The third edition of a work that defines the field of cognitive neuroscience, with extensive new material including new chapters and new contributors.

In this paper, our goal is to survey some of the legal contexts within which violence risk assessment already plays a prominent role, explore whether developments in neuroscience could potentially be used to improve our ability to predict violence, and discuss whether neuropredictive models of violence create any unique legal or moral problems above and beyond the well worn problems already associated with prediction more generally. In Violence Risk Assessment and the Law, we briefly examine the role currently played by (...) predictions of violence in three high stakes legal contexts: capital sentencing, civil commitment hearings, and sexual predator statutes. In Clinical vs. Actuarial Violence Risk Assessment, we briefly examine the distinction between traditional clinical methods of predicting violence and more recently developed actuarial methods, exemplified by the Classification of Violence Risk software created by John Monahan and colleagues as part of the MacArthur Study of Mental Disorder and Violence [1]. In The Neural Correlates of Psychopathy, we explore what neuroscience currently tells us about the neural correlates of violence, using the recent neuroscientific research on psychopathy as our focus. We also discuss some recent advances in both data collection and data analysis that we believe will play an important role when it comes to future neuroscientific research on violence. In The Potential Promise of Neuroprediction, we discuss whether neuroscience could potentially be used to improve our ability to predict future violence. Finally, in The Potential Perils of Neuroprediction, we explore some potential evidentiary, constitutional, and moral issues that may arise in the context of the neuroprediction of violence. (shrink)

"The Cognitive Neurosciences III is a magnificent accomplishment. It covers topics trom ions to consciousness, from reflexes to social psychology. ...

The majority of the chapters in this edition of The Cognitive Neurosciences are new, and those from the first edition have been completely rewritten and updated ...

Psychology is dead. The self is a fiction invented by the brain. Brain plasticity isn?t all it?s cracked up to be. Our conscious learning is an observation post factum, a recollection of something already accomplished by the brain. We don?t learn to speak; speech is generated when the brain is ready to say something. False memories are more prevalent than one might think, and they aren?t all that bad. We think we?re in charge of our lives, but actually we are (...) not. On top of all this, the common belief that reading to a young child will make her brain more attuned to reading is simply untrue. (shrink)

After the first callosotomy surgeries were performed, the general consensus among the medical community was that severing the corpus callosum had relatively little, if any, effect on an individual's behavior. Nearly twenty years later, researchers discovered that, under experimental conditions, the two hemispheres could simultaneously maintain very different interpretations of the same stimulus. These findings immediately called into question the unity of subjective experience, a fundamental characteristic of human consciousness. How could the split‐brain patient not experience any disruption in his (...) experience as a unified self when the two hemispheres are physically and functionally disconnected? In this chapter, we review the research that has led to a conceptualization of the split brain as two minds within one body and the implications of this research for the scientific study of consciousness. We argue that consciousness is a neural function that emerges from the integration of information across available functional modules. (shrink)

An amendment to this paper has been published and can be accessed via the original article.

How have online communities affected the ways their users construct, view, and define their identity? In this paper, we will approach this issue by considering two philosophical sets of problems related to personal identity: the “Characterization Question” and the “Self-Other Relations Question.” Since these queries have traditionally brought out different problems around the concept of identity, here we aim at rethinking them in the framework of online communities. To do so, we will adopt an externalist and cognitive point of view (...) on online communities, describing them as virtual cognitive niches. We will evaluate and agree with the Attachment Theory of Identity, arguing that there is continuity between offline and online identity and that usually the latter contributes to the alteration of the former. Finally, we will discuss ways users can enact self-reflection on online frameworks, considering the impact of the Filter Bubble and the condition of Bad Faith. (shrink)