An instructor's decision to drop an exam score and to assign a penalty to all class members because no one was willing to identify students who allegedly cheated is described, including how the class members felt about the incident. For the most part, students held the cheaters responsible for their penalties. The instructor received only slightly lower student evaluations, as compared to the 2 other courses she taught that year.

Derek Parfit's “reductionist” account of personal identity (including the rejection of anything like a soul) is coupled with the rejection of a commonsensical intuition of essential self-unity, as in his defense of the counter-intuitive claim that “identity does not matter.” His argument for this claim is based on reflection on the possibility of personal fission. To the contrary, Simon Blackburn claims that the “unity reaction” to fission has an absolute grip on practical reasoning. Now David Lewis denied Parfit's claim that (...) reductionism contravenes common sense, so I revisit the debate between Parfit and Lewis, showing why Parfit wins it. Is reductionism about persons then inherently at odds with the unity reaction? Not necessarily; David Velleman presents a reductionist theory according to which fission does not conflict with the unity reaction. Nonetheless, relying on the distinction between person level descriptions of first-person states and the first-person perspective itself, I argue that Velleman's theory does not eliminate fission-based conflict with the unity reaction. Footnotesa * Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the philosophy departments at Rutgers University and Bowling Green State University. I am indebted to many members of these audiences, and to the other contributors to this volume, for their comments—especially Frank Arntzenius, Michael Bradie, David Copp, John Finnis, Jerry Fodor, Brian Loar, Barry Loewer, Colin McGinn, Fred Miller, Mark Moyer, David Oderberg, Marya Schechtman, David Schmidtz, David Sobel, and Sara Worley. Special thanks to David Sanford. I am also grateful to graduate students in my seminar at Bowling Green during the spring of 2003, for urging me to take seriously the grip of the unity reaction; I am especially grateful for the comments of Nico Maloberti, Jonathan Miller, John Milliken, Robyn Peabody, Jennifer Sproul, Jessica Teaman, and Sherisse Webb. (shrink)

The most important problem is philosophical deontic logic is to determine the logical form of expressions of conditional obligation. The dissertation shows first that this problem is closely related to David Lewis's well-known "problem about permission"--a problem concerning the characterization of changes in normative systems. The dissertation contains a solution to the problem about permission, as well as an argument that expressions of conditional obligation cannot be represented satisfactorily by means of some combination of monadic deontic operators and a counterfactual (...) conditional . ;Lewis formulates the problem about permission in terms of a language game for imperative and permission sentences. In order to solve the problem it is necessary first to point out the shortcoming in Lewis's game that it cannot be used satisfactorily to provide semantics for "contrary to duty" imperatives. Having revised the game it is possible to define the concept of relative defeasibility between imperatives. It is in terms of this concept that a solution to the problem about permission is formulated. ;The "revised game" is used as well to discuss problems concerning reasoning from sets of rules, principles, and facts to "all things considered" conclusions. It is argued that two distinct senses or uses of 'ought' must be distinguished in order to represent such reasoning satisfactorily. The role of the notion ceteris paribus is discussed. The notion is given a precise definition in terms of the possible worlds semantics of the "revised game" and it is argued that the notion is not as significant in normative reasoning as commonly is supposed. An alternative notion is defined and defended. (shrink)

President Kennedy once said, “Mankind must put an end to war, or war will put an end to mankind.” The purpose of my presentation this evening is to show why a strike against Iraq is dangerous, unjustified, and unnecessary. Since Saddam Hussein has not engaged in any aggressive behavior since the Gulf War, launching an attack would be pre-emptive in nature.

In his recent book Professor Tuomela presents a philosophical account of social action that relies upon the presuppositions of his purposive-causal theory of individual action. In particular, the concept of “we-intention” plays as central a role in the new theory as does that of intention in the earlier one. This article examines Tuomela’s concept of “we-intention”. Tuomela’s introduction of the concept into social action theory is motivated by the assumption that theories of individual actions and social actions are analogous relative (...) to the role of a concept of intention in those theories. This assumption is criticized; and a number of difficulties with the new concept are discussed. (shrink)

IntroductionFew studies have examined psychological distress in healthcare workers across the care continuum. This study describes distress levels reported by HCWs across care settings and factors associated with distress.MethodsA cross-sectional survey of HCWs from Windsor, Ontario, was conducted between May 30th, 2020, and June 30th, 2020. The survey included the Kessler Psychological Distress Scale, sociodemographic, frontline status, perceptions of training, protection, support, respect among teams, and professional and personal stressors. Univariate analyses were used to compare across settings and multivariate logistic (...) regression assessed factors associated with distress.ResultsFour hundred and three HCWs from the hospital, community health and social service, first responder, primary care, home, and long-term care participated in the survey. Common concerns included fear of transmitting COVID-19 to family, safety on the job, and balancing personal care with work demands. LTC and home-care HCWs reported greater concern about workload and staffing levels, whereas community health workers were more anxious about their financial security. Overall, 228 HCWs who completed the K10 reported high distress, with greater rates among hospital and LTC HCWs. Distress was more likely in HCWs who identified as female, younger than 55, perceived lower respect among team, and experienced greater worry about physical and mental health and managing high workloads.ConclusionResults showed a high degree of distress experienced by HCWs across care settings and the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on personal and work-related stress. Promoting self-care and supportive and collaborative healthcare teams are promising avenues for mitigating symptoms of distress. (shrink)

Dans un autoportrait en diptyque réalisé en 2020 et intitulé Couch Ditpych (huile sur toile, 1,80 m x 3 m), la peintre Joan Semmel, alors âgée de 88 ans, se représente assise sur un canapé dans une posture de détente, relâchée, le corps entièrement nu livré à la vue du spectateur ou de la spectatrice. Entre le volet gauche et le volet droit du diptyque, sa position évolue légèrement : l’un de ses genoux, d’abord plié, est ensuite déplié ; l’avant-bras, (...) d’abord levé devant les yeux, descend en... (shrink)

The paper is a reply to the critical reviews of the author’s A Theory of social Action by Anton Leist, Marvin Belzer, and Julian Nida-Rümelin in this journal. As to Leist’s main criticisms, which concern the notions of social action, social practical reasoning, individualism, and social norms, they are argued to be incorrect and unjustified. Belzer’s criticisms are on the whole well taken, and in fact all of them have been noted by the author in his later work. (...) class='Hi'>Belzer does not, however, consider these newest analyses and improvements. Nida-Rümelin presents some comments on the relationships between collective preferences and we- intentions. These points are correct. (shrink)