Drawing on the mood-behaviour model (Gendolla, 2000), two studies investigated informational effects of mood on effort-related cardiovascular response. Experiment 1 manipulated mood state (positive, negative) and task difficulty (easy, difficult, extremely difficult). Effects on cardiovascular reactivity were as expected: On the easy level, reactivity was weak in a positive mood, but strong in a negative mood; on the difficult level, reactivity was strong in a positive mood, but weak in a negative mood; (...) on the extremely difficulty level mood had no effect. Experiment 2 manipulated mood only. As predicted, subjective demand and cardiovascular response were both higher in a negative mood than in a positive mood and the mood effect on cardiovascular response diminished after statistically controlling for the demand appraisals. Neither study revealed any mood effects on cardiovascular response during the mood inductions. (shrink)

In ordinary language, “calmness”, “melancholy”, “cheerfulness”, and “sadness” are employed to describe affective states experienced by sentient beings. More precisely, these terms are used to report instances of moods. Yet, the very same terms are used to describe what seem to be properties of certain objects (e.g., things, situations) which, unlike sentient beings, are unable to feel. We usually describe atmospheres employing these terms: We speak about the calmness of a forest, the melancholy of a painting, the cheerfulness of a (...) field of flowers and the sadness of a landscape. Are we in fact referring to the same phenomenon? If not, why then do we employ the same terms? (shrink)

Moods are usually taken to be pre-intentional affective states that tune our experience and cognition. Moreover, moods are sometimes considered to not only accompany cognitive acts, but to be understanding phenomena themselves. The following paper examines the assumption that moods represent a specific interpretative skill. Based upon that view, the semantic content of moods seems to be self-determining and to elude conceptual articulation. By contrast, I defend the thesis that the alleged inarticulable intelligibility of affective experiences is possible only due (...) to its belonging to a comprehensive theoretical horizon. For that purpose, I first analyze Heidegger’s influential account on moods in Being and Time, in order to clarify his claim that moods have their own understanding. Although Heidegger asserts that attuned understanding becomes itself when it is interpreted, he nevertheless rejects conceptual unfolding as a legitimate disclosure of the intelligible content of moods. I amend Heidegger’s account by engaging Hegel’s approach to this topic in his Philosophy of Mind. In this text, Hegel argues that feelings cannot give an account of their purport by feeling alone. Affective states not only manifest the need and urge to express themselves, but they reach their full extent when their meaning is disclosed within the entirety of the mind. It may be the case that affective states cannot always be fully clarified, but, even within a non-cognitivist account of moods, their intelligibility requires our acquaintance with articulated understanding. (shrink)

An assessment of mood or emotion is important in developing mental health measures, and facial expressions are strongly related to mood or emotion. This study thus aimed to examine the relationship between levels of negative mood and characteristics of mouth parts when moods are drawn as facial expressions on a common platform. A cross-sectional study of Japanese college freshmen was conducted, and 1,068 valid responses were analyzed. The questionnaire survey consisted of participants’ characteristics, the Profile of (...) class='Hi'>Mood States, and a sheet of facial expression drawing, and the sheet was digitized and analyzed using an image-analysis software. Based on the total POMS score as an index of negative mood, the participants were divided into four groups: low, normal, high, and very high. Lengths of drawn lines and between both mouth corners were significantly longer, and circularity and roundness were significantly higher in the L group. With increasing levels of negative mood, significant decreasing trends were observed in these lengths. Convex downward and enclosed figures were significantly predominant in the L group, while convex upward figures were significantly predominant and a tendency toward predominance of no drawn mouths or line figures was found in the H and VH groups. Our results suggest that mood states can be significantly related to the size and figure characteristics of drawn mouths of FACED on a non-verbal common platform. That is, these findings mean that subjects with low negative mood may draw a greater and rounder mouth and figures that may be enclosed and downward convex, while subjects with a high negative mood may not draw the line, or if any, may draw the line shorter and upward convex. (shrink)

A substantial portion of the knowledge base of psychology is based on subjective reports with a risk of information bias. The objective of the present study was to elucidate one contextual source of variance and potential bias in subjective reports: the influence of affective state at the time of responding to questionnaires. Employees were subjected to mood-induction procedures in the laboratory. Neutral, positive, and negative moods were induced by combinations of pictures from the international affective picture set and (...) music. The subjects responded to questions on visual analog scales in order to optimize sensitivity and attenuate short-term memory effects. Most subjects exhibited significant affective-state inductions with no change in arousal. The analyses took affective response to the manipulation into account. Only four of 20 questions were somewhat influenced by induced affective state: job overload, social support from co-workers, satisfaction with getting to develop personally, and an item measuring agreeableness. In general, responding to questions of work that were phrased for valence was little or insignificantly influenced by induced affective state. (shrink)

BackgroundMonitoring recovery–stress balance in sport is becoming more relevant to prevent training maladaptation and reach the optimal performance for each athlete. The use of questionnaires that identify the athlete’s recovery–stress state have much acceptance in sports due to reliability and useful, furthermore for its low cost. Identifying possible differences between sport modalities and sex is important to determine specific needs and possible intervention ways to keep a recovery–stress balance. The aim was to analyze the differences in the recovery–stress (...) class='Hi'>state and mood states by sex and sport type during the competitive phase in young Mexican athletes. As a secondary objective, the psychometric properties of the Mexican version of the Recovery–Stress Questionnaire for Athletes were analyzed.MethodsA cross-sectional study was carried on with 461 athletes, 17.95 years old, from six sports disciplines. The RESTQ-Sport and Profile of Mood States were applied in a single moment. Differences by sex and sports modality were analyzed. RESTQ-Sport’s confirmatory factor analysis was performed after the stress and recovery theoretical structure of two stress and two recovery dimensions, and last, the concurrent validation with the POMS was carried on.ResultsSignificant differences by sex were found in the General Recovery and Sport Stress dimensions of the RESTQ-Sport as well as Vigor factor of the POMS, being higher for men; furthermore, both the Sport Recovery dimension of RESTQ-Sport and Cholera and the Fatigue and Depression factors from POMS also had differences by sport type, showing a less recovery and high stress for individual sport athletes. Goodness-of-fit indexes of the model for the RESTQ-Sport were acceptable. Pearson’s correlation between questionnaires was moderate.ConclusionThe recovery–stress state shows differences in the function of sex and sport modality. More special attention is suggested for women and individual sport athletes. The higher punctuation for men compared with women in sport stress dimension did not negatively affect the recovery–stress balance for male athletes. Finally, the Mexican context adaptation of the RESTQ-Sport provides a psychometric instrument suitable to assess the recovery–stress balance in Mexican athletes. (shrink)

This paper presents three studies exploring the relationship between emotional responses to classic cognitive developmental moral dilemmas and moral reasoning indices as measured by the Defining Issues Test (DIT). Each study indicated that certain moral dilemmas elicit varying levels of anger and sadness as compared to a neutral baseline. In each study, decreased moral reasoning was observed in those instances where reports in both sadness and anger were high following a dilemma. This did not occur, however, in those instances where (...) only sadness or anger was high following a dilemma. Affective inductions prior to taking the DIT (study 3) did not impact trends beyond that found for individual moral dilemmas in studies 1 and 2. Although certain dilemmas elicited affective states that temporarily influenced reasoning, in general participants? reasoning levels stayed consistent across dilemmas. Results are discussed in terms of the role of affect on the moral judgment process. (shrink)

This paper develops an account of mood selection with attitude predicates in French. I start by examining the “contextual commitment” account of mood developed by Portner and Rubinstein Proceedings of SALT 22, CLC Publications, Ithaca, NY, pp 461–487, 2012). A key innovation of Portner and Rubinstein’s account is to treat mood selection as fundamentally depending on a relation between individuals’ attitudes and the predicate’s modal backgrounds. I raise challenges for P&R’s qualitative analysis of contextual commitment and explanations (...) of mood selection. There are indicative-selecting predicates that are felicitous in contexts where there isn’t contextual commitment ; and there are subjunctive-selecting predicates that involve no less contextual commitment than certain indicative-selecting verbs. I develop an alternative account of verbal mood. The general approach, which I call a state-of-mind approach, is to analyze mood in terms of whether the formal relation between the predicate’s modal backgrounds and an overall state of mind represents a relation of commitment. Indicative mood in French presupposes that the informational-evaluative state determined by the predicate’s modal backgrounds is included in the informational-evaluative state characterizing the event described by the predicate. The account provides an improved explanation of core mood-selection puzzles, including subjunctive-selection with emotive factives, indicative-selection with fiction verbs, indicative-selection with espérer ‘hope’ versus subjunctive-selection with vouloir ‘want’, and indicative-selection with commissives versus subjunctive-selection with directives. Subjunctive-selection with modal adjectives is briefly considered. The mood-selection properties of the predicates are derived from the proposed analysis of mood, independently attested features of the predicates’ semantics, and general principles of interpretation. (shrink)

To investigate the universality and cultural specificity of emotion processing in children from different ethnic groups (Han, Jingpo and Dai), we conducted three questionnaires, including emotional contagion scale, emotion regulation scale and the Chinese mood adjective check list (CMACL), among 1,362 ethnic Han, Dai and Jingpo participants (Mage = 13.78 years). We found emotion regulation (reappraisal and suppression) mediated the relations between emotional contagion and mood state, relation: (1) emotional contagion (positive and negative) increased positive mood (...) state and decreased negative mood state by reappraisal, and (2) Negative contagion finally increased negative mood state by weaken effect of reappraisal and enhance effect of suppression. Importantly, we found both universality and ethnic cultural specificity in the relations among emotional contagion, emotion regulation, and state mood. Firstly, the cultural specificity: (1) For Dai and Jingpo participants, negative contagion positively predicted reappraisal, while Han participants did not; (2) Jingpo participants demonstrated a weaker negative relation between reappraisal and negative mood state, and a stronger positive relation between negative contagion and suppression; and (3) Dai participants was the only ethnic group that showed a negative connection between negative contagion and positive mood state. Secondly, the emotion universality: Three ethnics both showed positive relations between negative contagion and negative mood, between suppression and negative mood; For all of them, positive contagion positively predicted positive mood state, mediated by reappraisal. In this paper, we discuss universal emotion processes and ethnic cultural differences in these emotion processes. (shrink)

Moods and emotions are sometimes thought to be counterexamples to intentionalism, the view that a mental state's phenomenal features are exhausted by its representational features. The problem is that moods and emotions are accompanied by phenomenal experiences that do not seem to be adequately accounted for by any of their plausibly represented contents. This paper develops and defends an intentionalist view of the phenomenal character of moods and emotions on which emotions and some moods represent intentional objects as having (...) sui generis affective properties, which happen to be uninstantiated, and at least some moods represent affective properties not bound to any objects. (shrink)

The philosophical debate around the nature of moods has mostly focused on their apparent undirectedness: unlike mental states such as perceptual experiences, thoughts, and emotions, moods do not seem to be directed at any specific object, and indeed they do not seem to be directed at anything at all. In this paper, I want to draw attention to a different feature of moods, one that is as important and in need of explanation as their apparent undirectedness, but which has been (...) overlooked by most participants in the debate: the fact that moods involve a particularly marked salience of the subjective aspect of experience. I argue that any adequate theory of moods should account for this fact. I call this the “subjective salience desideratum.” In the bulk of the paper, I articulate and motivate the desideratum, show that extant theories of moods do not satisfy it, and offer a preliminary overview of possible (yet unexplored) theories that have the subjective salience desideratum at their core. (shrink)

The paper explores situational and dispositional underpinnings of cooperative behavior. According to psychological research, cooperation is strongly related to affective states and personality dimensions. In an experimental study we examined the conditions under which people cooperate with each other. The dispositional traits of co-workers, the contribution to a collaborative effort, and a situational factor – ambient odor condition were taken into consideration. A one-way ANOVA revealed that compared to a malodorous condition, both the pleasant odor condition and the natural odor (...) condition showed higher rates of cooperation. Further analysis indicated that only malodors influenced affective states which in turn determined social decisions. Although we found effects for the participants’ agreeableness and the coworker’s contribution to a joint work, they appeared to play a less critical role than affective states induced by the experimental odor conditions tested here. (shrink)

The two main subjectivist accounts of wellbeing, hedonism and desire-satisfactionism, focus on pleasure and desire (respectively) as the subjective states relevant to evaluating the goodness of a life. In this paper, I argue that another type of subjective state, mood, is much more central to wellbeing. After a general characterization of some central features of mood (§1), I argue that the folk concept of happiness construes it in terms of preponderance of good mood (§2). I then (...) leverage this connection between mood and happiness to argue that having certain mood patterns in one’s life is sufficient for having a good life (§3), and explore their potential necessity for a good life (§4). I close with discussion of the role that mood patterns might play within the three leading philosophical theories of wellbeing: hedonism (§5), desire-satisfactionism (§6), and objective-list theory (§7). (shrink)

Perceived control in contingency learning is linked to psychological wellbeing with low levels of perceived control thought to be a cause or consequence of depression and high levels of control considered to be the hallmark of mental healthiness. However, it is not clear whether this is a universal phenomenon or whether the value that people ascribe to control influences these relationships. Here we hypothesize that values affect learning about control contingencies and influence the relationship between perceived control and symptoms of (...) mood disorders. We tested these hypotheses with European university samples who were categorized as endorsing (or not) values relevant to control - individualist and collectivist values. Three online experimental contingency learning studies (N1 = 127, N2 = 324, N3 = 272) were carried out. Evidence suggested that individualist values influenced basic learning processes via an effect on learning about the context in which events took place. Participants who endorsed individualist values made control judgments that were more in line with an elemental associative learning model, whilst those who were ambivalent about individualist values made judgments that were more consistent with a configural process. High levels of perceived control and individualist values were directly associated with increased euphoric symptoms of bipolar disorder, and such values completely mediated the relation between perceived control and symptoms. The effect of low perceived control on depression was moderated by collectivist values. Anxiety created by dissonance between values and task may be a catalyst for developing mood symptoms. Conclusions are that values play a significant intermediary role in the relation between perceived control and symptoms of mood disturbance. (shrink)

Although the literature has focused on individual differences in authenticity, recent findings suggest that authenticity is sensitive to context; that is, it is also a state. We extended this perspective by examining whether incidental affect influences authenticity. In three experiments, participants felt more authentic when in a relatively positive than negative mood. The causal role of affect in authenticity was consistent across a diverse set of mood inductions, including explicit (Experiments 1 and 3) and implicit (Experiment 2) (...) methods. The link between incidental affect and state authenticity was not moderated by ability to down-regulate negative affect (Experiments 1 and 3) nor was it explained by negative mood increasing private self-consciousness or decreasing access to the self system (Experiment 3). The results indicate that mood is used as information to assess one's sense of authenticity. (shrink)

The present study was conducted with the aim of constructing and validating a short form of the Profile of Mood States. The POMS is a widely-applied measure for the assessment of an individual's mood. Thus, it is of great relevance for many research questions in clinical and social psychology. To develop the short scale, we first examined psychometric properties and found the optimal 16-item solution among all valid combinations of the full POMS in an exploratory subsample of our (...) complete representative sample of the German general population. We then validated this model in a confirmatory subsample. Additionally, we examined its invariance across age groups and sex, as well as its reliability. Our results indicate that the POMS-16 is a valid and reliable measure of mood states with minimal losses compared to the 35-item version. Particularly where brevity and an economical assessment is desired, the POMS-16 should be considered. (shrink)

Objective: To cope with the Coronavirus Disease 2019 pandemic health authorities released social restrictions. Such social restrictions impacted on the people's possibilities to move deliberately in a public space and to gather with other people. In the present study, we investigated the impact of COVID-19-related restrictions on physical activity patterns before and during the confinement among team sports participants. Such PA patterns were further related to current mood states, and possible sex differences were also explored.Methods: A total of 476 (...) adults exercising team sport completed a series of self-rating questionnaires covering sociodemographic information, former and current PA patterns, and current mood states.Results: Compared with the period before the confinement, PA intensity decreased, but PA frequency increased during the confinement. Past, current, and changes in physical activity patterns were unrelated to participants' mood states. Sex differences in mood were spurious. Sex differences in physical activity patterns were modest, with male participants reporting a higher physical activity intensity during the confinement.Conclusions: The present pattern of results suggests that the COVID-19-related confinement did not impact in a uniform fashion on PA patterns of adults attending team sports. Furthermore, mood states were unrelated to current physical activity patterns. Given the complex psychosocial situation of COVID-19-related confinement, it appeared very unlikely that sole physical activity patterns could counterbalance possible impaired states of mood and behavior. (shrink)

Do moods have intentional objects? If so, what kinds of intentional objects might they have? Some theorists hold that moods are objectless affective states, not ‘about’ anything. Others argue that moods are directed toward a maximally general object like ‘the world’, and so they are about everything, in some sense. In this article, I advance a new theoretical account of the intentional object of moods. According to what I call the ‘present-situation view’, moods are directed toward, or about, the present (...) situation. In other words, a mood is essentially an interpretation of one’s current situational context. As such, our moods change over time in a way that tracks our changing sense of how things are going, here and now. This article aims to make the case that the present-situation view, so understood, offers unique theoretical resources to describe and explain how we experience moods and how they change over time, while also suggesting a helpful way to think about the functional role moods play in our broader cognitive architecture, and pointing toward promising directions for future research into the ways that moods can be experienced, managed, and shared. (shrink)

Playing traditional games has a direct impact on the mood states of the players, and this is the reason why physical education is an ideal setting for teaching how to recognize them and be aware about how they can swing. The objective of the study was to determine if participating in traditional opposition games causes changes to the participants' mood states. A total of 102 students participated. Each participant recorded the intensity of the mood state experienced (...) at the beginning and at the end of the sessions, using the validated Profile of Mood States instrument. The pedagogical experience was planned as 4 sessions with 6 and 5 opposition games each: with competition in mixed groups, equally and unequally mixed; without competition in mixed groups, equally and unequally mixed; with competition in same-gender groups; and without competition in same-gender groups. When comparing the different mood states according to session, the mood states of the depression, fatigue, and vigor dimensions were significantly different, with higher scores in the sessions with competition for the mood states of vigor and fatigue. Also, when comparing the mood states depending on session grouping and group type, the results showed differences in the scores obtained for the dimensions fatigue and anger, and general mood state. These differences were found at the start of the session and at the end, with the dimension fatigue being the only one with differences in both situations when comparing the same-gender, equally-mixed, and unequally-mixed groups for the two types of traditional opposition games compared. In addition, after an analysis of the mood states depending on gender was performed, the results and therefore the significant differences found, were very similar to those obtained according to group type. Lastly, it was concluded that the type of group, and gender were decisive, causing variations in the mood states of the students. This provides valuable information for teaching professionals about the structuring and organization of PE sessions, aiming to promoting positive motor experiences. (shrink)

Under the general heading of what we might loosely call emotional states, a familiar distinction can be drawn between emotions (strictly so-called) and moods. In order to judge under which of these headings a subject’s emotional episode falls, we advance a question of the form: What is the subject’s emotion of or about? In some cases (for example fear, sadness, and anger) the provision of an answer is straightforward: the subject is afraid of the loose tiger, or sad about England’s (...) poor performance in the World Cup, or angry with her errant child. Although the ways we find natural to talk in such situations can alter (afraid of, sad about, angry with, and so on), in each case the emotion has what Ronald de Sousa, following Wittgenstein, calls a target—“an actual particular to which that emotion relates.” (de Sousa, 1987, p.116). (shrink)

Should moods be regarded as intentional states, and, if so, what kind of intentional content do they have? I focus on irritability and apprehension, which I examine from the perspective of a teleosemantic theory of content. Eric Lormand has argued that moods are non-intentional states, distinct from emotions; Robert Solomon and Peter Goldie argue that moods are generalised emotions and that they have intentional content of a correspondingly general kind. I present a third model, on which moods are regarded, not (...) as generalised emotions, but as states of vigilance; and I argue that, on this model, moods should be regarded as intentional states of a kind quite distinct from emotions. An advantage of this account is that it allows us to distinguish between a mood of apprehension and an episode of objectless fear. (shrink)

Delusional mood is a well-recognized psychological state, often present in the prodromal stage of schizophrenia. Various phenomenological psychopathologists have proposed that delusional mood may not only precede but also contribute to the later formation of schizophrenic delusion. Hence, understanding experiential abnormalities involved with the delusional mood have been considered central for the understanding of schizophrenic delusion. Ranging from traditional and contemporary phenomenological and neurobiological accounts, it has been often mentioned that the peculiar affective saliency of the (...) world experience may underpin the emergence of delusional mood. In this paper, I employ Edmund Husserl’s account of affection and affective syntheses to clarify the nature of such an experience and illuminate how this experiential abnormality contributes to the emergence of the delusional mood. I conclude by relating the phenomenological account I advance here with a neurobiological account of aberrant salience hypothesis and chart out a possible way toward mutual enlightenment for both approaches. (shrink)

In the context of a history of the emotions, Martin Heidegger presents an important and yet challenging case. He is important because he places emotional states, broadly construed, at the very heart of his philosophical methodology—in particular, anxiety and boredom. He is challenging because he is openly dismissive of the standard ontologies of emotions, and because he is largely uninterested in many of the canonical debates in which emotions figure. My aim in this chapter is to identify and critique the (...) distinctive role which Heidegger allots to the emotions, focusing on Sein und Zeit's famous treatment of anxiety. Having outlined his position, I close by considering a number of challenges, both methodological and substantive, to Heidegger's approach. (shrink)

ObjectiveBasic combat training is a kind of necessary high-intensity training to help each military recruit convert into a qualified soldier. In China, both the physical fatigue and passive psychological state have been observed in new recruits during BCT. However, after same-intensity training, the degree of fatigue and passive mood vary among recruits. Therefore, this study aimed to explore the effect of BCT on mood state of recruits with different physical fitness levels from a perspective of fatigue.Materials (...) and methodsBefore and after BCT, the degree of fatigue and mood state of participants were evaluated via the Borg Rating of Perceived Exertion Scale and Profile of Mood States Questionnaire immediately after 20 push-ups as RPE and POMS scores [total mood disturbance, passive mood and positive mood ]. The participants were divided into two groups according to the RPE score measured after BCT: group 1: RPE score after BCT < 13 and group 2: RPE score after BCT ≥ 13.ResultA total of 564 recruits were included. After BCT, in group 1, TMD and passive mood Ttension, Tfatigue, Tdepression, Tconfusion declined significantly, but positive mood both increased significantly ; while in group 2, only Tanger and Testeem increased significantly.ConclusionBCT could alleviate passive mood and add to positive mood for recruits with better physical fitness, while had no ameliorative effects on or even deteriorate most of the passive mood for recruits with worse physical fitness. (shrink)

According to intentionalism, phenomenal properties are identical to, supervenient on, or determined by representational properties. Intentionalism faces a special challenge when it comes to accounting for the phenomenal character of moods. First, it seems that no intentionalist treatment of moods can capture their apparently undirected phenomenology. Second, it seems that even if we can come up with a viable intentionalist account of moods, we would not be able to motivate it in some of the same kinds of ways that intentionalism (...) about other kinds of states can be motivated. In this article, I respond to both challenges: First, I propose a novel intentionalist treatment of moods on which they represent unbound affective properties. Then, I argue that this view is indirectly supported by the same kinds of considerations that directly support intentionalism about other mental states. (shrink)

When experienced in-person, engagement with art has been associated—in a growing body of evidence—with positive outcomes in wellbeing and mental health. This represents an exciting new field for psychology, curation, and health interventions, suggesting a widely-accessible, cost-effective, and non-pharmaceutical means of regulating factors such as mood or anxiety. However, can similar impacts be found with online presentations? If so, this would open up positive outcomes to an even-wider population—a trend accelerating due to the current COVID-19 pandemic. Despite its promise, (...) this question, and the underlying mechanisms of art interventions and impacts, has largely not been explored. Participants were asked to engage with one of two online exhibitions from Google Arts and Culture. With just 1–2 min exposure, both improved negative mood, state-anxiety, loneliness, and wellbeing. Stepdown analysis suggested the changes can be explained primarily via negative mood, while improvements in mood correlated with aesthetic appraisals and cognitive-emotional experience of the exhibition. However, no difference was found between exhibitions. We discuss the findings in terms of applications and targets for future research. (shrink)

This discussion is about the moods characteristic of depressive and manic states. Moods are distinguished from the emotions they often accompany, and the relationship between these less and more cognitive, and seemingly less and more intentional, states is provided preliminary clarification. Epistemic deficiencies identified here, when combined with differences of quality and quantity in the moods and motivations that beset the depression and mania sufferer, seem likely to hinder self-knowledge and self-integration. These deficiencies, it is argued, may help explain why (...) the extreme moods found in states of depression and mania contribute to our inclination to regard these conditions as disorder. (shrink)

This study examines the influence of mood on corporate philanthropic giving. Drawing on group emotions theory and affect-infused decision theory, we advance the argument that firms allocate greater resources to philanthropy when headquarters-based employees are in a more positive affective state. We also describe three boundary conditions in this relationship—executives’ embeddedness in the firm, executives’ latitude to engage in philanthropic giving, and the firm’s track record of corporate social irresponsibility. We test our arguments using a longitudinal dataset of (...) philanthropic giving by U.S. firms. Our study contributes to the literature by shedding light on the role of affect in shaping the decision to allocate resources to corporate philanthropy. (shrink)

Moods are sometimes thought to be counter-examples to intentionalism, the view that a mental state’s phenomenal features are exhausted by its representational features. The problem is that moods are accompanied by phenomenal experiences that do not seem to be adequately accounted for by any of their plausibly represented contents. This paper develops and defends an intentionalist view of the phenomenal character of moods on which moods represent intentional objects as having sui generis affective properties that are not bound to (...) any objects. (shrink)

The results of recent community epidemiological research are reviewed, documenting that major depressive disorder (MDD) is a highly prevalent, persistent, and often seriously impairing disorder, and that bipolar disorder (BPD) is less prevalent but more persistent and more impairing than MDD. The higher persistence and severity of BPD results in a substantial proportion of all seriously impairing depressive episodes being due to threshold or subthreshold BPD rather than to MDD. Although the percentage of people with mood disorders in treatment (...) has increased substantially since the early 1990s, a majority of cases remain either untreated or undertreated. An especially serious concern is the misdiagnosis of depressive episodes due to BPD as due to MDD because the majority of depression treatment involves medication provided by primary care doctors in the absence of psychotherapy. The article closes with a discussion of future directions for research. (shrink)

Body expression and dance are activities that contribute to the integral well-being of people. In an educational context, the process of evaluating our students implies variations in their moods. This study tackles the states of mind that students perceive before and after the evaluation of a practice in the subject ofBody expression and dance, developed through choreographies, that were, previously rehearsed, and later presented to the rest of the class in a specific session. Our main interest was the obtention of (...) information on the states of mind of the students prior to the evaluation of their choreographies, and again once they had been performed. The study design consisted of two phases: two different choreographies separated by an interval of 2 months. The students were asked about their moods before and after performing their choreographies, which were evaluated. The participants, 167 in total, 35 women and 132 men, aged 18 to 22 years old, filled out a POMS questionnaire, before and after the evaluation of each occasion. Differences were found in the stress-anxiety, vigor-activity, fatigue-immobility scales and the total mood score. In all of them, except for the fatigue-immobility scale, we found a decrease in scores after the performance, compared to scores before. For the Stress-Anxiety factor, lower values were observed in the post-tests in comparison to the pre-tests, and also lower values in the pre- and post-test scores regarding the second choreography. We conclude that the practical evaluation of the subject through choreography modifies the mood states of the students, favoring their well-being after its execution, which is why evaluation through practice is considered a positive element in the educational process. (shrink)