I have always found it a sore trial of my faith to regard suam ipsam as = suam dominant, and can only join ipsam with matrem. This leaves suam stand alone, as = suam dominam. That use is doubtless defensible of a wife or mistress in the case of a lover; but it is hardly possible of a sparrow, to whom the lady does not ‘belong’ in that relation. That one who is not lover or husband may know suos is (...) no proof that he may know suum or suam alone. (shrink)

quam dolor hie umquam spatio euanescere possit,leniat aut odium tempus et hora meum.Here “spatio” means “lapse of time” : it is illustrated by A. A. II. 113forma bonum fragile est, quantumque accedit ad annos,fit minor et spatio carpitur ipsa suo.As regards the whole couplet, besides at this place, it is found also after line 40 in all the MSS. except the Galeanus Vaticanus and Phillipps MS. There, though it fits in with the context, it is not required: here it is (...) indispensable. It should therefore be omitted from the text after line 40, where its presence is due to that species of interpolation which consisted in the insertion of other portions of a writer's work kindred in meaning, on which see Mr. Hall's Companion to Classical Texts, p. 198. (shrink)

The supposed difficulties of this famous passage are set forth in Conington's notes. In reality they have been created by a misunderstanding, and chiefly through forgetfulness that the English of pauci is ' only a few.' In vv. 743–747 the sense is not that the souls dwell in Elysium ' until lapse of time hath removed the ingrown corruption.' This would surely require donee … exemerit …purumque reliquerit.The fact is that Anchises is explaining his own presence in Elysium at so (...) early a date after his death. If souls require a prolonged purgation before reaching Elysium and the laeta arua, how comes it that he himself is already there? The answer is—because he is one of the few in whose case the process was a short one.Quisque suos patimur Manes, says he, and the length and nature of the purgation depend upon what your Manes deserve and require.?‘ All souls go through such punishment and refining as are necessary.We each suffer our own Manes, and only a few of us are so fortunate as to enjoy the happy fields before a long period has removed the impurities.’ He is himself one of those who have so escaped, and hence his presence here to meet Aeneas so soon after decease. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 259 to the non-Latin reader; instead, it turns out to be a sort of catalogue of opinions on a wide variety of philosophical topics held by many of the thinkers active in the period: between St: Paul and. Marsilius of Padua. But a few facts and figures will, I think, show why' La filosofia medievale is more properly characterized as Liber Sententiarum than Antologia di testi...... Of (...) the book's 440 pages, 306 are occupied by actual text materials, the balance being. taken up with. bit-bibliographical prefatory remarks to each of the selections, an index, and the Table of Contents. Since selections from the works of thirty-five mediaeval authors are presented (!), an equable distribution of the 306 pages would leave something less than nine pages to be devoted to each writer. But as some of the selected figures, e.g., Augustine, Aquinas, and Ockham, have as many as 29 pages devoted to their writings, the others are given wholly inadequate representation. Now from this it can be easily seen that at best, i.e., where the full upper limit of space is assigned to the writings of any one of the mediaevals, his attack and stand on some chosen philosophical issue might be fairly represented. But when we look to the few men who are thus singled out for special consideration and note that their allotments of pages are spent on a great number of topics, drawn from many different works, the effect within the scope of a single "lengthy" selection mirrors perfectly the patchy and kaleidoscopic character of the entire collection. On the positive side, it must be noted at once that the translations are excellent: faithful and clear. The prefaces, albeit quite general, are accurate and informative; while the bibliographies, particularly those that deal with primary sources, are up-to-date and helpful. Further, it was most gratifying to find that this volume included selections culled from the writings of such oft-referred to, but never-anthologized figures as Peter Damian (289 pages), Gilbertus Porretanus (5~ pages), Vincent of Beauvais (4 pages), and Siger of Brabant (3 pages). An error occurs in the Table of Contents where Giustino, Atenagora, and Tertulliano, who should be listed under "L'apologetica cristiana," are cited under "Nuovo mestamento." To sum up: in a foredoomed attempt to be exhaustive of i momenti pith importanti del travaglio speculativo... dell'umanit~t per oltre 13 secoli, dall'avvento del Cristianesimo alle soglie della Rinascenza (Foreword), the eight collaborating editors of La filosofia medievale bit off much more than even their considerable talents could possibly have chewed--let alone properly digested. As a result, this book of readings, despite the excellences pointed out above, comes off a Book o] Sentences upon which (unlike Peter the Lombard's) only one Commentary can be written: inadequate. HERMAN SHAPIRO San lose State College Juan de Vald~s: la sua vitae il suo pensiero religioso. Con una completa bibliografia delle opere del Vald~s e degli scritti intorno a lui. Seconda edizione riveduta ed aggiornata. By Edmondo Clone. (Napoli: Fausto Fiorentino Editore, 1963. Pp. 225. = Collana di Studi e Testi di Letteratura, VII.) The Spaniard Juan de Vald~s (ca. 1495-1541) is one of the most significant personalities of Reformation times. He represents the flowering of Erasmian religious thought. Vald~s however keeps referring his readers to St Paul rather than to Erasmus. For Vald~s "the 260 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY Christian business" is not knowledge but experience. He founds religious certainty on individual inspiration and emphasizes charity against external written law. A man inspired by God becomes autonomous and acquires a mind of his own--independent of external authorities. This valuable study (pp. 5-109) is followed by an extensive bibliography (pp. 113--209) in which it could be added that Vald~s' Al[abeto Cristiano was reprinted in 1948 by the Editorial "La Aurora" of Buenos Aires. In 1946 this publisher considered (in the Preface to his reprint of Vald~s' Dicilogo de Doctrina Cristiana, p. 12) republishing also Vald6s' Ciento y diez consideraciones divinas. PAUL T. FUrIRMAN~ Columbia Theological Seminary Descartes. Oeuvres philosophiques. Tome I (1618-1637.) Textes 6tablis, pr6sent6s et... (shrink)

Nella problematica generale dei rapporti tra Dio e l'uomo rientra il problema del diritto naturale. Tale problema si e manifestato in modo particolare nel secolo XVII come dimostra lo studio di Ugo Grozio (1583-1645). L'attualita delle sue idee e vivo anche oggi sia in Italia che all'estero; Grozio e ricordato soprattutto dai giuristi, nonostante la sua attivita si sia svolta anche in altri campi come dimostra l'opera bibliografica di Meulen J. Ter e Diermanse. Molti studiosi elogiano le sue impostazioni giuridiche (...) come per esempio G.B. Vico che lo chiama iurisconsultus generis humani. D'altra parte ci sono anche molti critici poco entusiasti del suo pensiero e che anzi lo accusano considerandolo l'iniziatore di una nuova corrente dottrinale che rompe la vera linea del diritto naturale iniziata dai greci, perfezionata dai romani e ripresa dalla scolastica. Da tutto questo appare chiaro che non e facile entrare nel pensiero del giurista di Delft. Questo lavoro vorrebbe dare una risposta al problema del diritto naturale e del suo rapporto con Dio. Si vuol vedere come si puo accordare la famosa affermazione una sola volta nel Prolegomena 11 del De iure belli ac pacis, che le norme del diritto naturale alocum aliquem haberent etiam daremusanon esse Deum, aut non curari a beo negotia humanaa la quale sembra separare il diritto dalla Divinita con la convinzione veramente religiosa di Grozio e con i suoi continui richiami all'autorita delle Sacre Scritture, dei Padri della Chiesa e dei teologi. (shrink)

Kant’s critique/doctrine distinction tracks the difference between a canon for the understanding’s proper use and an organon for its dialectical misuse. The latter reflects the dogmatic use of reason to attain a doctrine of knowledge with no antecedent critique. In the 1790s, Fichte collapses Kant’s distinction and redefines dogmatism. He argues that deriving a canon is essentially dialectical and thus yields an organon: critical idealism is properly a doctrine of science or Wissenschaftslehre. Criticism is furthermore said to refute dogmatism, by (...) which Fichte means Spinozism. Schelling repudiates Fichte’s position in his Philosophical Letters by reviving Kant’s distinction. First, ‘critique’ for Schelling names a canon that is valid for all systems—including Spinozism—and thus favours none—not even the Wissenschaftslehre. Second, Schelling coins ‘dogmaticism’ to refer to what Kant calls ‘dogmatism’: reason’s uncritical claim to doctrine. Hence, he says all systems—even Fichte’s—are susceptible to the ‘enthusiasm’ of mistaking themselves for doctrines or ‘objects of knowledge’, instead of subjectively valid ‘objects of freedom’. I reconstruct Schelling’s argument for reviving Kant’s distinction, while noting two consequences for German idealism. First, if criticism favours no system, a system’s origin cannot be an act of knowledge, e.g., intellectual intuition, but only an act of endorsement. Second, if dogmaticism entails enthusiasm, a system’s goal cannot be absolute knowledge, but only infinite striving. Hence, by retrieving Schelling’s notion of dogmaticism, we can both gain a better understanding of the Letters and register the impact of a core Kantian distinction on the German idealist project. (shrink)

Questo studio costituisce la prima monografia italiana su una delle più complesse pensatrici dell’ultimo millennio. Filosofa dal pensiero formidabile, così ne parlò Sarah Boxer sul New York Times, Gertrude Elizabeth Margaret Anscombe, moglie di Peter Geach e madre di sette figli, ha sempre battagliato per la verità. In lei vita, passione e filosofia sono un tutt’uno e in tale unità si cela l’irriducibilità e il fascino del suo pensiero. In compagnia dei classici dell’antichità, dei moderni e di quei filosofi del (...) panorama contemporaneo con cui era solita dialogare, in primis Ludwig Wittgenstein, ella arrivò a elaborare un pensiero del tutto personale quale risposta ai diversi problemi sollevati in ambito sociale. Non a caso, come osserva Jane O’Grady, talvolta venne soprannominata la Dragon Lady di Oxford. Basti citare la sua opposizione pubblica al conferimento della laurea honoris causa al presidente Truman, o alle sfide che fronteggiò in campo morale. Autrice di numerosissime pubblicazioni, nel 1958 stilò il famoso scritto Modern Moral Philosophy, poi divenuto il manifesto della rinascita di un’etica di tipo neo-aristotelico. Il volume si conclude con una breve raccolta di testimonianze di persone, docenti, allievi e amici che hanno avuto occasione di incontrarla. E come ricorda Rosalind Hursthouse, Anscombe era una “filosofa straordinaria, e del tutto eccezionale”. (shrink)

Meillassoux seeks knowledge of transcendental reality, blaming Kant for the ‘correlationist’ proscription of independent access to either thought or being. For Meillassoux, correlationism blocks an account of the meaning of ‘ancestral statements’ regarding reality prior to humans. I examine three charges on which Meillassoux’s argument depends: (1) Kant distorts ancestral statements’ meaning; (2) Kant fallaciously infers causality’s necessity; (3) Kant’s transcendental idealism cannot grasp ‘the great outdoors’. I reject these charges: (1) imposes a Cartesian misreading, hence Meillassoux’s false assumption that, (...) for Kant, objects don’t exist without subjects; (2) misreads Kant, who infers causality’s necessity from the possibility of experience; (3) casts Kant’s idealism as subjective, ignoring his perspectival portrayal of it. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 259 to the non-Latin reader; instead, it turns out to be a sort of catalogue of opinions on a wide variety of philosophical topics held by many of the thinkers active in the period: between St: Paul and. Marsilius of Padua. But a few facts and figures will, I think, show why' La filosofia medievale is more properly characterized as Liber Sententiarum than Antologia di testi...... Of (...) the book's 440 pages, 306 are occupied by actual text materials, the balance being. taken up with. bit-bibliographical prefatory remarks to each of the selections, an index, and the Table of Contents. Since selections from the works of thirty-five mediaeval authors are presented (!), an equable distribution of the 306 pages would leave something less than nine pages to be devoted to each writer. But as some of the selected figures, e.g., Augustine, Aquinas, and Ockham, have as many as 29 pages devoted to their writings, the others are given wholly inadequate representation. Now from this it can be easily seen that at best, i.e., where the full upper limit of space is assigned to the writings of any one of the mediaevals, his attack and stand on some chosen philosophical issue might be fairly represented. But when we look to the few men who are thus singled out for special consideration and note that their allotments of pages are spent on a great number of topics, drawn from many different works, the effect within the scope of a single "lengthy" selection mirrors perfectly the patchy and kaleidoscopic character of the entire collection. On the positive side, it must be noted at once that the translations are excellent: faithful and clear. The prefaces, albeit quite general, are accurate and informative; while the bibliographies, particularly those that deal with primary sources, are up-to-date and helpful. Further, it was most gratifying to find that this volume included selections culled from the writings of such oft-referred to, but never-anthologized figures as Peter Damian (289 pages), Gilbertus Porretanus (5~ pages), Vincent of Beauvais (4 pages), and Siger of Brabant (3 pages). An error occurs in the Table of Contents where Giustino, Atenagora, and Tertulliano, who should be listed under "L'apologetica cristiana," are cited under "Nuovo mestamento." To sum up: in a foredoomed attempt to be exhaustive of i momenti pith importanti del travaglio speculativo... dell'umanit~t per oltre 13 secoli, dall'avvento del Cristianesimo alle soglie della Rinascenza (Foreword), the eight collaborating editors of La filosofia medievale bit off much more than even their considerable talents could possibly have chewed--let alone properly digested. As a result, this book of readings, despite the excellences pointed out above, comes off a Book o] Sentences upon which (unlike Peter the Lombard's) only one Commentary can be written: inadequate. HERMAN SHAPIRO San lose State College Juan de Vald~s: la sua vitae il suo pensiero religioso. Con una completa bibliografia delle opere del Vald~s e degli scritti intorno a lui. Seconda edizione riveduta ed aggiornata. By Edmondo Clone. (Napoli: Fausto Fiorentino Editore, 1963. Pp. 225. = Collana di Studi e Testi di Letteratura, VII.) The Spaniard Juan de Vald~s (ca. 1495-1541) is one of the most significant personalities of Reformation times. He represents the flowering of Erasmian religious thought. Vald~s however keeps referring his readers to St Paul rather than to Erasmus. For Vald~s "the 260 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY Christian business" is not knowledge but experience. He founds religious certainty on individual inspiration and emphasizes charity against external written law. A man inspired by God becomes autonomous and acquires a mind of his own--independent of external authorities. This valuable study (pp. 5-109) is followed by an extensive bibliography (pp. 113--209) in which it could be added that Vald~s' Al[abeto Cristiano was reprinted in 1948 by the Editorial "La Aurora" of Buenos Aires. In 1946 this publisher considered (in the Preface to his reprint of Vald~s' Dicilogo de Doctrina Cristiana, p. 12) republishing also Vald6s' Ciento y diez consideraciones divinas. PAUL T. FUrIRMAN~ Columbia Theological Seminary Descartes. Oeuvres philosophiques. Tome I (1618-1637.) Textes 6tablis, pr6sent6s et... (shrink)

Scientists normally earn less money than many other professions which require a similar amount of training and qualification. The economic theory of marginal utility and cost-benefit analysis can be applied to explain this phenomenon. Although scientists make less money than entertainment stars, the scientists do research work out of their interest and they also enjoy a much higher reputation and social status in some countries.

The Chinese academic assessment and incentive system drew mixed responses from academia. In the essay the author tried to explain why the current assessment system is appropriate in China and an opportunistic behavior in Chinese academia is exposed.

This study aims to explore effective ways to improve college students’ entrepreneurial self-efficacy and intentions through entrepreneurship education. The survey used a random sample of 804 college students in Zhejiang Province, China. The results show that: In terms of the characteristics of entrepreneurial intention, there are significant differences in gender, entrepreneurial experience, entrepreneurial competition experience, and family background of self-employment. There are significant differences in the characteristics of entrepreneurship education in gender, entrepreneurial competition experience, and the family background of self-employment. (...) In the relationship among entrepreneurship education, entrepreneurial self-efficacy, and entrepreneurial intention, entrepreneurship education is significantly and positively related to entrepreneurial self-efficacy and entrepreneurial intention. Entrepreneurial self-efficacy is significantly and positively associated with entrepreneurial intention. Entrepreneurial self-efficacy plays a complete mediating role between entrepreneurship education and entrepreneurial intention. Entrepreneurial self-efficacy also has a suppressing effect on the relationship between the two. Entrepreneurial competition experience moderates the second half of the mediating effect of entrepreneurial self-efficacy. Finally, the study offers several proposals for the teaching practice of entrepreneurship education. (shrink)

Bazzocchi disposes the text of the Tractatus in a user-friendly manner, exactly as Wittgenstein's decimals advise. This discloses the logical form of the book by distinct reading units, linked into a fashioned hierarchical tree. The text becomes much clearer and every reader can enjoy, finally, its formal and literary qualities.

Knowledge of mechanisms is critical for causal reasoning. We contrasted two possible organizations of causal knowledge—an interconnected causal network, where events are causally connected without any boundaries delineating discrete mechanisms; or a set of disparate mechanisms—causal islands—such that events in different mechanisms are not thought to be related even when they belong to the same causal chain. To distinguish these possibilities, we tested whether people make transitive judgments about causal chains by inferring, given A causes B and B causes C, (...) that A causes C. Specifically, causal chains schematized as one chunk or mechanism in semantic memory led to transitive causal judgments. On the other hand, chains schematized as multiple chunks led to intransitive judgments despite strong intermediate links. Normative accounts of causal intransitivity could not explain these intransitive judgments. (shrink)

Information can be public among a group. Whether or not information is public matters, for example, for accounts of interdependent rational choice, of communication, and of joint intention. A standard analysis of public information identifies it with (some variant of) common belief. The latter notion is stipulatively defined as an infinite conjunction: for p to be commonly believed is for it to believed by all members of a group, for all members to believe that all members believe it, and so (...) forth. This analysis is often presupposed without much argument in philosophy. Theoretical entrenchment or intuitions about cases might give some traction on the question, but give little insight about why the identification holds, if it does. The strategy of this paper is to characterize a practical-normative role for information being public, and show that the only things that play that role are (variants of) common belief as stipulatively characterized. In more detail: a functional role for “taking a proposition for granted” in non-isolated decision making is characterized. I then present some minimal conditions under which such an attitude is correctly held. The key assumption links this attitude to beliefs about what is public. From minimal a priori principles, we can argue that a proposition being public among a group entails common commitment to believe among that group. Later sections explore partial converses to this result, the factivity of publicity and publicity from the perspective of outsiders to the group, and objections to the aprioricity of the result deriving from a posteriori existential presuppositions. (shrink)

In this book William G. Lycan offers an epistemology of philosophy itself, a partial method for philosophical inquiry. The epistemology features three ultimate sources of justified philosophical belief. First, common sense, in a carefully restricted sense of the term-the sorts of contingentpropositions Moore defended against idealists and skeptics. Second, the deliverances of well confirmed science. Third and more fundamentally, intuitions about cases in a carefully specified sense of that term. The first half of On Evidence in Philosophy expounds a version (...) of Moore's method and applies it to each of several issues. This version is shown to resist all the standard objections to Moore; most of them do not even apply. It is argued, in Chapters 5 and 6, that philosophical method is far lesspowerful than most have taken it to be. In particular, deductive argument can accomplish very little, and hardly ever is an opposing position refuted except by common sense or by science. The final two chapters defend the evidential status of intuitions and the Goodmanian method of reflectiveequilibrium; it is argued that philosophy always and everywhere depends on them. The method is then set within a more general explanatory-coherentist epistemology, which is shown to resist standard forms of skepticism.In sum, William G. Lycan advocates a picture of philosophy as a very wide explanatory reflective equilibrium incorporating common sense, science, and our firmest intuitions on any topic-and nothing more, not ever. (shrink)

Unlike some other reproductions of classic texts (1) We have not used OCR(Optical Character Recognition), as this leads to bad quality books with introduced typos. (2) In books where there are images such as portraits, maps, sketches etc We have endeavoured to keep the quality of these images, so they represent accurately the original artefact. Although occasionally there may be certain imperfections with these old texts, we feel they deserve to be made available for future generations to enjoy.

Anscombe on thought, experience, sensation, and the ethics of virtue Gertrude Elizabeth Margaret Anscombe is one of analytical philosophy's most prominent figures, the founder of consequentialism, and a leading mind in the field of virtue ethics. Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Mind: The collected Philosophical Papers of G.E.M. Anscombe, Volume 2, is part of a multivolume compilation of her life's work, providing insight into the mind of a groundbreaking 20th century philosopher. This volume's work explores memory, intentionality, causality and time, (...) delving into the language, actions, and logic of perception, sensation, and more. (shrink)