Ausgehend vom § 398 der „Philosophischen Untersuchungen“, wird Wittgensteins Kritik an Freges Auffassung über Vorstellungen dargestellt. Anschließend wird eine Lösung zu einem Rätsel im genannten Paragraphen gegeben, die Licht auf einige – nicht ganz offensichtliche – wesentliche Unterschiede in unserer Rede über Gegenstände, Bilder und Vorstellungen wirft.

Zwei Vorwürfe in der gegenwärtigen kunsttheoretischen Debatte zeigen gegenüber traditionellen Kunstbegriffen starke strukturelle Parallelen. Erstens: Traditionelle abendländische Kunstbegriffe sind elitär, weil sie wichtige ästhetische, kulturelle Bereiche unserer Kultur ausgrenzen oder zu einem Randphänomen erklären; dazu gehört insbesondere der Bereich des Designs. Zweitens: Traditionelle abendländische.

Arthur Danto advocates the thesis that we cannot imagine the art or artwork of the future. This thesis is motivated primarily by his Hegelian conception of history and secondarily by his holistic conception of art, which is informed by Wittgenstein. At first glance the thesis seems to conflict with Danto's second thesis that anything can be a work of art. Danto's solution to this problem is not very convincing. A more promising approach can be found in Kant's aesthetics and especially (...) in his concept of genius. (shrink)

Die meisten kunsttheoretischen Ansätze gehen davon aus, daß jede sinnvolle Definition der Kunst zumindest implizit auf einen Wertbegriff zurückgreifen muß. Wie dies im einzelnen geschehen soll, darüber herrscht Uneinigkeit. Mit Hilfe des Supervenienzbegriffes, nach dem Schönheit einem Objekt zugeschieben wird, weil bestimmte andere, substantielle Eigenschaften an ihm wahrgenommen werden, die seine Schönheit determinieren, wurde u.a. von N. Zangwill ein Wertbegriff entwickelt, der es ermöglichen soll, das Wesen der Kunst zu erfassen. Nach kritischer Beleuchtung erweist sich die Konstruktion via supervenierender Eigenschaften (...) als durchaus problematisch und der gewonnene Wertbegriff bestenfalls partiell anderen überlegen. (shrink)

Die meisten kunsttheoretischen Ansätze gehen davon aus, daß jede sinnvolle Definition der Kunst zumindest implizit auf einen Wertbegriff zurückgreifen muß. Wie dies im einzelnen geschehen soll, darüber herrscht Uneinigkeit. Mit Hilfe des Supervenienzbegriffes, nach dem Schönheit einem Objekt zugeschieben wird, weil bestimmte andere, substantielle Eigenschaften an ihm wahrgenommen werden, die seine Schönheit determinieren, wurde u.a. von N. Zangwill ein Wertbegriff entwickelt, der es ermöglichen soll, das Wesen der Kunst zu erfassen. Nach kritischer Beleuchtung erweist sich die Konstruktion via supervenierender Eigenschaften (...) als durchaus problematisch und der gewonnene Wertbegriff bestenfalls partiell anderen überlegen. (shrink)

Warum es heute schwerer als früher ist, aktuelle Kunst zu verstehen.

Im Aufsatz wird eine antirealistische und nominalistische Position nicht nur bezogen auf fiktionale Eigennamen entwickelt. Ausgangspunkt sind Überlegungen von Nelson Goodman und Kendall Walton. Der Gedanke dabei ist, dass wir fiktionale Ausdrücke und Darstellungen vermittels metasprachlicher Kategorienbäume verstehen. Dieser Lösungsversuch erlaubt es, von einem Verständnis des Ausdrucks ‚Osterhasen‘ zu sprechen, ohne auf die Annahme der Existenz von seltsamen fiktiven Gegenständen verpflichtet zu sein.

In der Ontologie wird einerseits danach gefragt, was für Arten von Gegebenem es überhaupt gibt und andererseits, worin das Sein eines Gegenstandes bzw. einer Art von Gegenstand besteht. Im Folgenden wollen wir uns mit der Ontologie der Computerspiele beschäftigen. Dass es so etwas wie Computerspiele tatsächlich gibt, ist im Gegensatz zu der Frage, ob es Abstrakta wie allgemeine Eigenschaften oder fiktive Entitäten gibt, evident und unkontrovers. Spannender, weil alles andere als offensichtlich, ist aber die Antwort auf die Frage, was Computerspiele (...) eigentlich sind, oder anders formuliert, was Computerspiele zu Computerspielen macht, oder wieder anders gesagt, worin das Computerspiel-Sein beseht. (shrink)

Nelson Goodman (1906-1998) was one of the outstanding thinkers of the 20th century. In a memorial note, Hilary Putnam considers him to be ""one of the two or three greatest analytic philosophers of the post-World War II period"". Goodman has left his mark in many fields of philosophical investigation: Epistemology, Philosophy of Science, Logic, Metaphysics, the General Theory of Symbols, Philosophy of Languageand Philosophy of Art, all have been challenged and enriched by the problems he has shown up, the projects (...) he developed from them and the solutions he has suggested. In August 2006 a coup. (shrink)

Die Autorinnen und Autoren widmen sich der Frage nach dem Verhältnis von Kunst und Moral. Wie weit darf künstlerische Freiheit gehen? Lassen sich ästhetischer und moralischer Wert eines Kunstwerks trennen oder ist Kunst immer im Licht der Absicht.

A new theory is taking hold in neuroscience. It is the theory that the brain is essentially a hypothesis-testing mechanism, one that attempts to minimise the error of its predictions about the sensory input it receives from the world. It is an attractive theory because powerful theoretical arguments support it, and yet it is at heart stunningly simple. Jakob Hohwy explains and explores this theory from the perspective of cognitive science and philosophy. The key argument throughout The Predictive Mind (...) is that the mechanism explains the rich, deep, and multifaceted character of our conscious perception. It also gives a unified account of how perception is sculpted by attention, and how it depends on action. The mind is revealed as having a fragile and indirect relation to the world. Though we are deeply in tune with the world we are also strangely distanced from it. (shrink)

Climate change mitigation has become a paradigm case both for externalities in general and for the game-theoretic model of the Tragedy of the Commons (ToC) in particular. This situation is worrying, as we have reasons to suspect that some models in the social sciences are apt to be performative to the extent that they can become self-fulfilling prophecies. Framing climate change mitigation as a hardly solvable coordination problem may force us into a worse situation, by changing real-world behaviour to fit (...) our model, rather than the other way around. But while this problem of the performativity of the ToC has been noted in a recent paper in this journal by Matthew Kopec, his proposed strategies for dealing with their self-fulfilling nature fall short of providing an adequate solution. Instead of relying on the idea that modelling assumptions are always strictly speaking false, this paper shows that the problem may be better framed as a problem of underdetermination between competing explanations. Our goal here is to provide a framework for choosing between this set of competing models that allows us to avoid a ‘Russian Roulette’-like situation in which we gamble with existential risk. (shrink)

A series of recent developments points towards auditing as a promising mechanism to bridge the gap between principles and practice in AI ethics. Building on ongoing discussions concerning ethics-based auditing, we offer three contributions. First, we argue that ethics-based auditing can improve the quality of decision making, increase user satisfaction, unlock growth potential, enable law-making, and relieve human suffering. Second, we highlight current best practices to support the design and implementation of ethics-based auditing: To be feasible and effective, ethics-based auditing (...) should take the form of a continuous and constructive process, approach ethical alignment from a system perspective, and be aligned with public policies and incentives for ethically desirable behaviour. Third, we identify and discuss the constraints associated with ethics-based auditing. Only by understanding and accounting for these constraints can ethics-based auditing facilitate ethical alignment of AI, while enabling society to reap the full economic and social benefits of automation. (shrink)

A series of recent developments points towards auditing as a promising mechanism to bridge the gap between principles and practice in AI ethics. Building on ongoing discussions concerning ethics-based auditing, we offer three contributions. First, we argue that ethics-based auditing can improve the quality of decision making, increase user satisfaction, unlock growth potential, enable law-making, and relieve human suffering. Second, we highlight current best practices to support the design and implementation of ethics-based auditing: To be feasible and effective, ethics-based auditing (...) should take the form of a continuous and constructive process, approach ethical alignment from a system perspective, and be aligned with public policies and incentives for ethically desirable behaviour. Third, we identify and discuss the constraints associated with ethics-based auditing. Only by understanding and accounting for these constraints can ethics-based auditing facilitate ethical alignment of AI, while enabling society to reap the full economic and social benefits of automation. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 11.1 (2004) 65-70 [Access article in PDF] Top-Down and Bottom-Up in Delusion Formation Jakob Hohwy Keywords delusions, top-down, bottom-up, predictive coding Some delusions may arise as responses to unusual experiences (Davies et al. 2001; Maher 1974;). The implication is that delusion formation in some cases involves some kind of bottom-up mechanism—roughly, from perception to belief. Delusion formation may also involve some kind of top-down (...) mechanism. This could be in the shape of a patient's flawed background beliefs, or biases, which somehow modulate perception or ensure delusional interpretations of experience. There is little agreement about what kind of mechanism is primary in delusion formation, or, indeed, what the particular mechanisms and their neural substrates might be.In the evaluation of top-down and bottom-up mechanisms in delusion formation, a number of conceptual questions should be addressed (Davies and Coltheart 2000). For example, if there is an experiential component, why is a hypothesis with a delusional explanation of the unusual experience seen as relevant? Why do the subjects come to believe it tenaciously? How come some unusual experiences do not develop into delusions?A number of empirical findings also need to be taken into account: for example, the damage to the autonomic system in Capgras delusion (Ellis et al. 1997), the decreased ability for fast error correction in schizophrenia (Frith and Done 1989), modulation of activity in parietal cortex in delusions of alien control and other passivity experiences (Blakemore, Oakley, and Frith 2003), and also in schizophrenia, the increased sensitivity to self-produced stimuli, such as tickling oneself (Blakemore et al. 2000) and the sound of one's own voice (Ford et al. 2001).Theory choice can also be guided by philosophical doctrines about, for example, the nature of belief, the constitutive role of rationality, and intersubjectivity and the nature of judgements about the external world. It is natural, however, to let beliefs about philosophical doctrine be secondary to empirical findings and conceptual issues.The distinction between bottom-up and top-down mechanisms is particularly sharp in John Campbell's (2001) account of delusions and in Tim Bayne and Elisabeth Pacherie's (2004) discussion of Campbell. In this discussion, top-down approaches are associated with the general philosophical doctrine of rationalism, and bottom-up approaches with the philosophical doctrine of empiricism. Campbell's account is top-down because he posits delusional framework beliefs that arise directly as a result of brain damage or malfunction, and that work in some top-down fashion on the interpretation of experience. Bayne [End Page 65] and Pacherie convincingly defend empiricism against Campbell's rationalist account. Among their many other objections, they briefly puzzle about how a delusional framework belief (e.g., that one's spouse is an impostor) in a top-down fashion could cause the damage to the autonomic system seen in the Capgras and Cotard delusions (2004, 1). I think this is a very important objection because skin conductance data are part of the evidence for the bottom-up hypothesis concerning the Capgras delusion. We could add to this, for example, that it is mysterious how belief in a top-down fashion could cause people with schizophrenia to be worse at fast error correction than normal controls, to be better at tickling themselves than normal controls, and to have an increased response to the sound of their own voice.On the other hand, although the skin conductance response (SCR) evidence suggests a bottom-up approach to the Capgras delusion, it does not explain the character of the subjective experience that is hypothesized to give rise to the delusional belief: reduced SCR is not part of the experience itself (thanks to Ian Gold for discussion of this). Something more is required to give a full account of the type of experience that gives rise to the delusion. Further, as they stand, most bottom-up accounts are unable to account for why reality testing fails for beliefs based on these experiences.Neither rationalism nor empiricism on their own seem able to address the conceptual questions while paying... (shrink)

Recently, Jardas _et al_ have convincingly defended the patient preference predictor (PPP) against a range of autonomy-based objections. In this response, I propose a new autonomy-based objection to the PPP that is not explicitly discussed by Jardas _et al_. I call it the ‘objection from higher-order preferences’. Even if this objection is not sufficient reason to reject the PPP, the objection constitutes a pro tanto reason that is at least as powerful as the ones discussed by Jardas _et al._.

Diese Arbeit ist eine Studie zu einer der ältesten Fragen der Philosophie: der Frage nach der Beziehung, in der unsere Gedanken, unsere Sprache und unsere sinnliche Erfahrung zur Wirklichkeit stehen. In ihrer sowohl historisch als auch systematisch orientierten Studie argumentiert die Autorin für eine realistische Auffassung dieses Verhältnisses. In der Auseinandersetzung mit Positionen von Quine, Strawson oder McDowell wird ein Begriff von Objektivität entwickelt und im Rahmen einer Konzeption sinnlicher Erfahrung ausgewiesen, der auch der skeptischen Herausforderung standhält: In einer detaillierten (...) Analyse der begrifflichen Struktur unseres kognitiven wie perzeptiven Bezugs auf die Außenwelt wird aufgewiesen, dass aus den internen Verknüpfungen erkenntnistheoretischer und ontologischer Aspekte unserer Erfahrung die Notwendigkeit der Existenz- wie auch der Unabhängigkeitsdimension der realistischen These folgt. (shrink)

Important decisions that impact humans lives, livelihoods, and the natural environment are increasingly being automated. Delegating tasks to so-called automated decision-making systems can improve efficiency and enable new solutions. However, these benefits are coupled with ethical challenges. For example, ADMS may produce discriminatory outcomes, violate individual privacy, and undermine human self-determination. New governance mechanisms are thus needed that help organisations design and deploy ADMS in ways that are ethical, while enabling society to reap the full economic and social benefits of (...) automation. In this article, we consider the feasibility and efficacy of ethics-based auditing as a governance mechanism that allows organisations to validate claims made about their ADMS. Building on previous work, we define EBA as a structured process whereby an entity’s present or past behaviour is assessed for consistency with relevant principles or norms. We then offer three contributions to the existing literature. First, we provide a theoretical explanation of how EBA can contribute to good governance by promoting procedural regularity and transparency. Second, we propose seven criteria for how to design and implement EBA procedures successfully. Third, we identify and discuss the conceptual, technical, social, economic, organisational, and institutional constraints associated with EBA. We conclude that EBA should be considered an integral component of multifaced approaches to managing the ethical risks posed by ADMS. (shrink)

An exciting theory in neuroscience is that the brain is an organ for prediction error minimization. This theory is rapidly gaining influence and is set to dominate the science of mind and brain in the years to come. PEM has extreme explanatory ambition, and profound philosophical implications. Here, I assume the theory, briefly explain it, and then I argue that PEM implies that the brain is essentially self-evidencing. This means it is imperative to identify an evidentiary boundary between the brain (...) and its environment. This boundary defines the mind-world relation, opens the door to skepticism, and makes the mind transpire as more inferentially secluded and neurocentrically skull-bound than many would nowadays think. Therefore, PEM somewhat deflates contemporary hypotheses that cognition is extended, embodied and enactive; however, it can nevertheless accommodate the kinds of cases that fuel these hypotheses. (shrink)

Some monothematic types of delusions may arise because subjects have unusual experiences. The role of this experiential component in the pathogenesis of delusion is still not understood. Focussing on delusions of alien control, we outline a model for reality testing competence on unusual experiences. We propose that nascent delusions arise when there are local failures of reality testing performance, and that monothematic delusions arise as normal responses to these. In the course of this we address questions concerning the tenacity with (...) which delusions are maintained, their often bizarre content, the patients’ inability to dismiss them, and their often circumscribed character. (shrink)

Virtue ethics is traditionally a conservative project. It analyses the virtues that humanity has been relying on since antiquity. This conservatism unduly limits the potential of virtue ethics to contribute to moral progress. Instead, we should pay more attention to constructionist virtue ethics with the help of conceptual engineering. I will argue that revising and ameliorating the virtue concepts which a community uses directly and indirectly leads to a change of the virtues that exist in this community. By revising and (...) innovating virtue concepts, we can re-make and improve the virtues that we have. (shrink)

Berichte zur Wissenschaftsgeschichte, Volume 45, Issue 1-2, Page 87-111, June 2022.

The notion that the brain is a prediction error minimizer entails, via the notion of Markov blankets and self-evidencing, a form of global scepticism — an inability to rule out evil demon scenarios. This type of scepticism is viewed by some as a sign of a fatally flawed conception of mind and cognition. Here I discuss whether this scepticism is ameliorated by acknowledging the role of action in the most ambitious approach to prediction error minimization, namely under the free energy (...) principle. I argue that the scepticism remains but that the role of action in the free energy principle constrains the demon’s work. This yields new insights about the free energy principle, epistemology, and the place of mind in nature. (shrink)

Virtue ethics has many times been suggested as a promising recipe for the construction of artificial moral agents due to its emphasis on moral character and learning. However, given the complex nature of the theory, hardly any work has de facto attempted to implement the core tenets of virtue ethics in moral machines. The main goal of this paper is to demonstrate how virtue ethics can be taken all the way from theory to machine implementation. To achieve this goal, we (...) critically explore the possibilities and challenges for virtue ethics from a computational perspective. Drawing on previous conceptual and technical work, we outline a version of artificial virtue based on moral functionalism, connectionist bottom–up learning, and eudaimonic reward. We then describe how core features of the outlined theory can be interpreted in terms of functionality, which in turn informs the design of components necessary for virtuous cognition. Finally, we present a comprehensive framework for the technical development of artificial virtuous agents and discuss how they can be implemented in moral environments. (shrink)

The proposed European Artificial Intelligence Act (AIA) is the first attempt to elaborate a general legal framework for AI carried out by any major global economy. As such, the AIA is likely to become a point of reference in the larger discourse on how AI systems can (and should) be regulated. In this article, we describe and discuss the two primary enforcement mechanisms proposed in the AIA: the _conformity assessments_ that providers of high-risk AI systems are expected to conduct, and (...) the _post-market monitoring plans_ that providers must establish to document the performance of high-risk AI systems throughout their lifetimes. We argue that the AIA can be interpreted as a proposal to establish a Europe-wide ecosystem for conducting AI auditing, albeit in other words. Our analysis offers two main contributions. First, by describing the enforcement mechanisms included in the AIA in terminology borrowed from existing literature on AI auditing, we help providers of AI systems understand how they can prove adherence to the requirements set out in the AIA in practice. Second, by examining the AIA from an auditing perspective, we seek to provide transferable lessons from previous research about how to refine further the regulatory approach outlined in the AIA. We conclude by highlighting seven aspects of the AIA where amendments (or simply clarifications) would be helpful. These include, above all, the need to translate vague concepts into verifiable criteria and to strengthen the institutional safeguards concerning conformity assessments based on internal checks. (shrink)

In this paper, I defend what I call the ‘Inference Principle’. This principle holds that if an agent obtains some information legitimately, then the agent can make any inference she wants based on the information, without violating anyone’s right to privacy. This principle is interesting for at least three reasons. First, it constitutes a novel answer to the timely question of whether the widespread use of ‘data analytics’ to infer personal information about individuals is morally permissible. Second, it contradicts what (...) seems to be a common view of inferences’ ability to violate privacy rights. Third, it offers an account of the theoretically underdeveloped issue of what duties are engendered by the moral right to privacy with regard to inferred information. (shrink)

Virtue ethics has many times been suggested as a promising recipe for the construction of artificial moral agents due to its emphasis on moral character and learning. However, given the complex nature of the theory, hardly any work has de facto attempted to implement the core tenets of virtue ethics in moral machines. The main goal of this paper is to demonstrate how virtue ethics can be taken all the way from theory to machine implementation. To achieve this goal, we (...) critically explore the possibilities and challenges for virtue ethics from a computational perspective. Drawing on previous conceptual and technical work, we outline a version of artificial virtue based on moral functionalism, connectionist bottom–up learning, and eudaimonic reward. We then describe how core features of the outlined theory can be interpreted in terms of functionality, which in turn informs the design of components necessary for virtuous cognition. Finally, we present a comprehensive framework for the technical development of artificial virtuous agents and discuss how they can be implemented in moral environments. (shrink)