Margaret Cavendish was a philosopher, poet, scientist, novelist, and playwright of the seventeenth century. Her work is important for a number of reasons. It presents an early and compelling version of the naturalism that is found in current-day philosophy; it offers important insights that bear on recent discussions of the nature and characteristics of intelligence and the question of whether or not the bodies that surround us are intelligent or have an intelligent cause; it anticipates some of the central views (...) and arguments that are more commonly associated with figures like Thomas Hobbes and David Hume. This is the first full account of Cavendish’s philosophy and covers the whole span of her work. David Cunning begins with an overview of Cavendish’s life and work before assessing her contribution to a wide range of philosophical subjects, including her arguments concerning materialism, experimentation, the existence of God, social and political philosophy and free will and compatibilism. Setting Cavendish in both historical and philosophical context, he argues that like Spinoza she builds on central tenets of Descartes’ philosophy and develops them in a direction that Descartes himself would avoid. She defends a plenum metaphysics according to which all individuals are causally interdependent, and according to which the physical universe is a larger individual that constitutes all of reality. Cavendish is essential reading for students of seventeenth-century philosophy, early modern philosophy and seventeenth-century literature. (shrink)

This chapter examines the epistemologies of Margaret Cavendish, Mary Astell, and Mary Shepherd. Cavendish argues that minds come to have knowledge via two routes: sensory perception and reason. For Cavendish, these two faculties of knowledge differ not in kind but in degree: they work to produce ideas in the same way, but ideas that come from reason are less trustworthy than those from the senses. While Astell also acknowledges a distinction between sense perception and reason as faculties (...) of cognition, she claims that ideas that come from the senses cannot properly be called knowledge. In contrast, reason traffics in ideas that are wholly non-sensory and allow for a level of certainty that counts as knowledge in the strict sense. Shepherd locates a position that lies in between that of Cavendish and Astell. Like Astell, Shepherd argues that we have limited knowledge from sense perception, and we have absolutely certain knowledge of some things through a non-sensory faculty of reason – for example, that changes in a body cannot occur without a cause, and that things cannot be annihilated or come from nothing. However, for Shepherd, the scope of human knowledge is quite limited. (shrink)

In his June 1643 letter to Princess Elizabeth, Descartes makes a claim that is a bit surprising given the hyper-intellectualism of the Meditations and other texts. He says that philosophy is something that we should do only rarely. Here I show how Descartes’ recommendation falls out of other components of his system—in particular his stoicism and his views on embodiment. A consequence of my reading is that to an important degree the reasoning of the Fourth Meditation is the imprecise reasoning (...) of a not-yet-Cartesian meditator. (shrink)

Margaret Cavendish was a philosopher, poet, scientist, novelist, and playwright of the seventeenth century. Her work is important for a number of reasons. It presents an early and compelling version of the naturalism that is found in current-day philosophy; it offers important insights that bear on recent discussions of the nature and characteristics of intelligence and the question of whether or not the bodies that surround us are intelligent or have an intelligent cause; it anticipates some of the central views (...) and arguments that are more commonly associated with figures like Thomas Hobbes and David Hume. This is the first full account of Cavendish’s philosophy and covers the whole span of her work. David Cunning begins with an overview of Cavendish’s life and work before assessing her contribution to a wide range of philosophical subjects, including her arguments concerning materialism, experimentation, the existence of God, social and political philosophy and free will and compatibilism. Setting Cavendish in both historical and philosophical context, he argues that like Spinoza she builds on central tenets of Descartes’ philosophy and develops them in a direction that Descartes himself would avoid. She defends a plenum metaphysics according to which all individuals are causally interdependent, and according to which the physical universe is a larger individual that constitutes all of reality. Cavendish is essential reading for students of seventeenth-century philosophy, early modern philosophy and seventeenth-century literature. (shrink)

In his June 1643 letter to Princess Elizabeth, Descartes makes a claim that is a bit surprising given the hyper-intellectualism of the Meditations and other texts. He says that philosophy is something that we should do only rarely. Here I show how Descartes’ recommendation falls out of other components of his system—in particular his stoicism and his views on embodiment. A consequence of my reading is that to an important degree the reasoning of the Fourth Meditation is the imprecise reasoning (...) of a not-yet-Cartesian meditator. (shrink)

In this book, the author is attempting to make sense, as a philosopher, of the ideas of rationality put forward by economists, sociologists, and political theorists. The book intervenes in intense current debates within and among several disciplines. Its concern is with the true nature of social actors and the proper character of social science. Its arguments are the more challenging for being presented in simple, incisive, and lucid prose.

This book is a philosophers' attempt to bring together ideas put forward by economists, sociologists and political theorists. The author begins by exploring the economist's assumption that action is rational if it helps to achieve the agent's goals as efficiently as possible. The assumption is explored with the aid of rational-choice theory and game-theory, but it is rejected in the end for failing to account for the elements of trust and morality which rational social life requires. A discussion of 'Rational (...) Expectations' and of 'maximising' and 'satisficing' leads to a portrait of social actors as rational role-players. Rationality is, finally, the expression of the self in a social world. The book intervenes in intense current debates within and among several disciplines. Its concern is with the true nature of social actors and the proper character of social science. Its arguments are the more challenging for being presented in a simple, incisive and lucid prose. It will be of particular interest to philosophers, social theorists and social scientists interested in the philosophical aspects of their discipline. (shrink)

The central argument of this article is that there is a remarkable conceptual parallel between Hegel’s famous notion of the “cunning of Reason” and the philosophically profound concept of Chi in Igbo metaphysics. By way of establishing this parallel, the article advances the following subsidiary but complementary points: Chi is also “cunning” in its dynamics; both principles (i.e. Chi and Reason/Spirit) are non-deterministic because they try to maintain a dialectic balance between destiny and individual responsibility; both (...) possess divine attributes; and community serves as an invaluable medium of operation for both. The scholarly significance of the article lies in its attempt not only to systematise the Igbo thought on Chi by eliminating the vestiges of discredited “ethno-philosophy”, but also to open up a constructive dialogue between Hegel and elements of African philosophy, using Igbo metaphysics as a placeholder. This is against the backdrop of certain discontents generated by Hegel’s famous uncomplimentary and racist remarks on Africa. Seen in this light, the article may well be an exercise in “rapprochement”. (shrink)

Throughout the twelve chapters of this book, Hollis uses ideas from economics, sociology, political theory, and philosophy to reach his central goal: decoding the meaning of rational human action. Hollis begins the development of his argument by reviewing the standard microeconomic analysis of rational choice by a single individual such as Adam. Since action is the result of desire plus belief, rational action involves ordered desires, true beliefs, correct deliberation, and the maximization of net utility. Hollis questions the assumption that (...) desire, rather than belief, is the primary motivator of action. He challenges whether a theory of merely efficient choice which disregards ends can be considered a theory of rational choice. (shrink)

This paper is concerned with two theories of history—those of Hegel and of Marx. Its primary aim is to clarify. The writings of Hegel are notoriously obscure, and those of Marx have been variously interpreted, so there is room for a paper which tries to ensure that when the theories of history propounded by Marx and Hegel are criticized, what are criticized are views which they actually held. It is no part of this paper's thesis that, in his theory of (...) history, Marx consciously borrowed from Hegel. But it will be argued that there is more of Hegel in Marx than is sometimes supposed, and that if this fact is ignored one seriously distorts Marx. (shrink)

After 1807, Hegel contrasts microhistorical chaos with macrohistorical order, the "cunning of reason." Agents interact blindly, but reason integrates all interactions, and this is the development and expression of rationality. No particular state dictates or precludes any subsequent outcomes; to allow the cunning of reason is to deny that causal relations are decisive for historical events. Ends are extraneous to objects, which suffer violence in achieving them. Consequently historical progress must also be regarded as extraneous (...) to the objective social world, and this world must be assumed to suffer violence as progress is achieved. If anyone was fooled by the "cunning of reason," it was Hegel. (shrink)

This article poses the question of the social and intellectual conditions for genuine social scientific internationalism, through an analysis of the worldwide spread of a new global vulgate resulting from the false and uncontrolled universalization of the folk concepts and preoccupations of American society and academe. The terms, themes and tropes of this new planetary doxa - `multiculturalism', `globalization', `liberals versus communitarians', `underclass', racial `minority' and identity, etc. - tend to project and impose on all societies American concerns and viewpoints, (...) thereby transfigured into tools of analysis and yardsticks of policy fit to naturalize the peculiar historical experience of one peculiar society, tacitly instituted as a model for humanity. The article suggests how the logic of the international circulation of ideas, the transformations of the academic field, the strategies of foundations and publishers, and of local collaborators in global conceptual `import-export' converge to foster a particularly powerful and pernicious form of cultural imperialism of which academics are at once perpetrators and victims. (shrink)

This brief note takes the form of challenging a number of assumptions and generalizations in the article by Bourdieu and Wacquant. It calls for the invention of a new vocabulary to address the issues which have arisen for intellectuals in the context of the loss in authority of once secure foundations of modern critical enterprise, and the increasing commodification of intellectual work. The tone of the note seeks to encourage a debate towards establishing a more fruitful agenda for understanding the (...) complex relays between identity, power, governance, globalization, capitalism. (shrink)

How the arguments of Spinoza's Ethics work might seem obvious. Even if Spinoza's exposition is not perfect, and some suppressed premises might have to be recovered, it seems clear enough that the demonstrations are supposed to show, in Euclidian fashion, how truths about the basic structure of nature—as well as truths about how to live—follow from axioms and uncontroversial definitions. If readers keep their imagination and emotions from sullying their reasoning, they will see the force of the demonstrations and be (...) convinced.In his engaging, highly original book, Garver argues that the Ethics is not a linear march through timeless truths, but rather a complicated drama that works precisely because its "characters,"... (shrink)

In this paper, a fresh shear-displacement model is developed for the plastic deformation of the bulk metallic glasses. The multiscale behavior in the shear banding process and the dynamics transition with the parameters are investigated in analytical form. We present a theoretical support for the transition from unstable states to stable states in the experiment by multiscale analysis and the stability analysis. With the small parameter increasing from negative to positive, the stability of the shear slipping displacement system changes, and (...) there is a limit cycle at the transition stage. Meanwhile, the phase diagram and the power spectrum also suggest that there is dynamics transition with the parameter changing. Moreover, the complexity is analyzed for different disturbance parameters, and it is coincident with the fact that the solution is more irregular for larger disturbance. In addition, we find that the amplitude of solution decreases with the temperature decreasing, which is consistent with the experimental results that the amplitude of the serration is smaller and smaller as the temperature decreases. (shrink)

This paper considers the consensus control problem of nonlinear spatial-temporal hyperbolic partial difference multiagent systems and parabolic partial difference multiagent systems with time delay. Based on the system’s own fixed topology and the method of generating the desired trajectory by introducing virtual leader, using the consensus tracking error between the agent and the virtual leader agent and neighbor agents in the last iteration, an iterative learning algorithm is proposed. The sufficient condition for the system consensus error to converge along the (...) iterative axis is given. When the iterative learning number k approaches infinity, the consensus error in the sense of the L 2 norm between all agents in the system will converge to zero. Furthermore, simulation results illustrate the effectiveness of the algorithm. (shrink)

A generalization of a Burridge-Knopoff spring-block model is investigated to illustrate the dynamics of transform faults. The model can undergo Hopf bifurcation and fold bifurcation of limit cycles. Considering the cyclical nature of the spring stiffness, the model with periodic perturbation is further explored via a continuation technique and numerical bifurcation analysis. It is shown that the periodic perturbation induces abundant dynamics, the existence, the switch, and the coexistence of multiple attractors including periodic solutions with various periods, quasiperiodic solutions, chaotic (...) solutions through torus destruction, or cascade of period doublings. Throughout the results obtained, one can see that the system manifests complex dynamical behaviors such as chaos, self-organized criticality, and the transition of dynamical behaviors when it comes to periodic perturbations. Even very small variation of a parameter can result in radical changes of the dynamics, which provides a new insight into the fault dynamics. (shrink)

This important volume will be of great interest to scholars of early modern philosophy.

In a number a passages Descartes appears to insist that "I am, I exist" and its variants are wholly indubitable. These passages present an intractable problem of interpretation in the face of passages in which Descartes allows that any result is dubitable, "I am, I exist" included. Here I pull together a number of elements of Descartes' system to show how all of these passages hang together. If my analysis is correct, it tells us something about the perspective that Descartes (...) himself thinks we should take in reading the "Meditations". (shrink)

: For Cudworth, God would be a drudge if He did each and every thing, and so the universe contains plastic natures. Malebranche argues that finite power is unintelligible and thus that God does do each and every thing. The supremacy of God is reflected in the range of His activity and also in the manner of His activity: He acts by general non-composite volitions. Malebranche (like Cudworth) is careful to adjust other aspects of his system to square with his (...) position on causality, but his view that we are free and accountable for what we do will not be revised. (shrink)

(2008). Fifth meditation TINs revisited: A reply to criticisms of the epistemic interpretation. British Journal for the History of Philosophy: Vol. 16, No. 1, pp. 215-227.

Descartes holds that God's will is immutable. It cannot be changed by God and, because He is supremely independent, it cannot be changed by anything else. Descartes' God acts by a single immutable will for all eternity, and there is no sense in which it is possible for Him to will or to have willed anything other than what He in fact wills. Passages in which Descartes might appear to be suggesting a different view are simply manifestations of his analytic (...) method. (shrink)

The Seventeenth-Century philosopher, scientist, poet, playwright, and novelist Margaret Cavendish took a creative and systematic stand on major questions in philosophy of mind, epistemology, metaphysics, and political philosophy. This is the first volume to provide a cross-section of Cavendish's writings, views and arguments, along with introductory material. It excerpts the key portions of all her texts including annotated notes highlighting the interconnections between them. Including a general introduction by Cunning, the book will allow students to work toward a systematic (...) picture of Cavendish's metaphysics, epistemology, and political philosophy. (shrink)

In the _Fifth Meditation, Descartes introduces a being for which his system appears to leave no room. He clearly and distinctly perceives geometrical properties and concludes that, even though they may not actually exist, their _true and immutable natures exist nonetheless. Here I argue that the wedge that Descartes drives between an object and its true and immutable nature is only temporary and that, in the final analysis, a true and immutable nature of any X is just X itself. Given (...) the analytic method of the _Meditations, it is to be expected that the 'meditator' would not notice any of this in the _Fifth Meditation. He must wait until his epistemic position is more enhanced. (shrink)

Bei Cun’s article is short and not written in an academic style but as a reflective essay. The essay is theological, discussing sin, authority, and resurrection, but it is also spiritually political, discussing how the Chinese people should choose its future path and what is true authority. It was originally published in the April 2011 issue of the lifestyle magazine Xinrui, not in a literary or philosophical journal.

In VI.ii.3 of The Search After Truth Malebranche offers an argument for the view that only God is a cause. Here I defend an interpretation of the argument according to which Malebranche is supposing (quite rightly) that if there is a necessary connection between a cause and its effect, then if creatures were real causes, God's volitions would not be sufficient to bring about their intended effects. I then consider the argument from constant creation that Malebranche offers in Dialogues on (...) Metaphysics and on Religion. If Malebranche holds that God is literally creating things in their entirety at each and every moment, it is difficult to understand how his system could make room for finite substances, and it is difficult to understand how he can allow that finite minds are to be held accountable for what they do. Here I defend a weakened version of the doctrine of constant creation according to which God is constantly creating the modifications of things but is not constantly creating things in their entirety. (shrink)