I argue that consciousness is an aspect of an agent's intelligence, hence of its ability to deal adaptively with the world. In particular, it allows for the possibility of noting and correcting the agent's errors, as actions performed by itself. This in turn requires a robust self-concept as part of the agent's world model; the appropriate notion of self here is a special one, allowing for a very strong kind of self-reference. It also requires the capability to come to see (...) that world model as residing in its belief base , while then representing the actual world as possibly different, i.e., forming a new world-model. This suggests particular computational mechanisms by which consciousness occurs, ones that conceivably could be discovered by neuroscientists, as well as built into artificial systems that may need such capabilities. Consciousness, then, is not an epiphenomenon at all, but rather a key part of the functional architecture of suitably intelligent agents, hence amenable to study as much as any other architectural feature. I also argue that ignorance of how subjective states could be essentially functional does not itself lend credibility to the view that such states are not essentially functional; the strong self-reference proposal here is one possible functional explanation of consciousness. (shrink)

The studies of mind and language have traditionally been linked to one another. Indeed, theories of reference have over time brought more and more mind into meaning. Here I argue that the links must be made far stronger still if we are to understand either. I offer some criticism of the causal-functionalist theories of reference on this ground, and present some ideas for improvements. The upshot will be that intentionality is largely internal and very real indeed, that it provides a (...) genuine distinction between systems that have it and ones that do not, and that it hinges on internal complexities of a specifiable sort, ones that are tied to the detection of error. What is meaning, what is it good for, and what is a naturalist account of how it works? In this paper. I will argue that first two of these questions should be answered primarily in terms of processes inside the mind/brain, contrary to most recent thinking on this. In the sequel paper, I will argue that a key aspect of this is the physical body of the meaning agent, and propose a way in which this might work and how an external notion of reference can be recaptured from internal processes. (shrink)

The studies of mind and language have traditionally been linked to one another. Indeed, theories of reference (meaning, intentionality, content) have over time brought more and more mind into meaning. Here I argue that the links must be made far stronger still if we are to understand either. I offer some criticism of the causal-functionalist theories of reference on this ground, and present some ideas for improvements. The upshot will be that intentionality is largely internal and very real indeed, that (...) it provides a genuine distinction between systems that have it and ones that do not, and that it hinges on internal complexities of a specifiable sort, ones that are tied to the detection of error. What is meaning, what is it good for, and what is a naturalist (non-intentional) account of how it works? In this paper (part I of a two-part work). I will argue that first two of these questions should be answered primarily in terms of processes inside the mind/brain, contrary to most recent thinking on this. In the sequel paper (part II), I will argue that a key aspect of this is the physical body of the meaning agent, and propose a way in which this might work and how an external notion of reference can be recaptured from internal processes. (shrink)

In this paper we provide an account of the structural underpinnings of self-awareness. We offer both an abstract, logical account.

Black and Wilensky (1979) have made serious methodological errors in analyzing story grammars, and in the process they have committed additional errors in applying formal language theory. Our arguments involve clarifying certain aspects of knowledge representation crucial to a proper treatment of story understanding.Particular criticisms focus on the following shortcomings of their presentation: 1) an erroneous statement from formal language theory, 2) misapplication of formal language theory to story grammars, 3) unsubstantiated and doubtful analogies with English grammar, 4) various non (...) sequiturs concerning the generation of non‐stories, 5) a false claim based on the artificial distinction between syntax and semantics, and 6) misinterpretation of the role of story grammars in story understanding.We conclude by suggesting appropriate criteria for the evaluation of story grammars. (shrink)

When certain formal symbol systems (e.g., computer programs) are implemented as dynamic physical symbol systems (e.g., when they are run on a computer) their activity can be interpreted at higher levels (e.g., binary code can be interpreted as LISP, LISP code can be interpreted as English, and English can be interpreted as a meaningful conversation). These higher levels of interpretability are called "virtual" systems. If such a virtual system is interpretable as if it had a mind, is such a "virtual (...) mind" real? This is the question addressed in this "virtual" symposium, originally conducted electronically among four cognitive scientists: Donald Perlis, a computer scientist, argues that according to the computationalist thesis, virtual minds are real and hence Searle's Chinese Room Argument fails, because if Searle memorized and executed a program that could pass the Turing Test in Chinese he would have a second, virtual, Chinese-understanding mind of which he was unaware (as in multiple personality). Stevan Harnad, a psychologist, argues that Searle's Argument is valid, virtual minds are just hermeneutic overinterpretations, and symbols must be grounded in the real world of objects, not just the virtual world of interpretations. Computer scientist Patrick Hayes argues that Searle's Argument fails, but because Searle does not really implement the program: A real implementation must not be homuncular but mindless and mechanical, like a computer. Only then can it give rise to a mind at the virtual level. Philosopher Ned Block suggests that there is no reason a mindful implementation would not be a real one. (shrink)

The process of rationally revising beliefs in the light of new information is a topic of great importance and long-standing interest in artificial intelligence. Moreover, significant progress has been made in understanding the philosophical, logical, and computational foundations of belief revision. However, very little research has been reported with respect to the revision of other mental states, most notably propositional attitudes such as desires and intentions. In this paper, we present a first attempt to formulate a general framework for understanding (...) the revision of mental states. We develop an abstract belief-desire-intention model of agents, and introduce a notion of rationality for this model. We then present a series of formal postulates characterizing the processes of adding beliefs, desires, and intentions, updating costs and values, and removing beliefs, desires, and intentions. We also investigate the computational complexity of several problems involving the abstract model and comment on algorithms for revision. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Certain problems in commonsense reasoning lend themselves to the use of non-standard formalisms which we call active logics. Among these are problems of objects misidentification. In this paper we describe some technical issues connected with automated inference in active logics, using particular object misidentification problems as illustrations. Control of exponential growth of inferences is a key issue. To control this growth attention is paid to a limited version of an inference rule for negative introspection. We also present some descriptive (...) statistics for comparison with earlier active-logic approaches. (shrink)

Davidson attacks the intelligibility of conceptual relativism, i.e. of truth relative to a conceptual scheme. He defines the notion of a conceptual scheme as something ordering, organizing, and rendering intelligible empirical content, and calls the position that employs both notions scheme-content dualism. He argues that such dualism is untenable since: not only can we not parcel out empirical content sentence per sentence but also the notion of uninterpreted content to which several schemes are relative, and the related notion of a (...) theory ”fitting the evidence’, can be shown to lack intelligibility too. Davidson argues further that belief in incommensurable schemes or non-intertranslatable languages is possible only on violating a correct understanding of interpretability : if we succeed in interpreting someone else then we have shown there is no need to speak of two conceptual schemes, while if we fail ”there is no ground for speaking of two.’. (shrink)

SummaryNeither an infant one week old nor a snail is a rational creature. If the infant survives long enough, he will probably become rational, while this is not true of the snail. If we like, we may say of the infant from the start that he is a rational creature because he will probably become rational if he survives, or because he belongs to a species with this capacity. Whichever way we talk, there remains the difference, with respect to rationality, (...) between the infant and the snail on one hand, and the normal adult person on the other; this difference is discussed here.The difference consists, it is argued, in the having of propositional attitudes such as belief, desire, intention and shame. This raises the question how to tell when a creature has propositional attitudes; snails, we may agree, do not, but how about dogs or chimpanzees? The question is not empirical; the question is what sort of empirical evidence is relevant to deciding when a creature has propositional attitudes.It is next contended that language is a necessary concomitant of any of the propositional attitudes. This idea is not new, but there seem to be few arguments in its favor in the literature; one is attempted here.Crucial to the considerations advanced is the idea that belief depends on having the concept of objective truth, and that this comes only with language.RéuméNi un bébé d'une semaine, ni un serpent ne sont des créatures rationnelles. Si le bébé survit assez longtemps, il deviendra probablement rationnel, mais ce n'est pas vrai pour le serpent. Sil'on veut, on peut dire d'emblee du bébé qu'il est une créature rationnelle parce qu'il le deviendra s'il survit ou parce qu'il appartient à une espèce qui possède cette faculté. Quoi qu'on dise, la différence subsiste, en ce qui concerné la rationalité, entre le bébé et le serpent d'une part, la per‐sonne adulte normale de lcar;autre, et c'est cette différence qui sera discutée ici.La différence consiste, selon l'auteur, en une capacityé d'avoir des attitudes propositionnelles telles que la croyance, le désir, l'intention et la honte. Ceci pose la question de savoir quand on peut dire qu'une créature a des attitudes propositionnelles; on peut se mettre d'accord sur le fait que les serpents n'en ont pas, mais qu'en est‐il des chiens et des chimpanzés? La question n'est pas empirique, elle est de savoir quelle donnée empirique va décider si oui ou non une créature a des attitudes propositionnelles.L'auteur prétend que les attitudes propositionnelles s'accompagnent nécessairement du langage. Cette idèe n'est pas nouvelle, mais il semble qu'il y a peu d'arguments qui la soutiennent dans la littérature. On en trouvera un ici, où l'on montre qu'un élément crucial de a croyance dépend de l'acquisition du concept de vérité objective, qui ne se développe qu'avec le langage.ZusammenfassungWeder ein eine Woche altes Kind noch eine Schlange sind rationale Wesen. Wenn das Kind lange genug überlebt, wird es sich wahrscheinlich zu einem vernünftigen Wesen entwickeln, wäh‐rend das für die Schlange nicht zutrifft. Wenn wir wollen, können wir vom Kind sagen, dass es von Anfang an cin rationales Wesen ist, weil es im Fallc des Ubcrlebens vernünftig werden wird oder weil es zu einer Spezies mit dieser Fähigkeit gehört. Wie auch immer wir das ausdrücken, bleibt bezüglich der Rationalität der Unterschied zwischen dem Kind und der Schlange einerseits und der erwachsenen Person andererseits zurück. Dieser Unterschied wird hier diskutiert.Es wird argumentiert, dass der Unterschied in der Fähigkeit besteht, psychologische Haltun‐gen wie Glauben, Begierden, Absichten und Scham zu haben. Damit erhebt sich die Frage, wie man entscheiden kann, wann ein Wesen solchc Einstellungcn hat; Schlangen, wird man zugeben, haben keine; wie steht es aber mit Hunden Oder Schimpansen? Die Frage ist keine empirische, sondern betrifft die Frage, welche Art von empirischen Belegen für den Entscheid relevant ist, ob ein Wesen derartige Einstellungen hat.Es wird die These aufgestellt, dass Sprachen ein notwendiger Begleitumstand einer jeglichen propositionalen Haltung ist. Der Gedanke ist zwar nicht neu, aber es finden sich wenige Argu‐mente zu seiner Stützung in der Literatur; eines wird hier ausgeführt.Entscheidend für die vorgelegten Betrachtungen ist die Auffassung, wonach Glaube vom Begriff der objektiven Wahrheit abhängt, und dieser kommt erst mit der Sprache. (shrink)

SummaryNeither an infant one week old nor a snail is a rational creature. If the infant survives long enough, he will probably become rational, while this is not true of the snail. If we like, we may say of the infant from the start that he is a rational creature because he will probably become rational if he survives, or because he belongs to a species with this capacity. Whichever way we talk, there remains the difference, with respect to rationality, (...) between the infant and the snail on one hand, and the normal adult person on the other; this difference is discussed here.The difference consists, it is argued, in the having of propositional attitudes such as belief, desire, intention and shame. This raises the question how to tell when a creature has propositional attitudes; snails, we may agree, do not, but how about dogs or chimpanzees? The question is not empirical; the question is what sort of empirical evidence is relevant to deciding when a creature has propositional attitudes.It is next contended that language is a necessary concomitant of any of the propositional attitudes. This idea is not new, but there seem to be few arguments in its favor in the literature; one is attempted here.Crucial to the considerations advanced is the idea that belief depends on having the concept of objective truth, and that this comes only with language.RéuméNi un bébé d'une semaine, ni un serpent ne sont des créatures rationnelles. Si le bébé survit assez longtemps, il deviendra probablement rationnel, mais ce n'est pas vrai pour le serpent. Sil'on veut, on peut dire d'emblee du bébé qu'il est une créature rationnelle parce qu'il le deviendra s'il survit ou parce qu'il appartient à une espèce qui possède cette faculté. Quoi qu'on dise, la différence subsiste, en ce qui concerné la rationalité, entre le bébé et le serpent d'une part, la per‐sonne adulte normale de lcar;autre, et c'est cette différence qui sera discutée ici.La différence consiste, selon l'auteur, en une capacityé d'avoir des attitudes propositionnelles telles que la croyance, le désir, l'intention et la honte. Ceci pose la question de savoir quand on peut dire qu'une créature a des attitudes propositionnelles; on peut se mettre d'accord sur le fait que les serpents n'en ont pas, mais qu'en est‐il des chiens et des chimpanzés? La question n'est pas empirique, elle est de savoir quelle donnée empirique va décider si oui ou non une créature a des attitudes propositionnelles.L'auteur prétend que les attitudes propositionnelles s'accompagnent nécessairement du langage. Cette idèe n'est pas nouvelle, mais il semble qu'il y a peu d'arguments qui la soutiennent dans la littérature. On en trouvera un ici, où l'on montre qu'un élément crucial de a croyance dépend de l'acquisition du concept de vérité objective, qui ne se développe qu'avec le langage.ZusammenfassungWeder ein eine Woche altes Kind noch eine Schlange sind rationale Wesen. Wenn das Kind lange genug überlebt, wird es sich wahrscheinlich zu einem vernünftigen Wesen entwickeln, wäh‐rend das für die Schlange nicht zutrifft. Wenn wir wollen, können wir vom Kind sagen, dass es von Anfang an cin rationales Wesen ist, weil es im Fallc des Ubcrlebens vernünftig werden wird oder weil es zu einer Spezies mit dieser Fähigkeit gehört. Wie auch immer wir das ausdrücken, bleibt bezüglich der Rationalität der Unterschied zwischen dem Kind und der Schlange einerseits und der erwachsenen Person andererseits zurück. Dieser Unterschied wird hier diskutiert.Es wird argumentiert, dass der Unterschied in der Fähigkeit besteht, psychologische Haltun‐gen wie Glauben, Begierden, Absichten und Scham zu haben. Damit erhebt sich die Frage, wie man entscheiden kann, wann ein Wesen solchc Einstellungcn hat; Schlangen, wird man zugeben, haben keine; wie steht es aber mit Hunden Oder Schimpansen? Die Frage ist keine empirische, sondern betrifft die Frage, welche Art von empirischen Belegen für den Entscheid relevant ist, ob ein Wesen derartige Einstellungen hat.Es wird die These aufgestellt, dass Sprachen ein notwendiger Begleitumstand einer jeglichen propositionalen Haltung ist. Der Gedanke ist zwar nicht neu, aber es finden sich wenige Argu‐mente zu seiner Stützung in der Literatur; eines wird hier ausgeführt.Entscheidend für die vorgelegten Betrachtungen ist die Auffassung, wonach Glaube vom Begriff der objektiven Wahrheit abhängt, und dieser kommt erst mit der Sprache. (shrink)

Previous research indicates that students in engineering self-report cheating in college at higher rates than those in most other disciplines. Prior work also suggests that participation in one deviant behavior is a reasonable predictor of future deviant behavior. This combination of factors leads to a situation where engineering students who frequently participate in academic dishonesty are more likely to make unethical decisions in professional practice. To investigate this scenario, we propose the hypotheses that (1) there are similarities in the decision-making (...) processes used by engineering students when considering whether or not to participate in academic and professional dishonesty, and (2) prior academic dishonesty by engineering students is an indicator of future decisions to act dishonestly. Our sample consisted of undergraduate engineering students from two technically-oriented private universities. As a group, the sample reported working full-time an average of six months per year as professionals in addition to attending classes during the remaining six months. This combination of both academic and professional experience provides a sample of students who are experienced in both settings. Responses to open-ended questions on an exploratory survey indicate that students identify common themes in describing both temptations to cheat or to violate workplace policies and factors which caused them to hesitate in acting unethically, thus supporting our first hypothesis and laying the foundation for future surveys having forced-choice responses. As indicated by the responses to forced-choice questions for the engineering students surveyed, there is a relationship between self-reported rates of cheating in high school and decisions to cheat in college and to violate workplace policies; supporting our second hypothesis. Thus, this exploratory study demonstrates connections between decision-making about both academic and professional dishonesty. If better understood, these connections could lead to practical approaches for encouraging ethical behavior in the academic setting, which might then influence future ethical decision-making in workplace settings. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Joy and Aggravation of Being a Career Nursing AssistantDonald KoenigI am a male career nursing assistant with 10 years experience. I also happen to be the Ohio Chair Person for the Male Nursing Assistants Task Force. This task force is designed to help recruit, offer continuing education, increase public awareness, and help maintain the good quality men that work as career nursing assistants.Today I want to talk to (...) you about what it is like to be a nursing assistant. Let me walk you through a day of a nursing assistant. I work the day shift. My day starts at 6:45 am. The first thing I do when I arrive at work is to check the schedule for three things: first, to see what my assignment is; second, to note how many nursing assistants are scheduled for the whole nursing home for that shift; and finally, I check to see if there are any shower aides scheduled and, if so, what sections they are assigned to that day.Once I arrive at my assignment area I check to see how many of my residents are showers and how many assistants from the night shift have already done the morning care of getting residents dressed and up for the day. Federal Regulations are one nursing assistant for every fifteen residents. There are some days that there are more staff scheduled and I will have fewer residents; unfortunately those days do not occur often enough. If I am lucky I end up only having six to eight residents to do morning care with.Now it is time for the breakfast trays to arrive on the floor. Even though I am only assigned to take care of my residents, I have to help pass trays to all residents on my side of the building (61 in my case). First I pass the trays to all residents that require help eating or are total feeds. It is now about 8:30 a.m. and all the residents have been fed and it is time to pick up all the trays and record their intake.Now I am ready to get my report from the nurse and start doing my morning get-ups. Like I said earlier, I have anywhere from six to eight residents to do morning care with. This will include washing, [End Page 141] dressing, mouth and hair care and finally getting them up into their chair. I usually have about two or two and a half hours to accomplish this before it is time for me to go to lunch. During the time I am doing morning care, I am also responsible for answering call lights in my section for all fifteen residents under my care. Most sections will have residents who require two or three assistants per resident for transfers from bed to chair, so when it is time to transfer I have to go looking for help in my area and also must help my co-workers with their transfers. So what this averages out to, if I am lucky, is about fifteen minutes with each resident. I do not know about you but I take longer than that to get ready in the morning. It is now 11:00 a.m. and time for my lunch break of 30 minutes, my first break of the day to sit and relax.It is now lunchtime and there are four aides on the floor. Two at a time go to lunch, leaving the other two to cover the floor for the next hour. Hopefully, everyone got all their residents up and all you have to do is answer call lights, which can be for anything from wanting a pain pill, or wanting to go to the toilet, or needing to be changed because they had an accident. Oh yes, and in between all that I start to take residents down to one of the two dining rooms. One dining room is for those who can feed themselves and the other is for residents who need assistance eating or need to be fed.Lunch is over for the aides and it is time for two aides to... (shrink)

Leibniz denies that the actual world possesses the per se unity of a substance. Instead, he seems to hold, the world is limited to the mind-dependent unity of an aggregate. Against this answer, criticized by Kant in his Inaugural Dissertation, I argue that for Leibniz the unity of the actual world is not grounded simply in God’s perception of relations among created substances but in the common dependence of those substances on a unitary cause. First, the actual world is one (...) because every created substance is continuously dependent on God for its perfection. Without being the soul of the world, God is an emanative cause through which the created world is unified. Second, every substance is a unique “concentration” of an ideal world that is God’s model for creation. Consequently, while extensionally many, created substances are versions of the same one world chosen by God for creation. (shrink)

“Psychological relativity” means that “an observation is a relationship between the observer and the event observed.” It implies a profound distinction between “the internal first-person as opposed to the external third-person perspective.” That distinction, followed through, turns Lehar's discourse inside-out. This commentary elaborates the notion of “psychological relativity,” shows that whereas there is already a natural science of perceptual report, there cannot also be a science of perception per se, and draws out some implications for our understanding of phenomenal consciousness.

Pour Merleau-Ponty et Nancy, le sujet et son monde co-naissent ensemble dans le mouvement paradoxal du sentir. Dans cette perspective, le sentir serait alors un point de départ privilégié afin de déconstruire les théories classiques de la subjectivité et pour construire une nouvelle compréhension décentrée du sujet. Même si ces deux philosophes divergent sur la question du sujet, il est possible de les rapprocher sur la question du sentir et en particulier à propos de l’expérience de l’écoute. De cette façon, (...) nous ferons ressortir un ton radical chez le premier Merleau-Ponty et un timbre (ou une tonalité) phénoménologique chez Nancy. Pour ce faire, nous démontrons que l’écoute révèle la subjectivité comme activité de « coexistence » (et non pas de « coïncidence »), comme « co-naissance » (et non pas connaissance), et comme « trajectoire » (et non pas présence statique). En d’autres termes, c’est par la voie de l’écoute qu’on retrouve une théorie radicale de la subjectivité déjà présente dans la Phénoménologie de la perception, ainsi qu’une tonalité phénoménologique chez Nancy. For Merleau-Ponty and for Nancy, the subject and his or her world are born together (co-naissent) in the paradoxical movement of sensing. From this perspective, sensing is thus a privileged point of departure for the deconstruction of classical theories of subjectivity and for the construction of a new notion of a decentered subjectivity. Even though it may appear that these two thinkers diverge precisely with regard to the definition of the subject to be theorized, by bringing them together on the topic of sensing (and “listening” in particular), we are able to bring out a radical tone in Merleau-Ponty’s early work as well as a phenomenological timbre in Nancy’s thought. In this paper I demonstrate that listening reveals how subjectivity is an activity of “co-existence” rather than “co-incidence,” of “co-birth” (co-naissance) rather than “knowledge” (connaissance), and is a trajectory rather than a static presence. In other words, by listening to listening we rediscover a radical theory of subjectivity already at work in Phenomenology of Perception and a phenomenological tonality in the work of Nancy. Per Merleau-Ponty e Nancy, il soggetto e il suo mondo co-nascono nel movimento paradossale del sentire. In questa prospettiva, il sentire sarebbe allora un punto di partenza privilegiato per decostruire le teorie classiche della soggettività e costruire una nuova comprensione decentrata del soggetto. Anche se i due filosofi divergono sulla questione del soggetto, è possibile avvicinarli circa la questione del sentire e in particolare a proposito dell’esperienza dell’ascolto. In questo modo, cercheremo di far emergere un tono radicale nel primo Merleau-Ponty e un timbro (o una tonalità) fenomenologica in Nancy. Per farlo, mostreremo come l’ascolto riveli la soggettività come attività di “coesistenza” (e non di “coincidenza”), come “co-nascenza” (e non conoscenza), e come “traiettoria” (e non presenza statica). In altri termini, è attraverso l’ascolto che ritroviamo una teoria radicale della soggettività già presente in Fenomenologia della percezione, così come una tonalità fenomenologica in Nancy. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy and Literature 27.2 (2003) 475-477 [Access article in PDF] A Small Treatise on the Great Virtues: The Uses of Philosophy in Everyday Life, by André Comte-Sponville, trans. Catherine Temerson; x & 352 pp. New York: Metropolitan Books, 2001. Of two minds, I mirror the two sorts of audience this book's twenty-four translations have sought: "students" and "readers" (p. 5), those for whom the scholarly content and apparatus may (...) be of interest and those hopefully many more who wish to become better, to become virtuous. Although "students" will not find sustained engagement with this book rewarding, its bright virtues will raise "readerly" smiles among them.Reasons for Small's great popularity since its 1995 PUF release derive not from essaying eighteen virtues in its eighteen chapters. Its allure is its dance with love's piquant absences, a dance with virtues as "feeble approximations of love" (p. 98). Indeed, chapter 1 teaches that politeness "is not a virtue but a simulacrum that imitates virtue (in adults) and paves the way for it (in children)" (p. 13). And since love, "the alpha and omega of all virtue" (p. 226), is not itself clearly a virtue, then perhaps at most fifteen virtues are treated. For as all readers will pleasurably discover, purity (chapter 14) is really refractions of love's qualities.The virtues are multiply interconnected, not unified as Socrates thought. This idea finds graceful expression, among other places, at the conclusion of "Generosity" (chapter 7). "Combined with courage, it turns out to be heroism. Joined by justice, it becomes equity. Coupled with compassion, it becomes benevolence. In league with mercy, it becomes leniency" (p. 102). And chap-ter 9's mercy? "Because hatred is a sadness, mercy (like the process of mourning, which it resembles and might even require, since to forgive is to bid farewell to our hatred) is on the side of joy. When it is not yet joyous, it is forgiveness; when it already is, it is love" (p. 131). Simone Weil's meditations on God's absence, or "withdrawal," occasion insights into authentic parental love. [End Page 475] God does not fill the world since "were he to do so, there would be only God and no world"; similarly, "more often than one might think, parents withdraw, step back, cede their space to their children, and refrain from exercising all the power at their disposal. Why? Because they love them" (p. 274).Unfortunately, love's flowers, potted in this garden of Adonis (Phaedrus 276b), must contend with "student" scrutiny from without and a suffocating lack of concision from within. This "student's" efforts failed to disentangle ambivalences about the loving ego in the long, concluding love chapter. Organized into three sections—eros, philia, agape—the first has no patience for subtleties of the Symposium's eros. "Have I begged the question?... So be it," since Plato confuses "love—in all its forms—with [ego's] want" (p. 243). Philia "is a different way of [ego's] possessing, of enjoying" (p. 277). Finally, agape, universal and disinterested love, is simply one's genuine conatus, one's true power of existing (pp. 270f). So ego loves three ways—desire, possession, power—but each is about ego. Eros "usually" (p. 262) intermixes with philia: "we are forever hesitating, oscillating, fluctuating between the two affects [desire and joy] and the two truths (Plato's and Spinoza's), between want and capacity, hope and gratitude, passion and action, religion and wisdom, between the love that desires only what it does not have and wants to possess (ero \ s), and the love [philia] that, since it desires only what is, has everything it desires and finds pleasure and joy in it" (p. 253). Nevertheless, philia without excess Platonic eros is about and for ego, not alter. For the friend per se gives ego joy: ego's joy is the definiens of philia (pp. 249ff). Disconcertingly, there are a few contrary formulations of philia as loving "the other for the other's benefit" (p. 262). If "metaphysics is the... (shrink)

The original development of the formalism of quantum mechanics involved the study of isolated quantum systems in pure states. Such systems fail to capture important aspects of the warm, wet, and noisy physical world which can better be modelled by quantum statistical mechanics and local quantum field theory using mixed states of continuous systems. In this context, we need to be able to compute quantum probabilities given only partial information. Specifically, suppose that B is a set of operators. This set (...) need not be a von Neumann algebra. Simple axioms are proposed which allow us to identify a function which can be interpreted as the probability, per unit trial of the information specified by B, of observing the (mixed) state of the world restricted to B to be σ when we are given ρ – the restriction to B of a prior state. This probability generalizes the idea of a mixed state (ρ) as being a sum of terms (σ) weighted by probabilities. The unique function satisfying the axioms can be defined in terms of the relative entropy. The analogous inference problem in classical probability would be a situation where we have some information about the prior distribution, but not enough to determine it uniquely. In such a situation in quantum theory, because only what we observe should be taken to be specified, it is not appropriate to assume the existence of a fixed, definite, unknown prior state, beyond the set B about which we have information. The theory was developed for the purposes of a fairly radical attack on the interpretation of quantum theory, involving many-worlds ideas and the abstract characterization of observers as finite information-processing structures, but deals with quantum inference problems of broad generality. (shrink)

Over 100 million Americans suffer from chronic pain, which causes more disability than any other medical condition in the United States at a cost of $560–$635 billion per year. Opioid analgesics are frequently used to treat CP. However, long term use of opioids can cause brain changes such as opioid-induced hyperalgesia that, over time, increase pain sensation. Also, opioids fail to treat complex psychological factors that worsen pain-related disability, including beliefs about and emotional responses to pain. Cognitive behavioral therapy can (...) be efficacious for CP. However, CBT generally does not focus on important factors needed for long-term functional improvement, including attainment of personal goals and the psychological flexibility to choose responses to pain. Acceptance and Commitment Therapy has been recognized as an effective, non-pharmacologic treatment for a variety of CP conditions. However, little is known about the neurologic mechanisms underlying ACT. We conducted an ACT intervention in women with chronic musculoskeletal pain. Functional magnetic resonance imaging data were collected pre- and post-ACT, and changes in functional connectivity were measured using Network-Based Statistics. Behavioral outcomes were measured using validated assessments such as the Acceptance and Action Questionnaire, the Chronic Pain Acceptance Questionnaire, the Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale, and the NIH Toolbox Neuro-QoLTM scales. Results suggest that, following the 4-week ACT intervention, participants exhibited reductions in brain activation within and between key networks including self-reflection, emotion, and cognitive control. These changes in connectivity strength were correlated with changes in behavioral outcomes including decreased depression and pain interference, and increased participation in social roles. This study is one of the first to demonstrate that improved function across the DMN, SN, and FPN may drive the positive outcomes associated with ACT. This study contributes to the emerging evidence supporting the use of neurophysiological indices to characterize treatment effects of alternative and complementary mind-body therapies. (shrink)

Background: Bioethics consultations are conducted in varied settings, including hospitals, universities, and other research institutions, but there is sparse information about bioethics consultations conducted in corporate settings such as pharmaceutical companies. The purpose of this article is to describe a bioethics consultation service at a pharmaceutical company, to report characteristics of consultations completed by the service over a 6-year period, and to share results of a consultation feedback survey. Methods: Data on the descriptive characteristics of bioethics consultations were collected from (...) 2008 to 2013 and analyzed in Excel 2007. Categorical data were analyzed via the pivot table function, and time-based variables were analyzed via formulas. The feedback survey was administered to consultation requesters from 2009 to 2012 and also analyzed in Excel 2007. Results: Over the 6-year period, 189 bioethics consultations were conducted. The number of consultations increased from five per year in 2008 to approximately one per week in 2013. During this time, the format of the consultation service was changed from a committee-only approach to a tiered approach (tailored to the needs of the case). The five most frequent topics were informed consent, early termination of a clinical trial, benefits and risks, human biological samples, and patient rights. The feedback survey results suggest the consultation service is well regarded overall and viewed as approachable, helpful, and responsive. Conclusions: Pharmaceutical bioethics consultation is a unique category of bioethics consultation that primarily focuses on pharmaceutical research and development but also touches on aspects of clinical ethics, business ethics, and organizational ethics. Results indicate there is a demand for a tiered bioethics consultation service within this pharmaceutical company and that advice was valued. This company's experience indicates that a bioethics consultation service raises awareness about bioethics, empowers employees to raise bioethical concerns, and helps them reason through challenging issues. (shrink)

We present a one per cent measurement of the cosmic distance scale from the detections of the baryon acoustic oscillations in the clustering of galaxies from the Baryon Oscillation Spectroscopic Survey, which is part of the Sloan Digital Sky Survey III. Our results come from the Data Release 11 sample, containing nearly one million galaxies and covering approximately 8500 square degrees and the redshift range 0.2 < z < 0.7. We also compare these results with those from the publicly released (...) DR9 and DR10 samples. Assuming a concordance Λ cold dark matter cosmological model, the DR11 sample covers a volume of 13 Gpc3 and is the largest region of the Universe ever surveyed at this density. We measure the correlation function and power spectrum, including density-field reconstruction of the BAO feature. The acoustic features are detected at a significance of over 7σ in both the correlation function and power spectrum. Fitting for the position of the acoustic features measures the distance relative to the sound horizon at the drag epoch, rd, which has a value of rd,fid = 149.28 Mpc in our fiducial cosmology. We find DV = at z = 0.32 and DV = at z = 0.57. At 1.0 per cent, this latter measure is the most precise distance constraint ever obtained from a galaxy survey. Separating the clustering along and transverse to the line of sight yields measurements at z = 0.57 of DA = and H =. Our measurements of the distance scale are in good agreement with previous BAO measurements and with the predictions from cosmic microwave background data for a spatially flat CDM model with a cosmological constant. © 2014 The Author Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Royal Astronomical Society. (shrink)

L’idea che vi sia una netta dicotomia tra fatti e valori è uno dei dogmi dell’empirismo. Secondo questa concezione, i giudizi fattuali, in quanto verificabili o falsificabili empiricamente, riguardano le aree di razionalità «pura» e omogenea e sono ancorati naturalisticamente al mondo. Gli enunciati di valore, invece, sarebbero da relegare nella sfera di ciò che è semplicemente «soggettivo», emotivo, irrazionale. Questo assunto, che ha dominato per molto tempo le scienze e la filosofia, è stato messo in dubbio dai pragmatisti e (...) da alcuni dei più influenti pensatori contemporanei, che, intervenendo al dibattito sull’oggettività dell’etica, hanno mostrato come la presunta eterogeneità tra giudizi descrittivi e giudizi valutativi sia ormai insostenibile. Sulla scia della prospettiva inaugurata da questi pensatori, gli autori di questo libro mostrano come la dicotomia fatto/valore abbia corrotto il nostro pensiero, impedendoci di rivolgere l’attenzione alle intersezioni, le sinergie e le relazioni che esistono tra processi cognitivi e coefficienti valutativi, tra scienza e etica. Con saggi di S. Clough, D. Copp, D. Davidson, G. Marchetti, H. Putnam, R. A. Putnam B. Stroud, K. A. Taylor, V. Walsh. (shrink)

We argue that an unqualified use of the term solidarity in public health is not only equivocal but problematic toward the ends of public health. The term may be deployed normatively by public health advocates to strengthen the bonds among public health practitioners and refer to an ideal society in which the importance of interdependence among members ought to be acknowledged throughout the polity. We propose an important distinction between partisan solidarity and societal solidarity. Because any moralized belief in a (...) vision of a broad societal solidarity will be a contested political ideal, political reality would limit solidarity based on such a vision to partisan solidarity. An idealized vision of societal solidarity is simply not politically feasible in pluralistic, liberal, democratic societies. However, although societal solidarity is unlikely with respect to any particular policy, it might be hoped for with respect to constitutional procedures that provide boundaries for the agon of the political process. We suggest that moralizing assertions of a solidaristic ideal in a pluralistic society might be counterproductive to generating the political support necessary for public health per se and establishing legitimate public health policy. A pragmatic political approach would be for public health advocates to generate sufficient strong political support for those public health policies that are most amenable to the political and social realities of a time and place. (shrink)

Three decades of concern over consumption of potentially contaminated Great Lakes fish has led government agencies and public health proponents to implement risk assessment and management programs as a means of protecting the health of fishers and their families. While well-meaning in their intent, these programs––and much of the research conducted to support and evaluate them––were not designed to accommodate the understandings and concerns of the fish consumer. Results from a qualitative component of a multi-disciplinary, multi-year research project on frequent (...) (average 108 meals per year) consumers of Great Lakes fish tell the fishers’ side of the story. We present data from 87 tape recorded interviews conducted with Vietnamese, Chinese, and English-speaking participants that underscore the quality of freshly caught Great Lakes fish and the important social and cultural benefits of fish and fishing to the consumer. We also outline the participants’ understandings of risk from eating Great Lakes fish and the way in which fishers and their families manage this risk. The paper concludes with a discussion of these benefits, risks, and risk management strategies as ways that Great Lakes fish consumers “construct” rather than “perceive” risk. We advocate for risk assessment and management protocols that involve those who will be affected the most, such as frequent consumers of Great Lakes fish, from the initial “risk characterization” stage through to any necessary risk communication. (shrink)

What is the relation between a reason and an action when the reason explains the action by giving the agent's reason for doing what he did? We may call such explanations rationalizations, and say that the reason rationalizes the action. In this paper I want to defend the ancient - and common-sense - position that rationalization is a species of ordinary causal explanation. The defense no doubt requires some redeployment, but not more or less complete abandonment of the position, as (...) urged by many recent writers. (shrink)