It is well established that prior knowledge influences reconstruction from memory, but the specific interactions of memory and knowledge are unclear. Extending work by Huttenlocher et al. (Psychological Review, 98 [1991] 352; Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 129 [2000] 220), we propose a Bayesian model of reconstructive memory in which prior knowledge interacts with episodic memory at multiple levels of abstraction. The combination of prior knowledge and noisy memory representations is dependent on familiarity. We present empirical evidence of the influences (...) of prior knowledge at multiple levels of abstraction, showing that the reconstruction of familiar objects is influenced toward the specific prior for that object, while unfamiliar objects are influenced toward the overall category. (shrink)

Background Home-based care workers mainly work alone in the patient’s home. They encounter a diverse patient population with complex health issues. This inevitably leads to several ethical challenges. Aim The aim is to gain insight into ethical challenges related to patient autonomy in home-based care and how home-based care staff handle such challenges. Research design The study is based on a 9-month fieldwork, including participant observation and interviews in home-based care. Data were analysed with a thematic analysis approach. Participants and (...) research context The study took place within home-based care in three municipalities in Eastern Norway, with six staff members as key informants. Ethical considerations The Norwegian Agency for Shared Services in Education and Research evaluated the study. All participants were competent to consent and signed an informed consent form. Findings A main challenge was that staff found it difficult to respect the patient’s autonomy while at the same time practicing appropriate care. We found two main themes: Autonomy and risk in tension; and strategies to balance autonomy and risk. These were explicated in four sub-themes: Refusing and resisting care; when choosing to live at home becomes risky; sweet-talking and coaxing; and building trust over time. Staff’s threshold for considering the use of coercion appeared to be high. Conclusions Arguably, home-based care staff need improved knowledge of coercion and the legislation regulating it. There is also a need for arenas for ethics reflection and building of competence in balancing ethical values in recurrent ethical problems. (shrink)

Abstract Applied ethics is commonly carried out on the assumption that moral decisions can be handled by experts. This involves a failure to recognize that being morally serious means recognizing that one cannot hand over responsibility for certain decisions to anyone else. The idea of moral expertise is shown to be based on a misconstrual of the nature of moral discourse, one that can be overcome by following Wittgenstein's exhortation to philosophers to pay heed to the actual uses of language. (...) The sense of a moral judgment cannot be considered in isolation from what the speaker is doing in the context of utterance. The author concludes by suggesting that this discussion can provide the basis for a new reading of Anscombe's essay ?Modern Moral Philosophy? (shrink)

This editorial points back to the papers published in volume 18. It also announces the transfer of the position of main editor of Outlines – critical practice studies.One of the papers in vol. 18 relates directly to what is foundational to Outlines - critical practice studies: The encouragement of critique. For this reason it has been given some extensive attention here. Raffnsøe wrote: What is critique? Critical turns in the age of criticism.

This article investigates points of intersection between medievalism and memory. It mainly focuses on the formative period of the 19th century when the Norse past, the so-called Viking Age, as well as Old Norse mythology became integral parts of Danish national identity. The article homes in on Adam Oehlenschl.ger’s rejuvenation of the mythological materials and his reflections on the usefulness of the local mythologies, both for a national spirit and for poetic renewal. It is demonstrated that 19th century medievalism, with (...) its focus on mythology, essentially was a project of cultural memory, that is, of recollecting knowledge from culture’s childhood, and, additionally, that poetry, and with that imagination, plays a prominent role for the construction of a meaningful past. (shrink)

This work is guided by the idea that Wittgenstein's thought opens the door to a more profound break with the philosophical tradition than has been generally recognized. It brings this insight to bear on some basic problems of philosophy.

Good and Evil: an Absolute Conception, Raimond Gaita, Macmillan 1991. (Swansea Studies in Philosophy.).

In the interpretive literature from the 1950's through the 1970's the term 'criterion' was thought to be a central key to the understanding of Wittgenstein's later philosophy. Later on, it was relegated from this place of honour to being one of a variety of expressions used by Wittgenstein in dealing with philosophical questions. This Element tries to account for the shifting fate of this concept. It discusses the various occurrences of the word “criteria” in the Philosophical Investigations, argues that the (...) post-Wittgensteinian debate about criteria was put on the wrong track by a problematic passage in Wittgenstein's early Blue Book, and finally gives an overview of the main contributions to this debate, trying to achieve a reconciliation between the rival conceptions. (shrink)

In On Certainty, the emphasis is on the solitary individual as subject of knowledge. The importance of our dependence on others, however, is brought out in Wittgenstein's remarks about trust. In this paper, the role and nature of trust are discussed, the grammar of trust being contrasted with that of reliance. It is shown that to speak of trust is to speak of a fundamental attitude of one person towards others, an attitude which, unlike reliance, is not to be explained, (...) or assessed, by an appeal to reasons. It is, rather, because we have such a fundamental readiness to accept what we are taught by others that we can come to develop an understanding of reasons. The idea that believing something without evidence is always a weakness is shown to be a philosophical prejudice. Trust is always for something we can rightfully demand from others: misplaced trust, accordingly, is not a shortcoming on the part of the trustful person, but of the person in whom the trust was placed. The destruction of trust is a tragedy of life; in Culture and Value, Wittgenstein suggests a connection between distrust and madness. (shrink)

Hertzberg develops his daring thesis that the "modern, secular, anti-Semitism was fashioned not as a reaction to the Enlightenment and the Revolution, but within the Enlightenment and Revolution themselves." He finds that modern anti-Semitism owes less to Christian theological mentality than to doctrinaire libertarianism of figures such as Voltaire, d'Holbach, Diderot, and Marat.

Which famous twentieth-century philosopher instigated a revolution in philosophy, arguing that the philosopher’s business is not to advance general theories about reality, but rather to help release our thinking from the intellectual cramps produced by a misunderstanding of the forms of language? Wittgenstein? Wrong! according to John W. Cook. This revolution in philosophy actually had no author. Apparently, it arose through a misinterpretation of Wittgenstein’s later writings. In fact, Cook implies, Wittgenstein himself was not genuinely engaged in a struggle with (...) philosophical puzzles, but rather had an ontological theory up his sleeve: he was a conventional empiricist in the tradition of Berkeley, Ernst Mach, and Russell, though he happened to express himself so obscurely that some philosophers, believing themselves inspired by his writings, dreamed up the whole revolution by mistake, as it were. However, Cook is not arguing that the revolution should be canceled; rather he looks at Wittgenstein’s work from the standpoint of that accidental revolution, berating Wittgenstein, as it were, for not having thought to be a Wittgensteinian himself. (shrink)

Peter Winch, following Wittgenstein, was critical of the notion that philosophy could pass judgment on matters like the sense of words, the rationality of actions, or the validity of arguments. His critique had both what we might call a local strand – the insight that criteria of thought and action are not universal but vary between cultures and between practices – and a personal strand – the insight that those local criteria are ultimately given shape through the particular applications made (...) of them by individuals. These strands are prominent, for instance, in Winch’s discussion of cross-cultural understanding as well as his treatment of the distinction between valid reasoning and illicit persuasion. (shrink)

Review of Anat Matar, ed., Understanding Wittgenstein, Understanding Modernism. New York et al: Bloomsbury, 2017, ISBN: HB: 978-1-5013-0243-5, xv+270 pp.

Book Review of Ludwig Wittgenstein, Lecture on Ethics, edited with commentary by Edoardo Zamuner, Ermelina Valentina Di Lascio and D. K. Levy. Wiley Blackwell: Chichester, 2014, vii + 141 pp.

The existence of child soldiers is a problem of the ages, and there are no positive signs that it is abating. The difference now is that, with the development of modern weapons technology, children can be involved in large scale and horrific acts during conflicts. The circumstances surrounding the use of children to wage war will vary from situation to situation. Yet, it has been suggested that many people seem to have a ‘single focussed’ view of what child soldiers look (...) like, what their motivations are, and why they are engaged in activities associated with conflict. This article reflects on the recent views expressed by Mark A. Drumbl, who argues that we should ‘reimagine’ child soldiers, and offers some further views as to how this issue should best be addressed. (shrink)

This book shows that philosophers and linguists of quite different brands have tended to give undue priority to their own favorite theoretical framework, and have presupposed that the descriptive scheme invoked by that framework constitutes a pattern to which any linguistic practice somehow has to conform. United by a critical attitude towards such essentialist aspirations, the authors collectively manage to cast doubt on the very attempt to fit the whole of linguistic practice into a general theoretical mould.

Rush Rhees held Wittgenstein's work in high esteem but considered it in need of deepening. He was critical of Wittgenstein's idea that the builders' game might be the whole language of a tribe and that human language could be thought of as simply a range of language games. Rhees thought that Wittgenstein failed to do justice to the unity of language. The idea of the unity of language appears to have both an anthropological and an ethical aspect. The latter is (...) illustrated with the help of a Hemingway story. (shrink)

If it is asked: “How do sentences manage to represent?” – the answer might be: “Don’t you know? You certainly see it, when you use them.” For nothing is concealed. How do sentences do it? – Don’t you know? For nothing is hidden. But given this answer: “But you know how sentences do it, for nothing is concealed” one would like to retort “Yes, but it all goes by so quick, and I should like to see it as it were (...) laid open to view.”. (shrink)

Most of us, at one time or another, will have been struck by a thought that we might wish to express in the following words: ‘I could have been born in a different time and place, my position in life and all my personal characteristics could have been completely different from what they are; how amazing then that it should have fallen to my lot to live my life, the only life I shall ever live, as this particular individual rather (...) than any other.’ This thought need not derive from a sense that there is anything unusual about one's life; what it expresses, rather, may be the sense that there is something gratuitous or contingent about one's being any particular individual at all. This sense of contingency might be connected with a feeling of gratitude, perhaps of responsibility towards others less fortunate in life; or it might be bound up with envy, or pride, or self-pity, etc. (shrink)