What does the way we clarify and revise concepts reveal about the nature of concepts? This paper investigates the ontological commitments of conceptual analysis and explication regarding their supposed subject matter – concepts. It demonstrates the benefits of a cognitivist account of concepts, according to which they are not items on which the subject operates cognitively, but rather ways in which the subject operates. The proposed view helps to handle alternating references to ‘concepts’ and ‘terms’ in instructions on analysis and (...) explication. Furthermore, its virtue lies not in the capacity to render concepts ‘shareable’ but in its ontological parsimony. (shrink)

Die vorliegende Arbeit beschaftigt sich mit einem theoretischen Ansatz innerhalb der Semantik, der bisher in Europa wenig Zuspruch fand: die Prototypensemantik. Die Autorin weist nach, dass metaphorische Redewendungen sehr wohl strukturiert und vollstandig mit Mitteln moderner empirischer Forschung analysiert werden konnen. Vor allem soll diese Arbeit als Anstoss verstanden werden, neue Wege in der Semantik zu gehen. Diese ist eine Disziplin, in der eben nicht nur rein sprachwissenschaftliche Erkenntnisse und Methoden Verwendung finden sollten, da sie die Verbindung zwischen Sprache, Mensch (...) und Welt darstellt. Es ist daher notwendig, die Sprache in ihrem 'naturlichen' Zusammenhang zu betrachten.". (shrink)

While research on object individuation assumes that even very young children are able to perceive objects as particulars, we argue that the results of relevant studies can be explained in terms of feature discrimination. We propose that children start out navigating the world with a feature‐based ontology and only later become able to individuate objects spatiotemporally. Furthermore, object individuation is a cognitively demanding achievement resting on a uniquely human form of enculturation, namely the acquisition of deictic demonstratives. We conclude by (...) outlining empirical expectations for operationalizations of our proposal. (shrink)

Many Europeans are concerned about the living conditions of farm animals because they view animals as beings that possess interests of their own. Against this background the introduction of an animal welfare label is being intensively discussed in Europe. In choosing a market-based instrument to take these concerns into account, normative judgments are made about the formation of preferences, the value system that is implicitly assumed, and the distribution of property rights. From the perspective of classical institutional economics it can (...) be shown that the introduction of a label as an institutional change does not redefine institutions in a way that allows them to consider the interests of animals for their own sake. Rather, the label only redefines the property rights that humans have over animals. The market segregation into privileged and normal animals conflicts with the idea of equality between sentient animals. Within the group of humans only the interests of those who act on markets count. The commodification of their moral concerns assumes that people always decide based on their own interests, which can be traded off. The lexicographical ordering of preferences, which occurs when humans view animals as entities with rights, is not compatible with the normative assumptions of markets. Furthermore, interpreting animal suffering as market failure that can be corrected by labeling impedes a reasoned dialog within the society about the values and beliefs that serve as a basis for preference formation. Thus, an animal welfare label cannot replace a fundamental societal debate about legal standards on animal well-being. (shrink)

Journal of Philosophy of Education, EarlyView.

The term ‘speciesism’ was once coined to name discrimination against nonhuman animals as well as the bias that such discrimination expresses. It has sparked a debate on criteria for being morally considerable and the relative significance of human and nonhuman animals’ interests. Many defenses of the preferential consideration of humans have come with a denial of the normative meaning of the term ‘speciesism’ itself. In fact, defenders of the moral relevance of species membership and their critics alike have often used (...) ‘speciesism’ as a merely descriptive technical term for classifying positions in normative ethics. This paper argues that this terminological choice severely impoverishes our ethical vocabulary and moral conceptual scheme. It obscures the considerable common ground among theorists with differing views on the relevance of various properties for moral consideration. It is often overlooked that even most defenders of the preferential treatment of one’s fellow species members have good reason to hold on to the normative notion that ‘speciesism’ was originally meant to be. Two distinct types of concepts are involved when differential treatment along species lines is addressed in a normative and a descriptive way, respectively. The term ‘speciesism’ should be reserved for the normative concept and kept apart from the descriptive term ‘speciescentrism.’ Attempts to redefine speciesism as something that is not wrong by definition are shown to be epistemically and morally harmful for the same reasons attempts to redefine racism and sexism in this way are. (shrink)

Academic and public debates are increasingly concerned with the question whether and how algorithmic decision-making may reinforce social inequality. Most previous research on this topic originates from computer science. The social sciences, however, have huge potentials to contribute to research on social consequences of ADM. Based on a process model of ADM systems, we demonstrate how social sciences may advance the literature on the impacts of ADM on social inequality by uncovering and mitigating biases in training data, by understanding data (...) processing and analysis, as well as by studying social contexts of algorithms in practice. Furthermore, we show that fairness notions need to be evaluated with respect to specific outcomes of ADM systems and with respect to concrete social contexts. Social sciences may evaluate how individuals handle algorithmic decisions in practice and how single decisions aggregate to macro social outcomes. In this overview, we highlight how social sciences can apply their knowledge on social stratification and on substantive domains of ADM applications to advance the understanding of social impacts of ADM. (shrink)

Disney's Zootopia (2016) is a crime story about the involuntary partnership between Judy Hopps, the first rabbit police officer in the city of Zootopia, and Nick Wilde, a red fox making his living as a con artist. What makes Zootopia a utopia and the city of Judy's dreams is that it appears to be “where anyone can be anything.” Zootopia confronts people with three utopian ideals: of security and social order, of individual self‐determination and fulfillment, and of a just multispecies (...) society. Zootopia begins with the founding myth that tells the story of how the animals overcame an anything‐but‐ideal natural state, in which prey animals lived in constant fear of predators. Zootopia is too much of a metaphor for human ways of life to be a utopian human‐animal society, and too “messy” to count as a metaphoric utopia for humans. (shrink)

Frauke Albersmeier | : In Zoopolis, Donaldson and Kymlicka dismiss the abolitionist, or extinctionist approach in animal rights theory as insufficient in its theoretical foundation and disproportional regarding the means it promotes to prevent domesticated animals from suffering abuse by humans. Among the consequences of their counterproposal—granting domesticated animals citizenship—is an increased pressure to justify any interference with domesticated animals’ reproductive activities. This paper attempts to give such justification with reference to domesticated animals’ specific state of vulnerability, but also (...) takes into account the interest of the mixed society to prevent overly demanding obligations. Even while recognizing existing domesticated animals as citizens, humans might be unable to fully meet their obligation to protect the most dependent of them, and therefore might be justified in conditionally subscribing to “extinctionism” and limiting these animals’ reproduction to the point of their ultimate extinction. Therefore, rather than upholding a strict opposition between extinctionism in any form and a political framework for animal rights, out of reasonable concern for the well-being of domesticated animals in the societies they have been placed in, a qualified extinctionist approach should be incorporated into the political framework developed in Zoopolis. | : Dans Zoopolis, Donaldson et Kymlicka rejettent l’approche abolitionniste, ou extinctionniste, de la théorie du droit des animaux. Ils estiment que ses fondements théoriques sont insuffisants et que les mesures qu’elle promeut pour protéger les animaux domestiques des abus des humains sont disproportionnées. Leur contre-proposition – qui accorde la citoyenneté aux animaux domestiques – a plusieurs conséquences, parmi lesquelles un renforcement de la justification de toutes les formes d’ingérence dans la reproduction des animaux domestiques. Cet article tente de justifier pareille ingérence en raison de l’état particulier de vulnérabilité des animaux domestiques, mais tient également compte du fait que la société mixte a intérêt à éviter l’établissement d’obligations trop exigeantes. Cependant, les humains peuvent accorder aux animaux domestiques existant un statut de citoyen tout en s’avérant incapables de remplir pleinement leur obligation de protéger les plus dépendants d’entre eux. Ils pourraient par conséquent être justifiés de souscrire de manière conditionnelle à « l’extinctionnisme » et limiter la reproduction de ces animaux jusqu’à leur extinction. C’est pourquoi, au lieu de maintenir une opposition stricte entre l’extinctionnisme sous toutes ses formes et l’élaboration d’un cadre politique pour le droit des animaux, l’on devrait, par souci du bien-être des animaux domestiques dans les sociétés dans lesquelles ils vivent, insérer une approche extinctionniste conditionnelle dans le cadre politique élaboré dans Zoopolis. (shrink)

Can war be justified? Pacifists answer that it cannot; they oppose war and advocate for nonviolent alternatives to war. But defenders of just war theory argue that in some circumstances, when the effectiveness of nonviolence is limited, wars can be justified. -/- In this book, two philosophers debate this question, drawing on contemporary scholarship and new developments in thinking about pacifism and just war theory. Andrew Fiala defends the pacifist position, while Jennifer Kling defends just war traditions. Fiala argues that (...) pacifism follows from the awful reality of war and the nonviolent goal of building a more just and peaceful world. Kling argues that war is sometimes justified when it is a last-ditch, necessary effort to defend people and their communities from utter destruction and death. Pulling from global traditions and histories, their debate will captivate anyone who has wondered or worried about the morality of political violence and military force. Topics discussed include ethical questions of self-defense and other-defense, the great analogy between individuals and states, evolving technologies and methods of warfighting, moral injury and post-traumatic stress disorder, broader political and communal issues, and the problem of regional security in a globalizing world. The authors consider cultural and religious issues as well as the fundamental question of moral obligation in a world saturated in military conflict. The book was written in the aftermath of the war on terrorism and includes reflection on lessons learned from the past decades of war, as well as hopes for the future in light of emerging threats in Europe and elsewhere. -/- The book is organized in a user-friendly fashion. Each author presents a self-contained argument, which is followed by a series of responses, replies, and counter-arguments. Throughout, the authors model civil discourse by emphasizing points of agreement and remaining areas of disagreement. The book includes reader-friendly summaries, a glossary of key concepts, and suggestions for further study. All of this will help students and scholars follow the authors’ dialogue so they may develop their own answer to the question of whether war can be justified. (shrink)

This paper is concerned with the ethics of popularizing moral philosophy. In particular, it addresses the question of whether ethicists engaged in public debates should restrict themselves to acting as impartial informants or moderators rather than advocates of their own moral opinions. I dismiss the idea that being an impartial servant to moral debates is the default or even the only defensible way to publicly exercise ethical expertise and thus, to popularize moral philosophy. Using a case example from the public (...) debate about the human use of nonhuman animals, I highlight the benefits and risks of endorsing an advocate’s and a teacher’s or moderator’s role, respectively. I argue for a general requirement of judgment transparency which entails that the publicly engaged philosopher ought to be clear and consistent about the type of role she takes on, her publicly advanced opinions generally ought to be her professional ones and that she ought to flag her private opinions. I finally show that, despite general concerns about conflicts of interest, exercising ethical expertise and engaging in advocacy, i.e., acting as if one were a moral expert, are not incompatible modes of public engagement for the moral philosopher. (shrink)

The article deals with the role of companies in the social market economy. An example of a successful international self-regulatory initiative and its implementation in German chemical industry is discussed.

Diese Reihe präsentiert innovative Studien in deutscher oder englischer Sprache, die aktuelle Themen der praktischen Philosophie aus analytischer Perspektive behandeln. Dazu gehören Fragen aus den Bereichen der Metaethik, der normativen und der,angewandten' Ethik ebenso wie Fragen der politischen Philosophie, der Rechtsphilosophie und der Handlungstheorie.

Zur Sprache der Humanmedizin muss auch das Vokabular der tierexperimentellen Forschung gezählt werden, deren Paradigma sich im Begriff des ‚Tiermodells‘ ausdrückt. Er ist auch für die außerwissenschaftliche Kommunikation von Versuchsergebnissen charakteristisch. Der vorliegende Beitrag geht der Frage nach, inwiefern der Sprache der Tierversuche selbst ethische Relevanz zukommt, insbesondere, wenn sie in andere Kommunikationszusammenhänge hineinwirkt. Dazu soll zunächst auf Konfliktlinien zwischen wissenschaftlicher Freiheit und dem Anspruch ethisch bewussten Sprachhandelns eingegangen werden. Anschließend ist zu erläutern, inwiefern eine sprachliche Konvention als ‚ethischer bias‘ (...) infrage kommt. Diese Überlegungen werden schließlich beispielhaft auf den Tiermodell-Begriff bezogen, um den Vorwurf einer technisierenden und entindividualisierenden Sprache zu konkretisieren und abschließend ihre Wirkung auf die öffentliche Wahrnehmung von Tierversuchen zu diskutieren. Um die ‚Sprache der Forschung‘ geht es dabei durchgehend in einem weiten Sinne, der auch die Sprache über diese Forschung in philosophischen, (forschungs-)politischen, juristischen, didaktischen und ökonomischen Kontexten miteinschließt. (shrink)

We argue that objectivity is acquired by learning to refer to particular situations, that is, by developing episodicity. This contrasts with the widespread idea that genericity is crucial in developing humans’ ability to conceive of an objective world. According to the collective intentionality account, objectivity is acquired by contrasting one’s particular perspective in the “here and now” with a generic group perspective on how things are generally. However, this line of argument rests on confusing two independent notions of genericity: social (...) and worldly genericity. Holding these two notions apart shows that there is no coherent developmental route from episodicity to objectivity via genericity. In effect, the collective intentionality account presupposes objectivity. Alternatively, episodicity may develop by enculturation into the common practice of spatial-indexical use. This ability establishes an initial, socially shared spatiotemporal reference system comprising the basis for objectivity. (shrink)

The ability to refer to objects – singular reference – is arguably the decisive innovation on the way to human propositional cognition. This article argues that object individuation requires singular reference because basic singular terms, namely spatial indexicals, provide a symbolic frame of reference for object individuation. The authors suggest that singular reference is intrinsically connected to essential characteristics of propositionality: among other things, it guarantees the situation-independence of meaning, allows for the distinction between truth and falsehood, and enables us (...) to think about possibilities. The authors sketch how singular reference gives rise to the development of predication, the powerful logical tool of quantification, and forms the basis for differentiating between belief and desire. (shrink)

The current understanding of cognitive development rests on the premise that infants can individuate objects early on. However, the so-called object-first account faces severe difficulties explaining extant empirical findings in object individuation tasks while alternative, more parsimonious explanations are available. In this paper, we assume that children start as feature-thinkers without being able to individuate objects and show how this ability can be learned by thinkers who do not already implicitly possess the notion of an object. Based on Tugendhat's ideas (...) on the relation between singular terms and object reference, we argue that spatial indexicals comprise the fundamental means of object individuation and describe how feature thinkers might acquire the complex substitutional system of spatial indexicals. In closing, two accounts of object cognition that do not rely on symbolic capacities, namely Pylyshyn's FINST indexes and Burge's perceptual objectivity, are critically discussed. (shrink)

This article describes how methodologies of EU-funded research within the life sciences and biomedicine have recently become more gender sensitive. This transformation is the result of the Gender Impact Assessments of the EU Fifth Framework Programme, commissioned in 2000-1. The authors assessed the research programme for life sciences, which includes a large health-related component. The new guidelines for research emphasize the need for clear terminology for concepts of sex and gender and for a distinction to be made between the two, (...) for both life sciences and health research. Attention to possible sex differences, even in preclinical research, as well as to effects of gender, will lead to more adequate research data that serve the health of both men and women. The transformation to research becoming more gender-sensitive is further discussed in the context of feminist theory on the body. Being fully aware of the fact that what is happening in bodies is mediated by particular technologies, the authors make an appeal to invest in concepts that take the living and changing body into account. (shrink)

We report the results of a vignette study with an online sample of the German adult population in which we analyze the interplay between need, equity, and accountability in third-party distribution decisions. We asked participants to divide firewood between two hypothetical persons who either differ in their need for heat or in their productivity in terms of their ability to chop wood. The study systematically varies the persons’ accountability for their neediness as well as for their productivity. We find that (...) participants distribute significantly fewer logs of wood to persons who are held accountable for their disadvantage. Independently of being held accountable or not, the needier person is partially compensated with a share of logs that exceeds her contribution, while the person who contributes less is given a share of logs smaller than her need share. Moreover, there is a domain effect in terms of participants being more sensitive to lower contributions than to greater need. (shrink)

We explore the meaning and implications of Bourdieu’s construct of the field of power and integrate it into a wider conception of the formation and functioning of elites at the highest level in society. Corporate leaders active within the field of power hold prominent roles in numerous organizations, constituting an ‘elite of elites’, whose networks integrate powerful participants from different fields. As ‘bridging actors’, they form coalitions to determine institutional settlements and societal resource flows. We ask how some corporate actors (...) become hyper-agents, those actors who ‘make things happen’, while others remain ‘ordinary’ members of the elite. Three hypotheses are developed and tested using extensive data on the French business elite. Social class emerges as persistently important, challenging the myth of meritocratic inclusion. Our primary contribution to Bourdieusian scholarship lies in our analysis of hyper-agents, revealing the debts these dominants owe to elite schools and privileged classes. (shrink)

John Stuart Mill (1806-1873) gehört im angelsächsischen Raum seit jeher zu den Klassikern der Ideengeschichte. Aber auch im deutschsprachigen Raum wird er immer stärker rezipiert: Viele seiner Hauptschriften wurden neu editiert, sein Denken erfreut sich über die disziplinären Grenzen hinweg bis hinein in die Feuilletons wachsender Aufmerksamkeit. Das liegt nicht zuletzt an Mills ungewöhnlich undogmatischer Denkhaltung, die sich in der Berücksichtigung und Synthese verschiedenster Denkrichtungen niederschlägt. Seine Schriften zeugen von einem differenzierten Blick auf gesellschaftspolitische Zusammenhänge, was sie auch für moderne (...) Debatten vielfältig anschlussfähig macht. Das Handbuch stellt John Stuart Mills Leben, die wichtigsten Einflüsse auf sein Denken, sein Werk und die zentralen Konzepte sowie die Rezeption seines Denkens im Rahmen unterschiedlicher Diskurse vor. (shrink)

English summary: John Stuart Mill is not a classical proponent of liberalism, who wanted to reduce the scope of state competency to a minimum. The present work depicts Mill as a very versatile and unorthodox thinker, whose social revisions of the idea of the laissez-faire state gave his concept of the state connectivity to contemporary society. The individual studies discussed in this meaning of those particular aspects of Millian thought, which reject classical liberal doctrine. The background of the criticism of (...) the neoliberal social order also appears in this volume with valuable contributions for the current discourse. German description: John Stuart Mill ist kein klassischer Vertreter des Liberalismus, der die Staatstatigkeit auf ein Minimum reduzieren will. Der vorliegende Band zeigt Mill als ausserst vielseitigen und undogmatischen Denker, dessen soziale Korrekturen am Konzept des liberalen Nachtwachterstaates seinen Staatsbegriff auch heute noch anschlussfahig machen. Die einzelnen Beitrage diskutieren in diesem Sinne insbesondere diejenigen Aspekte des Mill'schen Denkens, die ueber die klassisch liberale Lehre hinaus weisen. Hier finden sich gerade auch vor dem Hintergrund der Kritik an neoliberalen Ordnungsvorstellungen wertvolle Anregungen fuer aktuelle Diskurse. (shrink)

This paper presents a proof of concept for a graphical models approach to assessing the moral coherence and moral robustness of systems of social interactions. “Moral coherence” refers to the degree to which the rights and duties of agents within a system are effectively respected when agents in the system comply with the rights and duties that are recognized as in force for the relevant context of interaction. “Moral robustness” refers to the degree to which a system of social interaction (...) is configured to ensure that the interests of agents are effectively respected even in the face of noncompliance. Using the case of conscientious objection of pharmacists to filling prescriptions for emergency contraception as an example, we illustrate how a graphical models approach can help stakeholders identify structural weaknesses in systems of social interaction and evaluate the relative merits of alternate organizational structures. By illustrating the merits of a graphical models approach we hope to spur further developments in this area. (shrink)

This book unearths and outlines the semantic foundations of white fragility and their consequences for racial justice in the United States. It argues that by expanding our racial vocabulary in certain ways, we can make progress toward justice equally enjoyed by all.

Contemporary arguments about private paramilitary organizations often focus on the threat of physical violence that they pose to the state: if such organizations garner enough physical power, then they can overtake the state via violent coup. Inspired by the legalist scholar Han Feizi’s position, we contend that such organizations also represent a sociopolitical, existential threat to the state. Specifically, their tendency for ideological expansion and subsequent gathering of political influence undermines state institutions, even without the use of overt physical force. (...) Consequently, the sociopolitical enterprise of having a unified, stable state is incompatible with the existence of, and public political support for, private paramilitary organizations, regardless of their actual or potential physical power. This argument succeeds regardless of the moral status of such paramilitary groups. Such groups, when they match the essential components of the description Han Feizi provides, are practically and politically antithetical to the integrity of the state. (shrink)

Perner and Roessler Causing human action: new perspectives on the causal theory of action, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, pp 199–228, 2010) hold that children who do not yet have an understanding of subjective perspectives, i.e., mental states, explain actions by appealing to objective facts. In this paper, we criticize this view. We argue that in order to understand objective facts, subjects need to understand perspectives. By analysing basic fact-expressing assertions, we show that subjects cannot refer to facts if they do (...) not understand two types of perspectivity, namely, spatial and doxastic perspectivity. To avoid conceptual confusion regarding different ways of referring to facts, we distinguish between reference to facts de re and de dicto. (shrink)

We report the results of a vignette experiment with a quota sample of the German population in which we analyze the interplay between need, equity, and accountability in third-party distributive decisions. We asked subjects to divide firewood between two hypothetical persons who either differ in their need for heat or in their productivity in terms of their ability to chop wood. The experiment systematically varies the persons’ accountability for their neediness as well as for their productivity. We find that subjects (...) distribute significantly fewer logs of wood to persons who are held accountable for their disadvantage. Independently of being held accountable or not, the needier person is always compensated with a share of logs that exceeds her contribution, while the person who contributes less is punished in terms of receiving a share of logs smaller than her need share. Moreover, there is a domain effect in terms of subjects being more sensitive to lower contributions than to greater need. (shrink)

A child is a developing person with evolving capacities that include autonomy, mental capacity and capacity to assume responsibility. Hence, children are entitled to participatory rights in South Africa as observed in the Children’s Act 38 of 2005. According to section 129 of the Act a child may consent to his or her own medical treatment provided that he or she is over the age of 12 years and is of sufficient maturity and decisional capacity to understand the various implications (...) of the treatment including the risks and benefits thereof. However, the Act does not provide a definition for what qualifies as ‘sufficient maturity’ nor does it stipulate how health professionals ought to assess the decisional capacity of a child. In addition, South Africa is a culturally diverse country. The Western liberal notion of autonomy may not necessarily find equal prominence in the mores of people with a different worldview. Hence we demonstrate a few salient comparisons between legal liberal moral theory and African communitarianism as pertinent to the autonomy of the child. Children are rights-holders by virtue of their humanity. Their dignity as individual human persons affords them the entitlement to human rights as contemplated under the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. However, contrary to the traditional Western notion of individual autonomous persons African societies hold a communalistic notion of person hence there is less regard for individual autonomy and rights with more emphasis on the communal good and maintaining the continuity of relationships and interdependencies shared within a community. A child considered in this view is not regarded as a full person. This implies that decisions concerning the child, including consent to medical treatment are discussed and determined by the community to which the child belongs. Lastly, in this article, we draw on the notion of capacity for responsibility to produce a pragmatic definition of sufficient maturity. It seems reasonable to suggest a move away from a general legal age of consent for medical treatment toward more individualised, context-specific approaches in determining the maturity of a child patient to consent to medical treatment. Perhaps, decision-making with respect to consent to the medical treatment of a child belonging to a traditional African community where the notion of a person is embedded in communitarianism ought to involve the child’s parents/guardians/caregivers where possible provided that the best interests of the child are awarded priority. (shrink)