El presente trabajo es el resultado de mi participación en el evento de discusión de la revista Problema. Anuario de Filosofía y Teoría del Derecho, que llevó por nombre “La construcción del precedente en el Civil Law: debates, conceptos y desafíos”, en el cual participaron varios colegas con un amplio conocimiento en el tema del precedente judicial; de igual forma, ahonda en los temas de mayor debate dentro de lo referente al precedente judicial, enfocado al (...) caso chileno. Todo ello, con la finalidad de proponer algunas soluciones al respecto, así como dilucidar ciertos aspectos importantes dentro del precedente. Partiendo de conceptos tan trascendentes como la prescriptibilidad, la racionalidad y el uso argumentativo, se logra llegar a ciertas problemáticas provocadas por el mal uso de los conceptos previamente mencionados, que a su vez nos conduce al stare decisis, término que mal utilizado puede resultar en un acto contrario a la independencia interna de la cual gozan los jueces. (shrink)

This paper is the result of my participation in a discussion event of Problema. Anuario de filosofía y teoría del derecho entitled “The Construction of Precedent in Civil Law: Debates, Concepts and Challenges”. Several colleagues with a vast knowledge on the subject of judicial precedent participated in this seminar, which also delved into the widely debated aspects of judicial precedent focused on the case of Chile. The entire discussion aimed at proposing solutions, as well as shedding some light (...) on some of its important aspects.Starting from such transcendental concepts as, rationality and argumentative use, it is possible to find certain problems arising from the improper use of the above concepts, which in turn leads us to stare decisis, a term that if used incorrectly may result in an act against the internal independence of judges. (shrink)

O artigo científico visa esclarecer acerca do judicial review com enfoque no originalismo e no interpretativismo. Neste trabalho pretendemos demonstrar ser o interpretativismo um construto da Suprema Corte dos Estados Unidos oriundo do precedente Brown. Em primeiro lugar, examinaremos os precedentes da Suprema Corte, cujos fundamentos foram obtidos a partir da corrente originalista, até chegarmos ao citado caso Brown e em seguida analisaremos filosoficamente o precedente. Em conclusão, antes se buscava a intenção original do constituinte, no entanto, (...) modernamente, almeja-se controlar a constitucionalidade com parâmetro nos princípios constitucionais. (shrink)

O presente artigo detém o intuito de analisar a implementação do sistema de precedentes judiciais adotado pelo Brasil no Novo Código de Processo Civil, diante da teoria de Ronald Dworkin. O Brasil historicamente adota o sistema denominado de Civil Law, o qual adota a lei como fonte principal do Direito, dando ao precedente judicial um caráter secundário e não vinculante. Ante a nova atualização legislativa do Código de Processo Civil de 2015, que vislumbra a adoção de um sistema (...) de precedentes, o Brasil deve superar diversas dificuldades para adequar este sistema ao ordenamento jurídico, pois a maior dificuldade provém do fato da ausência de costume ao observar os precedentes como fonte do Direito. O texto faz uma análise sobre os sistemas judiciais de Civil Law e Common Law trazendo a diferença entre os sistemas e as fontes do Direito que cada um adere, bem como disserta sobre as teorias relativas à Interpretação e Integridade de Ronald Dworkin. Por fim, investiga as alterações legislativas no Código de Processo Civil, bem como a fundamental importância das teorias de Dworkin para implementar no Brasil de maneira correta o sistema de precedentes judiciais. A metodologia utilizada foi o método indutivo de abordagem e o método de procedimento foi o método monográfico. As fontes de pesquisa utilizadas foram as mais diversificadas, tais como livros, artigos, pesquisas em sites, consulta de outras monografias, consulta de tese de mestrado e jurisprudências. (shrink)

The Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs of the American Medical Association examines physicians’ professional ethical responsibility in the event that the security of patients’ electronic records is breached.

La bioética ha cobrado autonomía académica y difusión social, al abordar los problemas relacionados con el origen y final de la vida humana y las exigencias morales derivadas de su protección. Su repercusión sobre el derecho plantea exigencias específicas, relacionadas con el aborto, la posibilidad de disponer para unos u otros fines de embriones humanos o la eutanasia. Ha surgido así el bioderecho, que se verá urgido por la biopolítica, para que le sirva de instrumento convirtiendo en socialmente normales determinados (...) planteamientos moralmente cuestionados. Andrés Ollero es catedrático de Filosofía del Derecho en la Universidad Rey Juan Carlos. Entre sus obras más relevantes, particularmente atentas a la jurisprudencia constitucional española, pueden citarse: Derechos humanos y metodología jurídica, Discriminación por razón de sexo, Igualdad en la aplicación de la ley y precedente judicial, Derecho a la verdad, España ¿un Estado laico? y ¿Tiene razón el derecho?. (shrink)

Precedents are judicial decisions that form the bases of further judicial decisions by constraining those decisions. There are two aspects to the constraints exerted by precedent decisions: the scope of the constraint and the strength of the constraint. The scope refers to the range of decisions that are affected by the precedent. The strength refers to the conditions under which a court can escape being bound by the precedent. Models of precedential scope are discussed and evaluated, and the (...) question of strength is analyzed.Resumen:Los precedentes son decisiones judiciales que constituyen la base de decisiones judiciales posteriores, al vincularlas. Hay dos aspectos de la vinculación ejercida por las decisiones de precedente: el alcance de la vinculación y la fuerza de la vinculación. El alcance se refiere al rango de decisiones que se ven afectadas por el precedente. La fuerza se refiere a las condiciones bajo las cuales un tribunal obligado por el precedente puede ignorarlo. En este artículo se discuten y evalúan algunos modelos del alcance del precedente y se analiza la cuestión de su fuerza. (shrink)

En marzo de 2021 se reformó la Constitución mexicana para transitar a un sistema de precedentes. Esta enmienda establece que las “razones” de las sentencias de la Suprema Corte serán obligatorias para los tribunales inferiores. Sin embargo, la reforma se enmarca en una arraigada práctica de tesis jurisprudenciales, i. e., enunciados abstractos identificados por la misma Corte al resolver un caso. Además, no hay consenso sobre qué son estas razones y por qué deberían ser vinculantes. El objetivo de este artículo (...) es identificar las posibles concepciones de razones para revelar los distintos roles de la Corte en la creación del derecho judicial. Se utilizan nociones de la ratio decidendi del common law como herramientas de introspección para identificar cuatro modelos de creación del derecho en la práctica mexicana, a saber: legislación judicial, reglas implícitas, justificaciones político-morales, y categorías sociales. Aunque la primera concepción parece ser la dominante, las alternativas amplían el abanico para entender cómo es que la Corte crea derecho dependiendo del contexto interpretativo en que opere. (shrink)

In March 2021, the Mexican Constitution was amended to transition to a system of precedents. This amendment mandates that the “reasons” of Supreme Court rulings will be binding on the lower courts. However, the reform is rooted in a long-standing practice of ‘Tesis’, i.e., abstract statements that the Court itself identifies when deciding a case. Moreover, there is no consensus as to what these reasons are and why they should be binding. The aim of this article is to identify the (...) possible conceptions of reasons to explore the Court’s different judge-made law roles. Different common law conceptions of the ratio decidendi are used as “mirrors” to identify four models of judicial lawmaking in Mexican practice, namely: judicial legislation, implicit rules, moral-political justifications and social categories. Although the first model seems to prevail, the others provide means for a broader understanding of how the Court creates law depending on the interpretative context in which it operates. (shrink)

Resumo O autor defende uma descrição normativa fraca do constitucionalismo internacional à luz de dois factos: a contínua relevância da soberania do Estado face à hegemonia de superpotências e a necessidade imperiosa de um regime supranacional eficaz de direitos humanos. Ao defender uma institucionalização constitucional de direitos humanos, que inclui aspectos de justiça processual e material, mostra-se que, como nos casos domésticos, tal institucionalização pode e, talvez deva, incorporar um procedimento de controlo judicial que ascende ao nível de controlo (...) constitucional. De facto, o parecer do Tribunal Europeu de Justiça no caso Kadi estabeleceu um possível precedente para o controlo do Conselho de Segurança no sentido do cumprimento dos direitos humanos e outras normas peremptórias. Dada a necessidade de perícia técnico legal para a elaboração de tal controlo, um caso prima facie pode ser feito para o estabelecimento de um Tribunal Constitucional especializado ao nível internacional. Contudo, dado o impacto desempenhado pelo poder político na resolução técnica da adjudicação de casos específicos e concretos, dentro de um sistema jurídico altamente fragmentado, e dado o facto de que o controlo constitucional também toca questões mais abstractas e menos técnicos de justiça social, o autor recomenda, que a função de controlo constitucional seja disseminada por várias instituições globais, incluindo a actual Assembleia Geral das Nações Unidas e na esfera pública global. O controlo constitucional pluricêntrico, bem como a institucionalização dos direitos humanos decorre do desacordo multicultural existente acerca do significado desses direitos e da ameaça da hegemonia de superpotências sobre as instituições globais. Assim antecipa-se também a realização de uma constitucionalização mais monista no Direito Internacional com o crescimento da solidariedade global entre os povos. Palavras-chave : Constitucionalização, Controlo Constitucional, Direitos Humanos, Habermas, Nações Unidades, Pluralismo LegalI defend a weakly normative description of international constitutionalism in light of two facts: the continued salience of state sovereignty in the face of superpower hegemony and the overriding need for an effective supranational human rights regime. In arguing for a constitutional institutionalization of human rights that includes aspects of procedural and substantive justice, I show that, as in the domestic case, such an institutionalization could and perhaps should incorporate a procedure for judicial review ascending to the level of constitutional review. In fact, the European Court of Justice’s review of the Kadi case establishes a possible precedent for reviewing Security Council compliance with human rights and other peremptory norms. Given the need for technical legal expertise in elaborating such review, a prima facie case can be made for establishing a specialized constitutional court at the international level. However, given the impact that political power plays in the technical resolution of concrete, case-specific adjudication within a highly fragmented legal system, and given the fact that constitutional review also touches on more abstract and less technical issues of social justice, I recommend that the function of constitutional review be dispersed in several global institutions, including the current United Nations General Assembly and a global public sphere. The pluralization of constitutional review and the accompanying interpretation and institutionalization of human rights recognizes existing multicultural disagreement on the meaning of human rights and the threat of superpower hegemony over global institutions while anticipating the realization of a more monistic constitutionalization of international law with the growth of global solidarity between peoples. Keywords : Constitutional Review, Constitutionalization, Habermas, Human Rights, Legal Pluralism, United Nations. (shrink)

Prior to Citizen’s United, particular types of corporate spending for purposes of influencing US-election-outcomes were limited due to an inherent skepticism of corporate influence in American politics. It was presumed that where corporations accessed wealth and resources for purposes of electing candidates that best serve corporate interests, American politics would be corrupted—indeed: democracy that is bought and sold. In the US, the juridical is entirely systematized by the ethos of the legal profession: legalism. It is the way in which the (...) law is supposed to be reasoned upon, deliberated upon, and decided upon. Although the Majority in Citizens expressed its reversal of law that limits corporate influence in American politics in legalese—the terminology within the system of legalism, the conservative Majority took an opportunity to establish conservative ideology as law—an ideology that subscribes to the equivocation between corporations and individuals, and, corporate spending with protected free-speech. (shrink)

El autor estudia en este trabajo los antecedentes de la pervivencia y desarrollo del gnosticismo antiguo en el mundo islámico. Hace un repaso de las principales fuentes de la gnosis y de sus principales doctrinas.

El problema de la destrucción antropogénica de la naturaleza vincula en lo fundamental las nociones de “Antropoceno” y “ecocidio”. Este no solo implica un crimen contra la biodiversidad, sino también una forma de autodestrucción ambiental que involucra al ser humano. Una humanidad que en su desarrollo ha construido la historia y legado simbólicos avances sobre la base de la degradación del entorno es agente de esa naturaleza a la cual se enfrenta, así como (por extensión) el microcosmos incide en el (...) macrocosmos en que está inserto sin encontrarse fuera ni ser independiente de él. El objetivo de este artículo es explicar cómo, gracias a la comprensión de la naturaleza y a la naturaleza misma en cuanto razón, es posible sondear a profundidad, desde el complejo global autodestructivo, la necesidad de una ecosuicidología. Para ello, presento el sentido y el significado filosófico del término. (shrink)

El presente estudio trata de elucidar la naturaleza del vínculo que, siguiendo a André de Muralt, puede establecerse entre el criticismo kantiano y la escolástica crítica del siglo XIV. A tal fin, trata de ilustrar, en primer lugar, la comunidad estructural entre el formalismo kantiano y el formalismo escotista, comunidad derivada del empleo sistemático de la distinción formal ex natura rei de Duns Escoto en la construcción del criticismo kantiano, y, en segundo lugar, la continuidad temática entre el giro copernicano (...) operado por Kant y la reforma de la causalidad que se deriva de la hipótesis teológica de potentia absoluta dei promovida por Guillermo de Ockham. Ello supone poner de manifiesto los aspectos de afinidad, más que de ruptura, presentes en los presupuestos teológicos de Duns Escoto y Guillermo de Ockham, así como la dependencia teológica de la filosofía que se edificó sobre ellos. (shrink)

Rejecting judicial supremacy in constitutional interpretation, this paper argues that understanding the interpretation of constitutions to be a solely legal and judicial undertaking excludes citizens from such activity. The paper proffers a two-pronged classification of analyses of constitutional interpretation. Implicit accounts discuss interpretation without reflecting on whether such activity can or should be performed by non-judicial institutions as well. Explicit accounts ask whether interpretation of constitutions is a matter to be dealt with by courts and answer affirmatively. (...) I criticise both camps. Implicit accounts fail to explain why constitutional interpretation is purely judicial in character. Explicit accounts do not provide enough reasons why the judiciary is allegedly the ideal institution to give constitutions meaning with final authority, both in instrumental and normative terms. The paper closes by suggesting avenues for future research. (shrink)

The legal reasons that bind a judge and the moral reasons that bind all persons can sometimes pull in different directions. There is perhaps no starker example of such judicial dilemmas than in criminal sentencing. Particularly where mandatory minimum sentences are triggered, a judge can be forced to impose sentences that even the judge regards as “immensely cruel, if not barbaric.” Beyond those directly harmed by overly harsh laws, some courts have recognized that “judges who, forced to participate in (...) such inhumane acts, suffer a loss of dignity and humanity as well.” When faced with such a judicial dilemma—a powerful tension between the judge’s legal and moral reasons—the primary question is what a judge can do to resolve it. We argue that the two standard responses—sacrificing morality to respect the law (“legalism”), or sacrificing the law to respect morality (“moralism”)—are unsatisfying. Instead, this Article defends an underexplored third response: rather than abandoning one ideal to maximally promote the other, we argue that judges should seek to at least minimally satisfy the demands of both. Judges should, in other words, look for and employ what we dub Satisficing Options. These are actions that enjoy sufficient support from both the legal reasons and the moral reasons, and thus are both legally and morally permissible—even if the acts in question would not strictly count as optimal by the lights of the law or morality. This common sensical response to the problem is not only underappreciated in the literature, but also has great practical import. Focusing on the sentencing context, this Article demonstrates that judicial dilemmas can be systematically resolved, mitigated or avoided through a range of concrete strategies that on their own or in conjunction can constitute Satisficing Options: these strategies include seeking out legally permitted but morally preferable interpretations of the law, expressing condemnation of unjust laws in dicta, and seeking assistance or cooperation from other actors to help defendants facing substantively unjust mandatory sentences. While these strategies can at times also go too far, we argue that in certain contexts they can be sufficiently defensible on both legal and moral grounds to be a justifiable response to judicial dilemmas. This Article thus provides both a novel theoretical framework for understanding the justification of judicial responses to unjust laws, as well as a practical a menu of options which judges can use to guide their responses to the judicial dilemmas that they are increasingly likely to encounter within our criminal justice system. (shrink)

This paper examines Jeremy Waldron’s ‘core case’ against judicial review. Waldron’s arguments, it shows, exaggerate the importance of voting to our judgements about the legitimacy and democratic credentials of a society and its government. Moreover, Waldron is insufficiently sensitive to the ways that judicial review can provide a legitimate avenue of political activity for those seeking to rectify historic injustice. While judicial review is not necessary for democratic government, the paper concludes that Waldron is wrong to believe (...) that it is a threat to democracy. (shrink)

In a new book-length treatment, Tara Smith, who has written extensively on the intersections of Objectivist philosophy and law, explains how judicial review, a feature of non-Objectivist jurisprudence, should function in a truly Objectivist legal system. Divided into two halves, Judicial Review in an Objective Legal System first sets forth what Objectivism is and how Objectivists understand law. Of particular importance in this regard, Smith stresses, is the written constitution, which Smith, following the logical premises of Objectivism, calls (...) “bedrock legal authority.” In the second half of the book, Smith moves to narrower considerations of judicial review proper. Smith’s first task in those sections is to critique the “failures” of “the reigning accounts” to understand judicial review. After dispensing with the various mistaken versions of judicial review as she sees them, Smith defines Objectivist judicial review before providing a handful of examples of how such a process might work in “contemporary conditions.”. (shrink)

The judiciary is a key policy actor that is involved in deciding health rights and policy by intervening in the policy process through a variety of judicial mechanisms, yet the appropriate extent of its involvement remains contentious. Taking the competence objection seriously requires understanding it as an epistemic problem about how courts assess empirical and scientific evidence in order to competently adjudicate controversial health claims. This paper examines recent advances in social epistemology to develop insights for the epistemic competence (...) of the judiciary from a system‐oriented approach. I outline three epistemic features that set the judiciary and the judicial decision‐making process apart from other types of decision‐makers in health policy: the distribution of epistemic power, the epistemic authority of a justified believer, and the principle of disinterestedness. Finally, I relate these insights back to the judicial decision‐making process with a specific focus on recent court decisions in health rights and health policy in Chile. (shrink)

Jeremy Waldron is well known for his disdain of U.S. jurisprudential doc- trine that allows courts to invalidate democratically enacted legislation on the ground it violates certain fundamental constitutional (and quasi-moral) rights. He believes that where disagreement on the relevant substantive is- sues is widespread among citizens and officials alike, it is illegitimate for judges to impose their views on the majority by invalidating a piece of enacted law. Even if we assume, plausibly enough, there are objective moral constraints on (...) what restrictions on behavior may be enacted into law, judges have no privileged access to the objective truth and must, like everyone else, rely on their own subjective intuitions and views. Given that judges are hence no more likely than citizens or legislators to reach the correct decision about what morality requires, these disagreements should be democratically resolved. As he puts it, if disagreement about rights is to be sorted out by counting heads, it should be the heads of citizens who have ultimate sovereignty in a democracy, rather than those of unelected judges, that ought to count.In this essay, I consider Wilfrid Waluchow’s response to Waldron’s argument in his outstanding new book, A Common Law Theory of Judicial Re- view, in which he attempts to provide the practice of judicial review with something akin to the foundation that justifies allowing judges authority over the development of the common law. I will begin with a short explication of Waldron’s argument and then consider Waluchow’s objections to Waldron, as well as Waluchow’s living-tree conception of a common-law constitution with content that evolves through a common law approach to reasoning in constitutional disputes.Resumen:A Jeremy Waldron se le conoce por el desprecio que ha manifestado con relación a la doctrina constitucional estadounidense que permite a los tribunales invalidar legislación que ha sido promulgada de manera democrática, dado que según Waldron lo anterior constituye una violación a ciertos derechos constitucionales (y cuasi-morales). Él piensa que si existe un desacuerdo importante entre los ciudadanos y oficiales del derecho en relación con cierto tema sustantivo, es ilegítimo que los jueces impongan sus puntos de vista sobre los de la mayoría de la población al invalidar una ley promulgada. Incluso si suponemos, de manera lo suficientemente plausible, que existen limitantes morales objetivas sobre las restricciones que el derecho puede contemplar en relación con el comportamiento de los ciudadanos, los jueces no gozan de un privilegio especial con el que puedan acceder a estas verdades objetivas y deben, como todos los demás, basarse en sus propios puntos de vista e intuiciones subjetivas. Entonces, dado que los jueces al igual que los ciudadanos y legisladores no pueden llegar a mejores y correctas decisiones en relación con lo que exige la moralidad, estos desacuerdos se deben decidir de manera democrática. Como sostiene Waldron, si los desacuerdos sobre los derechos se deben decidir con un recuento de manos, deben ser las manos de los ciudadanos, los cuales tienen la soberanía última en una democracia, no así los jueces que no son electos.En este artículo, el autor analiza la respuesta de Wilfrid Waluchow a los argumentos de Waldron, los cuales se encuentran plasmados en el nuevo e interesante libro: A Common Law Theory of Judicial Review, donde Waluchow intenta justificar la práctica del judicial review a través de algo parecido a la justificación que otorga a los jueces autoridad para desarrollar el common law. El autor inicia con una breve explicación del argumento de Waldron y continúa con las objeciones de Waluchow a Waldron, entre las cuales destaca la concepción de Waluchow de la Constitución como árbol viviente. (shrink)

The present paper puts forward a first outline of a possible agonistic theory of adjudication, conceived of as an extension of Chantal Mouffe’s agonistic theory of democracy onto the domain of the juridical, and specifically, judicial decision-making. Mouffe’s concept of the political as the dimension of inherent and unalienable conflicts (antagonisms) which, nonetheless, need to be tamed for a pluralist democracy to function, creates an excellent vantage point for a critical theory of adjudication. The paper argues for perceiving all (...) judicial decisions as having a double nature—juridical and political. Cloaked in legal form, judgments nonetheless decide on individual instances of on-going collective conflicts, opposing workers to employers, consumers to traders, tenants to landlords, moral progressives to traditionalists, minorities to majorities and so forth. Judges, when handing down judgments, enjoy a ‘relative sovereignty’, being always already inscribed into the institutional imperatives of the juridical, on one hand, and ideological influences, on the other, but at the same time called upon to decide in the terrain of the undecidable and contingent (after all, law does not ‘apply itself’ on its own). Indeed the determinacy of legal decisions is only relative: in many cases judges can, by performing a sufficient amount of legal interpretive work, reach a conclusion which will be different from theprima facieinterpretation. The collective conflicts of a various nature (economic, ideological, socio-political), once they are juridified, become the object of judicial decisions which, in light of Mouffe’s theory, can be seen as temporary hegemonic fixations. The goal of critical legal scholarship is to destabilise such hegemonies in the name of justice. This can be done not only through an external critique of the law, but also through an internal one. The methodological approach advanced in the latter part of the paper emphasises the need for a critique of judicial decisions based on the consideration of all possible alternative decisions a court could have reached, and their evaluation in the light of conflicting interests and ideologies. (shrink)

This article provides an exploration of the relationships between a procedural account of epistemic democracy, illegitimate laws and judicial review. I first explain how there can be illegitimate laws within a procedural account of democracy. I argue that even if democratic legitimacy is conceived procedurally, it does not imply that democracy could legitimately undermine itself or adopt grossly unjust laws. I then turn to the legitimacy of judicial review with regard to these illegitimate laws. I maintain that courts (...) do not have a moral privilege on the overthrow of illegitimate laws; in this respect the refusal of royal assent has the same status. I also explain how the rule of the clear mistake fails to restrict the action of courts to only illegitimate laws. Finally, I argue for the positive epistemic inputs of weak judicial review. (shrink)

Predictive judicial analytics holds the promise of increasing efficiency and fairness of law. Judicial analytics can assess extra-legal factors that influence decisions. Behavioral anomalies in judicial decision-making offer an intuitive understanding of feature relevance, which can then be used for debiasing the law. A conceptual distinction between inter-judge disparities in predictions and inter-judge disparities in prediction accuracy suggests another normatively relevant criterion with regards to fairness. Predictive analytics can also be used in the first step of causal (...) inference, where the features employed in the first step are exogenous to the case. Machine learning thus offers an approach to assess bias in the law and evaluate theories about the potential consequences of legal change. (shrink)

Many scholars believe that it is procedurally undemocratic for the judiciary to have an active role in shaping the law. These scholars believe either that such practices as judicial review and creative statutory interpretation are unjustified, or that they are justified only because they improve the law substantively. This Article argues instead that the judiciary can play an important procedurally democratic role in the development of the law. Majority rule by legislatures is not the only defining feature of democracy; (...) rather, a government is democratic to the extent to which it provides egalitarian forms of political participation. One such form of participation can be the opportunity to influence the law through the courts, either directly by participating in a case or indirectly by advocating litigation. Arguing from several examples, this Article shows that judicial decision-making allows different voices to be heard that may not necessarily have influence or power in majoritarian legislative structures or popular initiatives. Giving citizens the opportunity to change, to preserve, and to obtain authoritative clarification of the law through the courts can thus make a government procedurally more democratic. (shrink)

Rejecting judicial supremacy in constitutional interpretation, this paper argues that understanding the interpretation of constitutions to be a solely legal and judicial undertaking excludes citizens from such activity. The paper proffers a two-pronged classification of analyses of constitutional interpretation. Implicit accounts discuss interpretation without reflecting on whether such activity can or should be performed by non-judicial institutions as well. Explicit accounts ask whether interpretation of constitutions is a matter to be dealt with by courts and answer affirmatively. (...) I criticise both camps. Implicit accounts fail to explain why constitutional interpretation is purely judicial in character. Explicit accounts do not provide enough reasons why the judiciary is allegedly the ideal institution to give constitutions meaning with final authority, both in instrumental and normative terms. The paper closes by suggesting avenues for future research. (shrink)

Americans cannot live with judicial review, but they cannot live without it. There is something characteristically American about turning the most divisive political questions - like freedom of religion, same-sex marriage, affirmative action and abortion - into legal questions with the hope that courts can answer them. In Judicial Review in an Age of Moral Pluralism Ronald C. Den Otter addresses how judicial review can be improved to strike the appropriate balance between legislative and judicial power (...) under conditions of moral pluralism. His defense of judicial review is predicated on the imperative of ensuring that the reasons that the state offers on behalf of its most important laws are consistent with the freedom and equality of all persons. Den Otter ties this defense to a theory of constitutional adjudication based on John Rawls's idea of public reason and argues that a law that is not sufficiently publicly justified is unconstitutional, thus addressing when courts should invalidate laws and when they should uphold them even in the midst of reasonable disagreement about the correct outcome in particular constitutional controversies. (shrink)

In this revised and updated edition of a classic text, one of America's leading constitutional theorists presents a brief but well-balanced history of judicial review and summarizes the arguments both for and against judicial activism within the context of American democracy. Christopher Wolfe demonstrates how modern courts have used their power to create new "rights" with fateful political consequences and he challenges popular opinions held by many contemporary legal scholars. This is important reading for anyone interested in the (...) role of the judiciary within American politics. Praise for the first edition of Judicial Activism: "This is a splendid contribution to the literature, integrating for the first time between two covers an extensive debate, honestly and dispassionately presented, on the role of courts in American policy. —Stanley C. Brubaker, Colgate University. (shrink)

This study examines discursive representations of judicial power in Russian print media. The data are drawn from governmental and oppositional newspapers and cover a six-month period during 2013. Using an approach that is informed by Critical Discourse Analysis and a pragma-dialectical perspective on argumentation, the authors distinguish strategies and specific linguistic means as well as argumentation fallacies that journalists employ in the articles to construct the representation which is consistent with a newspaper’s ideology.

A variety of theoretical positions are emerging to explain the judicial process from such perspectives as hermeneutics, semiotics, critical theory and argumentation/rhetoric. They ask such questions as these: What is the source of judicial authority? How do judges arrive at their decisions? By what logic are decisions to be tested? In this essay I argue that a focus on decisions and their justifications alone masks the broader process in which judges, along with all the other relevant groups, engage (...) in a continuing and evolving dialogue to structure their normative universe through the complementary processes of dialectic and rhetoric. Contemporary concepts of argumentation can serve to analyze this process critically. (shrink)

Judicial formalism is perceived as fully compliant with the requirements of the rule of law. With its reliance on plain meaning and its reluctance to apply historical, purposive and functional interpretative premises, it seems an ideal tool for constraining discretionary judicial powers and securing the predictability of law’s application, which latter is one of the main tenets of the rule of law. In this paper, I argue that judicial formalism is based on a misguided model of language, (...) and as such cannot deliver what it promises. In fact, judicial decisions based on formalistic reasoning are surprising to their addressees and instead of promoting predictability, they undermine it. A judicial strategy fully compliant with the rule of law requires a different vision of language than that proposed by judicial formalism, and as a consequence, a different, moderately non-formalistic conception of legal interpretation. (shrink)

O presente estudo trata-se de uma pesquisa qualitativa com objetivo de analisar as mudanças nas relações familiares provenientes da guarda judicial dos netos, em disputa com seus filhos. Nesse texto, enfatizamse as questões sobre tempo e dinheiro e suas influências sobre essas relações. Para a const..

"The main argument of this paper is that there are reasons for judges not only to evaluate the substantive merit of legislation, but to advert to the fact that the place of elected legislatures in our scheme of government gives legislation a standing, an entitlement to consideration, that may go beyond judicial estimates of its intrinsic merit." [Is this just a statement of procedural legitimacy?] "To answer the question [of who assigns rights], courts must take a view as to (...) the proper role of courts vis-a-vis legislatures; they must take a view about the allocation of power in our legal/political system. In drawing this line, courts can take one of two approaches. First, they can make decisions solely on the basis of considerations internal to the relevant clauses of the Constitution, perhaps by giving them a moral reading. Second, they can include in their thinking institutional considerations regarding the role of popular decision-making bodies in our governmental structure." Claims that Dworkin advocates the first [which is false], and that we should accept the second, which is advocated by advocates of judicial restraint. It is appropriate for a judge to give weight to the fact that a decision was reached by a legislature. "Specifically, I think it appropriate that courts presume the constitutionality of such laws, understanding that their own role demands that they overturn them if they are not merely different from what the judges might have decided on their own, but are beyond acceptability." Reasons for the presumption of constitutionality: value of compromise, allocation of power ), appropriateness of humility, integrity and community. (shrink)

Since the proclamation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, over 165 countries have incorporated human rights standards into their legal systems: the resulting jurisprudence from diverse cultural traditions creates new dimensions to concepts first articulated in 1948. In this revised second edition, Nihal Jayawickrama draws on extensive sources to encapsulate the judicial interpretation of human rights law in one comprehensive volume. Jayawickrama covers the case law of the superior courts of 103 countries in America, Europe, Africa, Asia, the (...) Caribbean and the Pacific, as well as jurisprudence of human rights monitoring bodies. He analyses the judicial application of human rights law to demonstrate empirically the universality of contemporary human rights norms. This definitive volume is essential for legal practitioners, and government and non-governmental officials, as well as academics and students of both constitutional law and the international law of human rights. (shrink)

This essay defends judicial review on procedural grounds by showing that it is an integral part of American democracy. Critics who object to judicial review using counter-majoritarian and epistemic arguments raise important concerns that should shape our understanding of the Supreme Court. Nevertheless, critics often fail to account for the formal and informal mechanisms that overcome these difficulties. Critics also fail to show that other branches of government could use the power of Constitutional interpretation more responsibly. By defending (...) judicial review in the American context, this essay demonstrates that judicial review is not inherently undemocratic. (shrink)

This article focuses on strategic manoeuvring that takes place in Dutch administrative judi- cial decisions. These decisions may be seen as a distinct argumentative activity type. Starting from the char- acteristics that traditionally are per- tinent to this activity type, I will explore how implications of current discussions on the changing task of the administrative judge may be- come manifest in the judge’s strate- gic manoeuvring by means of the presentation of argumentation and the introduction of additional stand- points. The (...) case study of Dutch administrative law serves to demon- strate what consequences changing institutional demands may have for the starting points of the analysis of argumentation in judicial decisions. (shrink)

H.L.A. Hart’s lost and found essay ‘Discretion’ has provided new insight into the issue of how legal systems can cope with indeterminacy in the law. The so-called ‘open texture’ of law calls for the exercise of judicial discretion, which, I argue, renders judges susceptible to the problem of dirty hands. To show this, I frame the problem as being open to an array of appropriate emotional responses, namely, various senses of guilt. With these responses in mind, I revise an (...) example from Michael Walzer’s original analysis in a way that highlights purely personal sacrifices in solutions to dirty hands situations. I then turn to an account of moral emotions in legal decision-making and show how judges—in failing to advance all interests—might be left with a unique sense of guilt. With an application of this account to Hart’s legal positivism, it can be seen that a judge’s hands are often dirtied in resolving borderline cases. If discretion leaves judges in situations where they must do wrong in order to do right, Hart’s endorsement of a closure view of wrongdoing will lead to difficulties in how he can explain the presence of moral remainders in jurisprudence. (shrink)

In this book, a distinguished international group of legal theorists re-examine legal positivism as a prescriptive political theory and consider its implications for the constitutionally defined roles of legislatures and courts. The issues are illustrated with recent developments in Australian constitutional law.

Ch. 1 defines activism as involving four judicial practices: refusing to take an attitude of deference for legislative or executive power or judgment; relaxing requirements for justiciability; breaking precedent; and loosely or controversially construing constitutions, statutes or precedents. I defend each element, through , in later chapters. I defend primarily in Ch. 2A-B, primarily in Ch. 2C, primarily in Ch. 3 and in Chs. 2 and 4. Ch. 1 concludes that - seem to have knowing change of the law (...) in common. Ch. 1 considers and rejects different definitions of activism. My definition explains what I call The Crossover Thesis, which says that two types of activism, and , are quite distinct, and what I call The Political Neutrality Thesis, which says activism and passivism are politically neutral in that neither is necessarily conservative or liberal, and neither is necessarily politically superior to the other. ;Ch. 2 defends activism against objections based on democracy by reconciling activism with democracy somewhat and by supporting some activism based on the Constitution's supreme legal authority. I give what I call The Ashwander Defense and the Carolene Defense of activism, which are named after famous judicial opinions I use to defend activism. ;Ch. 3 argues against stare decisis, which requires following precedent. The passivists' version of stare decisis is inadequately supported by arguments that stare decisis increases: the fairness of treating like cases alike; the predictability of the law; thereby the efficiency of judges in making decisions. ;Ch. 4 argues that courts should use due process more to support activism which clarifies the law. I show how much activism is justified by the vagueness doctrine, which constitutionally requires law's meaning to be reasonably accessible to ordinary people. ;Ch. 5 summarizes earlier chapters and shows how my defense of activism is restrained. (shrink)