Whether to treat autism as exculpatory in any given circumstance appears to be influenced both by models of autism and by theories of moral responsibility. This article looks at one particular combination of theories: autism as theory of mind challenges and moral responsibility as requiring appropriate experience of the reactive attitudes. In pursuing this particular combination of ideas, we do not intend to endorse them. Our goal is, instead, to explore the implications of this combination of especially prominent ideas about (...) autism and about moral responsibility. These implications can be quite serious and practical for autists and those who interact directly with autists, as well as for broader communities as they attend to the fair, compassionate, and respectful treatment of increasing numbers of autistic adults. We find that these theories point to a limited range of situations in which autists should not be blamed for transgressive actions for which neurotypical individuals should be blamed. We build on what others have written on these issues by bringing in a recent cognitive model of the role theory of mind plays in empathy, by discussing the social implications of the theoretical findings, and by raising questions about the compatibility of reactive attitude theories of moral responsibility with the neurodiversity approach to autism. (shrink)

Definitions of health and disease are of more than theoretical interest. Understanding what it means to be healthy has implications for choices in medical treatment, for ethically sound informed consent, and for accurate assessment of policies or programs. This deeper understanding can help us create more effective public policy for health and medicine. It is notable that such contentious legal initiatives as the Americans with Disability Act and the Patients' Bill of Rights fail to define adequately the medical terms on (...) which their effectiveness depends. In Ethics and the Metaphysics of Medicine, Kenneth Richman develops an "embedded instrumentalist" theory of health and applies it to practical problems in health care and medicine, addressing topics that range from the philosophy of science to knee surgery."Embedded instrumentalist" theories hold that health is a match between one's goals and one's ability to reach those goals, and that the relevant goals may vary from individual to individual. This captures the normative implications of the term health while avoiding problematic relativism. Richman's embedded instrumentalism differs from other theories of health in drawing a distinction between the health of individuals as biological organisms and the health of individuals as moral agents. This distinction illuminates many difficulties in patient-provider communication and helps us understand conflicts between promoting health and promoting ethically permissible behavior. After exploring, expanding, and defending this theory in the first part of the book, Richman examines its ethical implications, discussing such concerns as the connection between medical beneficence and respect for autonomy, patient-provider communication, living wills, and clinical education. (shrink)

McCoy, Liu, Lutz, and Sisti (2020) raise concerns about “partial representation,” in which nonelected advocates or advocacy organizations fail to engage and hold themselves accountable to the full range of people they purport to represent. They are right to point out that the autism community is vulnerable to partial representation. This open peer commentary notes some elements among those engaged with autism that may not fit under the type of “federated model” of representation McCoy, et al recommend. Advocates should tread (...) carefully to avoid some types of harm that do not arise when forming federations on other topics. The influence of antivaxxers and other questionable or harmful movements might even lead us to think, despite the value of open debate and engagement, that there is benefit to partial representation if it prevents potential harms that could arise from legitimizing dangerous practices. (shrink)

For decades scholars thought they knew Hume's position on the existence of causes and objects he was a sceptic. However, this received view has been thrown into question by the `new readings of Hume as a sceptical realist. For philosophers, students of philosophy and others interested in theories of causation and their history, The New Hume Debate is the first book to fully document the most influential contemporary readings of Hume's work. Throughout, the volume brings the debate beyond textual issues (...) in Hume to contemporary philosophical issues concerning causation and knowledge of the external world and issues in the history of philosophy, offering the reader a model for scholarly debate. This revised paperback edition includes three new chapters by Janet Broughton, Peter Kail and Peter Millican. Contributors: Kenneth A. Richman, Barry Stroud, Galen Strawson, Kenneth P. Winkler, John P. Wright, Simon Blackburn, Edward Craig, Martin Bell, Daniel Flage, Anne Jaap Jacobson, Rupert Read, Janet Broughton, Peter Millican, Peter Kail. (shrink)

Michelle Garcia Winner’s Social Thinking Curriculum is widely used by schools across the USA and has garnered attention internationally. The curriculum addresses social language and behavior deficits among those on the autism spectrum. Although many embrace this curriculum without reservation, the emphasis on social conformity, including avoiding behaviors that make others uncomfortable, merits scrutiny. Individuals who have difficulty understanding social cues and conventions can derive tremendous benefit from learning to fit in, for example, or learning what is likely to make (...) others uncomfortable and why. However, too much emphasis on pleasing others can reinforce undesirable tendencies. For example, autism is already linked to avoidant personality disorder. An emphasis on avoiding making others uncomfortable may also inhibit the development of principled ethical thinking and action. Reframing social thinking to treat it not (or not only) as an end in itself, but as a way to achieve a variety of social and personal goals would go a long way toward addressing the weaknesses of the Social Thinking Curriculum. (shrink)

In a time when we as a society are in the process of deciding what our basic rights to health care are, it is critically important for us to have a full and complete understanding of what constitutes health. We argue for an analysis of health according to which certain states are healthy not in themselves but because they allow an individual to reach actual goals. Recognizing that the goals of an individual considered from the point of view of biology (...) and the goals of the same individual considered as an agent in the world might be different, we introduce a distinction between the health of an individual qua organism and the health of an individual qua person. We then argue that this distinction characterizes the evaluations made by patients and healthcare providers better than the widely discussed distinction between disease and illness. (shrink)

This paper responds to Goodwin Liu's argument in Volume II of this Journal that a pedagogy must be supported by an appropriate theory of knowledge, and that the epistemology which best supports the service-learning pedagogy is anti-foundational pragmatism. The author shows that Liu's characterization of the pragmatist model of knowledge does not avoid the dualism which he sees as a fault of the traditional epistemology. After suggesting a remedy to this, the author then extends Liu's argument by indicating the limits (...) to what the appropriately modified epistemological support will sanction. These limits are shown to be more restrictive than Liu suggests. The result is an improved philosophical justification of the service-learning pedagogy and some suggestions for evaluating proposed curriculum. (shrink)

This chapter addresses ethical issues for informed consent when recruiting autistic participants for research. The process of informed consent for participation in research involves some abilities, such as dialogue and understanding the intentions of the researchers, that can be especially challenging when autistic individuals are being asked to participate. This chapter reviews these abilities, and suggests ways to provide meaningful support to promote autonomy and help researchers meet their responsibilities. Beyond these more general challenges, it explores Hans Jonas’s suggestion that (...) true informed consent for research requires that participants identify with the goals of the researchers. Given the plurality of perspectives on how to respond to autism, Jonas’s ideas point to additional ethical concerns that can arise when autistic people are recruited for research on autism. (shrink)

In an earlier Dissecting Bioethics contribution, Debra J. H. Mathews, Joseph J. Fins, and Eric Racine challenge standard ways of thinking about the therapeutic misconception in the context of consent for research participation. They propose that instead of demanding “rational congruence” between how researchers and participants conceive of a given protocol, we should accept a less stringent standard of “reasonable coherence.” While Mathews, Fins, and Racine (MFR) provide some important insights, their proposal needs refinement. There is room for a wide (...) but not unlimited range of participant hopes and motivations. However, their model of reasonable coherence is too weak a standard for whether participants have adequate understanding of the scientific goals of a protocol. By the time participants are recruited for medical research, the goals of the protocol, having been set and agreed to through accepted scientific processes, are no longer open for alternate interpretations. This paper discusses this and other objections to MFR’s proposal. It then suggests that a concept of “deal breakers” might be useful in this context. (shrink)

Philosophers and bioethicists have mostly given up on human dignity. As a concept, dignity has seemed obscure and unintelligible, or forbidden because of its connection with theology. Here I take a fresh look, and identify two families of dignity concepts: dignity as arche and dignity as telos. Arche draws on the idea of an origin or source, as in ‘archetype’ or ‘archeology.’ Dignity as arche refers to the qualities inherent in a being that is the source (the arche) of our (...) duties to that being. Dignity as telos is the endpoint (telos) that we try to promote in our patients and in ourselves. I illustrate these ideas using examples from Frances Hodgson Burnett’s book for young readers, A Little Princess. Identifying these two families of dignity concepts helps to identify the dignity-related tasks for psychotherapists. These are to help patients recognise, connect with, and respect their own dignity as arche, and to help them realise their own dignity as telos. Revisiting Maslow’s hierarchy of needs helps us to see how these tasks also apply to the broader goals of healthcare. (shrink)

Ethicists, researchers and policy makers have paid increasing attention to the ethical conduct of research, especially research involving human beings. Research performed with and by undergraduates poses a specific set of ethical challenges. These challenges are often overlooked by the research community because it is assumed that undergraduate student researchers do not have a significant impact on the research community and that their projects are not host to research posing important ethical issues. This paper identifies several features characteristic of research (...) in undergraduate environments. The paper pays special attention to selective small liberal arts colleges, an important segment of higher education in the US, and advocates integrating instruction in research ethics wherever undergraduates are engaged in research. (shrink)