The notion of form is "the most important notion within the Critique of Aesthetic Judgment". The sensible form involved in aesthetic judgment stands in no clear relation to the formal elements of the Transcendental Aesthetic and Logic—neither to the a priori forms of space and time, nor to the categories. It is held to be the same "kind of form" as the intuitable, "empirical form" mentioned infrequently in the Pure Reason. The author attempts to establish only "what Kant meant" as (...) distinct from its "truth." He lays a bold preparation for "the suggestion... that aesthetic experience is a window, so to speak, into the noumenal world". In Ch. I he accepts a widely-held view that Kant is the discoverer of "philosophical aesthetics" or "the autonomy of the aesthetic realm." His concern is not with this historical question. Nonetheless it may be said that he is not sufficiently aware that the autonomy found in Kant is not in understanding aesthetics as a realm of art, but only in understanding aesthetic judgment in its concern with both art and nature. Accordingly the aesthetic form of objects of art and objects of nature is treated without differentiation. The author is little concerned with form in its relation to natural purposiveness, or with the relation of form in the Aesthetic Judgment to form in the Teleological Judgment. Since nature, at least in certain contexts, supplies a kind of norm for art—a "traditional" element in Kant—the author’s exposition of the manner in which art imitates nature is not entirely satisfactory. In Ch. II, the central issue is whether "individual colors and tones are more than mere sensations". If however each may be understood as "a play of sensations" they can be said to possess a "form" and may enter into aesthetic judgments. The assumption here is that only if the parts of a beautiful thing, e.g., the individual colors of a painting, are beautiful, "can the painting as a whole be a beautiful thing". But this atomistic view of the aesthetic part is subsequently modified. In Ch. III, the imagination is said to "function without the categories" in the synthesis of aesthetic forms. The author must then oppose the view of Kemp Smith and others "that there can be no cognitive awareness or consciousness apart from the categories". He relies especially on the "judgments of perception" of the Prolegomena which "require no pure concept of the understanding". The possibility is not considered that although the imagination may indeed function "autonomously"—without the categories—in the synthesis of aesthetic form, that same synthesis may presuppose a synthesis employing the categories, especially in certain types of aesthetic experience. Some valuable clarifications are achieved of the difficult notions of "play," the harmony of form and cognitive faculties, and the universality of aesthetic judgments. The thesis of Ch. IV is that the object of experience, or the phenomenal object, is not a second object, distinct from the thing-in-itself, but an appearance of the thing-in-itself. Ch. V is devoted to Kant’s theory of art and especially to genius as the productive faculty of aesthetic ideas. The harmony of the faculties of imagination and understanding required of the artistic genius is held to be the same as the harmony which "the work of art itself... arouses in the perceiver of that work of art", but is spontaneous and original in the former case. What would be required of the productive agency in the case of natural objects of aesthetic experience lies outside the range of subject matter chosen. Kant’s view, although not entirely lucid, is that "the standard of fine art must be sought in the supersensible substrate of the artist’s faculties and that the production of the accord of the faculties of understanding and imagination ‘is the ultimate end set by the intelligible basis of our nature'". This prepares the conclusion that "the artist, as creative genius, is he who not only produces but expresses in sensible products, forms which are windows into the supersensible substrate of being". The monograph effectively raises this possibility as a central issue in the discussion of Kant’s aesthetics.—R. K. (shrink)
The author has set out to provide an introduction to the theory of knowledge through a more "thorough study of three of its central topics." Unfortunately, he does not accomplish this for many reasons. Arner never discusses the birth of the epistemological problem that can be traced as far back as Plato, nor does he go into the implications of the problem. He chooses rather to give a superficial introduction into some of the more common problematic themes. Assuming this cursory (...) survey of 18 pages to be sufficient he devotes the remainder of the book to an offering of sampling selections by philosophers. Considering that the author furnishes only nine readings it is disconcerting to find C. I. Lewis and H. A. Prichard represented when notably absent are thinkers of such import as Plato, James, and Husserl among others. That no fewer pages are devoted to Lewis than to Kant and Descartes is indicative that Arner has missed the target. When a series of texts is used at the introductory level to offer a clear exposition of the philosophers’ thoughts, problems, methods, and attempted solutions, it is incumbent on the author to provide a general but thorough introduction to the theme along with appropriate brief introductions accompanying the particular readings. The fact that Arner has failed to do this, paired with the brevity and insignificance of some of the selections makes this book of little value to the student who professes no prior familiarity with the epistemological question.—K.R.M. (shrink)
The title essay was originally presented as two lectures inaugurating the John Dewey lectures at Columbia. It is an important essay for understanding Quine's work for it brings together many themes at the center of his thinking since Word and Object. Quine quotes with approval Dewey's statement "meaning is primarily a property of behavior" and then goes on to consider a thesis which, according to Quine, is a consequence of such a behavioral theory of meaning, i.e., the thesis of the (...) indeterminacy of meaning and translation. Quine relates this indeterminacy thesis, which he has been defending for some time, to language learning, the foundations of mathematics, and to a general view of ontological relativity. Other essays in the volume concern natural kinds and the various paradoxes of confirmation, propositional objects, quantification and existence and the empirical basis of science. All the essays are post-1965 except the introductory essay which was Quine's Presidential Address to the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association in 1956. This address was something of an introduction to the ideas to appear in Word and Object and is placed at the beginning of this collection to emphasize that all the essays collected here expand on and defend some of the positions of Word and Object. Quine's fluid style is everywhere in evidence.--R. H. K. (shrink)
If there is an age in which philosophy seemed to experience a demise it is the nineteenth century, and yet this was not due to a lack of philosophy nor to the fact that there prevailed an attitude of estrangement from philosophy. Rather, what appeared to be a de-emphasis was merely a replacement of writings by "philosophers" with those by the natural scientist and the humanist. Tatarkiewicz divides his period into three phases distinguishing the era with their peculiar disciplines: 1830-60 (...) marked by positivism, empiricism, naturalism, and dialectical materialism; 1860-80 in which the minimalistic philosophy of positivism reached full bloom; 1880-1900 dominated by minimalism, positivism, scientism and in addition the appearance of opposing doctrines. Although such familiar names as Comte, Mill, Marx, Engels, Spencer, Brentano and Nietzsche find their way into Tatarkiewicz’ book, of greater significance is the manifold of less familiar figures who play a determining role in this period of philosophy. Yet it is not the author’s intent to expound individual doctrines in reference to anything but philosophical currents of the day. Tatarkiewicz focuses on times not men. A very good summary is presented at the end of the book mapping out the social, economic, political, geographic, and religious climate prevalent in the nineteenth century, thus concluding a helpful survey of a period that has been somewhat neglected in the history of philosophy.—K.R.M. (shrink)
The virtue of this book is that it brings together in one volume discussions related to our ordinary conception of space and time on the one hand and discussions related to the conception of space and time in contemporary physical theory on the other. Thus we have discussion of the topology, metrical geometry, and tri-dimensionality of space; absolute vs. relative space; the order and direction of time in physical theory; the size and physical limits of the universe; and the beginning (...) and end of the universe in contemporary cosmological theory. But in addition there is discussion of the problems of identifying objects in space and time, including problems of personal identity, the notion of place and its relation to matter, the ordinary conception of past and future, and other topics. The author works through this maze by making use of a distinction between the necessary and contingent properties of space and time. His manner of drawing the line between the necessary and contingent is surely the most controversial aspect of his book. Certain cosmological theories, for example, are ruled out on logical grounds despite the fact that they may be compatible with general relativity. But the author's arguments are challenging and are backed up by an extensive knowledge of contemporary physical theory as well as of recent philosophical discussion of space and time in the English speaking world.--R. H. K. (shrink)
This is a fine work that purports to serve as an introduction to philosophic problems surveyed from the historical perspective. Hartnack chooses to focus on a single work or theme of those philosophers who have significantly contributed to the development of philosophy starting with Heraclitus and ending with Wittgenstein. He renders concise and uncomplicated accounts that capture the nucleus of the problems. What makes this book stand out among so many other similar endeavors is that the expositions are not only (...) true to the problem but, refreshingly, they say neither too little nor too much. Rather they afford the reader a taste of the author’s wares whetting the appetite to further sample the original sources in hopes of finding the solutions to the problematics offered. For the freshman with little or no previous encounter with philosophy this can be an immeasurable bonus since too often he is victimized by arid and tedious readings. Hartnack makes good use of cross referencing providing the work with a thread of continuity, and it is only in his chapter on Kant’s epistemology that we note a deficiency in this area. Had he spelled out the influence of Hume’s skepticism on Kant’s Critique he might have approached the chapter in terms of the question which seems to be most central to Kant’s project, i.e., "Is metaphysics as a science possible?" rather than start out with an analysis of the antinomies that only indirectly point to this problem. However, if there is a deficiency in this chapter, it is offset by an excellent account of Kant’s moral philosophy. Notwithstanding this negative criticism plus the fact that there are several typographical errors, this is a scholarly accomplishment and deserves to be on the bookshelf of not only the beginning philosophy student who wishes to have a viable resource but also for those who have passed beyond this stage and wish to possess a valuable reference tool. Included at the end is a short but worthwhile bibliography.—K.R.M. (shrink)
This compact book provides a much needed study of Leibniz’ moral philosophy which, unfortunately, has not been given the attention that his metaphysics and logic have received. It is Hostler’s contention that this neglect is an indication that the moral system of Leibniz has been incorrectly viewed as tangential to his other systems which are supposed to be Leibniz’ primary concerns. On the contrary, as Hostler points out, Leibniz’ moral philosophy was largely completed before his metaphysical works which were intended (...) to provide the principles for his ethical system. As Leibniz himself says in the New Essays, "you are more in the tradition of metaphysical thought, whereas I am more interested in ethics." Hostler embarks on his task by orienting us to Leibniz’s general metaphysics and proceeds throughout the study to show the interconnection between his morals and metaphysics. Leibniz’ ethics is traditionally grounded in that he acknowledges the essential relationship between the will, reason, and desire. At the same time he breaks with tradition by introducing two apparently contradictory motives for voluntary action. On one hand he proposes an egoism which aims at one’s own welfare, and on the other hand he proposes an altruism that demands that one should seek the welfare of the other. Hostler’s analysis of the concepts of the good, pleasure, happiness, and perfection shows that the contradiction is only apparent, and that egoism and altruism are reconcilable in Leibniz’ system. The good that I seek for myself is achieved when I do good for others, because in doing good to others I realize a perfection to some degree, and my awareness of that perfection is a source of pleasure which identifies itself as the consciousness of an increase in perfection. Hostler discusses the substantive part of Leibniz’ ethics wherein we find that love tempered by prudence produces justice, the demands of which are binding on all beings possessing reason and free will. Consequently, even God is subject to the moral imperative. As the ens perfectissimum God displays both perfect benevolence and wisdom in all his activities, hence he must create the best of all possible worlds, an act that Leibniz describes as "universal justice." Ultimately it can be seen that the reconciliation between egoism and altruism is explained through the principle of pre-established harmony for what affects one affects the others and every act has infinite consequences. It is only our finite intellect that prevents us from seeing the perfection in every object and thereby choosing it. The choice of the lesser good is a manifestation of that radical finitude. Hostler has presented us with a well organized study of Leibniz’ moral philosophy and has managed to situate it in terms of his philosophy as a whole. The brevity of the volume does not diminish its worth as a fine treatment of the subject.—K.R.M. (shrink)
A book which attempts to introduce the reader to current problems in the philosophy of science, and at the same time to provide a new and significant treatment of some of these problems. The "modest empiricism" which Scheffler has espoused in a number of previous publications is given a detailed presentation in a study of historical attempts to provide meaning for three crucial concepts in the field: explanation, signification and confirmation.--R. H. K.
This book considers some of the problems of a logical nature about reference which have troubled contemporary philosophers--particularly problems about existence, identity, and definite descriptions. It deals with five philosophers who have been especially concerned with these logical problems: Meinong, Frege, Russell, Strawson, and Quine. The pivotal chapters concern Russell's theory of descriptions and Strawson's well-known critique of that theory in his paper "On Referring." According to Linsky, some of Strawson's criticisms of Russell hit their mark; but not all of (...) them do, because Russell and Strawson turn out to have "compatible views about different subjects". Strawson is concerned with certain uses of words, Russell with propositions of certain kinds. Linsky's arguments on these matters are challenging precisely because they turn some of Strawson's own assumptions against him. But Strawsonians would surely want to carry the argument beyond this book by demanding a more thorough defense of the usefulness of introducing propositions into philosophical analysis as Russell does. Other noteworthy discussions of the book concern the consequences of Frege's semantics, substitutivity and impure reference in the chapter on Quine, and a discussion of extensionality and descriptions.--R. H. K. (shrink)
This is a careful analytical study of some of the central concepts of contemporary political thought. In separate chapters the author deals with the concepts of liberty, loyalty, power, and tolerance, exposing in the process some of the contradictions and confusions of contemporary American liberal and conservative thought. In the first chapter, which takes its point of departure from J. S. Mill's writings on liberty and political economy, Wolff shows that conservatives and liberals in the U.S. often share common principles (...) but disagree over the relevant facts. Since he thinks liberals have usually been right about the facts they have come, in his opinion, to dominate political debates. But the principles themselves need questioning, according to Wolff, and he formulates his own alternative in a final chapter entitled "Community." His aim in this final chapter is to rehabilitate the notion of the general or public good as distinct from the sum of the private goods of individuals, without falling into the totalitarian mold of various theories of the general good during the past few centuries. His ideas are not fully worked out in this chapter but they are interesting and stimulating. The other chapters on loyalty, power, and tolerance exemplify the two virtues which the book as a whole possesses. On the one hand they contain a careful analysis of the concepts involved, and on the other hand they represent a successful attempt to relate the analysis to current political problems.--R. H. K. (shrink)
A highly technical theory of visual perception is developed in the first half of this psychological study with the aid of set-theoretical symbols and a complex array of variables ranging over states of the various sub-systems of the organism related to perception. In the later chapters the author describes several new and crucial experiments favoring the theory over other theories of perception, and discusses its philosophical implications for a behavioral account of mind. Those who wade through the welter of symbols (...) will find important material for a philosophy of perception in the theory and especially in the experiments, involving externally induced environmental changes which are corrected by the behavior of the organism over a period of time. --R. H. K. (shrink)
This is the second volume in the new monograph series sponsored by the American Philosophical Quarterly and judging by the high quality of most of the essays in this collection the idea for such a series seems to be a good one. A wide variety of topics in contemporary philosophical logic are discussed in seven essays, as suggested by the following brief account of their contents: Montgomery Furth's "Two Types of Denotation" is a careful study of Frege's views of denotation, (...) function, and object which manages to make some original suggestions as well as to clear up some confusing features of Frege's discussion. Jaako Hintikka's "Language Games for Quantifiers" develops interesting connections between the uses of quantifiers and various verbs related to seeking and finding and with these connections in mind offers a game theoretic interpretation of quantifiers. J. W. Cornman's admirably clear essay "Types, Categories and Nonsense" discusses the views of Ryle, Russell, Black, Pap, and Sommers on categories and types, formulating criteria of type difference close to that of Sommers. In "A Theory of Conditionals," R. C. Stalnaker takes some clues from the semantical analysis of modal logics in order to present an analysis of 'if... then...' statements and to deal with some epistemological problems about counterfactuals. In "Goodman's Nominalism," A. Hausman and C. Echelberger discuss certain facts which, in their view, no nominalist ontology, including Goodman's can deal with. Ted Honderlich's "Truth: Austin, Strawson, Warnock" is a discussion of Austin's views on truth and some of the confusions surrounding commentary on and criticism of it. Honderlich suggests his own definition of truth in the article. Finally, Colwyn Williamson in "Propositions andPropositions" discusses the various arguments which have been put forward to show that propositions are entities of a sort distinct from sentences. He rejects all such arguments as well as their conclusion.--R. H. K. (shrink)
Leibniz' General Investigations, a group of memoranda on logical and methodological matters, remained unpublished until Couturat published the original Latin manuscript in 1903. Only after 1960 was a German translation made by F. Schmidt and an English translation by G. H. R. Parkinson. The present translation provides extensive reference notes to Leibniz' other manuscripts, and a commentary and notes to the text. In these respects it has some advantages over previous translations. The translation is clear although the work itself is (...) sometimes difficult to follow and the notes are most welcome. An introduction discusses the place of the General Investigations within the context of Leibniz' thought. With the interest in Leibniz' logical writings very strong at present, this new translation and commentary is most welcome.--R. H. K. (shrink)
This small volume successfully captures the essential in Kant’s philosophy, his insight and understanding of the a priori as the universal and necessary condition in epistemology and ethics. Knowledge and morality, if they are to qualify as knowledge and morality, must be subjected to principles of universalizability, and it is Kant’s contribution to philosophy that he argues for the non-empirical conditions that make these possible. The author approaches Kant’s theory of knowledge from an untraditional perspective. Rather than start his inquiry (...) with a study of the Transcendental Aesthetic and Transcendental Analytic, Hartnack focuses in on the Transcendental Dialectic giving Kant’s arguments for the first two antinomies and presenting a cursory account of the paralogisms and Transcendental Idea. Hartnack defends his procedure by calling our attention to the fact that it was not primarily Hume’s attack on the necessary connexion of cause and effect that influenced Kant to undertake his transcendental criticism as many scholars believe. By Kant’s own admission which he makes clear in a letter to Christian Garve in 1798 it was the antinomy of pure reason that "first aroused me from my dogmatic slumber and drew me to the Critique of Pure Reason itself in order to resolve the scandal of ostensible contradiction of reason with itself." It was the illegitimate use of reason that prompted Kant to search out the bounds and limits to which reason could legitimately make claim to. Bearing this in mind the present study centers on the dialectical illusion of reason which necessarily implies that it has another side to it, the legitimate and regulative use of reason. Hartnack strongly emphasizes the relationship between the Transcendental Analytic and Transcendental Dialectic and the relationship of the Critique as a whole to the Critique of Practical Reason where the a priori finds its expression in the categorical imperative. The Transcendental Dialectic are as two sides of the same coin. Reason on the one side legitimately applies its categories to the empirical, conditioned, phenomenal object of sense experience. But by nature reason seeks the unempirical, unconditioned, noumenal object which by definition cannot be given, and reason by applying the categories falls prey to the antinomies, paralogisms, and transcendental Idea. Hartnack’s critical account reveals the intimate and dynamic unity within the first Critique and its unity with the Critique of Practical Reason, a synthesis of Kant’s theory of knowledge and theory of morality. Much of what is obscure and obfuscatory in the primary sources is clarified and simplified for us in this work and yet the author has sacrificed none of the depth and dimension that characterize Kant’s writings. Rather in a few pages he has managed to target in on a significant aspect that sheds light and puts into proper perspective Kant’s project as a whole. Here is a case where less is better than more.—K.R.M. (shrink)
Intended for students of Thomistic metaphysics, this is a companion to Smith's earlier work on Natural Theology. From the basic question of being, stated in terms of the one and the many, a consistent metaphysics is developed. Stress is put upon the questions of our knowledge and the cause of being, and the relations of metaphysics, epistemology, and theology in Thomistic philosophy. The treatments of analogy, possibility, abstraction, and the transcendentals are especially informative.--R. H. K.
In 1933, Bonhoeffer delivered some lectures on Christology at the University of Berlin. They were later reconstructed by his students and finally published in 1960 in Germany. This book is the English translation of that reconstruction. The book contains an introduction and sections on "The Present Christ--The 'Pro me'," and "The Historical Christ." Underlying these are the valid questions Bonhoeffer thought Christology should answer: who? and where? rather than the invalid traditional question: how? Who is Jesus Christ? These questions lead (...) to the answer of His presence in the Church in his pro me structure as Word, as sacrament, and as community. The question, Where is Jesus Christ? receives three answers: Jesus Christ is at the border of my existence; Jesus Christ is the center and meaning of history; Jesus Christ is the heart of nature. Somewhat difficult, the book is not for those uninitiated in theology. Yet, since Christology is the key to Bonhoeffer's whole thought, the translation is an important contribution to Bonhoeffer scholarship in the English-speaking world.--R. G. K. (shrink)
The aim of this book is to introduce the reader to some new areas of contemporary logic which generally fall under the rubric of philosophical logic. It succeeds in this task to a degree, although the chapters are for the most part adaptations of journal articles published by Rescher over the last ten years and are more self-contained than they might have been. But the book should renew interest in the problems of philosophical logic. It contains many interesting discussions and (...) a great deal of useful information. Rescher begins with chapters on modal logic which include some discussion of intuitionistic logic and the causal modalities as well as the alethic modalities. He then discusses the notion of belief as a representative notion of epistemic logic. A long chapter is devoted to a history and survey of the main systems of many valued logics. Shorter, but still substantial, chapters are devoted to the logic of existence, non-standard quantification theory, chronological or tense logic, topological or positional logic, logic of assertion and logic of preference. Still shorter chapters are given to deontic logic, probability logic, a discussion of random individuals and self-reference. An interesting final chapter provides a new "discourse on method" for the philosophical or applied logician.--R. H. K. (shrink)
This is a systematic and critical account of Berkeley’s philosophy of science. Brook’s intention is to evaluate Berkeley’s analysis of significant scientific concepts, his general theories in optics, physics, and mathematics, and finally Berkeley’s own interpretation and criticism of Newton’s principles. That Berkeley’s writings are pervaded with ambiguities, inconsistencies, and misinterpretations of Newton seems to be the conclusion that Brook reaches, although he does distinguish in the writings the areas in which he feels Berkeley is on target. Berkeley conceived the (...) purpose of science to be the practical mastery of nature, and his philosophy is indicative of a phase in the evolution of a "new" science that had its roots as far back as Galileo who envisioned a universe that could be read off in terms of mathematical relationships. This view entailed the overthrow of traditional physics and its concern with substantial forms and qualitative changes. As Brook points out, the object of physics for Berkeley is a phenomenal order that can at best display only uniformities, efficient causality belongs to the realm of metaphysics. Brook does not go into the metaphysical or historical foundations of Berkeley’s philosophy of science, but his first chapter on the theory of signification presents sufficient background for the more detailed and complex chapters that deal with his theory of vision, philosophy of physics and mathematics. This is not an easy book to read, and the chapter on Berkeley’s mathematics may prove to be especially difficult to those who lack an orientation to this field. Yet Brooks could hardly do better than he does considering the obscurities and obfuscatory trappings that are to be found in the primary sources from which he is working. A good bibliography is included that should serve to facilitate a reading of this book. Brook’s study is the only work to date that takes into account Berkeley’s scientific works as a whole and not just some aspects.—K.R.M. (shrink)
Reichenbach wrote this book just after taking the first course Einstein ever taught on the theory of relativity. His important and influential work The Philosophy of Space and Time was written several years later and relied in part on the axiomatization of the special and general theories of relativity already worked out in this book. For special relativity Reichenbach divides his axioms into two sets, the light axioms which relate light signals to the topology and metric of time and space, (...) and the matter axioms which do the same for rigid rods and clocks. Thus the axioms focus on the conventions uniting theory and observation and give more insight into the physical foundations of the theory than do most axiomatizations. Reichenbach's approach has been criticized by Weyl and others, but at least some of the criticism seems to rest on a misunderstanding of what Reichenbach was attempting to do. Now that this early work has been translated into English, there is hope that it will be more widely read. There is no doubt that students of the theory or of recent philosophical discussion of space and time will profit from a careful reading of this book.--R. H. K. (shrink)
Peter Geach brings the same careful attention to logical detail to these studies in the philosophy of religion and philosophy of mind as he has brought to other philosophical works. Some of the topics discussed here, however, will surprise some readers of Geach's earlier works, e.g., reincarnation, immortality, creation, praying for things to happen, and worshipping the right God. There are separate chapters on these topics as well as chapters on thought, form and existence, and the moral law. It should (...) be noted for readers who may not share Geach's interest in some of these topics that each of the chapters makes important points about issues which go beyond the topics of immediate interest. For example, Geach's two chapters on reincarnation and immortality are very interesting commentaries on the problem of personal identity, and the chapter on praying for things to happen is an interesting essay on time. The chapters on existence and thought pick up themes from Geach's earlier writing on Aquinas and Frege and mental acts. The Aristotelian roots of Geach's thought are clear in these essays from his account of existence and thought to his denial of clear sense to the idea of an immortality of a separate soul or its reincarnation. There is a helpful analytical index.--R. H. K. (shrink)
The author divides present ideological tendencies into three groups: Christian, Communist, and agnostic. Subsequent chapters attempt to outline a "small-1 liberal" theology designed to provide a "reason for living" through "the present chaos."--K. R. D.
A useful edition of some political and strategic writings, together with all the significant philosophical essays of Mao Tse-tung, who is described as the "most influential" contemporary Marxist philosopher. Except for the 1957 "Hundred Flowers" speech, all the translations and footnotes are from International Publishers' four volume Selected Works. Miss Fremantle's forty-one page introduction is largely a paraphrased abridgment of Edgar Snow's well known biography, Red Star over China. For the general reader, this Mentor paperback probably provides the best low (...) priced introduction to the thought of Mao Tse-tung.--K. R. D. (shrink)
This second volume in the series designed to review the work done in various areas of philosophy during the period 1956-1966 is concerned with the philosophy of science. There are forty essays on a variety of topics in the philosophy of science describing the work done in that area in the past decade and a bibliography covering the same period. Most are in English, some in French or German. Some representative topics and their authors are: Laws, Models, Causality, Induction and (...) Probability, Scientific Methodology, Time, Space, Cosmology, Philosophy and Physics, Quantum Theory, Biology and Philosophy. In addition there are several general essays on the influence of various philosophers and scientists on current developments in the philosophy of science, on the ethical and philosophical implications of science, on Cybernetics, Information Theory, Game theory and a number of essays on the development of philosophy of science in different countries of Western and Eastern Europe and Japan. Like the first volume of this series, this book is an indispensable guide to anyone interested in the field, and a place should be made for it on every library shelf---where there is an interest in philosophy of science.--R. H. K. (shrink)
A significant advance toward a more objective understanding of western philosophy in Soviet philosophical circles. Unlike the off-hand condemnations of western philosophers which so often fill the pages of Voprosy Filosofii, this Georgian philosopher presents a well documented historical development of twentieth century analytic philosophy from Russell's atomism, through Wittgenstein's Tractatus, logical positivism, and recent trends in English analysis. The "moral" of the story is that western thinkers are gradually coming to see the poverty of their philosophical perspective; linguistic analysis (...) must give way to the "precise vision of historical materialism."--K. R. D. (shrink)
The expressed aim of Alf Ross' study is to lay the philosophical foundations for deontic logic by explicating the concepts of directive and norm. But there is a wider significance to his task, for he makes clear throughout that the concepts of directive and norm are central to a wide variety of disciplines, including moral, legal, and social philosophy, linguistics and the other social sciences. Moreover, the test of adequacy of his explications include an appeal to the usefulness the concepts (...) have, not only to the logician, but for the moral and legal philosopher and especially in the case of his account of norms, for the social scientist. He begins with a discussion of speech acts, developing a distinction between indicative and directive speech. A "directive" is defined in terms of directive speech as an action-idea conceived as a pattern of behavior in directive speech and a variety of different sorts of directives are distinguished. A "norm" is then defined as a directive which stands in a certain kind of relation to social facts and the elements of norms are discussed. Finally, Ross offers an interpretation of deontic logic as a set of postulates defining directive speech. He discusses some of the problems of interpretation although he does not make contact with some of the more recent discussion of deontic paradoxes, e.g., the paradoxes engendered by contrary-to-duty imperatives. This is an informative and thought provoking study. The writing is very clear and the reader is guided throughout by a helpful analytical index.--R. H. K. (shrink)
The author outlines and compares the ethics of the six orthodox systems, Buddhism, Jainism and the Cärväka System as well as the ethical teaching of the Vedas, Upanishads and the Bahagavadgïtä. The concluding four chapters deal with the ethics of Tagore, Radhakrishnan, Gandhi and Nehru. Dr. Sharma is particularly concerned with showing that the ethics of these schools have more in common than is ordinarily supposed, that ethics must be grounded in metaphysics and that the ethical theories of the East (...) are "superior" to those of the West. The highly polemical nature of this book, as well as the author's reliance on secondary sources detracts from its purported usefulness to the scholar and student.—R. J. K. (shrink)
This is a translation of Jacob Klein's study "Die Griechische Logistik und die Entstehung der Algebra" which appeared in 1934-1936. His principal thesis is that the Renaissance mathematicians of the sixteenth century did not simply continue the work of the Greek and Arab mathematicians but in the process of developing ancient mathematics introduced a radically new conception of number which has since guided modern mathematical thought. The central figure in this revolution is Vieta. Klein traces the influence of Vieta's ideas (...) upon Stevin, Descartes, Wallis, and other figures of the scientific revolution, after discussing the conception of number and arithmetic in Plato, Aristotle, and other Greek sources. Persons reading this book with a primary interest in the philosophical ideas involved will be frustrated by the mass of historical detail which often obscures rather than illuminates the philosophical issues. But the book deserves its reputation as an important historical study.--R. H. K. (shrink)
In this British Academy lecture, Popper argues for a reformulation of epistemological questions. In the past we have asked for the ultimate sources of knowledge and thus begged for authoritarian answers. He charges that this question of origins is relevant to the determination of meaning but not to the determination of truth. The historical sections are often interesting in their own right, especially those on the conspiracy theory of ignorance.--R. H. K.
Many of the papers in this volume originated in a colloquium at the University of Western Ontario in 1967. These include a paper on the logic of norms by G. H. Von Wright, a paper on the logic of questions by L. Åqvist, a paper on the logic of belief by W. Sellars, and a paper on inductive logic by R. Ackermann. The commentaries by Anderson and Sosa have been revised for the volume and a further commentary to Ackermann's paper (...) by Wesley Salmon has been added. In addition to the colloquium papers a number of further papers are published here for the first time: J. Hintikka on the semantics of propositional attitudes, R. Hilpinen on relativized modalities, C. Harrison on the unanticipated examiner and H. Smokler and M. Rohr on confirmation and translation. The volume is completed by two papers published in Synthese and a well-known paper in modal logic by Lemmon, Meredith, Meredith, Prior, and Thomas published complete with a new postscript by Prior. Although the collection is somewhat haphazard and seems to have no unifying theme, philosophers interested in these topics in philosophical logic will be thankful for the availability of the papers, both old and new.--R. H. K. (shrink)
When in 1950, the distinguished psychologist, Jean Piaget, published a book on the relation of logic and psychology, the book was severely criticized in the journal Methodos by the logician E. V. Beth. Piaget asked to get together with Beth to discuss the issues involved. The result, over 15 years later, is the present book. Beth is the author of the first half in which he defends the complete autonomy of logic in relation to psychology by means of a partly (...) philosophical, partly historical treatment of logicist, formalist, and intuitionist philosophies of mathematics. Briefly put, Beth's thesis is the now familiar one in contemporary philosophy that logic and mathematics are normative sciences, psychology is a factual science. As a consequence, Beth argues that we must renounce all "psychologism" in logic and mathematics, and all "logicism" in psychology. Piaget has come to accept these main contentions of Beth and affirms them in the second half of the volume. But Piaget is impressed by the fact that a good deal of human conceptual development must go on before human beings recognize and state normative laws of logical thought. Piaget attempts to chart this conceptual development and explain how it takes place. He attempts to show that this genetic-psychological approach to the study of logical and mathematical thought is complementary to and fully compatible with the deductive approach of the formal logician, and hence compatible with Beth's thesis about the conceptual autonomy of logic and psychology. Logician and psychologist can thus deal with the same material although their approaches are conceptually autonomous. The book repays careful reading not only for the arguments defending these challenging claims but also for many other details in both parts.--R. H. K. (shrink)
Three short essays on the position of the philosopher and philosophy in modern society. Maritain illuminates the situation of the philosopher in a milieu of conflicting systems. The final essay, which deals with the relation of science and religion, shows evidence of a growing appreciation by Maritain of the aims of modern science.--R. H. K.
This collection contains twenty-three papers published by Suppes over the last eighteen years. For the most part they are foundational studies ranging over a wide variety of topics in the philosophy of science. The first two of four parts contain papers on methodological issues like models, measurement, probability and utility. There are two papers on models, an axiomatic treatment of extensive quantity and two papers on measurement. The six papers in Part II deal with probability theory and decision theory with (...) reference to theories of behavior, economics, and other topics. Part III contains studies in the axiomatic foundations of physics, one on relativistic kinematics and three on probability in quantum mechanics. The final and longest section contains eight papers on the foundations of psychology. Several of these deal with the psychological or behavioral bases of mathematics. Others deal with unpredictability in human behavior, finite automata, cognition and other topics. The book is nicely printed and those who have learned from Suppes work in the past will be grateful for this collection of his most important papers.--R. H. K. (shrink)
In this Eddington Memorial lecture, Von Wright distinguishes two points of view from which a logician may study time. The one focuses interest on the order of temporal events and the macro-aspect of time, its flow from an indefinitely remote past through the present to an indefinitely remote future. The other focuses attention on the micro-aspect of time, the nature of the time medium, on questions of whether time is discrete or infinitely divisible or the internal structure of limited time (...) intervals. Von Wright takes the second point of view and as a result his study of time is different in some respects than that of other contemporary tense logicians. Assuming a Tractatus type ontology of possible worlds which can be totally described by stating the existence or non-existence of all possible states of affairs, Von Wright constructs several logical systems, one of discrete time ordering, another of discrete time division. He shows the latter, which is the most important for his purposes, to be formally related to certain systems of modal logic. An interpretation of this system yields an interesting definition of continuity of change and time. The definition is interesting because of its relation to another result which he derives, namely that this definition of continuity implies that the world sometimes will have to be described as being in two contradictory states at one time, a conclusion which he relates to Hegel's philosophy. This is an original and thought provoking essay.--R. H. K. (shrink)
A new journal issued in connection with the Hegel-Kommission der Deutschen Forschungsgemeinschaft, which is preparing a new critical-historical collection of Hegel's works. The first volume contains critical editions of certain Hegel fragments, essays on Hegel, and reviews of Hegel literature.--K. R. D.
A selection of articles originally written in English for the New York Tribune and here edited with an eye to proving the tantalizing thesis "that for Karl Marx antagonism between capital and labor took second place to the eternal duel between East and West, in which his sympathies... lay unequivocally with the West." Although these articles, dealing mainly with the Crimean War, merit greater attention than they have thus far received, this edition is misleading in two critical aspects: 1) Many (...) of the articles signed by Marx in the New York Tribune, especially those dealing with military affairs, were actually written by Engels. The crucial document for distinguishing them, a notebook kept by Marx's wife, is acknowledged to be in Moscow, but the editor makes no mention of this. 2) The editor also gives no hint of Marx's many other statements on Russia, especially in his preface to the second edition of Capital and in his correspondence with Vera Zasulich.--K. R. D. (shrink)
Philosophers committed to the task of coming to grips with reality must face the fact that there are no final solutions and the need to question is fundamental to their project. Taking this as his point of departure Clark proposes that questioning is not confined to the philosopher; it marks every self that is confronted with a given empirical order. Before rendering an analysis of the experience of questioning which is the main thrust of this work, Clark outlines the situation (...) of knowledge in which we find two prevailing viewpoints, the spectator approach, and the performative approach. In the former a subjectivism ensues when the knower passively receives the objects creating a solipsistic prison where the objects take residence precluding any response to the world. In this sense there is no appropriation of meanings as "mine." Clark maintains that this is not what occurs. The self does not merely stand against a world of objects, rather through his intentions he modifies the data conferring meaning on it and in doing so validates his own self. The performative account acknowledges the knower as an active constituting agent who not only intends the facts but uses them in his effort to become a self. A series of historical studies is presented examining these two viewpoints in such philosophers as Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Descartes, the empiricists, and finally ending with Kant who represents the synthesis of both perspectives. Using the Critiques as his source, Clark suggests that while the theoretical reason of Kant is a spectator approach, practical reason incorporates the performative account where the "I can" verifies the active self who is responsible for its realization. Kant’s endeavor to construct a transcendental analysis is seen by Clark as primarily an enterprise to set up the necessary conditions for knowledge which can be applied in the practical order. The self only questions for a reason, so that it "can" do something. The "I can" presupposes the "I know," but the "I know" presupposes the "I ask." Clark proposes his own transcendental analysis of questioning and asks what structures are necessary for the experience of questioning in general with total disregard for the content of that question. He attempts to show that the experience involves self discovery, for what is revealed will only be revealed through further self questioning which is always subject to modification. Questioning is a unique and personal response to a world in which I find myself and yet I intend the world, bestowing on it the meaning that is necessary for my fulfillment. There is an analogy between this transcendental analysis and Kant’s, although Clark is quick to point out that he has hesitations about Kant’s treatment of time and space which he has somewhat modified to serve as the necessary structures of the experience of questioning. Philosophy has been pregnant with analyses of the self primarily as a knowing agent and perhaps it is now time for a movement towards the direction that Clark is suggesting. This book may provide the stimulus for more thought on the self as a questioner.—K. R. M. (shrink)
The fact that this study of Russian dialectical materialism originally appeared before the demotion of Stalin should not be allowed to obscure its value as a source book in the development of dialectical materialism in the U.S.S.R. The author notes its limitations in the preface to the second edition and remedies the situation somewhat in a second appendix with an account of significant developments from 1950 to 1958. Each of the two major parts of the main text, the first historical (...) the second systematic, is marked by the author's capacity for terse and pointed analysis of his material.—R. H. K. (shrink)
In this book, a Woodbridge Lecture, Professor Dennes assesses the formulations of naturalism given by such philosophers as John Dewey and J. E. Woodbridge, and finds them open to certain fundamental circularities of argument. The critique centers its attention on the questions of meaning and morals, and in each area seeks to lay bare the 'restriction metaphysics' to which naturalistic explanation is inevitably tied down.--K. R. D.
The translator has collected passages from the varied corpus of Schweitzer's writing and has pieced them together into a brief but impressive sketch of the man and the thinker. Some sections are autobiographical; others contain Schweitzer's thoughts on Africa, world peace, on Goethe and Bach among historical figures, and a few of his basic philosophical ideas. An index provides references to the original works.--R. H. K.
A comprehensive introduction to modal logic is long overdue and this one has many virtues. It is clearly written and should be accessible to any student who has at least one semester of basic logic and is willing to read carefully and think abstractly. The first part, on modal propositional logic, begins with a summary account of classical propositional logic, the axiomatization of Principia Mathematica being the basis for the development of modal logics throughout the book. The transition to modal (...) logic is nicely motivated by a clear presentation of intuitive notions of modality and the requirements to be included in a modal logic. Thereafter three standard systems of modal propositional logic are developed axiomatically, Feys' system T and Lewis' systems S4 and S5. The semantics for these systems is then developed in the manner of Kripke with some terminological modifications. The explanation of accessibility relations between possible worlds is made especially clear through a helpful analogy with certain sorts of games. Decision procedures and completeness proofs are then developed. A similar pattern of exposition is given to modal predicate logic in Part II, the difference being that Henkin-type methods are used in the completeness proofs. Because of the many philosophical problems raised by modal predicate logic, Part II contains more philosophical discussion than Part I. A discussion of identity and descriptions in modal predicate logic is also included. The third and final part is a survey of modal systems beginning with the Lewis' systems S1-S5 and going on to systems weaker and stronger than the Lewis' systems and others which are independent of them. Systems with alternative primitives and axiomatic bases are also discussed. A final chapter discusses the relation of Boolean algebras to modal logics and brief appendices deal with natural deduction systems of modal logic, systems of entailment, alternative notations and the semantics of Kripke and Hintikka among other topics. There are exercises at the end of each chapter. This summary suggests the merits of this introduction, its clear exposition and the enormous amount of material it brings together and summarizes.--R. H. K. (shrink)
As the author states, this book could be read as an introductory text on scientific explanation and related topics or as a monograph which introduces some new ideas and takes a stand on these topics. Part I is strictly a textbook treatment of explanations and laws. It is clearly written and is particularly good in the classification of sorts of explanations. Part II is less successful as introductory material, but it contains some novel ideas. The author develops an approach to (...) explanation, prediction, and retrodiction by considering discrete state systems. He shows that for any number of simple systems of this kind, deterministic and probabilistic explanation, prediction, and retrodiction may not work. The discussion is abstract and the results are not related to actual physical systems. But the possibility of such systems is surely important for any complete theory of explanation as the author suggests. Discussions are also included of teleological systems and of confirming evidence. Part III discusses philosophical issues about the nature of laws, causality, indeterminism, and the limits of explanation. Two appendices discuss problems of scientific explanation in history and the social sciences. There is a long and very useful bibliography.--R. H. K. (shrink)
A physicist searches for models with which to interpret the idea of atomicity in modern physical theory. He favors a notion of atomic connexions over traditional particle and wave interpretations. The implications of physical theory, it is argued, cannot be understood without a familiarity with the mathematical tools, and in particular the experimental procedures of physicists. This is not a crude operationalism but a simple statement of the thesis that much writing in the philosophy of science is of less value (...) than it could be were more attention given to matters of experimental practice.--R. H. K. (shrink)
In an attempt to discover that which makes man distinctively human Wilson takes as his starting point two opposing accounts of what distinguishes man from inanimate objects and indicates why both of them are invalid. The Cartesian concept maintains that man is distinct from the inanimate by virtue of his consciousness, the neo-Wittgensteinian views the distinction as one of behavior and interaction explicable in terms of reason and motives. Wilson agrees that emotion and behavior constitute the primary difference between man (...) and the inanimate but that this human type of activity is analyzable in causal terms. He refutes certain anti-causal arguments that posit a non-contingent connection between an emotion and its object. Wilson rightly points out that a necessary proposition is one that is necessarily true, but a relation cannot be true or false, and therefore cannot be necessarily or contingently true or false. In order to prove his thesis that the emotion-object relationship is one of causality the term "object" is restricted to that which has existential status. Emotions referable to non-existent objects are malfounded emotions and not causally connected. Wilson proposes that the problem does not lend itself to a logico-grammatical analysis of statements that assign objects to emotions, but that the approach requires a study in the philosophy of mind. Such an inquiry discloses that emotion is caused by a mental state, i.e., attention to the object in which a thought or belief about the object causes a certain feeling or reaction. After a rather complicated analysis of the emotion-object relationship in which he considers the questions of materialism, free will intentionality, and rationality, Wilson returns to his original concern and concludes that "a person’s action and his end of action make sense and form a coherent whole because they are rooted in a complex network of feelings and attitudes." This is what makes man distinctively human.—K. R. M. (shrink)
A free and lucid translation of Scheler's first mature work on social and ethical theory. It represents an imaginative reinterpretation of Nietzsche's concept of "ressentiment," the structural key to the phenomenon of "slave morality." Generously sprinkled with apt illustrations, Ressentiment is a sustained attack on the notions of "work" and the "universal love of mankind" as ultimate sources of value. Such ressentiment-laden social tendencies are seen to form the faulty cornerstone of modern morality, both bourgeois and socialist.--K. R. D.
In this very brief space the author summarizes in the form of a succession of theses, all but the purely historical sections of Osnovy Marksistskoj Filosofii, the 1958 text of Soviet Marxist Philosophy published by the Institute of Philosophy and the Academy of Sciences of the Soviet Union. For specialists, this synopsis cannot replace the original text, as yet untranslated into English, but it will provide for the general reader an excellent summary of what is currently, in the author's words, (...) "the heart of Soviet dogma." Philosophically significant theses are given in direct translation. The only complaint would be that the price of this slim volume is rather high.—R. H. K. (shrink)
This volume contains thirty essays written in honor of Charles Hartshorne. The papers are divided into four sections: The Current Status of Metaphysics, Studies in Whiteheadian Philosophy, Studies in Metaphysics and Logic, and Studies in the Philosophy of Religion. Although many of the essays do not focus directly on Hartshorne's thought, two of the most interesting do center on his theological concerns. They are Shubert Ogden's "Bultmann's Demythologizing and Hartshorne's Dipolar Theism" and J. N. Findlay's "Reflections on Necessary Existence. Included (...) in the book are two bibliographies, one noting the published works of Hartshorne and the other listing writings by and about Whitehead published in languages other than English.—J. K. R. (shrink)
This book is far more than an exposition of Frege's logical system and semantic concepts, although it is that. The author puts forward the challenging thesis that in trying to cope with Russell's paradox Frege deserted principles of his system which he had relied on throughout. Sternfeld attempts to show, by offering his own interpretation of Frege's logical theory, that if Frege had relied consistently on his previously formulated logical principles, Russell's paradox would have given him no trouble. Further, he (...) uses these arguments as a basis for defending the general thesis that paradoxes and other difficulties with various logical systems can only be discussed relative to the philosophical principles underlying the logical system and adopted independently of it. While these are the most challenging of the book's theses they are not its only topics. The author seems to have read everything by and about Frege and is in control of his material. There will undoubtedly be disagreements over his interpretation of Frege because Frege did not write to make expositors happy. But all students of Frege, as well as students of the philosophy of logic and philosophy of mathematics, will find this book rewarding.--R. H. K. (shrink)