I carved a massive cake of beeswax into bits and rolled them in my hands until they softened … Going forward I carried wax along the line, and laid it thick on their ears. They tied me up, then, plumb amidships, back to the mast, lashed to the mast, and took themselves again to rowing. Soon, as we came smartly within hailing distance, the two Sirens, noting our fast ship off their point, made ready, and they sang … The lovely (...) voices in ardor appealing over the water made me crave to listen, and I tried to say ‘Untie me!’ to the crew, jerking my brows; but they bent steady to the oars. (shrink)

The theory of the firm did not exist, in any serious manner, until around 1970. Only then did the current theory of the firm literature begin to emerge, based largely upon the work of Ronald Coase and to a lesser degree Frank Knight. It was work by Armen Alchian, Robert Crawford, Harold Demsetz, Michael Jensen, Benjamin Klein, William Meckling and Oliver Williamson, among others, that drove the upswing in interest in the firm among mainstream economists. (...) This accessible book provides a valuable overview of the prehistory of the firm. Spanning an impressive timeline, it delves into Antiquity, the Medieval era, the pre-classical economics period and the 19th and 20th centuries. Next, the book traces the theoretical contributions from pre-classical, classical and neoclassical economics. It will be illuminating reading for students and researchers of the history of economic thought, industrial organization, microeconomic theory and business history. (shrink)

The place of money capital in the theory of the firm has remained a relatively neglected question in traditions of economic analysis. In this highly integrative work, issues in production, pricing, capital investment and financial theory are brought to new levels of interdependence. Developing a three-part argument, Money Capital in the Theory of the Firm deals successively with the theoretical issues and analytic motivation, the neoclassical tradition and postclassical perspectives. In doing so, it presents (...) a self-contained foundation in the basic structures of microeconomic analysis relating to optimize decision making in the firm and in the accounting concepts and statistical apparatus of probability theory relevant to the neoclassical aspects of the argument. Additionally, the book provides the essential mathematical development of such advanced topics as utility functions defined over stochastic arguments, the equilibrium theory of financial asset prices and yields, the cost of money capital, and investment decision criteria. This book makes an important contribution to the formation of new and analytically richer perspectives in the important area of economics it addresses. It will be of particular interest to those working in economic theory and microeconomics, and their advanced students. (shrink)

The conflict between agency and stakeholder theories of the firm has long been entrenched in organizational and management literature. At the core of this debate are two competing views of the firm in which assumptions and process contrast each other so sharply that agency and stakeholder views of the firm are often described as polar opposites. The purpose of this paper is to show how agency theory can be subsumed within a general stakeholder model of the (...) firm. By analytically deconstructing the assumptions of agency theory, it is argued that agency theory: (1) must include a recognition of stakeholders; (2) requires a moral minimum to be upheld, which places four moral principles above the interests of any stakeholders, including shareholders; (3) consists of contradictory assumptions about human nature and which give rise to the equally valid assumptions of trust, honesty and loyalty to be infused into the agency relationship. In this way, stakeholder theory is argued to be the logical conclusion of agency theory. Empirical hypotheses are presented as a means to substantiate this claim. (shrink)

Since ought implies can, i.e., one cannot be obligated to do what one cannot do, the question of corporate responsibility cannot be discussed intelligibly without an inquiry into the range of corporate or managerial discretion. Hence, the moral relevance of a theory of the firm. Within classical or neo-classical economic theory, for instance, firms which act other than to maximize profit are eliminated. They cannot do otherwise, and thus either have no obligations at all or only (...) the duty to maximize profit. The thesis of the Managerial Revolution, if true, establishes only that management is free from direct stockholder control. By asserting that corporations have responsibilities to do other than maximize profit, philosophers assume a wide degree of managerial discretion, without considering recent developments in the theory of the firm which suggest that new incentives and constraints radically restrict managerial liberty in a capitalist society. (shrink)

The original intent of business education in America focused on the development of professional managers who would look after the interests of society. As economic and shareholder theories influenced business education, firm performance became the manager’s top – if not only – priority. The economic responsibility of the firm also appears to be dominating scholarly interest in organisations as well. However, business firms constitute part of the fabric of society and closer attention should be paid by (...) organisation researchers to the social responsibilities of the firm. In doing so, a more balanced research approach can be achieved. In this article, we give evidence that research within the study of the organisation, specifically in the field of management, has predominately turned its attention to the economic responsibility of the firm. We close by demonstrating that other fields within organisation research also appear to be favouring the study of performance and we offer suggestions as to how scholars might better address the firm’s role in society beyond its economic responsibility. (shrink)

Hegel’s practical philosophy has important insights for understanding the ethical role of the firm in modern society. From a broadly Hegelian perspective, the firm’s role in society is to facilitate freedom, that is, the concrete realization of rational agency. It does this by providing the institutional structures, norms, practices, and modes of discourse necessary for individuals to link their subjective aims with objectively valid societal aims, embodied in the firm’s purpose. Accordingly, I first present a Hegelian account (...) of the link between action and social structure, before arguing that the firm, when it functions properly, enables individuals to express their capacity for rational agency within concrete social contexts. I then draw upon Paul Adler’s Marxist analysis of the development of organizational structures and processes to support the viability of a broadly Hegelian account of the firm within a contemporary economic context. I conclude by outlining a number of practical implications of this account, before explaining its implications for two prominent theories of business ethics, the MacIntyrean perspective, and the Market Failures Approach. (shrink)

The conflict between agency and stakeholder theories of the firm has long been entrenched in organizational and management literature. At the core of this debate are two competing views of the firm in which assumptions and process contrast each other so sharply that agency and stakeholder views of the firm are often described as polar opposites. The purpose of this paper is to show how agency theory can be subsumed within a general stakeholder model of the (...) firm. By analytically deconstructing the assumptions of agency theory, it is argued that agency theory: (1) must include a recognition of stakeholders; (2) requires a moral minimum to be upheld, which places four moral principles above the interests of any stakeholders, including shareholders; (3) consists of contradictory assumptions about human nature and which give rise to the equally valid assumptions of trust, honesty and loyalty to be infused into the agency relationship. In this way, stakeholder theory is argued to be the logical conclusion of agency theory. Empirical hypotheses are presented as a means to substantiate this claim. (shrink)

This paper explores an approach for formulating a prescriptive theory of the firm that integrates economic and ethical criteria to guide strategic and operationalconduct of managers. A prescriptive theory posits goal optimization. A “constrained multiple goal optimization” approach models the firm as a broad set of multiple goals and multiple constraints, the latter both internal and external. An exploration begins with no assumptions concerning whether economics and ethics are compatible or antithetical. If the two approaches (...) are mutually reinforcing, a win-win situation obtains. If the two approaches are in win-lose conflict, a key issue is which approach is hierarchically superior or whether the two approaches can be weighted relatively. (shrink)

Abuse of authority is an unsolved problem in the new institutional theory of the firm. This paper attempts a double attack to this problem by developing a contractarian view of corporate codes of ethics. From the ex-ante standpoint the paper elaborates on the idea of a Social Contract based on Co-operative Bargaining Games and deduces from it the fair/efficient 'Constitution' of the firm endorsed by means of a well-devised corporate code of ethics. From the ex-post standpoint, codes (...) of ethics are proved to be self-enforcing norms, by showing how they put at work the mechanism of a Repeated Game of Reputation within hierarchical transactions (firms) characterised by incomplete contracts and unforeseen events. To accomplish this task a theory of rationality in the face of unforeseen contingencies is sketched by working out the idea that the domain of a principle of ethics defines a fuzzy event, i.e. an event to which also the ex-ante unforeseen, unimaginable states of the world belong to a certain degree. (shrink)

Over the last two decades, the Japanese notion of ba, introduced by Ikujiro Nonaka and his associates to the West, has come to play an important role in management theory. This notion, which has been roughly translated as ‘place’ or ‘topos,’ stresses the importance of processual spatial thinking for economics and management alike. As such, it echoes and amplifies recent voices in the business world, which argue that we must understand business strategy in terms of space, that is to (...) say, as an expression of the dynamics of social interaction which involves such factors as connectivity, information flow, external versus tacit knowledge, etc. Despite many efforts, the barriers for fully integrating ba into the body of Western management literature will remain for as long as its underlying assumptions are defined by ontologically static categories. This article is an attempt to overcome this theoretical bottleneck, first by critiquing the sub optimal approach to processual problems generated by conventional Western business theories, which can neither recognise their hidden background assumptions about space nor transcend them, and second, by explaining, within the framework of comparative analysis, how ba leads to a new processual and dynamic account of business life. Our overall aim is to demonstrate how a new processual notion of space enables a deeper, more integrated understanding not only of the nature of the firm, but also of the role managers play within firms. (shrink)

Economics in general, and the theory of the firm more specifically, places motivation and cognition in very different analytical boxes, in spite of cognitive science evidence that the boundaries between the two are in reality blurred. While this analytical assumption has often served the theory of the firm well, a number of organizational phenomena are better understood if cognition and motivation are allowed to interact, for example, through framing effects, as organizational scholars have long argued. The (...) paper exemplifies by developing the implications of this for Williamson’s notion of the “impossibility of selective intervention.”théorie de la firme en particulier placent la motivation et la connaissance dans des boites analytiques très différentes, en dépit de preuves scientifiques affirmant que les deux se confondent dans la réalité. Même si cette hypothèse analytique a souvent été utile dans la théorie de la firme, certains phénomènes organisationnels sont mieux compris si on permet à la connaissance et à la motivation de réagir réciproquement, par exemple à travers des effets d’“encadrement ” comme les théoriciens des organisations le soutiennent depuis longtemps. Ce papier illustre cette interaction en développant les implications de l’effet d’encadrement pour la notion d’“impossibilité d’intervention sélective” de Williamson. (shrink)

Over the last two decades, the Japanese notion of ba, introduced by Ikujiro Nonaka and his associates to the West, has come to play an important role in management theory. This notion, which has been roughly translated as ‘place’ or ‘topos,’ stresses the importance of processual spatial thinking for economics and management alike. As such, it echoes and amplifies recent voices in the business world, which argue that we must understand business strategy in terms of space, that is to (...) say, as an expression of the dynamics of social interaction which involves such factors as connectivity, information flow, external versus tacit knowledge, etc. Despite many efforts, the barriers for fully integrating ba into the body of Western management literature will remain for as long as its underlying assumptions are defined by ontologically static categories. This article is an attempt to overcome this theoretical bottleneck, first by critiquing the sub optimal approach to processual problems generated by conventional Western business theories, which can neither recognise their hidden background assumptions about space nor transcend them, and second, by explaining, within the framework of comparative analysis, how ba leads to a new processual and dynamic account of business life. Our overall aim is to demonstrate how a new processual notion of space enables a deeper, more integrated understanding not only of the nature of the firm, but also of the role managers play within firms. (shrink)

The paper maps out an alternative to a behavioural (economic) approach to business ethics. Special attention is paid to the fundamental philosophical principle that any moral ‘ought’ implies a practical ‘can’, which the paper interprets with regard to the economic viability of moral agency of the firm under the conditions of the market economy, in particular competition. The paper details an economic understanding of business ethics with regard to classical and neo-classical views, on the one hand, (...) and institutional, libertarian thought, on the other hand. Implications are derived regarding unintentional and passive intentional moral agency of the firm. The paper moves on to suggest that moral agency can be economically viable in competitive ‘market’ interactions, which is conventionally disputed by classical/neo-classical and institutional, libertarian economics. The paper here conceptualises active moral agency of the firm as the utilisation of ethical capital in firm--stakeholder interactions. This yields a reinterpretation of instrumental stakeholder theory. (shrink)

In the past half century, the theory of the firm has become a specific and prolific research field. However, the social ontology of this central institution of capitalism has never truly been the subject of investigation. I consider this negligence harmful for organizational economics and management and, more broadly, for the social sciences, notably because the first and central question raised by the theory of the firm relates to its nature: What is a firm? For (...) this reason, I propose some novel considerations for a social ontology of the firm by focusing on social emergence, reconstitution, the two-level institutional logic of the firm, complex organizational dynamics and interacting mechanisms, and power. (shrink)

Ethical theories have been largely focused on finding and clarifying certain amoral principles. However fruitful the communication of moral principles for providing orientation in modern society might be, a serious omission has been made in that the problem of implementation is not addressed. Two fundamental question have neither been raised nor answered: Why should self‐interested individuals follow the proposed moral principles in their daily conduct? Are societal institutions of such a design that is in the power of the individuals to (...) follow these moral principles? It is shown in this article that an economic theory of morals does systematically address these two questions and therefore provides a firm basis for discussing the possibilities and boundaries of following the moral principles inherent in the long history of moral philosophy. (shrink)

'Presents a good balance in terms of perspectives and content... should appeal to a large audience of scholars from multiple disciplines, including business history, organisational economics, international business, and strategic management.' -Academy of Management Review 'Pitelis's book opens our eyes to the variety of contexts in which Penrose's theory of firm-level growth is applicable... Rereading Penrose after reading Pitelis's book should result in a different learning experience for the reader, who will connect the dots between Penrose's ideas and (...) different research contexts more naturally.' -Academy of Management ReviewThis book celebrates the monumental contribution to economics, strategic management, international business, and more of Edith Penrose -- the first person to analyse the theory of the growth of the firm. She examined knowledge creation within firms, leading to endogenous growth and to limits to growth, and applied her insights to business strategy and industrial organisation. In this volume, eminent economists and management scholars assess, apply, and extend Penrose's contribution to new fields of enquiry. (shrink)

Ethical theories have been largely focused on finding and clarifying certain amoral principles. However fruitful the communication of moral principles for providing orientation in modern society might be, a serious omission has been made in that the problem of implementation is not addressed. Two fundamental question have neither been raised nor answered: (1) Why should self‐interested individuals follow the proposed moral principles in their daily conduct? (2) Are societal institutions of such a design that is in the power of the (...) individuals to follow these moral principles? It is shown in this article that an economic theory of morals does systematically address these two questions and therefore provides a firm basis for discussing the possibilities and boundaries of following the moral principles inherent in the long history of moral philosophy. (shrink)

While the economic and environmental dimensions of the triple bottom line have been covered extensively by management theory and practice, the social dimension remains largely underrepresented. The resource-based view of the firm and the natural resource-based view of the firm are revisited to lay the theoretical foundation for exploring how the social dimension might be addressed. Social capabilities are then explored by looking at the social entrepreneurship literature and illustrative cases with the purpose of elaborating RBV (...) toward a social resource-based view of the firm. Three illustrative cases, which represent social businesses located in catastrophe-ridden Haiti, show how capabilities are used to overcome challenging constraints. The goal for the social entrepreneur is to employ the appropriate capabilities to ensure economic success, a positive environmental impact, and social benefits that leave the local community in a better position than without the business. Just as NRBV is a previous elaboration of RBV, so can SRBV be an elaborated theoretical foundation for future research. The components of a theory are systematically addressed by extending the range of variables, extending the domain, and offering propositions on variable relationships and outcome predictions. By highlighting the social capabilities of social entrepreneurs, this research illuminates the micro-foundations of corporate social responsibility, emphasizing the value of individual level analyses. (shrink)

The paper reconstructs in economic terms Friedman's theorem that the only social responsibility of firms is to increase their profits while staying within legal and ethical rules. A model of three levels of moral conduct is attributed to the firm: (1) self-interested engagement in the market process itself, which reflects according to classical and neoclassical economics an ethical ideal; (2) the obeying of the "rules of the game," largely legal ones; and (3) the creation of ethical capital, which (...) allows moral conduct to enter the market process beyond the rules of the game. Points (1) and (2) position the Friedman theorem in economic terms while point (3) develops an economic revision of the theorem, which was not seen by Friedman. Implications are spelled out for an instrumental stakeholder theory of the firm. (shrink)

The theory of the firm initially developed by Ronald Coase has made explicit the political nature of firms by putting hierarchy at the heart of the economic process. Theories of workplace democracy articulate this intuition in the normative terms of the conditions under which this political power can be legitimate. This paper presents an organizational theory of workplace democracy, and contends that the democratization of firms requires that we take their organizational dimension explicitly into account. It (...) thus construes democracy as an organizational principle and juxtaposes it to market, hierarchy, and norm-compliance as rival principles for the organization of economic activities. Attempts to construe democracy as an organizational principle with unique features in the tradition of transaction-cost economics are discussed before proposing an innovative solution based on an updated version of grid/group cultural theory of politics, adjusted to accommodate the basic requirements of democratic theory. (shrink)

This highly original book develops a systematic zero-net-profit comparative statics theory of the firm that challenges many widely held views in microeconomics. It builds a bridge between the marginalist long-run theory of the firm and Sraffian theory to create a unified theoretical framework that explains how firms react to exogenous shocks resulting in new equilibrium positions of the whole economy. The central message of the book is that too often economists expect more from the microeconomic (...) laws of input demand and output supply than they can really give. The authors show that the zero-net-profit condition requires a more articulated analysis that sometimes yields qualitative results contrary to those of familiar economic laws. Written for academic researchers and graduate students, the book will be of particular interest to those working on the microeconomics of industry equilibrium, comparative statics and Sraffian economics. (shrink)

Neoclassical and Austrian/evolutionary economic paradigms have different implications for integrating corporate social responsibility (corporate citizenship) and competitive strategy. porter's "Five Forces" model implicitly rests on neoclassical theory of the firm and is not easily reconciled with corporate social responsibility. Resource-based models of competitive strategy do not explicitly embrace a particular economic paradigm, but to the extent their conceptualization rests on neoclassical assumptions such as imperfect factor markets and profits as rents, these models also imply a trade-off (...) between competitive advantage and corporate social responsibility. Differences in Austrian/evolutionary economic model's assumptions about equilibrium, profits, and other economic concepts allow this paradigm to embrace alternative views of strategy such as the activities or dynamic capabilities views. These alternative views of strategy focus on learning and adaptation; they align more easily with corporate social responsibility. In practice this alignment comes about because social engagement facilitates the learning and adaptation that are a source of competitive advantage. Among the many business arguments for CSR such as improved employee morale/productivity or brand differentiation, this view prioritizes innovation. (shrink)

This financial, economic, and organizational behavior literatures have been reviewed in order to evaluate three competing theories regarding ownership and management of the firm: 1) firms are not affected in terms of performance and policy by control status; 2) owner-controlled firms attempt to provide larger dividend payouts; and 3) owner-controlled firms tend to have smaller dividend payouts. No generalizations regarding either the superiority or the equality of employee-owned firms to professionally-managed firms can be drawn.

This study tests an integrative model of corporate political action, the filter model, based on the behavioral theory of the firm. The filter model posits that external political, economic, and industry environments are mediated by organizational structures and resources to affect a firm’s political actions. The authors rate the filter model’s predictive power against that of an economic-based direct-effects model by examining the efforts of about 1,100 U.S.-domiciled manufacturing firms to influence trade policy. LISREL analysis (...) demonstrates that the integrative filter model provides a superior explanation of corporate political action. (shrink)

As the transaction cost theory of the firm was taking shape in the 1970s, another important movement in economics was emerging: a revival of the ‘Austrian’ tradition in economic theory associated with such economists as Ludwig von Mises and F. A. Hayek . As Oliver Williamson has pointed out, Austrian economics is among the diverse sources for transaction cost economics. In particular, Williamson frequently cites Hayek , particularly Hayek’s emphasis on adaptation as a key problem of (...) economic organisation . Following Williamson’s lead, a reference to Hayek’s ‘The Use of Knowledge in Society’ has become almost mandatory in discussions of economic organisation . However, there are many other potential links between Austrian and transaction cost economics that have not been explored closely and exploited.This article argues that characteristically Austrian ideas about property, entrepreneurship, economic calculation, tacit knowledge, and the temporal structure of capital have important implications for theories of economic organisation, transaction cost economics in particular. Austrian economists have not, however, devoted substantial attention to the theory of the firm, preferring to focus on business-cycle theory, welfare economics, political economy, comparative economic systems, and other areas. Until recently the theory of the firm was an almost completely neglected area in Austrian economics, but over the last decade, a small Austrian literature on the firm has emerged. While these works cover a wide variety of theoretical and applied topics, their authors share the view that Austrian insights have something to offer students of firm organisation. (shrink)

Stakeholder theorists distinguish between normative stakeholders, those who gain moral standing by making contributions to the firm, and derivative stakeholders, those who can constrain the corporate association even though they make no contribution. The board of directors has the legal authority to distinguish among these stakeholder groups and to distribute rights and obligations among these stakeholder groups. To be sure, this stakeholder formulation appropriately seizes on the firm’s voluntary, associative character. Yet, the firm’s constituents contribute assets and (...) incur risks to participate in market, economic activities. And, as such, the firm’s “stakeholders” must share an imperfect language to assist in making two key economic decisions: (1) who are the legitimate and who are the derivative stakeholders; and (2) who should sit on the board? Still, stakeholder theorists have good reason to be skeptical of neoclassical economics. Its assumptions that all act opportunistically and that all can calculate rationally and fully hardly correspond to studies on the managerial experience of corporate coordination. However, advances in behavioral law and economics now provide a cogent economic logic that readily fits into a stakeholder mode. In brief, we argue that (1) the firm’s economic purpose designates legitimacy to core stakeholders, to those who add value, assume unique risk, and can incur harm; (2) the board serves as the principal who coordinates these core stakeholders to sustain competitive advantage and new wealth creation; and (3) state incorporation law, Delaware in particular, reinforces the board’s function. These, in turn, supply selection criteria for board membership. We aim to synchronize concepts from behavioral law and economics with stakeholder theory. (shrink)

Among the various institutional structures of an economy like the firm and the marketplace is one that is like no other. Science is unique. This uniqueness raises an important question: why does science exist? From an economic perspective, there are two potentially meaningful approaches to the existence of science. They both encompass institutional pluralism. A substitutes theory of comparative institutions presupposes the primacy of the commercial marketplace over firms—that firms substitute for the market when markets fail. This (...) theory has not been used to explain the existence of science. A complements theory postulates that many simultaneous institutional responses, including science, are necessary for creating an efficient and equitable economy. The economic function of science is to produce fundamental theoretical abstractions about our world. Scientific theories are public goods that would not likely be produced within the governance structures of commercial markets and firms. The aim is to complement but not supplant traditional philosophical answers that science exists to discover truth and knowledge. (shrink)

Out of the Margin is the first book to consider feminist concerns across the whole domain of economics. In recent years there has been a tremendous increase in interest on the relation between gender and economics. Feminists have found much of concern in the way the economics has written women out of its history, built its theories around masculinist values, failed to take proper account of women and their work when measuring the economy and ignored most of the policy issues (...) that press most heavily upon women. This book is a firm rejection of this marginalized position. Including contributions from leading feminist economists from the US and Europe, the book offers a richness of new insights in addressing the absence of women, both as subject and object, in the history of economic thought. Out of the Margin also explores the philosophical roots of rational economic man, power relations and conflicts within the family, the limitations of relying on secondary data, the need for new data and research, the policy implications of neo-classical economic models and the need for fundamental research in policy making. With its range and depth of coverage, this is not only an excellent introduction to the field but also indispensible for anyone looking for an in-depth analysis of gender and economics. (shrink)

In the 1990s, large insurance companies failed in virtually every major market, prompting a fierce and ongoing debate about how to better protect policyholders. Drawing lessons from the failures of four insurance companies, When Insurers Go Bust dramatically advances this debate by arguing that the current approach to insurance regulation should be replaced with mechanisms that replicate the governance of non-financial firms.Rather than immediately addressing the minutiae of supervision, Guillaume Plantin and Jean-Charles Rochet first identify a fundamental economic rationale (...) for supervising the solvency of insurance companies: policyholders are the "bankers" of insurance companies. But because policyholders are too dispersed to effectively monitor insurers, it might be efficient to delegate monitoring to an institution--a prudential authority. Applying recent developments in corporate finance theory and the economic theory of organizations, the authors describe in practical terms how such authorities could be created and given the incentives to behave exactly like bankers behave toward borrowers, as "tough" claimholders. (shrink)

The critical environmental justice (CEJ) framework contends that inequalities are sustained through intersecting social categories, multi-scalarity, the perceived expendability of marginalized populations, and state-vested power. While this approach offers new pathways for environmental justice research, it overlooks the role of firms, suggesting a departure from long-standing political-economic theories, such as the treadmill of production (ToP), which elevate the importance of producers. In focusing on firms, we ask: how do firms operationalize diverse social forces to produce environmental injustice? What organizational (...) logics sustain these inequalities? To understand the firm-level dynamics shaping treadmill acceleration and environmental injustice, we utilize two concepts—social embeddedness and managerial authority—from economic sociology research on firms. The former refers to the social and non-economic factors that guide economic decision-making, whereas the latter refers to the power that reinforces worksite hierarchies. This theoretical paper argues that social embeddedness and managerial authority interact within firms to produce an organizational logic that sustains environmental injustice and ecological disorganization. We draw from historical and contemporary evidence on sugarcane plantations in Latin America and the Caribbean, with cases ranging from the colonial period to the present day. By bringing economic sociological concepts to bear on the CEJ and ToP frameworks, we advance debates on how firm-level dynamics shape environmental inequalities. (shrink)

This book brings together in a single coherent framework a research programme begun by the author in the forties. The main model around which the analysis is built is Hicksian in character, having been drawn in large part from John Hicks's Value and Capital. The model is extended so as to include money and securities. In respect of the theory of the firm the model focuses on demand and supply plans, on inputs and outputs, on inventories, and on (...) dependencies between them. The stability of temporary equilibrium is discussed for linear and non-linear cases. Because the concept of structural stability is important for understanding non-linear cases, it is defined and applied to the case of economic motion generated from the temporary equilibrium analysis. The addenda focus on developments in economic theory following the publication of the main model. (shrink)

In this article, we introduce important others, accounting firms, in the ethical decision making system. The rational economic person assumption does not always provide the best choice for accounting firms in the influence mode selection on the clients' immoral behaviors. It still leaves many arguments. From the perspective of virtue ethics, we take a step forward for the literature and propose the ethical obligations and active influence of accounting firms on clients' immoral behaviors. We then empirically investigate the influence (...) of accounting firms on the immoral informational disclosure of China's listed companies. Our research goes beyond some of the traditional perceptions on accounting firms such as irrelevant excuse, capability discrimination, forced auditor rotation, and maximum audit tenure. From the perspective of business ethics, we use theory of virtue ethics to further explain the results. Conclusions and implications are presented at the end of this article. (shrink)

ABSTRACT:The notion of stakeholder salience based on attributes (e.g., power, legitimacy, urgency) is applied in the family business setting. We argue that where principal institutions intersect (i.e., family and business); managerial perceptions of stakeholder salience will be different and more complex than where institutions are based on a single dominant logic. We propose that (1) whereas utilitarian power is more likely in the general business case, normative power is more typical in family business stakeholder salience; (2) whereas in a general (...) business context legitimacy is socially constructed; for family stakeholders, legitimacy is based on heredity; and (3) whereas temporality and criticality are somewhat independent in general-business urgency, they are linked in the family business case because of family ties and family-centered non-economic goals. We apply this theoretical framework to position and integrate the contributions to this special section ofBusiness Ethics Quarterlyon “Stakeholder Theory, Ethics, Corporate Social Responsibility, and Family Enterprise.”. (shrink)

Tasubinsa is a "Special Employment and Occupational Center" constituted in accordance with Spanish Law where 90% of the workers have mental, sensorial or physical impairments of at least 30%. Its positive experience of more than 15 years provides entirely different responses from mainstream neoclassical theory (transaction cost theory, agency theory, and shareholder theory) to basic questions such as "What is a firm?", "What is its purpose?", "Who owns a firm?", and "What do a (...) class='Hi'>firm's owners seek?". The article discusses how these different premises give rise to a distinctive corporate culture centered on the handicapped person. (shrink)

In the wake of recent corporate scandals, this paper examines the claim made by John Boatright that business ethics, as it is currently conceived, “rests on a mistake.” Ethics in business should not be achieved through managerial vision, discretion or responsibility; rather, ethics should shape the design of institutions that regulate business from the outside. What ethicists should advocate for, according to Boatright, are moral markets not moral managers. I explore the empirical and normative dimensions of his claim with special (...) attention paid to the extent to which Boatright’s development of the economic theory of the firm supports his position. I conclude by suggesting some reasons why moral markets and moral management are compatible frameworks for corporate reform. (shrink)

Beyond different starting points, stakeholder theory and Catholic Social Thought share many compatible perspectives when analyzing the role of the firm in economic activity, especially regarding the attention of the firm to different social and economic actors. Additionally, ST bears limitations regarding its ethical and anthropological foundation, and also about the legitimation of the different stakeholders’ interests. Therefore, ST lacks clear criteria to solve possible conflicts of interest between stakeholders. This paper analyzes the potentiality of (...) ST, widely accepted in corporate management, to integrate CST principles in order to solve those conflicts. At the same time, the paper studies the possibility of finding in the principles of CST an anthropological and ethical foundation for ST. This foundation could be the source of criteria to discuss the levels of legitimation and prioritization between stakeholders´ interests, especially when those interests collide. (shrink)

This book is a collection and reworking of research done by Pascal Salin since around 1990. Salin is an economist in the tradition of the Austrian school of economics. He emphasizes the centrality of individual choice in an uncertain world in which individual actions interact to produce spontaneous orders. But he is no mere conduit of established ideas. He also offers his own highly original insights honed after a lifetime as an economist, one who has earned the respect in which (...) he is now held by his peers worldwide. The book makes delightful reading. Salin covers a lot of ground in this book, mostly within the topics indicated by the title, though in the final two chapters he goes beyond these and into the foundations of economic science. The book is divided into five parts: (1) firms, markets and competition, (2) globalization and international economic problems, (3) monetary integration, (4) money, finance and economic policies, and (5) foundations of economic theory. (shrink)

This article develops a liberal theory of the virtues in business. I first articulate two key liberal values embodied within market society: self-authorship and mutual benefit. Self-authorship is a mode of autonomy given expression through the effective exercise of economic liberties. Mutual benefit involves the intentional pursuit of the well-being of one’s transaction partners within economic exchange. These values are uniquely realized, I argue, within business, conceptualized as a distinct, firm-level, social practice. More specifically, individuals realize (...) self-authorship by purposively integrating cospecialized resources, forms of knowledge, and business functions to facilitate mutually beneficial transactions. Through their commitment to mutual benefit, businesspersons establish ongoing, cooperative relationships with customers, members of other firms, and various stakeholders more generally. These relationships are constitutive of a distinct liberal notion of the common good. The practice of business and the common good in a market society are sustained by a range of individual-level virtues. I recount these virtues and, before concluding, discuss several other theoretical implications of this account. (shrink)

ABSTRACT:The notion of stakeholder salience based on attributes (e.g., power, legitimacy, urgency) is applied in the family business setting. We argue that where principal institutions intersect (i.e., family and business); managerial perceptions of stakeholder salience will be different and more complex than where institutions are based on a single dominant logic. We propose that (1) whereas utilitarian power is more likely in the general business case, normative power is more typical in family business stakeholder salience; (2) whereas in a general (...) business context legitimacy is socially constructed; for family stakeholders, legitimacy is based on heredity; and (3) whereas temporality and criticality are somewhat independent in general-business urgency, they are linked in the family business case because of family ties and family-centered non-economic goals. We apply this theoretical framework to position and integrate the contributions to this special section ofBusiness Ethics Quarterlyon “Stakeholder Theory, Ethics, Corporate Social Responsibility, and Family Enterprise.”. (shrink)

Various authors advocate consideration of stakeholder value concerns in organizational decision making. Brenner and Cochran (1990, 1991) propose a stakeholder theory of the firm which contains several propositions and a stakeholder value matrix. In order to begin any stakeholder rnodel validation, an approach is needed to measure stakeholder value and influence weights. We propose a multicriteria decision modeling approach, utilizing the analytic hierarchy process, to estimate stakeholder value matrix weights. This approach is illustrated using a simplified example and (...) suggestions are made regarding the process needed to begin to validate the stakeholder theory of the firm. (shrink)

Recent years have seen the flowering of a new literature on the economic nature of firms marked by a concern with their internal organization and contractual characteristics. Related literatures on the principal-agent problem and the theory of financial markets have also contributed to a better understanding of firms as economic institutions. However, the place of the concept of the ownership of the firm is poorly developed in most of this literature, with many writers either ignoring the (...) concept entirely or arguing that it is of no importance. The purpose of the present article is to point out that the concept of ownership of firms is crucial to an understanding of internal governance issues. Most economists implicitly presume that firms must be ownable and saleable if they are to be operated efficiently, and recently this viewpoint has been made more explicit by writers such as Jensen and Fama and Williamson. Their point of view is to some degree at odds with views of the firm as a coalition, which frequently appear in the same literature, and even more fundamentally in conflict with conceptions of the firm as an association or polity within which greater or lesser degrees of democracy in governance may be pursued. The first purpose of this article is to show that the incompletely articulated position of the leading authors on the economics of organization is that the firm is a commodity and must be so for purposes of efficiency. (shrink)

Abstract The classical case for market society appeals to the complementary goods of economic liberty and maximum wealth. A market society overgrown with economic firms, however, partly sacrifices liberty for the sake of wealth. This point was accepted by prewar, theorists of the economic firm, such as Frank Knight and Ronald Coase, and the attempt to moderate, or compensate for, the constriction of economic liberty was a central struggle of the Progressive Era. Since World War (...) II, however, neoclassical economists have tried to assimilate the firm to the theory of market exchange. Because they have failed, issues of authority and control have recently reassumed their place at the center of the theory of the firm. (shrink)

The traditional theories of the firm leave no room for love in business organizations, perhaps because it is thought that love is only an emotion or feeling, not a virtue, or because economic efficiency and profit making are considered to be incompatible with the practice of charity or love. In this article, we show based on an approach to the human action within the organization, that love can and must be lived in firms for firms to operate efficiently, (...) be attractive to those who take part in them, and act consistently in the long run. (shrink)

Control of the market microstructure theory of corporate governance perspective on the traditional theory of the firm as a deepening of the study, the use of information economics and game theory tools to the mainstream economic analysis framework for the development, the market for corporate control transactions, configuring and tuning the details of the process accurately describes the shares of companies in the separation of ownership and control of internal control case shareholders, tender offers, takeover (...) bids and other governance mechanisms different from the actual control and operation of, the existence of incomplete information and transaction costs under control conditions to analyze market transactions , from the perspective of market microstructure control to clarify the shareholders of the managers to implement effective control mechanisms, policies and conditions. Share control over the behavior of financial market issues, equity market and environmental factors control the interaction between the control and equity issues in the legal protection and market control policy design issues will be the future theoretical research in this field focus. Corporate governance theory based on corporate control market microstructure focuses on trading, allocating and adjusting process of the corporate control market, applying the information economic approach and game instrument to expand the mainstream economic analysis framework. It accurately describes the factual operation of different corporation control and governance mechanism such as corporation owner's internal control, tender offer, takeover bid and negotiating transfer, deepening the traditional firm theory. Moreover it analyzes the corporate control market transactions on the case of incomplete information and positive transaction cost, examines the effective mechanism, strategies and condition by which the owner control and monitor the management based on corporate control market microstructure perspective. Those are the future research topics in this field that behavior finance, interaction with environments and legislation protect and regulation policy designations. (shrink)

In this article, we empirically assess the impact of corporate ethical identity (CEI) on a firm's financial performance. Drawing on formulations of normative and instrumental stakeholder theory, we argue that firms with a strong ethical identity achieve a greater degree of stakeholder satisfaction (SS), which, in turn, positively influences a firm's financial performance. We analyze two dimensions of the CEI of firms: corporate revealed ethics and corporate applied ethics. Our results indicate that revealed ethics has informational worth (...) and enhances shareholder value, whereas applied ethics has a positive impact through the improvement of SS. However, revealed ethics by itself (i.e. decoupled from ethical initiatives) is not sufficient to boost economic performance. (shrink)