Recent EEG studies on the early postmortem interval that suggest the persistence of electrophysiological coherence and connectivity in the brain of animals and humans reinforce the need for further investigation of the relationship between the brain’s activity and the dying process. Neuroscience is now in a position to empirically evaluate the extended process of dying and, more specifically, to investigate the possibility of brain activity following the cessation of cardiac and respiratory function. Under the direction of the Center for Healthy (...) Minds at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, research was conducted in India on a postmortem meditative state cultivated by some Tibetan Buddhist practitioners in which decomposition is putatively delayed. For all healthy baseline and postmortem subjects presented here, we collected resting state electroencephalographic data, mismatch negativity, and auditory brainstem response. In this study, we present HB data to demonstrate the feasibility of a sparse electrode EEG configuration to capture well-defined ERP waveforms from living subjects under very challenging field conditions. While living subjects displayed well-defined MMN and ABR responses, no recognizable EEG waveforms were discernable in any of the tukdam cases. (shrink)

Une entité est phénoménalement consciente si et seulement s’il existe quelque chose comme l’effet-que-ça-fait d’être cette entité. À partir de cette définition, aucun test empirique ne peut être fourni pour établir si une entité S est consciente ou pas. S peut croire qu’elle est consciente parce qu’en effet elle l’est, mais pour qu’un sujet W puisse attribuer la conscience à S, une théorie est nécessaire. Cette théorie doit fournir des critères intersubjectifs, basés sur l’observation du comportement, les propriétés physiques ou (...) quelque chose de cette sorte. En bref : (C) Pour qu’un sujet S puisse établir si une autre entité W est consciente, il doit faire appel à une théorie empirique proposant un critère d’un point de vue à la troisième personne pour l’attribution de la conscience. Il n’est pas possible de prouver que la conscience est un phénomène réel, mais les éliminativistes ne peuvent pas prouver non plus que ce ne soit pas le cas. Pour le réaliste, la conscience est donnée comme un fait brut, alors que pour l’éliminativiste l’existence de la conscience est une affirmation théorique. J’adhère à une vision réaliste de la conscience, supportée par le fait qu’il me semble vraiment que j’ai des expériences phénoménales, et par l’idée que la dichotomie réalité/ apparence ne s’applique pas aux contenus phénoménaux. Il y a manifestement des corrélations entre les phénomènes physiques et mentaux, qui donnent de bonnes raisons de croire qu’il y a des relations causales entre le monde physique (y compris le corps) et les esprits (conscients). Le dualisme des substances, le dualisme des propriétés, l’épiphénoménalisme et le panpsychisme ne parviennent pas à fournir une explication convaincante de ces corrélations. Une forme de physicalisme apparaît être l’alternative la plus raisonnable, en dépit du fait que l’esprit ne semble pas, d’un point de vue subjectif, être de nature physique. (shrink)

Kripke [1972] a présenté un argument très influent contre le physicalisme, basé sur l’idée suivante : les énoncés psycho-physiques—ceux qui identifient les phénomènes psychologiques de l’expérience à des phénomènes physiques—sont, s’ils sont vrais, nécessairement vrais. Pourtant, ils semblent être contingents. Par la suite, Levine [1983] a prétendu que l’apparence de contingence était due à un «fossé explicatif » qui se trouve dans ces énoncés : les phénomènes physiques ne semblent pas rendre compte de l’existence et des caractéristiques des phénomènes psychologiques. (...) Je suspecte que l’apparition du fossé explicatif résulte, du moins en partie, du fait que l’on prend la subjectivité de l’expérience comme une condition ontologique alors qu’elle serait épistémologique. Dans ce papier je présente et développe cette idée. (shrink)

The late J. D. Bernal's lectures given to first-year students in physics at Birkbeck College, University of London, are presented here in their entirety, tracing the history of physics up to the end of the classical era at the end of 19th century, just before the discoveries of the subatom and relatively were made. In view of the prestige and profundity of the newer discoveries, Bernal felt that the classical era was being largely forgotten. In this book, he (...) attributes a greater relevance to the work of men from the distant past than is usually given. For instance, the idea of "atom" not only retains the language of the Greek, Democritus, who first postulated it, but there is also an absolutely unbroken connection between the atom of the Greek and that of the modern physicist. Bernal felt that the historical method would be a suitable introduction to the fundamental concepts of physics, and it is hoped that the readers of the book will be able to see something of the interplay between the theoretical and practical aspects of the subject. (shrink)

Scientists and laypeople alike use the sense of understanding that an explanation conveys as a cue to good or correct explanation. Although the occurrence of this sense or feeling of understanding is neither necessary nor sufficient for good explanation, it does drive judgments of the plausibility and, ultimately, the acceptability, of an explanation. This paper presents evidence that the sense of understanding is in part the routine consequence of two well-documented biases in cognitive psychology: overconfidence and hindsight. In light of (...) the prevalence of counterfeit understanding in the history of science, I argue that many forms of cognitive achievement do not involve a sense of understanding, and that only the truth or accuracy of an explanation make the sense of understanding a valid cue to genuine understanding. (shrink)

There is a standard story told about the rise and fall of ordinary language philosophy: it was a widespread, if not dominant, approach to philosophy in Great Britain in the aftermath of World War II up until the early 1960s, but with the development of systematic approaches to the study of language—formal semantic theories on one hand and Gricean pragmatics on the other—ordinary language philosophy more or less disappeared. In this paper we present quantitative evidence to evaluate the standard story (...) of the rise and fall of ordinary language philosophy, building on the topic model of over 30,000 philosophy articles in Weatherson (2022). Using a combination of qualitative judgment and a topic-model-based measurement of similarity between individual articles, we find evidence that supports the first part of the standard story, according to which ordinary language philosophy arises in the 1940s, peaks between the early 1950s and the late 1960s, and then rapidly declines. But we argue that there is also evidence of a "new wave" of ordinary language philosophy in the early 21st century that defies the second part of the standard story. (shrink)

Abstract Today’s scholarship and policymaking on business and human rights (BHR) urges businesses to better understand their human rights responsibilities and remedy them, when and if abuses do occur. Despite the public discourse about businesses and human rights, the state—as the main duty bearer in international human rights law—plays a fundamental role as the protector and enforcer of human rights obligations. Yet, the existing literature overlooks state involvement as perpetrators of abuse in the corporate context. We develop the term _economic (...) complicity_ to shed light on the state’s role in directly or indirectly abusing human rights within a corporation’s sphere of influence, such as police violence toward nonviolent protesters or granting environmental licenses without adhering to legally required community consultations. We ask: What contributes to the state’s engagement in economic complicity in corporate human rights abuses? We assess hypotheses emergent from the democratic change and development studies literatures with a unique database that includes economic complicity data from Latin America, the Corporations and Human Rights Database (CHRD). This research has important theoretical implications for the business ethics and BHR literatures, as understanding economic complicity highlights the need for business actors to avoid shirking their moral responsibilities to not only ‘do no harm’ but also to protect human rights when they are threatened by the state. (shrink)

The focus of this study was to analyze the content, distribution, and comparative genome relationships of 996 chromosome bin-mapped expressed sequence tags accounting for 2266 restriction fragments on the homoeologous group 3 chromosomes of hexaploid wheat. Of these loci, 634, 884, and 748 were mapped on chromosomes 3A, 3B, and 3D, respectively. The individual chromosome bin maps revealed bins with a high density of mapped ESTs in the distal region and bins of low density in the proximal region of the (...) chromosome arms, with the exception of 3DS and 3DL. These distributions were more localized on the higher-resolution group 3 consensus map with intermediate regions of high-mapped-EST density on both chromosome arms. Gene ontology classification of mapped ESTs was not significantly different for homoeologous group 3 chromosomes compared to the other groups. A combined analysis of the individual bin maps using 537 of the mapped ESTs revealed rearrangements between the group 3 chromosomes. Approximately 232 of the consensus mapped ESTs matched sequences on rice chromosome 1 and revealed large- and small-scale differences in gene order. Of the group 3 mapped EST unigenes ∼21 and 32% matched the Arabidopsis coding regions and proteins, respectively, but no chromosome-level gene order conservation was detected. (shrink)