Recent history reveals a series of rogue traders, jeopardizing their employers’ assets and reputation. There have been instances of unauthorized acting in concert between traders, their supervisors and/or firms’ decision makers and executives, resulting in collusive rogue trading. We explore organizational misbehaviour theory and explain three major collusive rogue trading events at National Australia Bank, JPMorgan with its London Whale and the interest reference rate manipulation/LIBOR scandal through a descriptive model of organizational/structural, individual and group forces. Our model draws conclusions (...) on how banks can set up behavioural risk management and internal control frameworks to mitigate potential collusive rogue trading. (shrink)

Zusammenfassung Die enge Widerspruchslösung in Österreich erlaubt eine postmortale Organspende bei fehlendem Widerspruch zu Lebzeiten, da von einer mutmaßlichen Zustimmung ausgegangen wird. Liegt kein Eintrag im Widerspruchsregister vor, wird die Familie zum mutmaßlichen Willen der verstorbenen Person befragt. Um die praktische Umsetzung der Widerspruchslösung in Österreich zu beschreiben, sollen relevante Aspekte der Angehörigengespräche und die Rolle der Familie im Entscheidungsprozess zur postmortalen Organspende identifiziert werden. Es wurden insgesamt zehn leitfadengestützte Expert:inneninterviews mit Ärzt:innen und Pflegepersonen an einer österreichischen Krankenanstalt durchgeführt, die (...) mithilfe der qualitativen Inhaltsanalyse nach Mayring unter Anwendung von MAXQDA ausgewertet wurden. Herausforderungen beim Ermitteln des mutmaßlichen Patient:innenwillens im Angehörigengespräch können aufgrund von unterschiedlichen Kulturen/Religionen, Uneinigkeit und Entscheidungsunfähigkeit in der Familie aufgrund von Trauer und der Schwierigkeit der Angehörigen, das Hirntodkonzept zu begreifen, entstehen. Daher ist eine gute Vorbereitung, ausreichend Zeit, interdisziplinäre Zusammenarbeit, das Schaffen von Vertrauen und professionelle Gesprächsführung sowie das Eingehen auf Fragen und Bedürfnisse von Angehörigen durch Ärzt:innen und Pflegepersonen in einem geeigneten Setting notwendig. Die Kommunikation mit Angehörigen bezüglich einer postmortalen Organspende ist sowohl für das Gesundheitspersonal als auch die Familie belastend. Anhand der Ergebnisse wird die Anwendung des Kommunikationsleitfadens der Gesundheit Österreich mit Erweiterung um die Information zur Gesetzeslage sowie regelmäßige Kommunikationsschulungen des Gesundheitspersonals empfohlen. Zudem wird eine flächendeckende Information der Bevölkerung zur Förderung der intrafamiliären Diskussion gefordert. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Introductory Remarks The ‘Construction Principles’of Hegel's Philosophy of Nature The Content of Hegel's “Mechanics” and “Physics” in Outline 31 Problems Inherent in the Sciences According to Hegel Conclusions References.

Kant’s critique/doctrine distinction tracks the difference between a canon for the understanding’s proper use and an organon for its dialectical misuse. The latter reflects the dogmatic use of reason to attain a doctrine of knowledge with no antecedent critique. In the 1790s, Fichte collapses Kant’s distinction and redefines dogmatism. He argues that deriving a canon is essentially dialectical and thus yields an organon: critical idealism is properly a doctrine of science or Wissenschaftslehre. Criticism is furthermore said to refute dogmatism, by (...) which Fichte means Spinozism. Schelling repudiates Fichte’s position in his Philosophical Letters by reviving Kant’s distinction. First, ‘critique’ for Schelling names a canon that is valid for all systems—including Spinozism—and thus favours none—not even the Wissenschaftslehre. Second, Schelling coins ‘dogmaticism’ to refer to what Kant calls ‘dogmatism’: reason’s uncritical claim to doctrine. Hence, he says all systems—even Fichte’s—are susceptible to the ‘enthusiasm’ of mistaking themselves for doctrines or ‘objects of knowledge’, instead of subjectively valid ‘objects of freedom’. I reconstruct Schelling’s argument for reviving Kant’s distinction, while noting two consequences for German idealism. First, if criticism favours no system, a system’s origin cannot be an act of knowledge, e.g., intellectual intuition, but only an act of endorsement. Second, if dogmaticism entails enthusiasm, a system’s goal cannot be absolute knowledge, but only infinite striving. Hence, by retrieving Schelling’s notion of dogmaticism, we can both gain a better understanding of the Letters and register the impact of a core Kantian distinction on the German idealist project. (shrink)

(2005). Hegel's Anti-Reductionism. Angelaki: Vol. 10, continental philosophy and the sciences the german traditionissue editor: damian veal, pp. 61-76.

The persisting conception of Hegel's criticism of Newton's physics as an irrational or at least hopelessly exaggerated one partly has its roots mainly in Hegel's terminology and in his style. This does not mean that a mere translation of Hegel's arguments into any contemporary philosophical language be sufficient to immediately convince every Newtonian scientist. However, a non-Hegelian way of rephrasing the core of Hegel's anti-Newtonian philosophy of nature can help to understand to which extent the latter does satisfy any scientist's (...) criteria for a rational and self-consistent theory. To demonstrate this is the central aim of my talk, which is structured as follows: In the first part, I'm trying to highlight basic features of Hegel's criticism of Newton's optics and celestial mechanics, eventually focussing on his concept of a "sense of nature". This part has the character of a review. Second -­ and that is supposed to be the "reconsideration" part of my paper -­ I'll try to highlight the fundamental difference between Newton's and Hegel's ideas of natural laws and of the relation between mathematics and physics. Third, the metaphysical background of this difference will be analyzed. It is by the analysis of this metaphysical background that I hope to render Hegel's criticism of Newton's scientific revolution more understandable. (shrink)

_Teachers Investigate Their Work_ introduces the methods and concepts of action research through examples drawn from studies carried out by teachers. The book is arranged as a handbook with numerous sub-headings for easy reference and fourty-one practical methods and strategies to put into action, some of them flagged as suitable `starters'. Throughout the book, the authors draw on their international practical experience of action research, working in close collaboration with teachers. It is an essential guide for teachers, senior staff and (...) co-ordinators of teacher professional development who are interested in investigating their own practice in order to improve it. (shrink)

Meillassoux seeks knowledge of transcendental reality, blaming Kant for the ‘correlationist’ proscription of independent access to either thought or being. For Meillassoux, correlationism blocks an account of the meaning of ‘ancestral statements’ regarding reality prior to humans. I examine three charges on which Meillassoux’s argument depends: (1) Kant distorts ancestral statements’ meaning; (2) Kant fallaciously infers causality’s necessity; (3) Kant’s transcendental idealism cannot grasp ‘the great outdoors’. I reject these charges: (1) imposes a Cartesian misreading, hence Meillassoux’s false assumption that, (...) for Kant, objects don’t exist without subjects; (2) misreads Kant, who infers causality’s necessity from the possibility of experience; (3) casts Kant’s idealism as subjective, ignoring his perspectival portrayal of it. (shrink)

(2009). Lectures on the History of Philosophy 1825–26. Vol. II: Greek Philosophy. British Journal for the History of Philosophy: Vol. 17, No. 1, pp. 218-221.

Bazzocchi disposes the text of the Tractatus in a user-friendly manner, exactly as Wittgenstein's decimals advise. This discloses the logical form of the book by distinct reading units, linked into a fashioned hierarchical tree. The text becomes much clearer and every reader can enjoy, finally, its formal and literary qualities.

Knowledge of mechanisms is critical for causal reasoning. We contrasted two possible organizations of causal knowledge—an interconnected causal network, where events are causally connected without any boundaries delineating discrete mechanisms; or a set of disparate mechanisms—causal islands—such that events in different mechanisms are not thought to be related even when they belong to the same causal chain. To distinguish these possibilities, we tested whether people make transitive judgments about causal chains by inferring, given A causes B and B causes C, (...) that A causes C. Specifically, causal chains schematized as one chunk or mechanism in semantic memory led to transitive causal judgments. On the other hand, chains schematized as multiple chunks led to intransitive judgments despite strong intermediate links. Normative accounts of causal intransitivity could not explain these intransitive judgments. (shrink)

Information can be public among a group. Whether or not information is public matters, for example, for accounts of interdependent rational choice, of communication, and of joint intention. A standard analysis of public information identifies it with (some variant of) common belief. The latter notion is stipulatively defined as an infinite conjunction: for p to be commonly believed is for it to believed by all members of a group, for all members to believe that all members believe it, and so (...) forth. This analysis is often presupposed without much argument in philosophy. Theoretical entrenchment or intuitions about cases might give some traction on the question, but give little insight about why the identification holds, if it does. The strategy of this paper is to characterize a practical-normative role for information being public, and show that the only things that play that role are (variants of) common belief as stipulatively characterized. In more detail: a functional role for “taking a proposition for granted” in non-isolated decision making is characterized. I then present some minimal conditions under which such an attitude is correctly held. The key assumption links this attitude to beliefs about what is public. From minimal a priori principles, we can argue that a proposition being public among a group entails common commitment to believe among that group. Later sections explore partial converses to this result, the factivity of publicity and publicity from the perspective of outsiders to the group, and objections to the aprioricity of the result deriving from a posteriori existential presuppositions. (shrink)

In this book William G. Lycan offers an epistemology of philosophy itself, a partial method for philosophical inquiry. The epistemology features three ultimate sources of justified philosophical belief. First, common sense, in a carefully restricted sense of the term-the sorts of contingentpropositions Moore defended against idealists and skeptics. Second, the deliverances of well confirmed science. Third and more fundamentally, intuitions about cases in a carefully specified sense of that term. The first half of On Evidence in Philosophy expounds a version (...) of Moore's method and applies it to each of several issues. This version is shown to resist all the standard objections to Moore; most of them do not even apply. It is argued, in Chapters 5 and 6, that philosophical method is far lesspowerful than most have taken it to be. In particular, deductive argument can accomplish very little, and hardly ever is an opposing position refuted except by common sense or by science. The final two chapters defend the evidential status of intuitions and the Goodmanian method of reflectiveequilibrium; it is argued that philosophy always and everywhere depends on them. The method is then set within a more general explanatory-coherentist epistemology, which is shown to resist standard forms of skepticism.In sum, William G. Lycan advocates a picture of philosophy as a very wide explanatory reflective equilibrium incorporating common sense, science, and our firmest intuitions on any topic-and nothing more, not ever. (shrink)

Unlike some other reproductions of classic texts (1) We have not used OCR(Optical Character Recognition), as this leads to bad quality books with introduced typos. (2) In books where there are images such as portraits, maps, sketches etc We have endeavoured to keep the quality of these images, so they represent accurately the original artefact. Although occasionally there may be certain imperfections with these old texts, we feel they deserve to be made available for future generations to enjoy.

Anscombe on thought, experience, sensation, and the ethics of virtue Gertrude Elizabeth Margaret Anscombe is one of analytical philosophy's most prominent figures, the founder of consequentialism, and a leading mind in the field of virtue ethics. Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Mind: The collected Philosophical Papers of G.E.M. Anscombe, Volume 2, is part of a multivolume compilation of her life's work, providing insight into the mind of a groundbreaking 20th century philosopher. This volume's work explores memory, intentionality, causality and time, (...) delving into the language, actions, and logic of perception, sensation, and more. (shrink)

A directory of archives and manuscript repositories, with links to web pages for the repositories and to online finding aids. Searchable by: collection name; city; state; National Inventory of Documentary Sources (NIDS) number; and National Union Catalog of Manuscript Collections (NUCMC) number.