It is a paradox that medical experimentation on individuals, whether patients or healthy volunteers, is now controlled by strict ethical guidelines, while no such protection exists for whole populations which are subjected to medical interventions in the name of preventive medicine or health promotion. As many such interventions are either of dubious benefit or of uncertain harm-benefit balance, such as mass screening for cancers or for risk factors associated with coronary heart disease, there is no justification for maintaining the ethical (...) vacuum in which preventive medicine finds itself at present. (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work is in the "public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be (...) preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

Biological species are spatio-temporally localized entities. This fact led to the concept of species as individuals [11], [14], and, at the same time, to the refutation of essentialism in evolutionary biology and taxonomy. On the other hand, molecular biology is compatible with essentialisms of chemistry and physics. The new concept of "historical essences", which is presented in this paper, tries to reconcile antiessentialism of evolutionary biology with essentialism of molecular biology. Historical essences are those parts of genetic information which determine (...) characters relevant for the identification of a taxon. Since membership in a particular taxon is defined by the sharing of the most recent common ancestor, historical essences correspond to the genetic information responsible for the creation of such common ancestor. Historical essences, which are spatiotemporally localized, generate a particular arrangement of spatiotemporally unrestricted processes which lead to the creation, maintenance and reproduction of organisms. These arrangements are results of fortuitous confluence of biological and extrabiological circumstances . In historical essences such a sequence of historical contingencies is "conserved", which allows molecular taxonomy to reconstruct the phylogenetic relationships. The concept of historical essences can be seen as a post-Darwinian modification of the original Aristotleś term of essence - "to-ti-en-einai". (shrink)

In Matthew 24, Jesus prophesied to his disciples about ‘wars and rumours of wars’ and other eschatological birth-pangs to prepare them in advance on how they are to be responding to eschatological events as they would be unfolding in the interim of his ascension and his promised Parousia. What then does Jesus mean by enlisting ‘wars and rumours of wars’ in this eschatological era to be functioning as ‘the beginning of birth-pangs’ and how should Christians be responding to wars and (...) rumours of wars as eschatological birth-pangs? Employing the redaction exegetical method, this study focuses on interpreting Matthew 24:6−8 to explain what Jesus most probably meant as he enlisted ‘wars and rumours of wars’ as eschatological birth-pangs; and with special reference to the Russia–Ukraine war that broke out on 24 February 2022, recommends from the Olivet prophecy how Christians are to be righteously responding to ‘wars and rumours of wars’ as eschatological birth-pangs. Contribution: This study explored Matthew 24:6−8 to unveil what Jesus means by enlisting wars and rumours of wars as eschatological birth-pangs. With special reference to the Russian military invasion of Ukraine, theological highlights were recommended on how Christians are to be responding to war and war rumours as end-time birth-pains. (shrink)

For Hume, one task of logic is “to explain the principles and operations of our reasoning faculties”; this chapter is a study of his logic of inductive reasoning, as presented in Book I of his Treatise and in the Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. Like other early modern logics—especially those composed, as Hume’s was, under the influence of Locke—Hume’s logic is descriptive, explanatory, and normative. It also aspires to be revelatory. It is descriptive in documenting how our reasoning actually proceeds, explanatory (...) in telling us why it so proceeds, normative in telling us how it should proceed, and revelatory in using those findings to arrive at larger truths about human nature and human life. Hume formulates rules of inductive reasoning and ranks inductive arguments as better and worse. He also advocates the reform of intellectual disciplines. Yet his logic, it is argued, is at the same time deeply skeptical. (shrink)

Cover -- Half Title -- Title -- Copyright -- Contents -- Preface -- Preface to the First Edition -- Introduction -- 1 On Referring -- 2 Particular and General -- 3 Singular Terms and Predication -- 4 Identifying Reference and Truth-Values -- 5 The Asymmetry of Subjects and Predicates -- 6 Propositions, Concepts, and Logical Truths -- 7 Grammar and Philosophy -- 8 Intention and Convention in Speech Acts -- 9 Meaning and Truth -- 10 Truth -- 11 A Problem (...) about Truth -- 12 Truth: A Reconsideration of Austin's Views -- Index of Names. (shrink)

I argue for accepting a pluralist approach to species, while rejecting the realism about species espoused by P. Kitcher and a number of other philosophers of biology. I develop an alternative view of species concepts as divisions of organisms into groups for study which are relative to the systematic explanatory interests of biologists at a particular time. I also show how this conception resolves a number of difficult puzzles which plague the application of particular species concepts.

Originally published in 1923 as part of a series of handbooks for teachers, this book sets out a possible course of instruction in citizenship through the teaching of history and geography. Showan includes a helpful bibliography for students and teachers alike who are seeking more information on teaching a subject in such a way, as he says in his preface, 'as to inculcate a respect for our national institutions, a desire and an aptitude for public and social service … and (...) an abiding love for England'. This book will be of value to anyone interested in the history of education, particularly citizenship education. (shrink)

P. Kyle Stanford - The Manifest Connection: Causation, Meaning, and David Hume - Journal of the History of Philosophy 40:3 Journal of the History of Philosophy 40.3 339-360 The Manifest Connection: Causation, Meaning, and David Hume P. Kyle Stanford 1. Introduction exciting recent hume scholarship has challenged the traditional view that Hume's theory of meaning leads him to deny the very intelligibility or coherence of supposing that there are objective causal powers or intrinsic necessary connections between causally related entities. Influential (...) recent interpretations have variously held that Hume himself accepted the existence of such powers and connections, that he was genuinely agnostic about them, or that he denied their existence while nonetheless holding it to be a perfectly coherent possibility, indeed one that we routinely think actual. In this paper I will argue against all three of these lines of interpretation and in favor of what I consider a neglected alternative: that Hume rejects the existence of objective necessary connections or causal powers as literally incoherent or meaningless, but on subtle and sophisticated semantic grounds, rather than simplistic ones. I find support for this semantic reading and against the alternatives not only in passages whose significance to the debate is widely appreciated, but also in Hume's discussions "Of Liberty and Necessity" and "Of the Immateriality of the Soul." The.. (shrink)

Justice Stephen J. Field was the champion of a form of liberalism often said to be especially friendly to capitalism, the approach to the Constitution traditionally identified with “Lochnerism,” i.e., a laissez-faire oriented judicial activism. More recently a form of judicial revisionism has arisen, challenging the accepted descriptions of “Lochnerism” and of Field's jurisprudence. This article is an attempt to extend the revisionist approach by arriving at a more satisfactory understanding of the grounding of Field's jurisprudence in the natural rights (...) philosophy. Field, it turns out, orienting around natural rights, was not so unambiguously friendly to capitalism as previous generations of scholars maintained, but his approach is surely friendlier than the constitutional theories that have replaced natural rights since Field's day. (shrink)

It might seem incoherent or a contradiction in terms to suggest that we can be philosophical naturalists while nonetheless resisting the scientific realist's view that that the claims of our best scientific theories concerning otherwise inaccessible domains of nature are at least probably and/or approximately true. I suggest, however, that this conclusion follows only from a dogmatic and unappealingly scientistic conception of naturalism itself. I go on to argue not only that a more attractive form of philosophical naturalism can indeed (...) be coherently combined with a rejection of scientific realism, but also that this combination of views is the one that thoroughgoing and sophisticated naturalists should in fact embrace. And I conclude by offering a systematic conception of the role of philosophy of science in the resulting integrative form of naturalistic inquiry. (shrink)

Realists have responded to challenges from the historical record of successful but ultimately rejected theories with what I call the selective confirmation strategy: arguing that only idle parts of past theories have been rejected, while truly success‐generating features have been confirmed by further inquiry. I argue first, that this strategy is unconvincing without some prospectively applicable criterion of idleness for theoretical posits, and second, that existing efforts to provide one either convict all theoretical posits of idleness (Kitcher) or stand refuted (...) by detailed consideration of the very examples (optical/electromagnetic ether, caloric fluid) to which they appeal (Psillos). I also argue that available avenues for improving on these proposals are unpromising. (shrink)

There are two general classes of social conventions: conventions of coordination, and conventions of partial conflict. In coordination problems, the interests of the agents coincide, while in partial conflict problems, some agents stand to gain only if other agents unilaterally make certain sacrifices. Lewis' (1969) pathbreaking analysis of convention in terms of game theory focuses on coordination problems, and cannot accommodate partial conflict problems. In this paper, I propose a new game-theoretic definition of convention which generalizes previous game-theoretic definitions (Lewis (...) 1969, Vanderschraaf 1995), and which can be used to characterize norms of justice in partial conflict situations. I argue that the key structural property necessary for a social arrangement to be a convention is that it be conditionally self-enforcing, in the sense that: (i) each agent has a decisive reason to follow her end of the arrangement given that she expects all to do likewise, (ii) given a different set of expectations, some agents would have had a decisive reason to deviate, and (iii) these facts are common knowledge. This leads to a definition of convention as a strict correlated equilibrium (Aumann 1974) together with appropriate common knowledge conditions. Examples are given in which it is shown how this more general account of convention can be used to analyze norms of justice as well as coordination problems. It is only a general sense of common interest; which sense all the members of the society express to one another, and which induces them to regulate their conduct by certain rules. I observe, that it will be for my interest to leave another in the possession of his goods, provided he will act in the same manner with regard to me. He is sensible of a like interest in the regulation of his conduct. When this common sense of interest is mutually express'd, and is known to both, it produces a suitable resolution and behavior. And this may properly be call'd a convention or agreement betwixt us,.. (shrink)

P D Walsh; Value Education in a Pluralist Society, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 10, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 24–33, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1.

A numerical classification was performed on 69 elements with 54 chemicaland physicochemical properties. The elements fell into clusters in closeaccord with the electron shell s-, p- andd-blocks. The f-block elements were not included forlack of sufficiently complete data. The successive periods ofs- and p-block elements appeared in an ovalconfiguration, with d-block elements lying to one side. Morethan three axes were required to give good representation of thevariation, although the interpretation of the higher axes is difficult.Only 15 properties were scorable for (...) the noble gases, but despite thepaucity of properties reflecting chemical reactivity, analysis of the 69elements on these properties still showed the major features seen fromthe full set. (shrink)