This book assesses the ethical implications of using armed unmanned aerial vehicles in contemporary conflicts. The American way of war is trending away from the heroic and towards the post-heroic, driven by a political preference for air-powered management of strategic risks and the reduction of physical risk to US personnel. The recent use of drones in the War on Terror has demonstrated the power of this technology to transcend time and space, but there has been relatively little debate in the (...) United States and elsewhere over the embrace of what might be regarded as politically desirable and yet morally worrisome: risk-free killing. Arguably, the absence of a relationship of mutual risk between putative combatants poses a fundamental challenge to the status of war as something morally distinguishable from other forms of violence, and it also undermines the professional virtue of the warrior as a courageous risk-taker. This book considers the use of armed drones in the light of ethical principles that are intended to guard against unjust increases in the incidence and lethality of armed conflict. The evidence and arguments presented indicate that, in some respects, the use of armed drones is to be welcomed as an ethically superior mode of warfare. Over time, however, their continued and increased use is likely to generate more challenges than solutions, and perhaps do more harm than good. This book will be of much interest to students of the ethics of war, airpower, counter-terrorism, strategic studies and security studies in general. (shrink)

This article contributes to the debate among just war theorists about the ethics of using armed drones in the war on terror. If violence of this kind is to be effectively restrained, it is necessary first to establish an understanding of its nature. Because it is difficult to conceptualize drone-based violence as war, there is concern that such violence is thus not captured by the traditional jus ad bellum framework. Drone strikes probably do not constitute a law enforcement practice, so (...) the peacetime ethics of criminal justice do not apply either. One possible solution is to develop and apply a legitimization framework of jus ad vim in which vim is “force short of war,” although this depends upon a vim–bellum distinction being a sustainable one. Moving beyond discussion of these three alternative concepts of drone-based violence, the article suggests a fourth—vis perpetua —and explores the ethical implications thereof. As a form of violence that presents no physical risk to individual users of force, a program of drone strikes poses a moral problem if it is intended to continue indefinitely, leading to the systematic endangerment of innocents without the eventual promise of peace. (shrink)

Ethical analysis of armed drones has to date focused heavily on their use in foreign wars or counterterrorism operations, but it is important also to consider the potential use of armed drones in d...

Exploring a variety of ways of thinking ethically about drone violence. The violent use of armed, unmanned aircraft is increasing worldwide, but uncertainty persists about the moral status of remote-control killing and why it should be restrained. Practitioners, observers and potential victims of such violence often struggle to reconcile it with traditional expectations about the nature of war and the risk to combatants. Addressing the ongoing policy concern that state use of drone violence is sometimes poorly understood and inadequately governed, (...) the book's ethical assessments are not restricted to the application of traditional Just War principles, but also consider the ethics of artificial intelligence, virtue ethics, and guiding principles for forceful law-enforcement. This edited collection brings together nine original contributions by established and emerging scholars, incorporating expertise in military ethics, critical military studies, gender, history, international law and international relations, in order to better assess the multi-faceted relationship between drone violence and justice. Christian Enemark is Professor of International Relations in the Department of Politics and International Relations at the University of Southampton. (shrink)

Moral uncertainty surrounding the use of armed drones has been a persistant problem for more than two decades. In response, [this book] provides greater clarity by investigating the ways in which violent drone use is seen as just or unjust in a variety of circumstances. Adopting a broad-based approach to normative inquiry, this book organizes moral ideas around a series of concepts of drone violence, including warfare, violent law enforcement, tele-intimate violence and violence devolved from humans to artificial intelligence (AI) (...) technologies. Christian Enemark assesses these concepts to discern and address teh potential for armed drone systems to support moral progress or to generate injustice. (shrink)

“All war is violent, but not all violence is war, so not all drone violence will be drone warfare” (26).1 Based on this assumption, Christian Enemark’s Moralities of Drone Violence provides a detai...

How should you decide what to do when you’re uncertain about basic normative principles? A natural suggestion is to follow some "second-order:" norm: e.g., obey the most probable norm or maximize expected choiceworthiness. But what if you’re uncertain about second-order norms too—must you then invoke some third-order norm? If so, any norm-guided response to normative uncertainty appears doomed to a vicious regress. This paper aims to rescue second-order norms from the threat of regress. I first elaborate and defend the claim (...) some philosophers have made that the regress problem forces us to accept normative externalism, the view that at least one norm is incumbent on all agents regardless of their normative beliefs. But, I then argue, we need not accept externalism about first-order norms, thus closing off any question of how agents should respond to normative uncertainty. Rather, we can head off the threat of regress by ascribing external force to a single second-order norm: the enkratic principle. (shrink)

The classic programme of conceptual engineering (Cappelen, Herman. 2018. Fixing Language: An Essay on Conceptual Engineering. Oxford: Oxford University Press; Eklund, Matti. 2021. “Conceptual Engineering.” In The Routledge Handbook of Social and Political Philosophy of Language, edited by Justin Khoo, and Rachel Sterken, 15–30. London: Routledge) envisages a two-stage ameliorating process. First, we assess ‘F’ and determine what the term should express. Second, we bring it about that ‘F’ expresses what it should express. The second stage gives rise to a (...) practical challenge: the implementation challenge. Engineering advocates need to explain by what means they can implement specific conceptual changes in the natural language shared by a community – a feat Herman Cappelen (2018. Fixing Language: An Essay on Conceptual Engineering. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020; “Conceptual Engineering: The Master Argument.” In Conceptual Engineering and Conceptual Ethics, edited by Alexis Burgess, Herman Cappelen, and David Plunkett, 132–151. Oxford: Oxford University Press) argues to be beyond our understanding and control both on an externalist and on an internalist meta-semantics. I devise a new answer to the implementation challenge. Enlisting the influential theory of social norms by Cristina Bicchieri, I argue that engineering social norms in Bicchieri’s technical sense amounts to an effective, specific, and feasible means to implement specific conceptual change, at least on internalist premises. I also argue that Bicchieri’s social norms are an essential addition to the more familiar conventions and moral norms when it comes to conceptual engineering. (shrink)

How should you decide what to do when you're uncertain about basic normative principles (e.g., Kantianism vs. utilitarianism)? A natural suggestion is to follow some "second-order" norm: e.g., "comply with the first-order norm you regard as most probable" or "maximize expected choiceworthiness". But what if you're uncertain about second-order norms too -- must you then invoke some third-order norm? If so, it seems that any norm-guided response to normative uncertainty is doomed to a vicious regress. In this paper, I aim (...) to rescue second-order norms from this threat of regress. I first elaborate and defend the suggestion some philosophers have entertained that the regress problem forces us to accept normative externalism, the view that at least one norm is incumbent on agents regardless of their beliefs or evidence concerning that norm. But, I then argue, we need not accept externalism about first-order (e.g., moral) norms, thus closing off any question of what an agent should do in light of her normative beliefs. Rather, it is more plausible to ascribe external force to a single, second-order rational norm: the enkratic principle, correctly formulated. This modest form of externalism, I argue, is both intrinsically well-motivated and sufficient to head off the threat of regress. (shrink)

The principle that rational agents should maximize expected utility or choiceworthiness is intuitively plausible in many ordinary cases of decision-making under uncertainty. But it is less plausible in cases of extreme, low-probability risk (like Pascal's Mugging), and intolerably paradoxical in cases like the St. Petersburg and Pasadena games. In this paper I show that, under certain conditions, stochastic dominance reasoning can capture most of the plausible implications of expectational reasoning while avoiding most of its pitfalls. Specifically, given sufficient background uncertainty (...) about the choiceworthiness of one's options, many expectation-maximizing gambles that do not stochastically dominate their alternatives "in a vacuum" become stochastically dominant in virtue of that background uncertainty. But, even under these conditions, stochastic dominance will not require agents to accept options whose expectational superiority depends on sufficiently small probabilities of extreme payoffs. The sort of background uncertainty on which these results depend looks unavoidable for any agent who measures the choiceworthiness of her options in part by the total amount of value in the resulting world. At least for such agents, then, stochastic dominance offers a plausible general principle of choice under uncertainty that can explain more of the apparent rational constraints on such choices than has previously been recognized. (shrink)

Die sogenannte Syphilisfrage ist von Beginn an ein Thema der Nietzscheforschung. Das vorliegende Buch versucht diese Frage zu beantworten, indem es sich auf eine aufwändige Spurensuche bis zurück zur Syphilis der Renaissance-Päpste begibt. Wie war in verschiedenen Zeiten der Umgang mit der Krankheit und der fortwährenden Furcht, infiziert zu sein? Mit welchen Subtexten bringen Dichter und Denker zur Zeit Nietzsches das Thema zur Sprache? Und wie gab Nietzsche selbst in seinen Werken und Briefen davon Kunde? Das Buch betrachtet Nietzsche im (...) europäischen Kontext des 19. Jahrhunderts, in dem die Angst vor der Lustseuche allgegenwärtig war. Christian Niemeyers Nietzsche-Lektüre im Zeichen der Syphilis eröffnet überraschende Deutungsmöglichkeiten im Werk Friedrich Nietzsches. (shrink)

Christian Niemeyers "Nietzsche. Werk und Wirkung eines freien Geistes" geht der Frage nach, wie Nietzsches Werk heute gelesen werden soll. Für Philosophen und für interessierte Laien bietet dieser Band eine Antwort auf die Frage, wieso Nietzsche auch noch im 21. Jahrhundert wichtig ist. Christian Niemeyers Werk "Nietzsche. Werk und Wirkung eines freien Geistes" konzentriert sich auf Nietzsches Spätwerk ab Menschliches, Allzumenschliches. In dieser Phase ist Nietzsche frei von den Einflüssen Schopenhauers oder Wagners; es handelt sich um den echten (...) Nietzsche. Was an diesem Nietzsche ist auch heute noch relevant, und wo und warum verliert der späte Nietzsche die Spur? Warum geht er auch in der Rezeptionsgeschichte zunehmend verloren? Und was war seine Intention? Der renommierte Nietzsche-Forscher Christian Niemeyer geht auf diese Fragen ein und zeigt dem Leser, wie Nietzsche heute gelesen werden muss. Klar und verständlich führt Niemeyer sowohl Philosophen als auch interessierte Laien an den authentischen Nietzsche jenseits von Pathos, Rhetorik und Selbststilisierung heran. (shrink)

European Journal of Philosophy, EarlyView.

Rev. version of the author's Habilitationsschrift, Martin-Luther-Universitèat.

This chapter approaches the hierarchical theory of time from a philosophical point of view. It is based on a critical reading of Fraser's work through Neo-Kantian eyes. The chapter reflects upon the methodological constraints that apply to a natural philosophy of time. At the same time, it attempts to resolve some tensions between this theory's content and its epistemological and ontological foundations as stated by Fraser himself. The chapter begins with a discussion on the essential characteristics of the Neo-Kantian point (...) of view. Next, it enumerates the main points of contention between Fraser's and the Neo-Kantian point of view, but also the logical tensions inherent in Fraser's position. This is followed by a critical review of Fraser's "working concept" of truth and of the extended umwelt principle. Some consequences for the hierarchical theory of time are proposed. (shrink)

Über die weitreichende Bedeutung von Briefwechseln für die Formierung der frühneuzeitlichen Gelehrtenrepublik besteht seit längerem ein für geisteswissenschaftliche Verhältnisse ungewöhnlicher Konsens. Die großen Briefwechsel von Grotius, Leibniz oder Haller machen deutlich, dass die Innovationsdynamik der Gelehrtenkultur im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert im Wesentlichen auf Kommunikationsstrukturen zurückzuführen ist, die durch Korrespondenzen und durch die damit verbundenen Netzwerke etabliert wurden. Obwohl der in Halle lehrende Jurist und Philosoph Christian Thomasius (1655-1728) zu den,,schlechthin zentralen Persönlichkeiten" der deutschen und - über deren Rezeption (...) - auch der europäischen Aufklärung gehört, ist eine Edition seiner Korrespondenz zwar verschiedentlich als Desiderat benannt, tatsächlich aber noch nie in Angriff genommen worden. Die hier vorgelegte Ausgabe will diesem Desiderat abhelfen und bietet eine vollständige und kommentierte Edition der aktiven und passiven Korrespondenz von Christian Thomasius. Damit soll bislang unbekanntes Quellenmaterial erschlossen und über die Kommentierung ausgewertet werden, das einerseits der Erforschung des Oeuvre von Christian Thomasius und seinem Umfeld neue Impulse geben wird und andererseits geeignet ist, wichtige Aufschlüsse über die frühaufklärerische Gelehrtenkultur im Übergang vom 17. zum 18. Jahrhundert zu verschaffen. Hierbei ist sowohl an die Veränderungen innerhalb der Kommunikationsstrukturen der Res publica litteraria zu Beginn der Aufklärung als auch - und zwar in erster Linie - an die Rekonstruktion der Genese und der Lösung von einzelnen theoretischen wie praktischen Problemen im Kontext der im ausgehenden 17. Jahrhundert sich vollziehenden sozialen und politischen Veränderungen zu denken. (shrink)

The traditional possible-worlds model of belief describes agents as ‘logically omniscient’ in the sense that they believe all logical consequences of what they believe, including all logical truths. This is widely considered a problem if we want to reason about the epistemic lives of non-ideal agents who—much like ordinary human beings—are logically competent, but not logically omniscient. A popular strategy for avoiding logical omniscience centers around the use of impossible worlds: worlds that, in one way or another, violate the laws (...) of logic. In this paper, we argue that existing impossible-worlds models of belief fail to describe agents who are both logically non-omniscient and logically competent. To model such agents, we argue, we need to ‘dynamize’ the impossible-worlds framework in a way that allows us to capture not only what agents believe, but also what they are able to infer from what they believe. In light of this diagnosis, we go on to develop the formal details of a dynamic impossible-worlds framework, and show that it successfully models agents who are both logically non-omniscient and logically competent. (shrink)

Die Debatte um den wissenschaftlichen Realismus spielt seit einigen Jahrzehnten eine prominente Rolle in der Wissenschaftsphilosophie. In ihrem Mittelpunkt steht die Frage, ob die erfolgreichen Theorien der modernen Naturwissenschaften eine mindestens annäherungsweise wahre Beschreibung einer von uns unabhängigen physischen Wirklichkeit liefern. In der vorliegenden Studie wird der Versuch unternommen, eine Strategie zur Verteidigung des wissenschaftlichen Realismus zu entfalten, die einige der gängigen Einwände zu entkräften vermag. Die entscheidende Rolle kommt dabei der Ausarbeitung eines realistischen Beobachtungsbegriffs für die Naturwissenschaften zu. Des (...) weiteren werden empiristische und konstruktivistische Gegenpositionen zum wissenschaftlichen Realismus kritisch untersucht. (shrink)

I argue that Metaphysics H.6 is not an isolated chapter but the conclusion of an argument begun in H.3. This view will provide further and better arguments for the following view about long-standing interpretative debates: first, Aristotle provides a substantive account of the unity of the composite substance (although he also briefly addresses the unity of the form); second, neither Aristotle’s conception of matter nor his account of form changes between H.1–5 and H.6; and third, H does not rely on (...) and is not completed by book Θ in any significant way. (shrink)

This collective volume gives an exemplary overview over the philosophical reactions William of Ockham has provoked and also serves to better understand not only Ockham s thought in its historical context, but also the philosophy of the 14th century in general.".

The Studies in Religious History and Philosophy cover the entire field of theology, especially the history of Christianity and the philosophy of religion.

Cette étude formule l'hypothèse critique d'une opération de remythologisation par une réactualisation théologico-politique de la tragédie chez Heidegger. Cette opération ne saurait simplement coïncider avec une revalorisation " irrationnelle " du mythe, car elle procède d'abord d'une mise en question, non moins problématique, de la dualité supposée entre muthos et logos pour culminer dans ce qu'une note des années 1950 appellera la " mytho-logie de l'événement ". La réélaboration de la notion de mythe s'accomplit à partir du poème de Hölderlin (...) qui doit préfigurer les dieux de l'" autre commencement " post-judéo-chrétien, selon le projet spéculatif d'une " religion " censée relier le peuple à ses dieux nouveaux via l'être comme événement. L'hypothèse d'une remythologisation théologico-politique doit ainsi permettre d'éclairer non seulement le rôle matriciel de Hölderlin pour la pensée de l'être, mais aussi le surinvestissement illusoire du national-socialisme censé donner lieu au " peuple de Hölderlin ". Pour interroger cette réactualisation théologico-politique du mythe, l'étude se concentre sur les cours que Heidegger consacra à Hölderlin, tout en sollicitant l'intégralité du corpus des années 1933-1945, c'est-à-dire les cours fribourgeois, les traités inédits rédigés dans le sillage des Contributions (Beiträge) et les Cahiers noirs (Schwarze Hefte). (shrink)

This book provides theoretical tools for evaluating the soundness of arguments in the context of legal argumentation. It deals with a number of general argument types and their particular use in legal argumentation. It provides detailed analyses of argument from authority, argument ad hominem, argument from ignorance, slippery slope argument and other general argument types. Each of these argument types can be used to construct arguments that are sound as well as arguments that are unsound. To evaluate an argument correctly (...) one must be able to distinguish the sound instances of a certain argument type from its unsound instances. This book promotes the development of theoretical tools for this task. (shrink)

FastNationalismusdiePatriotismus gesamte Welt ist in etwa 200 Staaten aufgeteilt. Nur für die hohe See und die Antarktis gilt dies nicht. Diese flächendeckende Staatlichkeit wird kaum grundsätzlich in Frage gestellt, wenn man von anarchistischenAnarchie Positionen einmal absieht.

Der Begriff der VerantwortungVerantwortungProbleme und Bedingungen der Zuschreibung von Verantwortung ist ein zentraler Grundbegriff der Angewandten Ethik. Darüber hinaus hat er eine zentrale Bedeutung für eigentlich alle Bereiche der praktischen Philosophie, aber auch für die Handlungstheorie und im Zusammenhang mit dem Problem der Willensfreiheit indirekt für die Philosophie des Geistes. Seine Bedeutung als Grundbegriff der Angewandten Ethik beruht vor allem auf zwei Punkten.

In der als wissenschaftliche Disziplin noch recht jungen WirtschaftsethikWirtschaftsethik geht es um das Verhältnis von Wirtschaft und Moral. Jemand kann – so die Grundannahme – wirtschaftlich handeln, ohne moralisch zu handeln und jemand kann moralisch handeln, ohne wirtschaftlich zu handeln. In den meisten wirtschaftsethischen Ansätzen wird der Moral ein normativer Vorrang vor der Wirtschaft eingeräumt.

In recent years, an interdisciplinary debate on the social and political role of business corporations has evolved. With this special issue, we would like to facilitate a comprehensive discussion of three questions that are especially pertinent in that debate: (1) How is the social and political agency of corporations to be understood? (2) How should the power of corporations be analyzed? (3) Under which conditions would the social and political roles of corporations be legitimate? In this introduction to the special (...) issue, we start with a short outline of the debate. In the next step, we provide an overview of the five contributions. We conclude by summarizing what can be learned from those contributions with respect to the three research questions. (shrink)

Des Herrn Doct. und Prof. Joachim Langens, oder, Der Theologischen Facultaet zu Halle Anmerckungen über des Herrn Hoff-Raths und Professor Christian Wolffens Metaphysicam ... nebst beygefügter Hr. Hoff-R. und Prof. Christian Wolffens gründlicher Antwort -- Herrn D. Joh. Francisci Buddei S.S. Theol. P.P.O. zu Jena Bedencken über die Wolffianische Philosophie, mit Anmerckungen erläutert von Christian Wolffen.

Parallel to the edition volumes of the series Traditio Praesocratica, in which texts of early Greek natural philosophers are presented in a critical edition with translation, the series Studia Praesocratica presents commentaries, monographs and collective volumes on early Greek philosophy and its doxography.

Bislang wurde Walter Benjamins Werk nicht auf Staatlichkeit hin gelesen, weist es doch weder eine Staatstheorie noch deren explizite Kritik auf. Der Staat als genuin politische Kategorie wird zwar kaum direkt, dafur aber uber andere Begriffe adressiert, wie Souveranitat und Gewalt, Produktionsverhaltnisse und Warenform oder soziale Kollektive wie Klasse und 'Volk'. Mit Problemen moderner Staatlichkeit beschaftigte sich Benjamin zeitlebens uber die kulturelle Sphare, und sein politisches Denken motivierte sich wesentlich aus Beobachtungen an Alltagsdingen und Konsumgutern sowie der Auseinandersetzung mit neuen (...) kunstlerischen Verfahren und Technologien. Der Band stellt diesen mittelbaren Zugriff heraus und versucht aufzuzeigen, welche Problemfelder von Benjamins politischem Denken je schon auf die Phanomene Staat und Staatlichkeit verweisen, ohne dass diese direkt angesprochen und ausgefuhrt wurden. Mit Beitragen von: Nils Baratella, Christine Blattler, Astrid Deuber-Mankowsky, Wolfram Ette, Jeanne Marie Gagnebin, Sebastian Jahn, Heinz Dieter Kittsteiner, Esther Leslie, Daniel Loick, Gerard Raulet, Sven Rucker, Gerhard Scheit, Falko Schmieder, Uwe Steiner, Martin Vialon, Christian Voller, Jannis Wagner. (shrink)

A fresh interpretation of Jeremy Bentham, finding that his “radical foolery” embodied a social ethics that was revolutionary for its time. Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832) is best remembered today as the founder of utilitarianism (a philosophy infamously abused by the Victorians) and the conceiver of the Panopticon, the circular prison house in which all prisoners could be seen by an unseen observer—later seized upon by Michel Foucault as the apotheosis of the neoliberal control society. In this volume in the Untimely Meditation (...) series, Christian Welzbacher offers a new interpretation of Bentham, arguing that his “radical foolery” (paraphrasing Goethe's characterization of Bentham) actually embodied a social ethics that was new for its time and demands proper historical contextualization rather than retroactive analysis from the vantage point of late capitalism. Welzbacher provides just such an analysis, offering an account of the two great utilitarian projects that occupied Bentham all his life: the Panopticon and the Auto-Icon. Welzbacher rescues the Panopticon from the misapprehensions of Foucault, Orwell, and Lacan, arguing that Bentham saw the Panopticon as a pedagogical instrument incorporating the tenets of reason; construction and function, plan and influence, architecture and politics are brought into alignment. Bentham extolled the discovery in words that could easily be ascribed to Le Corbusier, Bruno Taut, or any other modernist architect. The Auto-Icon expressed Bentham's theories that the dead should benefit later generations; these theories were effectively sealed when Bentham decided to have his body preserved and put on display. (It can be seen today in a cabinet at University College London.) He also donated his inner organs to science—a practice outlawed at the time—and posthumously stage-managed his own ceremonial autopsy. Welzbacher reveals a Bentham who raised questions that feel familiar and current, invoking topoi that would come to define the modern era and that reverberate to this day. (shrink)