In this paper, we consider a notion of nonmeasurablity with respect to Marczewski and Marczewski-like tree ideals $s_0$, $m_0$, $l_0$, $cl_0$, $h_0,$ and $ch_0$. We show that there exists a subset of the Baire space $\omega ^\omega,$ which is s-, l-, and m-nonmeasurable that forms a dominating m.e.d. family. We investigate a notion of ${\mathbb {T}}$ -Bernstein sets—sets which intersect but do not contain any body of any tree from a given family of trees ${\mathbb {T}}$. We also obtain a (...) result on ${\mathcal {I}}$ -Luzin sets, namely, we prove that if ${\mathfrak {c}}$ is a regular cardinal, then the algebraic sum of a generalized Luzin set and a generalized Sierpiński set belongs to $s_0, m_0$, $l_0,$ and $cl_0$. (shrink)

Let Γn be a formula of LPA meaning “there is a proof of φ from PA-axioms, in which ω-rule is iterated no more than n times”. We examine relations over pairs of natural numbers of the kind. ≦H iff PA + RFNn' ⊩ RFNn .Where H denotes one of the hierarchies ∑ or Π and RFNn is the scheme of the reflection principle for Γn restricted to formulas from the class C implies “φ is true”, for every φ ∈ C). (...) Our main result is that. ≦H if n ≦ n' and k ≦ max. (shrink)

This article aims to read feminist new materialisms (Barad), together with ‘postulated’ linguistic or cultural primacy of Queer Theory (Butler), to show how both are engaged in similar critical-ethical endeavours. The central argument is that the criticism of Barad and new materialisms misses Butler’s materialistic insights due to a narrow interpretation of Butler's alleged social-constructivist position. There is, therefore, a specific focus on where they both make similar ethical appeals. Moreover, the article relies on Adorno's negative dialectic to highlight an (...) interpretation of Barad and Butler as being part of the same dialectical movement, in which materialism and idealism fluctuate in their mutual criticisms, thus continuing the procession towards 'new knowledge' and emancipation, or freedom, through their motions back and forth. (shrink)

Niniejszy esej stanowi piąty rozdział tomu The Realm of Spirit kończącego cykl The Realms of Being. Podstawą przekładu jest pierwsze wydanie dzieła: George Santayana, The Realms of Being (London: Constable and Co., Ltd., Toronto: The Macmillan Company, 1940), 67–89. -/- This essay is the fifth chapter of The Realm of Spirit volume concluding The Realms of Being series. The translation is based on the first edition of the work: George Santayana, The Realms of Being (London: Constable and Co., Ltd., Toronto: (...) The Macmillan Company, 1940), 67-89. (shrink)

The book challenges the values of much of contemporary bioethics and health care policy by confronting their failure to secure the moral norms they seek to apply.

Mit der Vorstellung vom Stil als Eigentum verbindet sich die Hoffnung, Exklusivitätsrechte auf ererbte, erlernte, gekaufte, geborgte, geschenkte oder auch gestohlene Epochen-, National- oder Individualstile geltend machen zu können. Da sich der stets unscharfe und relationale Stilbegriff gleichwohl nur bedingt juristisch einhegen lässt, ist das Recht auf den Stil vor allem in historiografischen, ethischen oder ideologischen Diskursen ausgefochten worden. Ihnen widmet sich der vorliegende Band.

Obecna dominacja hedonizmu, a ściślej eudajmonistycznego ideału „udanego życia” jako samorealizacji opierającej się na potęgowaniu jednostkowego szczęścia stanowi symptom procesów modernizacyjnych, które dogłębnie zmieniły naszą społeczną i kulturową rzeczywistość. Poziom względnego dobrobytu osiągnięty w najbardziej rozwiniętych częściach świata sprzyja upowszechnianiu się wiary w nieomal bezgraniczną wolność jednostki, która coraz częściej i intensywniej poddaje krytycznej refleksji panujące dotąd systemy aksjologiczne. Świat wartości etycznych pluralizuje się, rozprasza i traci na naszych oczach swoje stabilne fundamenty. Pomimo licznych symptomów kryzysowych wciąż jednak utrzymuje się (...) powszechny stan względnego samozadowolenia, który syci się przekonaniem o „etycznej wyższości” kultury Zachodu. Wprawdzie przyznajemy, że świat liberalnej demokracji, w jakim żyjemy, stopniowo traci swój „moralny kręgosłup", ale nadal żywimy przekonanie, że nie ma dla niego żadnej lepszej realnej alternatywy. Opisywany przez prezentowanych w niniejszej monografii autorów proces estetyzacji życia codziennego, historii i polityki bynajmniej nie poprawia tej sytuacji, lecz wydaje się jedynie pogłębiać nasze etyczne rozchwianie. (shrink)

Provability, Computability and Reflection.

This is the first complete, one-volume English translation of the ancient Chinese text Xunzi, one of the most extensive, sophisticated, and elegant works in the tradition of Confucian thought. Through essays, poetry, dialogues, and anecdotes, the Xunzi articulates a Confucian perspective on ethics, politics, warfare, language, psychology, human nature, ritual, and music, among other topics. Aimed at general readers and students of Chinese thought, Eric Hutton’s translation makes the full text of this important work more accessible in English than ever (...) before. Named for its purported author, the Xunzi has long been neglected compared to works such as the Analects of Confucius and the Mencius. Yet interest in the Xunzi has grown in recent decades, and the text presents a much more systematic vision of the Confucian ideal than the fragmented sayings of Confucius and Mencius. In one famous, explicit contrast to them, the Xunzi argues that human nature is bad. However, it also allows that people can become good through rituals and institutions established by earlier sages. Indeed, the main purpose of the Xunzi is to urge people to become as good as possible, both for their own sakes and for the sake of peace and order in the world. In this edition, key terms are consistently translated to aid understanding and line numbers are provided for easy reference. Other features include a concise introduction, a timeline of early Chinese history, a list of important names and terms, cross-references, brief explanatory notes, a bibliography, and an index. (shrink)

The development of transplantation technology increasingly places before society a multitude of diverse, complex ethical and legal problems. The subject is the more complex because of the various divergent interests involved. There are the interests of the donor of organs, who has a right to protection of his legal position, and those of the patient in need of an often lifesaving organ. There are also the interests of the donor’s relatives, after his death, and those of the transplantation surgeons. The (...) international dimension of transplantation technology makes the picture even more complicated. Though this article is devoted to the European situation, the problems are similar all over the world. (shrink)

The development of transplantation technology increasingly places before society a multitude of diverse, complex ethical and legal problems. The subject is the more complex because of the various divergent interests involved. There are the interests of the donor of organs, who has a right to protection of his legal position, and those of the patient in need of an often lifesaving organ. There are also the interests of the donor’s relatives, after his death, and those of the transplantation surgeons. The (...) international dimension of transplantation technology makes the picture even more complicated. Though this article is devoted to the European situation, the problems are similar all over the world. (shrink)

Catastrophic risk raises questions that are not only of practical importance, but also of great philosophical interest, such as how to define catastrophe and what distinguishes catastrophic outcomes from non-catastrophic ones. Catastrophic risk also raises questions about how to rationally respond to such risks. How to rationally respond arguably partly depends on the severity of the uncertainty, for instance, whether quantitative probabilistic information is available, or whether only comparative likelihood information is available, or neither type of information. Finally, catastrophic risk (...) raises important ethical questions about what to do when catastrophe avoidance conflicts with equity promotion. (shrink)

First published in 2000. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

This study described the relationships between academic class and student moral sensitivity and reasoning and between curriculum design components for ethics education and student moral sensitivity and reasoning. The data were collected from freshman (n = 506) and senior students (n = 440) in eight baccalaureate nursing programs in South Korea by survey; the survey consisted of the Korean Moral Sensitivity Questionnaire and the Korean Defining Issues Test. The results showed that moral sensitivity scores in patient-oriented care and conflict were (...) higher in senior students than in freshman students. Furthermore, more hours of ethics content were associated with higher principled thinking scores of senior students. Nursing education in South Korea may have an impact on developing student moral sensitivity. Planned ethics content in nursing curricula is necessary to improve moral sensitivity and moral reasoning of students. (shrink)

First Published in 2000. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

A promise to do some action seems to create a binding obligation to do that action. And yet, paradoxically, an obligation seems not to be a fact that we can create or bring into existence; we can create an obligation only by creating or bringing into existence something else. The only way to avoid the paradox is to show that the act of promising creates something other than an obligation, which nonetheless binds us to perform the action in question. After (...) considering and rejecting various options such as the promisee's expectation and the promisor's resolve, Prichard locates the bindingness of a promise in a prior general promise, which allows the noises we make when promising to generate an obligation to perform the promised action. (shrink)

What are 'emotions'? This book offers a balanced survey of facts and theory.

Several theoretical perspectives have generated research on grandparental investment, notably socialization and evolutionary psychological perspectives. Using data collected from more than 200 older adults (mean age 67 years), we test three hypotheses derived from socialization and evolutionary perspectives about grandparents’ relationships with and investment in grandchildren. Results indicate that (1) emotional closeness with both children and children-in-law is positively related to reports of emotional closeness with grandchildren; (2) maternal grandmothers invest more in grandchildren than do other grandparents; and (3) grandparents (...) invest more in daughters’ children than in sons’ children. Discussion addresses limitations of self-report methodology in this context and situates the current findings within the body of research indicating the existence of psychological mechanisms designed to guide differential nepotism. (shrink)

Science Without Numbers caused a stir in 1980, with its bold nominalist approach to the philosophy of mathematics and science. It has been unavailable for twenty years and is now reissued in a revised edition with a substantial new preface presenting the author's current views and responses to the issues raised in subsequent debate.

An English language translation accompanies the original Greek text of Aristotle's book about the nature of the state, constitutions, revolutions, democracy, and oligarchy.

To the question ‘What does it mean to act or to do something?’, replies that it is not easy to identify a common character in actions. Begins by examining the position of Cook Wilson, who maintains that ‘to do something’ means to originate, cause, or bring into existence, either directly or indirectly, some not yet existing state either in oneself or some other body. Although Prichard agrees that usually action involves causing something, he observes that causing a change is not (...) itself an activity. In moving one's hand, one performs that indefinable mental activity of willing some change. The movement of the hand is the effect of the action, not the action itself, a fact overlooked by thinkers like Locke. Turning to the nature of the desire behind one's willing, Prichard rejects the view that this desire is actually a desire for the change willed. Despite forceful objections, Prichard maintains that this desire is the desire for the willing of that change. (shrink)

Suppose that a decision-maker's aim, under certainty, is to maximise some continuous value, such as lifetime income or continuous social welfare. Can such a decision-maker rationally satisfy what has been called "continuity for easy cases" while at the same time satisfying what seems to be a widespread intuition against the full-blown continuity axiom of expected utility theory? In this note I argue that the answer is "no": given transitivity and a weak trade-off principle, continuity for easy cases violates the anti-continuity (...) intuition. I end the note by exploring an even weaker continuity condition that is consistent with the aforementioned intuition. (shrink)

According to the orthodox treatment of risk preferences in decision theory, they are to be explained in terms of the agent's desires about concrete outcomes. The orthodoxy has been criticised both for conflating two types of attitudes and for committing agents to attitudes that do not seem rationally required. To avoid these problems, it has been suggested that an agent's attitudes to risk should be captured by a risk function that is independent of her utility and probability functions. The main (...) problem with that approach is that it suggests that attitudes to risk are wholly distinct from people's (non-instrumental) desires. To overcome this problem, we develop a framework where an agent's utility function is defined over chance propositions (i.e., propositions describing objective probability distributions) as well as ordinary (non-chance) ones, and argue that one should explain different risk attitudes in terms of different forms of the utility function over such propositions. (shrink)