In this paper I study the attribute of God ́s omnipotence in Francisco Suárez. The need, perfection and infinity of the divine essence qualify this attribute crucially; potence belongs to God himself, who –as an infinite being- contains all possible perfection. God contains all by its nature, because He contains every possibility, which is infinite. Thus, undestanding Himself, God understands everything, because He contains all in its essence.

There are good reasons for envisioning a global discourse about God, premised necessarily agreed upon perfections considered to be by definition proper to God, and for thinking through the implications of our understanding of God for morality. Philosophically, it makes sense to hold that claims about omnipotence, omniscience, and other superlative perfections are indeed maximal, and define “God” wherever the terminology of divine persons is taken up. Religiously too, it makes sense to assert that a deity possessed of perfections (...) is not just the deity of one’s own tribe or religion, but also the deity of the whole world, whether acknowledged as such or not. This essay delves into the larger set of rich complexities by three moves. First, I look into a single extended historical case of the extension of the discourse about God beyond the Christian West, the discourse on God proffered by Western Jesuit missionaries in India from the sixteenth to twentieth centuries. Second, I place next to that Jesuit learning the instance of a famed Hindu theologian’s discourse on God, God’s perfections, and their moral implications. Third, I briefly step back and assess the dangers and fruitful prospects inherent in thinking about God and morality in an interreligious context. (shrink)

Numerous examples have been offered that purportedly show that God cannot be omnipotent. I argue that a common response to such examples (i.e., that failure to do the impossible does not indicate a lack of power) does not preserve God’s omnipotence in the face of some of these examples. I consider another possible strategy for preserving God’s omnipotence in the face of these examples and find it wanting.

Wersja przedostatnia, z 2010 roku. Proszę cytować wersję opublikowaną. Pre-final version, from 2010. Please, quote the published version.

The Issues of God’s Omnipotence – Things New and Old -/- The purpose of this paper is to shortly introduce into the philosophical issues of omnipotence in the history of philosophy and philosophically oriented theology, and to show how the articles included in the special issue on God’s power fits with it. There are three main subjects of debate on the power of God (gods). First, how to precisely define omnipotence, in philosophically as well as theologically adequate (...) way, by using correct terms. This task has two sides, semiotic and the corresponding metaphysical one – how should we correctly understand the very nature of God’s power. The second topic, or rather set of topics is to map the scope of omnipotence up and delineate its limits. And the last, third subject concerning omnipotence is to establish the relation of omnipotence to others attributes as well as to the God’s nature as such. All the issues are placed in the context of historical and actual debates. The paper distinguish with some detail different subtopics connected with each main issues. The problem of correct, adequate main term used in definiens of God’s power definition and task to detect paradoxes of omnipotence, to find it’s sources, and remove them, if it is possible are connected with first. It includes the task of distinguishing of different kinds of God’s power. In the second group of topics the paper lists nine different questions concerning the scope and limits of power of God, for example some connected with the ways of acting of God in the world, the relations between power of God and human freedom, God’s omnipotence and evil, with possibility of creating of different world or world with different value status or even with different moral laws. One of this paper task is to show the importance and actuality of issues of omnipotence of God, so the topics of nineteen of papers included in this special issue of “Filo-Sofija” are presented in their proper, historical and actual, context. (shrink)

Libertarians such as J.R. Lucas have abandoned traditional Christian doctrines because they cannot reconcile them with the freedom of the will. Traditional Christian thinkers such as Augustine have repudiated libertarianism because they cannot reconcile it with the dogmas of the Faith. In Free Will and the Christian Faith, W.S. Anglin demonstrates that free will and traditional Christianity are ineed compatible. He examines, and solves, puzzles about the relationships between free will and omnipotence, omniscience, and God's goodness, using the (...) idea of free will to answer the question of why God allows evil, and presenting arguments that link free will to eternal life and to the nature of revelation. Topics covered include the meaning of life, the soul and Lesbegue measure, and strategies for discerning the voice of God. (shrink)

This chapter contains section titled: Maximal Power and the Uniqueness of God What an Omnipotent Agent Can Do The Analysis of Omnipotence Divine Omnibenevolence, Omnipotence, and Freedom.

There are proposed two simple formal descriptions of the notion of God’s omnipotence which are inspired by formalizations of C. Christian and E. Nieznański. Our first proposal is expressed in a modal sentential language with quantifires. The second one is formulated in first order predicate language. In frame of the second aproach we admit using self-referential expressions. In effect we link our considerations with so called paradox of God’s omnipotence and reconstruct some argumentation against the possibility of reference (...) God’s omnipotence to a lack of itself. (shrink)

This article is devoted to consideration of the main principles of the concept elaborated by the famous English scientist and Christian theologian J. Polkinghorne and directed to formation more accurate idea of Creator and creation. The basic ideas of this concept: the necessity to theology a rational approach to comprehension not only of nature and peculiarities of the universe but also of its Creator; an importance of co-ordination of the modern Christian doctrine of creation with the scientific picture of the (...) world; the great significance of natural theology for solving propounded tasks; our universe is a complex, developing by interaction of chance and law, but at the same time well-ordered and interrelated structure; human being is a part of this structure; the act of creation is a continuing process; God express Himself through His creation; Creator is simultaneously immanent and transcendent to His creation; Creator’s actions are dependent only on His free will; Creator is not impersonal, but rational, loving and suffering; Creator presented universe with an ability to self-development and human being with free will; realization of this self-development is accompanied by unpredictable consequences which are unknown not only for man, but for Creator also; God only of His own free will realized a self-limitation of His omnipotence because He loves human beings; one of our main tasks is to learn how to use our superior value - our freedom. (shrink)

The reality and severity of the COVID-19 pandemic question God’s omnibenevolence and omnipotence. Two questions that stare us in the face are a) is God omnibenevolent given the current reality? b) is God omnipotent? This paper addresses these questions from the African place using the African theory of duality and its underlying logic, Ezumezu. We argue that the reality of the COVID-19 pandemic and its adverse effects (such as death, hardship and social isolation) do not negate God’s benevolence and (...) powerfulness. We assert that while the current reality cannot sustain a defence of the traditional theistic qualities of omnipotence and omnibenevolence, the notions of a powerful and benevolent God are not necessarily undermined by the reality of Covid-19. In the light of the African theory of duality and Ezumezu logic, we contend that the COVID-19 pandemic brings out the argument that inherent in God’s benevolence is wickedness and inherent in God’s powerfulness is weakness. (shrink)

Normally, activity is regarded as discernible, but according to relativity theory whatever is discernible lies in the past of the discernible. Only the present subjective immediacy is properly active. Subjectivity is properly understood as present becoming; objectivity as past being. I propose that we extend the domain of subjective immediacy to include the future as well as the present. This future universal activity is pluralized in the present in terms of the many actualities coming into being. Subjectivity is the individualization (...) of becoming, and so can apply to the future as a whole as well as to particular present subjects. The future as divine grows out of Whitehead's revisions of traditional notions of omnipotence and omniscience. But he separates creativity from the God of Western theism. This separation can be overcome if God is future creativity individualized in its own realm, which is the source of the creativity within each of us. (shrink)

This paper deals with Swinburne’s project of developing a theodicy. We criticise this project from both an external and an internal perspective. Regarding the first strategy, the target of our critique is Swinburne’s construal of God’s attributes—especially omniscience—and the related issue of incorrigible foreknowledge. We argue that Swinburne has to clarify and improve his position to deal with the fideist or the atheist. Regarding the second strategy, we focus on Swinburne’s notion of God’s right. In this context, the parent-child-analogy strikes (...) us as particularly problematic. Hence, we argue that Swinburne should either rethink it or drop it altogether. (shrink)

This paper arises from a symposium on philosophical reconstructions of religious doctrines within the 16th conference of the Australasian Association for the Study of Religions held in the Armidale, N.S.W., July, 1993. The convenor, Peter Forrest, read a paper on ‘Making sense of karma and original sin’, and I elected to discuss the doctrine of karma in the context of the problem of evil. Forrest's paper appeared in the previous issue ofSophia and I shall be making reference to this paper (...) as Forrest, 1993. On process theory of karman and the issue of personal identity, see also Peter Forrest, ‘Reincarnation without survival of memory or character’,Philosophy East and West 28, No. 1, January 1978, pp. 91–97, I would also take this opportunity to record special thanks to Dr Bruce Langtry and Mr Patrick Hutchings for their invaluable comments on an earlier draft. (shrink)

Whitehead’s position regarding God’s power is rather unique in the philosophical and theological landscape. Whitehead rejects divine omnipotence (unlike Aquinas), yet he claims (unlike Hans Jonas) that God’s persuasive power is required for everything to exist and occur. This intriguing position is the subject of this article. The article starts with an exploration of Aquinas’s reasoning toward God’s omnipotence. This will be followed by a close examination of Whitehead's own position, starting with an introduction to his philosophy of (...) organism and its two-sided concept of God. Thereupon, an analysis of Whitehead’s idiosyncratic view on God’s agency will show that, according to this conception, God and the world depend upon each other, and that God’s agency is a noncoercive but persuasive power. The difference between coercion and persuasion will be explained as well as the reason why God, according to Whitehead’s conception, cannot possibly coerce. Finally, a discussion of the issue of divine almightiness will allow for a reinterpretation of divine almightiness from a Whiteheadian perspective, which will show how, despite Whitehead’s rejection of God’s omnipotence, his concept retains essential elements of God as pantokrator (and thus markedly differs from Hans Jonas's concept). (shrink)

A science of metaphysics adhering to Immanuel Kant's critical demands as set forth in his "Critique of Pure Reason", and "Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysic...." The work includes an Appendix that quotes Kant's most relevant remarks in this regard, along with his criterion for objective validity that, given the technical jargon, can be next to impossible to interpret even for those most familiar with Kant. The Appendix allows Kant to interpret himself, the point being that many secondary works enter into (...) conflict with Kant. This can be seen most notably with respect to the somewhat understandable notion that Kant was opposed to speculative metaphysics; but Kant's criterion for objective validity undermines this closed-to-speculative-metaphysics interpretation. As a science in the Kantian sense this work (in this latest edition there is a 2/3 page abstract diagram of the science that makes it more conceptually clear) offers an opportunity for those inclined to shy away from speculative metaphysics to reexamine their interpretations. The objectives are as Kant mentions in the introduction to his CPR: God, Freedom, and Immortality; and that these problems can be dealt with rationally can be seen in this work; and without fear of violating Kant's justifiable strictures, the main one being that where anything offered in the name of pure reason is concerned, it must be such that it helps us to make sense of our phenomenal world. And as to Kant's prerequisite: "How are synthetic cognitions, a priori possible?" I refer to my essay "Beyond Kant and Hegel ..." in "The Review of Metaphysics", March 2013. The premise advanced in the essay is the same as in this booklet. This first part forms the groundwork for the second part, "Rational Theism, Part Two: The Problem of Evil, and God's Omnibenevolence (A Biblical Exegesis)," which notwithstanding its title, is philosophically grounded as a dissertation that can stand on its own. This secondary work is not secondary in importance, but primary in that it provides a rational answer to the problem of evil; and that answer can be found in the pages of the Bible. It is an answer that has escaped the notice of theologians and apologists and philosophers who have sought for an answer to the problem outside the sacred texts wherein the sole answer to the problem can be found, at least for anyone who cares to examine the relevant texts with care and attention. In this short work there are over five dozen scriptures taken into account that support the answer given; and the answer is both very clear, and rational. (shrink)

This work in metaphysics adheres to the critical demands of Immanuel Kant for what Kant would call a science of metaphysics, in that it consits strictly of a priori principles that, while from pure reason, can help make sense of our phenomenal world (Kant's criterion for objective validity). The work has an Appendix quoting Kant's most relevant remarks with regard to a science, and offers parallel quotes from David Hume's "Treatise of Human Nature". The work advances the explanation of a (...) causal process that accounts for the origination of the universals: space, time, mass (or substance), and mind (or consciousness), and it necessitates the existence of God as Absolute Being and Absolute Mind. Hegel's 'Science of Logic' is quoted wherein Hegel makes an analogous claim. The causal process is defined with both a definite beginning and a definite end and agreement can be found with the statement found in the book of Revelation, final chapter: "I am the Alpha and the Omega, the first and the last, the beginning and the end." The statement suggests a movement that is not in conflict with the science, and seems to reflect Hegel's own thoughts. The science does not conflict with, but it further finds agreement with the science of big bang cosmology, but it goes further in necessitating a 'singularity' at the beginning of time. The causal process defined has a Formative Phase and a Creative Phase, with the former preceding the big bang and the latter following after the big bang. (shrink)

This is a system of pure speculative reason in answer to the challenge issued by Immanuel Kant, in his "Critique of Pure Reason," with regard to metaphysics; the challenge being clearly mentioned in the Appendix to his "Prolegomena..." wherein he asks his Reviewer to take any one of his four sets of contradictory propositions, and offer an a priori judgment/proposition of his own that would overturn the antinomy, and thus, allow room for the possibility of raising metaphysics to the level (...) of a science, meaning a synthesis of judgments, from pure reason, self-evidently a priori, therefore, necessary; and that as a synthesis of pure understanding, would relate to and help us make sense of reality, that is, the world of our experience. (shrink)

In this paper, I explore the traditional religious account of what can make a life meaningful, namely, the view that one's life acquires significance insofar as one fulfils a purpose God has assigned. Call this view ‘purpose theory’. In the literature, there are objections purporting to show that purpose theory entails the logical absurdities that God is not moral, omnipotent, or eternal. I show that there are versions of purpose theory which are not vulnerable to these reductio arguments. However, I (...) then contend that there is a problem facing purpose theory which no version can avoid. I argue that the best reason for holding a God-centred theory of life's meaning logically precludes the possibility of purpose theory being the correct version of it. More specifically, I argue that if a relationship with God is necessary for one's life to acquire meaning, this must be because God would have properties such as atemporality and simplicity, perfections which are incompatible with purposiveness. I conclude that religious thinkers have good reason to develop other theories of the way God could confer meaning on our lives. (shrink)

The problem of God's action in the world is at the heart of debates today on the relationship between science and religion. By analysing the issue through the lens of analytic philosophy, Marek Slomka reveals how philosophy can successfully bridge science and theology to bring greater clarity to divine action. This book identifies essential aspects from various branches of theism, starting with traditional Thomistic approaches, through to their modified forms such as Molinism and contemporary varieties such as free-will theism (...) and probabilistic theism. Analysing crucial elements of God's nature including omnipotence, omniscience, his relation to time and the tension between immanence and transcendence, Slomka reveals the difficulties in proposing a single conception of God through one theistic tradition. Instead of simplistically juxtaposing particular theistic trends, he highlights the value of pluralistic insights that also draw on important scientific theories, including Darwin's evolution, quantum mechanics and cosmology. By taking a renewed stance on theism that takes into account modern scientific knowledge, this book argues for a new presentation of the problem of God's action in the world and justifies the need for further discussion on contemporary manifestations of internal and external criticism of theism. (shrink)

Traditional African societies tend to favor a theocentric and anthropocentric conception of the universe, with God at the top of the hierarchy of being, in which the human sphere is a major center of influence and meaning. God is sometimes conceived in the traditional theistic sense and attributed with superlative qualities of omnipotence, omniscience, and benevolence. On the other hand, a more critical study of oral sources of African traditional religious thought constrains the traditional theistic interpretation and presents the (...) idea of a limited God. This chapter will provide an overview of the issues and questions that have driven debates in African philosophy of religion. Specifically, this chapter will critically engage the question of the existence of God and the problem of evil from the perspective of African philosophical thought. This chapter will highlight the strengths and weaknesses of the approaches to the problem of evil adopted by African philosophers. In the process of reconciling the transcendental and immanent conceptions of God in African religious thought, this chapter will provide an outline of an African theodicy as a basis for further explorations of African theodicies formulated beyond the limit of traditional African thought. (shrink)

In God, Chance and Purpose, statistician David Bartholomew chides Christians who cling to, in his words, a “naive orthodoxy.” Such Christians view God as exhibiting a set of perfections (especially omniscience and omnipotence) and as satisfying a set of propositions (a creed). Such a view is, according to Bartholomew, unworthy of God. In place of a “naive orthodoxy,” he therefore proposes a “critical orthodoxy.” At the center of his “critical orthodoxy” is the skeptical claim that “all knowledge is uncertain, (...) in varying degrees” (p. 232). Question: To what degree is that claim uncertain? Bartholomew’s claim does not pass its own test. (shrink)

A general conceptualization of God’s omnipotence is that he possesses illimitable superior power over and above every other thing. Consequently, God is thought of being able to bring about “all” things. Such belief includes that as all-powerful, he does not need to be protected or defended by his creatures, insofar as he “cannot” be vulnerable to the threats or attacks of any creature, except possibly self-inflicted attacks, which would be selfcontradictory. Human power, on the other hand, assumes the belief (...) that even though God is absolutely omnipotent, believers in him have the duty to either carry out what they believe is his commandment or each one acts as he should act. This being so, the human claim to omnipotence absolutizes man/woman as being able, with impunity, in fact, with stupendous promise of reward, by acting as the “arm” or “brain” of God. The logical conclusion of such reasoning is to deny either claim of omnipotence by God or man. But how plausible would such a conclusion be to real-life situation? (shrink)

The horrendous deeds objection to metaethical divine command theory (MDCT) says that since God can command anything whatsoever, even things that are horrendous, MDCT seems to imply that God can make any action, no matter how repugnant, morally obligatory. Defenders of MDCT frequently claim, by way of response, that since God is essentially omnibenevolent, it is impossible that he commands us to do horrendous things. I have recently argued that it is irrelevant that God cannot issue horrible commands. The argument (...) runs as follows: On MDCT, God has moral grounding power — the power to make an action morally obligatory by commanding that we do it. Given that omnipotence is possession of maximal power, every omnipotent being has this power. In some possible world, there exists a non-benevolent omnipotent being who issues horrible commands. Therefore, on MDCT, there is a possible world in which some horrendous action is morally obligatory. Matthew Flannagan has responded to this argument on behalf of the divine command theorist. Flannagan argues that since, on MDCT, moral obligations are constituted by God’s commands, and no other being can perform God’s actions, no other being can possess moral grounding power. In this paper, I criticize Flannagan’s argument. His argument assumes that when some phenomenon is constituted by the actions of an agent, no other agent’s actions can constitute this phenomenon. I argue that this assumption is false. (shrink)

God, by definition, is all-powerful, all-good, all-wise, and all-knowing. Therein lies a problem for the theist, of course, for every one of these attributes has been the subject of fierce debate. In this paper I want to return to the debate by introducing a new problem for the idea that anyone could have the kind of perfect knowledge God is supposed to have. What distinguishes my problem from others is that the sort of knowledge it focuses on is self-knowledge, hence (...) knowledge of a particularly intimate kind. My claim is that God cannot have infallible knowledge of at least some of his own perfections, in particular his being all-wise or ideally rational. Such ignorance is not only inconsistent with the usual conception of God's omniscience, given that whatever knowledge God possesses is traditionally thought to be be a priori and infallible, but, more importantly, is inconsistent with the fundamental idea that God at least knows infallibly or incorrigibly that he has what it takes to be God: qualities such as omnibenevolence, omnipotence, and supreme wisdom. In short, my claim is that God must have a deep “blindspot” about his own nature, something which is inconsistent with a traditional picture of that nature. (shrink)

One prominent response, based on the work of Robert Adams, Edward Wierenga, and others, to the Euthyphro objection to the divine command theory is to point out that God is essentially omnibenevolent. The commands of an essentially loving being will not be arbitrary since they are grounded in his nature, nor is it possible for a loving God to issue horrendous commands such as the gratuitous torture of infants. This paper argues that this response is inadequate. The divine command theory (...) attributes to God the power to make an action morally obligatory. Given the reasonable assumption that any omnipotent being has the same powers as God, contemplating the commands of a malevolent deity is enough to cast doubt on the claim that any being, loving or otherwise, has the power to make an action morally obligatory just by commanding it. (shrink)

Can God change the past? The standard Aquinas line answers this question negatively: God cannot change the past since such an act implies a contradiction; thus is not within the purview of God's omnipotence. While the Aquinas line is well-known, there are other, non-standard solutions to this question. In this paper, I look into such answers. In particular, I explore those answers that employ the resources of gappy and glutty logics. I show how these solutions are motivated and (...) how each offers an alternative conception of what it is for God to be omnipotent. Finally, I consider and reply to potential issues that may be raised against these non-standard answers. (shrink)

This book stands in the tradition of philosophers who advance the rationality of faith. Yet, this book goes beyond their accounts, for it not only defends the view that faith can be termed rational, but it also considers the different senses in which faith can be termed rational. While this book advances the idea that faith as a general category can be termed rational, it does not investigate in a detailed way whether there are arguments for the rationality of particular (...) faiths which would go beyond the arguments for the rationality of faith as a general category. Besides discussing whether betting on God in Pascal’s wager and believing in miracles are forms of the rationality of faith, I will provide unique solutions to the problem of evil and the paradoxes of omnipotence and omniscience. (publisher). (shrink)

Whether God has a knowledge is a controversial issue both philosophy and theology. Does God have a knowledge? If He has, does He know the particulars? When we assume that God knows particulars, is there any change in God’s essence? In the theistic tradition, it is accepted that God is wholly perfect, omniscience, omnipotent and wholly good. Therefore, it is not possible to say that there is a change in God. Because changing is a kind of imperfection. On God’s knowledge, (...) another controversial issue is whether God knows particulars or not. Most of theist thinkers argued that God is wholly perfect; because of perfectness, He must have perfect attributes. Knowing and goodness are a kind of perfect attributes. Ignoring and evil are a kind of imperfectness. If God is perfect being, He should have the perfect attributes and must know the particulars. For me in this subject, there are some similarities between al-Ghazālī and Maimonides. In this study I took into consideration the idea of al-Ghazālī and Maimonides on this subject. Based on Griffel and Stroumsa’s argument, I tried to show similarity between al-Ghazālī and Maimonides on God’s knowledge. Summary: Whether God has a knowledge is a controversial issue both philosophy and theology. Does God have a knowledge? If He has, does He know the particulars? When we assume that God knows particulars, is there any change in God’s essence? In this study I took into consideration the idea of al-Ghazālī and Maimonides on this subject. Based on Griffel’s and Stroumsa’s arguments, I tried to show similarity between al-Ghazālī and Maimonides on God’s knowledge.In the theistic tradition, it is accepted that God is wholly perfect, omniscience, omnipotent and wholly good. Therefore, it is not possible to say that there is a change in God because changing is a kind of imperfection. On God’s knowledge, another controversial issue is whether God knows particulars or not. Most of theist thinkers argued that God is wholly perfect; because of perfectness, He must have perfect attributes. Knowing and goodness are a kind of perfect attributes. Ignoring and evil are kinds of imperfectness. If God is perfect being, He should have the perfect attributes and must know the particulars. Based on God’s immutability, some thinkers argued that God does not knows particulars. Particulars occurs due to the matter. Matter and its functions are continually changing. Therefore, to know the particulars requires changing in God’s essence. If God is the most perfect being, it is impossible that He is subject to affection. Thus, God does not know the particulars. Other thinkers, like Avicenna, argued that God knows the particulars as a universal way. For example, God knows only humanity and He cannot know Zayd as a particular person. al-Ghazālī criticizes Avicenna’s idea in Tahafut al-Falasifa (The Incoherence of the Philosophers) and argues that God is a perfect being and He should know particulars as a particulars. For al-Ghazālī, God should know everything, and His knowledge is different from our knowledge. In order to explain this matter, he says in Ninety-Nine Names of God;“But this can be understood only through an example. Perhaps you have seen the clock which informs one of the hour of worship. If you have not seen it, then, generally speaking, (it is constructed in this manner). There must be a mechanism in the form of a cylinder which contains a known amount of water. There must also be another hollow mechanism which is placed within the cylinder (but) above the water, and a string which has one of its ends tied to this hollow mechanism. The other end is tied to the part of a small container which is placed above the hollow cylinder. In (this container) there is a ball. Under the ball there is another bowl (placed) in such a manner that if the ball drops will fall into the bowl, and its jingle will be heard. Then the bottom of the cylindrical mechanism must be pierced to a determined extent so that the water can escape through it little by little…. All of this can be determined by a determination of the extent of cause which neither increases nor decreases. It is possible to make the falling of the ball into the bowl a cause of another action and this other action a cause of a third action, and to continue this process indefinitely so that from it are generated remarkable and predetermined movements (actions) of circumscribed extent. The first cause was the falling of the water in a determined quantity…. All of that happens in a determined quantity and to a determined extent which causes the determination of all of it by (adding at this point) the determination of the first movement which is the movement of the water. When you understand that these mechanisms are the principles from which movements must result, and that the movement must be determined if the result is to be regulated, then certainly that which has been determined must proceed from them….Even as the movement of the mechanism, the string, and the ball are not external to the will of the inventor of the mechanism -on the contrary, that is what He willed when He invented the mechanism- so also all the events which occur in the world, both the evil and the good and the beneficial and harmful, are not external to the will of God Most High. Rather (all of) that is the intention of God Most High for the sake of which He has planned its causes.” For Maimonides, as in al-Ghazālī, God is a perfect being and He must have the perfect attributes. Because of knowing is a perfect attribute, He should know everything, and His knowledge is different from human knowledge. In order to explain the difference between God’s knowledge and human knowledge Maimonides gives a parable in The Guide of the Perplexed. “Suppose a thing is produced in accordance with the knowledge of the producer, the producer was then guided by his knowledge in the act of producing the thing. Other people, however, who examine this work and acquire a knowledge of the whole of it, depend for that knowledge on the work itself. An artisan makes a box in which weights move with the running of the water, and thus indicate how many hours have passed of the day and of the night. The whole quantity of the water that is to run out, the different ways in which it runs, every thread that is drawn, and every little ball that descends -all this is fully perceived by him who makes the clock; and his knowledge is not the result of observing the movements as they are actually going on; but, on the contrary, the movements are produced in accordance with his knowledge. But another person who looks at that instrument will receive fresh knowledge at every movement he perceives; the longer he looks on, the more knowledge does he acquire; he will gradually increase his knowledge till he fully understands the machinery…Our knowledge is acquired and increased in proportion to the things known by us. This is not the case with God. His knowledge of things is not derived from the things themselves; if this were the case, there would be change and plurality in His knowledge…” As can be seen from above, when Maimonides is explaining the difference of God’s and human knowledge, he uses the same example what al-Ghazālī used. Even though Maimonides does not mention al-Ghazālī’s name in his works, it could be seen that there are a lot of similarities between al-Ghazālī’s and Maimonides’s ideas. Based on Griffel and Stroumsa’s argument, in this paper, I tried to show that there is a similarity between al-Ghazālī’s and Maimonides’s ideas on God’s knowledge. In my opinion, therefore, in the formation of Maimonides’s thought, as he thanks to Muslim philosophers like al-Farābī, Avicenna and Averroes, he also thanks to al-Ghazālī. (shrink)

According to Eric Funkhouser, omnipotence and necessary moral perfection (what Funkhouser calls "impeccability") are not compatible. Funkhouser gives two arguments for this claim. In this paper, I argue that neither of Funkhouser's arguments is sound. The traditional theist can reasonably claim that, contra Funkhouser, (i) there is no possible being who possesses all of God's attributes sans impeccability, and (ii) the fact that there are things that God cannot do does not entail that God lacks omnipotence. Armed (...) with (i) and (ii), the theist has all that is needed to refute Funkhouser's arguments. (shrink)

-/- This article analyzes Richard Swinburne’s arguments in the problem of evil and raises new criticism and understanding regarding genocides, especially the Holocaust. Genocides are the greatest challenge for theodicies and free-will defenses, yet they are rarely addressed in the scholarship. My empirical approach questions why a loving omnipotent God permits genocides of evil. Swinburne argues that evils are necessary for good free acts, such as the creation of moral virtues. However, future goods do not justify the millions of horrific (...) and unnecessary deaths and suffering in genocides. Swinburne’s theory that free will is so valuable that evil acts must be permitted is also very weak. Moreover, his position that God lacks foreknowledge of our free actions limits divine omniscience. Thus, Swinburne's theodicy cannot resolve the Problem of Evil and fails to justify or defend the omnipotent God. Ultimately, he relies on faith, not his arguments. (shrink)

With very few exceptions philosophers believe that no account of the doctrine of divine omnipotence is adequate if it entails that God can do what is logically impossible. Descartes is credited with believing otherwise. In his article ‘Descartes on the Creation of the Eternal Truths’ Harry Frankfurt attributes to Descartes the belief that God is ‘a being for whom the logically impossible is possible’. In addition, Frankfurt claims that because of this belief Descartes’ account of God's omnipotence (...) is open to the charge of being incoherent. I will argue that it is wrong to attribute this belief to Descartes and that if his account of divine omnipotence is incoherent, it is incoherent for reasons other than that it entails the possibility of what is logically impossible. (shrink)

With very few exceptions philosophers believe that no account of the doctrine of divine omnipotence is adequate if it entails that God can do what is logically impossible. Descartes is credited with believing otherwise. In his article ‘Descartes on the Creation of the Eternal Truths’ Harry Frankfurt attributes to Descartes the belief that God is ‘a being for whom the logically impossible is possible’. In addition, Frankfurt claims that because of this belief Descartes’ account of God's omnipotence (...) is open to the charge of being incoherent. I will argue that it is wrong to attribute this belief to Descartes and that if his account of divine omnipotence is incoherent, it is incoherent for reasons other than that it entails the possibility of what is logically impossible. (shrink)

In “God of the gaps: A neglected reply to God’s stone problem,” Jc Beall and A. J. Cotnoir offer a gappy solution to the paradox of the stone – a paradox that involves God’s omnipotence. This paper shows that their solution extends to a puzzle concerning God’s impeccability or inability to sin. This latter puzzle not only involves God’s omnipotence but also His omnibenevolence.

Theists claim that God can make a causal difference in the world. That is, theists believe that God is causally efficacious, has power. Discussion of divine power has centered on understanding better the metaphysics of creation and sustenance, special intervention, governance, and providing an account of omnipotence consistent with other divine attributes, such as omnibenevolence. But little discussion has centered on what, deep down ontologically, God’s power is. I show that a number of prominent accounts of power fail to (...) model what divine power could be, and then develop an account based on teleological and primitivist accounts of power. (shrink)

This paper explores the contradiction of positing the existence of a God who is at once omnipotent and not omnipotent in respect of his power that arises in the thought of two African philosophers of religion, John A.I. Bewaji and Ademola Kazeem Fayemi who accept the limitation thesis that projects a limited God and deny the legitimacy of the transcendence view in Yoruba and, by extension, African thought. I demonstrate in this paper that the contradiction arises from the fact that (...) while Bewaji and Fayemi explicitly deny the legitimacy of the transcendence view in Yoruba and, by extension, African thought, they implicitly accept the view and unwittingly and illegitimately attempt to reconcile the conflicting views through the analysis of the notions of God’s creatorship, co-creatorship, and controllership. I conclude by recommending that instead of attempting to reconcile the antinomy of God’s existence in African philosophy of religion, African philosophers should acknowledge the legitimacy of the two conflicting theses constituting the antinomy and, accordingly, sustain logical consistency by strictly thinking within either the framework of limitedness or the framework of transcendence. (shrink)

Prima facie, there is an incompatibility between God’s alleged omnipotence and impeccability. I argue that this incompat- ibility is more than prima facie. Attempts to avoid this appearance of incompatibility by allowing that there are commonplace states of affairs that an omnipotent being cannot bring about are unsuc- cessful. Instead, we should accept that God is not omnipotent. This is acceptable since it is a mistake to hold that omnipotence is a perfection. God’s moral perfection should be privileged (...) over God’s potency properties—and the same is true of human beings as well. (shrink)

Could God command us to hate him? Here I offer two arguments that He cannot. I also argue that this restriction on God’s power is consistent with a strong doctrine of omnipotence according to which God can do anything broadly logical possible.

Maurice Merleau-Ponty claims that we as body-subjects have an immediate sensational understanding of the world. A body that perceives and experience the world before any thought and word can render it. The words we use describing sensations are interpretations of sense-experiences, and will never render the total bodily understanding of the world. This article gives a brief insight of what an understanding of Merleau-Ponty’s body-subject implies for the researcher in body-phenomenological studies of toddlers.

This paper explores the contradiction of positing the existence of a God who is at once omnipotent and not omnipotent in respect of his power that arises in the thought of two African philosophers of religion, John A.I. Bewaji and Ademola Kazeem Fayemi who accept the limitation thesis that projects a limited God and deny the legitimacy of the transcendence view in Yoruba and, by extension, African thought. I demonstrate in this paper that the contradiction arises from the fact that (...) while Bewaji and Fayemi explicitly deny the legitimacy of the transcendence view in Yoruba and, by extension, African thought, they implicitly accept the view and unwittingly and illegitimately attempt to reconcile the conflicting views through the analysis of the notions of God’s creatorship, co-creatorship, and controllership. I conclude by recommending that instead of attempting to reconcile the antinomy of God’s existence in African philosophy of religion, African philosophers should acknowledge the legitimacy of the two conflicting theses constituting the antinomy and, accordingly, sustain logical consistency by strictly thinking within either the framework of limitedness or the framework of transcendence. (shrink)

Following an Open conception of Divine Foreknowledge, that holds that man is endowed with genuine freedom and so the future is not definitely determined, it will be claimed that human freedom does not limit the divine power, but rather enhances it and presents us with a barrier against arbitrary use of that power. This reading will be implemented to reconcile a well-known quarrel between two important interpreters of Duns Scotus, Allan B. Wolter and Thomas Williams, each of whom supports a (...) different interpretation of the way God acts according to right reason. (shrink)