Discusses the phenomenological foundations for qualitative research in psychology which operates out of the intersection of phenomenological philosophy, science, and psychology; challenges long-standing assumptions about the practice of grounding the science of psychology in empiricism and asserts that the broader philosophy of phenomenological theory of science permits more adequate psychological development"--Provided by publisher.

La Dictio 17 (= 239 Vogel) di Ennodio è una controuersia in cui il declamatore si scaglia contro un figlio che non ha provveduto al mantenimento del padre anziano tanto da provocarne la morte. L’argomentazione è rafforzata da esempi di animali, aquile e lupi, che, a differenza dell’accusato, si prendono cura dei genitori. Nell’esempio delle aquile è sfruttato un tema ampiamente diffuso nella tradizione esegetica biblica; in particolare, Ennodio dimostra strette consonanze con la versione di questo motivo che si legge (...) in Paolino di Nola (Carm. 24 Hartel). Più oscuro rimane l’esempio dei lupi che in genere sono contraddistinti da ferocia e rapacità, mentre in Ennodio dimostrano una singolare benevolenza verso i genitori. Anche in questo caso si propongono alcuni precedenti biblici che possono aver influenzato la loro caratterizzazione positiva nella controuersia ennodiana. Una lettura della Dictio 17 in chiave soltanto allegorica è da evitare, ma la scelta di questi esempi animali, connotati in modo fortemente cristiano, permette di pensare a un’interpretazione su più livelli, retorico, morale e spirituale. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Jahrbuch für Wissenschaft und Ethik Jahrgang: 19 Heft: 1 Seiten: 203-238.

The investigation of concept of “true” and “false” has long privileged in contemporary philosophy apophantic truth, that is, the truth of dicta (sentences or propositions). To which entities, though, beyond dicta, the predicate ‘true’ pertains? This paper sheds a light on the less frequently investigated cases where we speak of a truth of things, or res. We say, for instance, that a 17 euros banknote is not a true banknote, or that a true soldier ought to be brave. The paper, (...) thus, distinguishes, beside the concept of de dicto (apophantic) truth, the concept of de re truth and two of its subspecies: eidological truth and idiological truth. (shrink)

The use of rights based arguments to justify claims that donor offspring should have access to information identifying their gamete donor has become increasingly widespread. In this paper, I do not intend to revisit the debate about the validity of such rights. Rather, the purpose is to examine the way that such alleged rights have been implemented by those legislatures that have allowed access to identifying information. I will argue that serious inconsistencies exist between the claim that donor offspring have (...) a right to know the identity of their gamete donor and the way such a right is currently met in practice. I hope to show that in systems where non‐anonymous donation is practised, an understanding of the proclaimed right of donor offspring to know their genetic identity is one composed of two different rights – the right to know the circumstances of their conception and the right to information identifying the gamete donor – can provide important insights into this important area of public policy. (shrink)

This Chapter aims to present a very preliminary exploration of the role and functioning of some ‘leading ideas’ that represent the most consistent attempts to balance freedom of scientific research with the need to protect participants and the community as a whole. To this end, we searched two databases, a scientific and a legal one, for some keywords (Freedom of research, Precautionary principle, Risk-based approach, Responsible research and innovation), to check the consistency of their presence and evolution over time. Without (...) aiming to in-depth investigate the precise connotations of each term and the context in which they are used from time to time, the core idea is to provide a very first quantitative exploration, which lays the foundations for further future investigation. (shrink)

Ce livre questionne. Il ne prétend pas dissoudre les obscurités qui subsistent concernant l'histoire du XXe siècle. Bien plutôt se voit-il confronté à la nécessité d'entamer une réflexion de fond sur l'écriture de l'histoire abordée sous un jour nouveau, dans une perspective transdisciplinaire - la discipline historique n'ayant pas le monopole de son objet. L'écriture de l'histoire est appréhendée thématiquement, géopolitiquement (auteurs allemands et français alternent), historiquement (du milieu du XVIIIe à nos jours) et par les disciplines respectives dont ils (...) émanent. (shrink)

In his article “Reflexive Predictions” in a recent issue of this Journal [1], Professor Roger C. Buck refers to our theorem concerning correct public prediction of economic and, in general, social events [2]. Unfortunately he misunderstands the nature of our theorem. He begins by stipulating the infinite regress which originally led to the belief that correct public prediction in the social sciences might be impossible: the forecaster who attempts to take into account the agent's reaction to his public prediction, finds (...) his adjusted public prediction again falsified by the agent's reaction to it, and so on ad infinitum [3]. Professor Buck then makes an admittedly tempting mistake. He argues that, provided the sequence of public predictions—each one adjusted for the agent's reaction to its predecessor—converges towards some value, correct public prediction is possible: at the end of a sequence of falsified predictions the forecaster, as it were, catches up with the agent. (shrink)

This article points out the criteria necessary in order for a qualitative scientific method to qualify itself as phenomenological in a descriptive Husserlian sense. One would have to employ description within the attitude of the phenomenological reduction, and seek the most invariant meanings for a context. The results of this analysis are used to critique an article by Klein and Westcott , that presents a typology of the development of the phenomenological psychological method.

Abstract.The starting point of deontic logic is the distinction between non‐normative necessity and normative necessity. The first part of the paper shows that the distinction between normative necessity and non‐normative necessity occurs already in Aristotle's Orgunon. The second part of the paper makes a further distinction within normative deon itself: The distinction between deontic deon and anankastic deon. Anankastic deon behaves differently from deontic deon in a very important respect: Deontic indifference has no anankastic counterpart.

The author explains that his background was in experimental psychology but that he wanted to study the whole person and not fragmented psychological processes. He also desired a non-reductionistic method for studying humans. Fortunately he came across the work of Edmund Husserl and discovered in the latter’s thought a way of researching humans that met the criteria he was seeking. Eventually he developed a phenomenological method for researching humans in a psychological way based upon the work of Husserl and Merleau-Ponty. (...) This article briefly describes the method. (shrink)

Nel contesto della presente crisi climatica ed ambientale, istituzioni pubbliche e private promuovono la costruzione di ‘infrastrutture viventi’. L’articolo analizza l’economia biopolitica che caratterizza questi progetti, concentrandosi sull’infrastrutturalizzazione del pioppo: un genus botanico ampiamente utilizzato come ‘barriera contro la desertificazione’, ‘struttura di fitorisanamento’, e ‘pozzo di assorbimento di anidride carbonica’. Questi progetti mobilizzano il metabolismo della cellula vivente, dando forma a nuove reti di potere bio-infrastrutturale ed elaborate strategie di accumulazione del capitale.

Pragmatic Ambiguity: The Thetic Function of Modality The aim of this paper is to present an overview of the pragmatic aspects of ambiguity present in deontic sentences, which may have three pragmatic functions: a prescriptive or a descriptive or a constitutive function. This type of ambiguity is investigated on the lexical, phrasal, and sentential level. The discussion focuses on the deontic constructions of the German verb sollen and the English shall as they are used in legal texts. It also includes (...) comments on the thetic function of the Latin imperative mood and the subjunctive mood. (shrink)