and demonstrated their divergent validity. The results suggest that EDIS can be a valuable tool for exploring the intentions of exam dishonesty and has potential for practical applications in academic integrity policy and research. (shrink)

The history of Milton's reception in Poland suggests that he was mainly seen as a model practitioner of epic poetry, rather than as a political or religious thinker. This conclusion is borne out by comparing two of the three complete translations of Paradise Lost into Polish—the first by Jacek Przybylski (1791), the second by Władysław Bartkiewicz (1902) (the third being Maciej Słomczyński's 1974 translation). The examination of a few crucial passages demonstrates that the earlier translation, Przybylski's, is more (...) successful in representing Milton's linguistic sophistication, theology, and attitude to the Roman Church, than Bartkiewicz's later translation, which, characterized above all by a concern with Catholic correctness, includes many omissions and distortions. Słomczyński's translation, criticized for its theological inaccuracies, is only briefly discussed, as are a few fragments of Milton's work that were translated by other Polish poets. (shrink)

The paper focuses on a specific type of referring legal provisions, in which the referring phrase contains a component that indicates the position of a certain fragment of the same text of a normative act by determining the position of that fragment in relation to the fragment in which the given referring phrase is located. Despite the fact that these referrals, called deictic, may be perceived as uncomplicated in structure and as functioning correctly in legal texts, many theoretical as well (...) as practical problems arise during their drafting and legal interpretation. The article attempts to reveal, organize and name these problems basing on the conceptual grid formulated by Studnicki, Łachwa, Fall and Stabrawa as a universal, although not widely known outside Polish jurisprudence, tool for analysing and solving referring provisions as elements of various legal systems, especially continental ones. Texts of selected Polish Codes have been chosen as an illustrative material of deictic referrals which have been incorrectly formulated as leaving space for interpretative doubts in terms of place of indication and place of reference, which also causes a potential problem of the deferred ostension phenomenon noticed by Quine. The author argues that proper drafting of referring legal provisions with deictic indication requires that the legislator should have extensive pragmalinguistic knowledge and is an essential part of law-making oriented towards achieving comprehensibility of texts of normative acts, especially as important as Codes. (shrink)

The distinction between quantitative and qualitative parsimony is supposed to allow David Lewis to dismiss one of the charges against his modal realism: that is, the charge of bloated ontology. The aim of this paper is to undermine Lewis's response to this objection. In order to do this, a distinction between multipliable and nonmultipliable objects is introduced. Based on this it is argued that the acceptance of Lewis's response requires one to believe in modal realism in the first place—that is, (...) one has to believe in the view that the existence of nonactual spatiotemporal worlds does not affect the quality of the ontological commitment. Although the paper focuses on the problem of the metaphysics of possible worlds, this should be regarded merely as a case study. Accordingly, the results of this analysis should find applications in other metaphysical debates as well. (shrink)