The implicit motivational needs for power, achievement, and affiliation are highly relevant in the context of sports. Sport enables people to experience achievement incentives like mastering challenges as well as social incentives such as recognition by teammates. Further, McClelland’s (1986) hypothesized that implicit motives are particularly associated right-hemisphere functions. Therefore, this preregistered study, conducted online, examines motivational needs using a standard picture-story exercise (PSE) and their associations with indicators of laterality, sports participation, and competition in gymnasts (N (...) = 67). Further it explores how implicit motives interact with suitable motivational incentives in the prediction of sports performance. Results partly confirm a link between indictors of cerebral rightward laterality and implicit motives, showing that the implicit affiliation and achievement motives are positively associated with an indicator of emotional-perceptional laterality (chimeric-faces task), but not with an indicator of motor laterality (turning bias). Moreover, the implicit achievement motive was positively correlated with training hours. The implicit affiliation motive was negatively associated with competition level. The presence of achievement incentives (perceived control, failure) and affiliation incentives (training together or alone) did not interact with corresponding motives to predict sports performance. (shrink)

David McClelland’s research on the different kinds of (implicit) motives and how to measure them has a substantial influence on contemporary psychology of motivation. He did not, however, reflect on the nature of implicit motives in much detail. In this paper I fill this gap. I argue that implicit motives should not be understood as mental states the agent has no introspective access to. Instead, I propose that the implicit motives that McClelland (...) and others in the field distinguish – the power, achievement, and affiliation motive – are generic descriptions of specific ends an agent may act for. These motives are implicit, because they are not explicitly expressed but merely implied in what the agent does, thinks, and feels. Establishing whether an agent acts for or has a certain implicit motive, then, is a matter of interpreting the agent’s expressions. This proposal is in line with and explains the empirical findings. (shrink)

Objective: Theory and research suggest that the pursuit of personal goals that do not fit a person's affect-based implicit motives results in impaired emotional well-being, including increased symptoms of depression. The aim of this study was to evaluate an intervention designed to enhance motive-goal congruence and study its impact on well-being. Method: Seventy-four German students (mean age = 22.91, SD = 3.68; 64.9% female) without current psychopathology, randomly allocated to 3 groups: motivational feedback (FB; n = 25; participants (...) learned about the fit between their implicit motives and explicit goals), FB + congruence-enhancement training (CET; n = 22; participants also engaged in exercises to increase the fit between their implicit motives and goals), and a no-intervention control group (n = 27), were administered measures of implicit motives, personal goal commitments, happiness, depressive symptoms, and life satisfaction 3 weeks before (T1) and 6 weeks after (T2) treatment. Results: On two types of congruence measures derived from motive and goal assessments, treated participants showed increases in agentic (power and achievement) congruence, with improvements being most consistent in the FB+CET group. Treated participants also showed a trend-level depressive symptom reduction, but no changes on other well-being measures. Although increases in overall and agentic motivational congruence were associated with increases in affective well-being, treatment-based reduction of depressive symptoms was not mediated by treatment-based agentic congruence changes. Conclusion: These findings document that motivational congruence can be effectively enhanced, that changes in motivational congruence are associated with changes in affective well-being, and they suggest that individuals’ implicit motives should be considered when personal goals are discussed in the therapeutic process. (shrink)

This special section is the outcome of a conference organized in Würzburg, as part of the interdisciplinary research project Motivational and Volitional Processes of Human Integration: Philosophical and Psychological Approaches to Human Flourishing (2018–2021). The goal of the project was to connect (philosophical) perspectives on flourishing to empirical research that suggests that implicit motives play an important role in who we are and what we do and decide. One main aim was to find a middle ground between two (...) extremes that conceptualize implicit motives either as recalcitrant states that hamper flourishing, or as reflecting who we really are, much more than our explicit motives. We propose that both implicit and explicit motives are crucial to flourishing. The articles in this special section bring up other important questions as well. First of all, what is the role of the external world? It seems to be crucial for being a self, but it may also hamper flourishing. And second, how should the relationship between the self as basic subjectivity, and the self with certain values, desires, and intentions be understood? (shrink)

When is choice affected by subliminal messages? This question has fascinated scientists and lay people alike, but it is only recently that reliable empirical data began to emerge. In the current paper we bridge the literature on implicit motivation and that on subliminal persuasion. We suggest that motivation in general, and implicit motivation more specifically, plays an important role in subliminal persuasion: It sensitizes us to subliminal cues. To examine this hypothesis we developed a new paradigm that allows (...) powerful tests of subliminal influences as well as stringent assessments of subliminality. The results of two experiments suggest that implicit motivation can enhance the effects of subliminal priming on choice. (shrink)

A comprehensive theory of implicit and explicit knowledge must explain phenomenal knowledge (e.g., knowledge regarding one's affective and motivational states), as well as propositional (i.e., “fact”-based) knowledge. Findings from several research areas (i.e., the subliminal mere exposure effect, artificial grammar learning, implicit and self-attributed dependency needs) are used to illustrate the importance of both phenomenal and propositional knowledge for a unified theory of implicit and explicit mental states.

The market failures approach is amongst the most influential theories of business ethics. Its interest within the field is, in large part, a result of its rejection of moralism and any sort of applied ethics approach, favouring, in contrast, a focus on the institutionally embodied goal of economic activity, which it takes to be that of Pareto efficiency. From this articulation of the goal, or purpose, of markets, a set of efficiency imperatives are derived that are taken to comprise the (...) implicit morality of the market. However, the market failures approach has not adequately explained the basis of market actors’ moral motivation, that is, the reasons individuals have to self-consciously adhere to moral norms governing market transactions. This failure, I argue, stems from its misspecification of the purpose of the market. After explaining this failure to address the problem of moral motivation, I argue that a distinctive mode of freedom understood as a form of self-authorship is better seen as the purpose of the market, a goal that actually animates individual market participants. I then argue that this notion of freedom is intrinsically linked to a conception of responsibility and that this notion of responsibility can be more adequately conceptualized as involving a set of market virtues focused on promoting mutually beneficial transactions. Thus, the link between freedom and responsibility, stemming from an individual’s need to legitimize their freedom in a market context, provides the basis for a self-conscious sense of moral motivation. As such, this approach better captures the implicit morality of the market while also addressing the problem of moral motivation. (shrink)

The present research seeks to utilize Implicit Theories of Intelligence and Achievement Goal Theory to understand students’ intrinsic motivation and academic performance in mathematics in Singapore. 1,201 lower-progress stream students, ages ranged from 13 to 17 years, from 17 secondary schools in Singapore took part in the study. Using structural equation modeling, results confirmed hypotheses that incremental mindset predicted mastery-approach goals and, in turn, predicted intrinsic motivation and mathematics performance. Entity mindset predicted performance-approach and performance-avoidance goals. Performance-approach goal was (...) positively linked to intrinsic motivation and mathematics performance; performance-avoidance goal, however, negatively predicted intrinsic motivation and mathematics performance. The model accounted for 35.9% of variance in intrinsic motivation and 13.8% in mathematics performance. These findings suggest that intrinsic motivation toward mathematics and achievement scores might be enhanced through interventions that focus on incremental mindset and mastery-approach goal. In addition, performance-approach goal may enhance intrinsic motivation and achievement as well, but to a lesser extent. Finally, the study adds to the literature done in the Asian context and lends support to the contention that culture may affect students’ mindsets and adoption of achievement goals, and their associated impact on motivation and achievement outcomes. (shrink)

BackgroundSeveral studies identified low subjective feelings of power in women with anorexia nervosa. However, little is known about implicit power motives and the discrepancy between explicit feelings of power and implicit power motives in AN.AimThe study investigated the discrepancy between explicit feelings of power and implicit power motives and its relationship to anxiety in patients with AN.MethodFifty-three outpatients and inpatients with AN and 48 participants without AN were compared regarding subjective feelings of power and (...) anxiety. Explicit power [investigated with the Personal Sense of Power Scale and a visual analog scale ], implicit power motives [investigated with the Multi-Motive Grid ] and trait anxiety [measured with the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory ], were assessed.ResultsExplicit feelings of power were lower in patients with AN compared to non-AN participants. No differences in implicit power motives were found when comparing the groups against each other. However, looking at the groups separately, women with AN had similar levels of implicit fear of losing power and hope for power, whereas woman without AN had significantly lower fear of losing power than hope for power. Focusing on discrepancies between powerful feelings and power motives, results were mixed, depending on the subscale of the MMG. Lastly, discrepancies between implicit power motives and explicit feelings of power were positively correlated with trait anxiety in AN patients.ConclusionThese findings underline that individuals with AN display significantly lower explicit feelings of power, however, they show similar implicit power motives compared to individuals without AN. The discrepancy between explicit feelings of power and implicit power motives is related to anxiety in AN and may represent a vulnerability factor to illness maintenance. (shrink)

Motivating reforms to address discrimination and exclusion is important. But what epistemic practices characterize better or worse ways of doing this? Recently, the phenomena of implicit biases have played a large role in motivating reforms. We argue that this strategy risks perpetuating two kinds of epistemic oppression: the vindication dynamic and contributory injustice. We offer positive proposals for avoiding these forms of epistemic oppression when confronting racism.

The aim of three studies was to examine the differences between business majors and non-business majors, in their level of implicit and explicit power motivation.It was predicted that there are no differences between these two groups in the general level of power motivation, but that differences exist in the way it is explicitly expressed: through desire for leadership and prominence vs. desire for helping. Results of Study 1 indicated that business majors declared a higher leadership motive and a lower (...) helping motive than non-business majors.Study 2 addressed question whether the above differences in power motivation stem from socialization at the university level or from pre-selection. The relationship between high school students’ academic major preferences and their power motivation was tested. It was found that the more they were business-oriented, the higher their scores were on leadership, and lower on helping scales. In Study 3, business majors and non-business majors completed the same questionnaire as participants in previous studies, as well as performed the IAT. Non-business majors declared stronger explicit helping motive, while business majors expressed stronger prominence and leadership motives. Furthermore, for non-business majors, IAT results could be predicted by their helping score. Implications and possible limitations of the presented results are discussed. (shrink)

This article takes the following two assumptions for granted: first, that gifts influence physicians and, second, that the influences gifts have on physicians may be harmful for patients. These assumptions are common in the applied ethics literature, and they prompt an obvious practical question, namely, what is the best way to mitigate the negative effects? We examine the negative effects of gift giving in depth, considering how the influence occurs, and we assert that the ethical debate surrounding gift-giving practices must (...) be reoriented. Our main claim is that the failure of recent policies addressing gift giving can be traced to a misunderstanding of what psychological mechanisms are most likely to underpin physicians’ biased behavior as a result of interaction with the medical industry. The problem with gift giving is largely not a matter of malicious or consciously self-interested behavior, but of well-intentioned actions on the part of physicians that are nonetheless perniciously infected by the presence of the medical industry. Substantiating this claim will involve elaboration on two points. First, we will retrace the history of policies regarding gift giving between the medical profession and the medical industry and highlight how most policies assume a rationalistic view of moral agency. Reliance on this view of agency is best illustrated by past attempts to address gift giving in terms of conflicts of interest. Second, we will introduce and motivate an alternate view of moral agency emerging from recent literature in social psychology on implicit social cognition. We will show that proper consideration of implicit social cognition paints a picture of human psychology at odds with the rationalistic model assumed in discussions of COIs. With these two pieces on the table we will be able to show that, without fully appreciating the social-psychological mechanisms of implicit cognition, policy-makers are likely to overlook significant aspects of how gifts influence doctors. (shrink)

As the phenomenon of implicit bias has become increasingly widely known and accepted, a variety of criticisms have similarly gained in prominence. This paper focuses on one particular set of criticisms, generally made from the political left, of what Sally Haslanger calls “implicit bias stories”—a broad term encompassing a wide range of discourses from media discussions to academic papers to implicit bias training. According to this line of thought, implicit bias stories are counterproductive because they serve (...) to distract from the structural and institutional factors that underlie oppression of social groups. This paper argues on the contrary that implicit bias stories, properly told, can help direct attention and concern to structural and institutional factors, and indeed may be especially helpful in motiving action. The key, however, is to tell these stories properly. When implicit bias sto- ries are told in the wrong way, they are indeed counterproductive. This paper looks in detail at several examples of good and bad implicit bias stories, examining what makes some of them counterproductive and others highly effective in motivating action to combat social injustice. (shrink)

Can implicit biases be properly thought of as epistemic vices? I start by sketching the contours of implicit biases (1), and then turn to the recent claim, from Cassam, that implicit biases are epistemic vices (2). However, I argue that concerns about the stability of implicit biases and their role in producing behavior make for difficulties in establishing that implicit biases of individuals are epistemic vices (3). I then consider a recently developed model which prompts (...) us to consider implicit biases as properties of groups (4). This raises the question of whether implicit biases might constitute collective epistemic vice. I suggest that there is a way to make sense of this claim, but it requires rethinking how we conceptualise collective epistemic vice (5). These re-conceptualisations can be independently motivated. I close by marshalling some considerations in favour of using the terminology of vice to capture these defects of collective epistemic practice (6). (shrink)

This paper takes as its focus efforts to address particular aspects of sexist oppression and its intersections, in a particular field: it discusses reform efforts in philosophy. In recent years, there has been a growing international movement to change the way that our profession functions and is structured, in order to make it more welcoming for members of marginalized groups. One especially prominent and successful form of justification for these reform efforts has drawn on empirical data regarding implicit biases (...) and their effects. Here, we address two concerns about these empirical data. First, critics have for some time argued that the studies drawn upon cannot give us an accurate picture of the workings of prejudice, because they ignore the intersectional nature of these phenomena. More recently, concerns have been raised about the empirical data supporting the nature and existence of implicit bias. Each of these concerns, but perhaps more commonly the latter, are thought by some to undermine reform efforts in philosophy. In this paper, we take a three-pronged approach to these claims. First, we show that the reforms can be motivated quite independently of the implicit bias data, and that many of these reforms are in fact very well suited to dealing with intersectional worries. Next, we show that in fact the empirical concerns about the implicit bias data are not nearly as problematic as some have thought. Finally, we argue that while the intersectional concerns are an immensely valuable criticism of early work on implicit bias, more recent work is starting to address these worries. (shrink)

Consider a typical fear episode. You are strolling down a lonely mountain lane when suddenly a huge wolf leaps towards you. A number of different interconnected elements are involved in the fear you experience. First, there is the visual and auditory perception of the wild animal and its movements. In addition, it is likely that given what you see, you may implicitly and inarticulately appraise the situation as acutely threatening. Then, there are a number of physiological changes, involving a variety (...) of systems controlled by the autonomic nervous system. Your heart races, your breathing becomes strained and your start trembling. These changes are accompanied by an expression of fear on your face: your mouth opens and your eyes widen while you stare at the wolf. There is also a kind of experience that you undergo. You are likely to feel a sort of pang, something that might consist in the perception of the physiological changes you are going through. Moreover, a number of thoughts are likely to cross your mind. You might think that the wild beast is about to tear you into pieces and that you’ll never escape from this. In addition to this, your attention focuses on the wolf and its movement, as well as, possibly, ways of escaping or defending yourself. Last, but not least, your fear is likely to come with a motivation, such as an urge to run away or to strike back. Whatever the details of the story, it is clear that a typical emotion episode involves a number of different components. Roughly, these components are a) a sensory perception or more generally an informational component, b) a kind of appraisal, d) physiological changes, c) conscious feelings, d) cognitive and attentional processes, and e) an actiontendency or more generally a motivational component. One central question in the theory of emotion is which, if any, of these components, constitute the emotion.. (shrink)

In chapter one I consider two arguments for the claim that we ought to attribute linguistic knowledge to speakers of a natural language. The a priori argument has it that a theory of understanding reveals what it is that speakers of a language know about their language. The second argument takes the form of an inference to the best explanation, emphasising the idea that speaking and understanding a language is a rational activity carried on by agents with intention and purpose. (...) Linguistic knowledge is attributed to speakers as a way of making such a practice intelligible. ;In chapter two, I examine the several sceptical worries and substantive objections that have been raised to the idea of linguistic knowledge. None of these objections is fatal; rather they direct our attention to the need to specify what kind of knowledge linguistic knowledge is. ;In chapter three I argue that we do best to think of the notion of implicit linguistic knowledge as a "place-holder". ;In chapter four, I turn to a discussion of implicit belief, drawing a distinction between the way in which the content of a belief might be represented in an agent's brain and the kind of access she has to that content. I argue against an account of implicit belief that is motivated by concerns about representation, and for one that focuses on the kind of access an agent has to her implicit beliefs. ;In chapter five I attempt to sketch an account of implicit linguistic knowledge that fulfills its explanatory agenda while avoiding the objections discussed in earlier chapters. A speaker's implicit linguistic knowledge, understood as a set of articulated psychological states, grounds her full-blooded linguistic dispositions. This analysis of implicit linguistic knowledge is not subject to standard objections to that notion. Furthermore, it provides a "non-reductive" explanation of a speaker's language mastery, since it holds a middle ground between strictly biological, or neurophysiological accounts and purely behavioristic accounts of what makes an agent a speaker of a language. ;Finally, I take up the question of whether Dummett can accept my account of implicit linguistic knowledge. (shrink)

This paper takes as its focus efforts to address particular aspects of sexist oppression and its intersections, in a particular field: it discusses reform efforts in philosophy. In recent years, there has been a growing international movement to change the way that our profession functions and is structured, in order to make it more welcoming for members of marginalized groups. One especially prominent and successful form of justification for these reform efforts has drawn on empirical data regarding implicit biases (...) and their effects. Here, we address two concerns about these empirical data. First, critics have for some time argued that the studies drawn upon cannot give us an accurate picture of the workings of prejudice, because they ignore the intersectional nature of these phenomena. More recently, concerns have been raised about the empirical data supporting the nature and existence of implicit bias. Each of these concerns, but perhaps more commonly the latter, are thought by some to undermine reform efforts in philosophy. In this paper, we take a three- pronged approach to these claims. First, we show that the reforms can be motivated quite independently of the implicit bias data, and that many of these reforms are in fact very well suited to dealing with intersectional worries. Next, we show that in fact the empirical concerns about the implicit bias data are not nearly as problematic as some have thought. Finally, we argue that while the intersectional concerns are an immensely valuable criticism of early work on implicit bias, more recent work is starting to address these worries. (shrink)

This paper uses the Process Dissociation Procedure to explore whether people can acquire unconscious knowledge in the serial reaction time task [Destrebecqz, A., & Cleeremans, A. . Can sequence learning be implicit? New evidence with the Process Dissociation Procedure. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 8, 343–350; Wilkinson, L., & Shanks, D. R. . Intentional control and implicit sequence learning. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 30, 354–369]. Experiment 1 showed that people generated legal sequences above baseline levels (...) under exclusion instructions. Reward moved exclusion performance towards baseline, indicating that the extent of motivation in the test phase influenced the expression of unconscious knowledge. Experiments 2 and 3 revealed that even with reward, adding noise to the sequences or shortening training led to above-baseline exclusion performance, suggesting that task difficulty and the amount of training also affected the expression of unconscious knowledge. The results help resolve some current debates about the role of conscious awareness in sequence learning. (shrink)

Recent virtue theorists in psychology implicitly assume the truth of motivational internalism, and this assumption restricts the force and scope of the message that they venture to offer as scientists. I aim to contrive a way out of their impasse by arguing for a version of Aristotelian motivational externalism and suggesting why these psychologists should adopt it. There is a more general problem, however. Although motivational externalism has strong intuitive appeal, at least for moral realists and ‘Humeans’ about motivation, it (...) continues to be threatened by Smith’s fetishisation argument and burdened by the inability of its familiar counter-examples to internalism (of the immoral, wicked, listless and amoral persons) to bear full scrutiny. I argue that Aristotle’s example of the continent person (as distinct from the fully virtuous) offers a more persuasive counter-example to internalism. The moral judgements of continent persons do not motivate them intrinsically, yet the continent cannot be counted as practically irrational with regard to morality. If Aristotelian motivational externalism holds true, psychologists can offer full-fledged theories of virtue without the danger of turning the science of psychology into a prescriptive moralism. (shrink)

This paper discusses essential motivational representations necessary for a comprehensive computational cognitive architecture. It hypothesizes the need for implicit drive representations, as well as explicit goal representations. Drive representations consist of primary drives — both low-level primary drives (concerned mostly with basic physiological needs) and high-level primary drives (concerned more with social needs), as well as derived (secondary) drives. On the basis of drives, explicit goals may be generated on the fly during an agent’s interaction with various situations. These (...) motivational representations help to make cognitive architectural models more comprehensive and provide deeper explanations of psychological processes. This work represents a step forward in making computational cognitive architectures better reflections of the human mind and all its motivational complexity and intricacy. (shrink)

Two decades ago, the introduction of the Implicit Association Test (IAT) sparked enthusiastic reactions. With implicit measures like the IAT, researchers hoped to finally be able to bridge the gap between self-reported attitudes on one hand and behavior on the other. Twenty years of research and several meta-analyses later, however, we have to conclude that neither the IAT nor its derivatives have fulfilled these expectations. Their predictive value for behavioral criteria is weak and their incremental validity over and (...) above self-report measures is negligible. In our review, we present an overview of explanations for these unsatisfactory findings and delineate promising ways forward. Over the years, several reasons for the IAT’s weak predictive validity have been proposed. They point to four potentially problematic features: First, the IAT is by no means a pure measure of individual differences in associations but suffers from extraneous influences like recoding. Hence, the predictive validity of IAT-scores should not be confused with the predictive validity of associations. Second, with the IAT, we usually aim to measure evaluation (“liking”) instead of motivation (“wanting”). Yet, behavior might be determined much more often by the latter than the former. Third, the IAT focuses on measuring associations instead of propositional beliefs and thus taps into a construct that might be too unspecific to account for behavior. Finally, studies on predictive validity are often characterized by a mismatch between predictor and criterion (e.g., while behavior is highly context-specific, the IAT usually takes into account neither situation nor domain). Recent research, however, also revealed advances addressing each of these problems, namely (1) procedural and analytical advances to control for recoding in the IAT, (2) measurement procedures to assess implicit wanting, (3) measurement procedures to assess implicit beliefs, and (4) approaches to increase the fit between implicit measures and behavioral criteria (e.g., by incorporating contextual information). Implicit measures like the IAT hold an enormous potential. In order to allow them to fulfill this potential, however, we have to refine our understanding of these measures, and we should incorporate recent conceptual and methodological advancements. This review provides specific recommendations on how to do so. (shrink)

We are not cosmopolitans, if by cosmopolitan we mean that we are willing to prioritize equally the needs of those near and far. Here, I argue that cosmopolitanism has yet to wrestle with the motivational challenges it faces: any good moral theory must be one that well-meaning people will be motivated to adopt. Some cosmopolitans suggest that the principles of cosmopolitanism are themselves sufficient to motivate compliance with them. This argument is flawed, for precisely the reasons that motivate this paper (...) - we are cosmopolitan neither in our attitudes nor in our behaviors towards others. Other cosmopolitans suggest that 'global solidarity' is sufficient to generate a commitment to carrying out duties towards others. These latter efforts implicitly rely on insights best captured by the nationalist thesis, that is, that national communities are the best vehicles, morally speaking, through which individuals can carry out their obligations to others. I consider, and refute, two objections to my argument: first, that it is guilty of a 'time-lag fallacy' and, second, that it ignores an emergent cosmopolitan attitude among global citizens. (shrink)

The need for synthesis in the domain of implicit processes was the motivation behind this book.

Implicit coordination is an important research topic in the field of social cognition. Previous studies have studied implicit coordination behavior from the perspective of team mental model but ignored the internal mechanism of individual status competition motivation on implicit coordination behavior. Based on the differences of status competition motivation, the individual status competition motivation is divided into prestige-type and dominant-type. With knowledge sharing as the mediating variable and psychological safety as the moderating variable, this research constructed a (...) process model of the influence of status competition motivation on implicit coordination behavior. The empirical study was carried out with a sample of 367 employees of 44 enterprises. The research results show the following findings: Status competition has a differentiated impact on implicit coordination. Prestige-type status competition has a significant positive impact on implicit coordination behavior, while dominant-type status competition has a significant negative impact on implicit coordination behavior. Knowledge sharing plays a mediating role between status competition and implicit coordination. Psychological safety positively moderates the relationship between prestige-type status competition, dominant-type status competition, and knowledge sharing. The research results provide a new perspective for the field of implicit coordination; reveal the mechanism of status competition motivation in implicit coordination, which is of great significance to the practice of enterprise team management and human resource management. (shrink)

A correlational pilot study (N = 143) and an integrative data analysis of two experiments (total N = 377) provide evidence linking anger to the psychology of social hierarchy. The experiments demonstrate that the experience of anger increases the psychological accessibility of implicit cognitions related to social hierarchy: compared to participants in a control condition, participants in an anger-priming condition completed word stems with significantly more hierarchy-related words. We found little support for sex differences in the effect of anger (...) on implicit hierarchy-related cognition; effects were equivalent across male and female participants. Findings fit with functionalist evolutionary views of anger suggesting that anger may motivate the use of dominance to strive for high social rank in group hierarchies. Implications for downstream behaviour, including aggression and negotiation, are discussed. (shrink)

This thesis is concerned with explaining how a subject can acquire a priori knowledge of arithmetic. Every account for arithmetical, and in general mathematical knowledge faces Benacerraf's well-known challenge, i.e. how to reconcile the truths of mathematics with what can be known by ordinary human thinkers. I suggest four requirements that jointly make up this challenge and discuss and reject four distinct solutions to it. This will motivate a broadly Fregean approach to our knowledge of arithmetic and mathematics in general. (...) Pursuing this strategy appeals to the context principle which, it is proposed, underwrites a form of Platonism and explains how reference to and object-directed thought about abstract entities is, in principle, possible. I discuss this principle and defend it against different criticisms as put forth in recent literature. Moreover, I will offer a general framework for implicit definitions by means of which - without an appeal to a faculty of intuition or purely pragmatic considerations - a priori and non-inferential knowledge of basic mathematical principles can be acquired. In the course of this discussion, I will argue against various types of opposition to this general approach. Also, I will highlight crucial shortcomings in the explanation of how implicit definitions may underwrite a priori knowledge of basic principles in broadly similar conceptions. In the final part, I will offer a general account of how non-inferential mathematical knowledge resulting from implicit definitions is best conceived which avoids these shortcomings. (shrink)

The later Wittgenstein’s perspective on mathematical sentences as norms is motivated for sentences belonging to Hilbertian axiomatic systems where the axioms are treated as implicit definitions. It is shown that in this approach the axioms are employed as norms in that they function as standards of what counts as using the concepts involved. This normative dimension of their mode of use, it is argued, is inherited by the theorems derived from them. Having been motivated along these lines, Wittgenstein’s perspective (...) on mathematical language may appeal also to those who are not friends of or experts on Wittgenstein’s later philosophy of mathematics. (shrink)

Like the concept "structure" a generation ago, "power" now figures prominently in the anthropological understanding of human action. This essay attempts to locate the concept of power in the cultural history of Anglo-Saxon political discourse. Discussion focuses on a specific domain of inquiry—"ethnopsychology"— and on one of the texts recognized as exemplary of that domain, Lutz's Unnatural Emotions. In a field largely concerned with matters of cognitive process, of knowledge structures and patterns of inference, the concept of "power" is used (...) to supply motivational force; motivation is the will to power. This is intelligible, however, only against the implicit background of Anglo-Saxon political theory, best represented historically in the work of Thomas Hobbes. It is argued that the circumstances of "post-modernity" make the return of Hobbesianism inevitable and that it is this tradition that ethnopsychology unwittingly reproduces in the quest to understand cognition, emotion, and agency. (shrink)

Among philosophers of the emotions, it is common to view emotional content as purely descriptive – that is, belief-like or perception-like. I argue that this is a mistake. The intentionality of the emotions cannot be understood in isolation from their motivational character, and emotional content is also inherently directive – that is, desire-like. This view’s strength is its ability to explain a class of emotional behaviors that I argue, the common view fails to explain adequately. I claim that it is (...) already implicit in leading theories of emotion elicitation in cognitive psychology – “appraisal theories.” The result is a deeper understanding of emotional intentionality. Employing Peter Goldie’s “Feeling Theory” of the emotions as an example of the common view, I suggest that emotional feelings, too, should be understood on this model: emotional feelings toward items in the world cannot be disentangled from felt motivation. (shrink)

I show that words with indefinite implicit complements occasion a dilemma for their model theory. There has been only two previous attempts to address this problem, one by Fodor and Fodor (1980) and one by Dowty (1981). Each requires that any word tolerating an implicit complement be treated as ambiguous between two different lexical entries and that a meaning postulate or lexical rule be given to constrain suitably the meanings of the various entries for the word. I show (...) that the positing of such an ambiguity runs counter to the facts and propose an alternative solution which does not appeal to ambiguity, meaning postulates or lexical rules. Indeed, I show that the dilemma posed by indefinite implicit complements is posed by all implicit complements and that a general solution to the problem of implicit complements follows from an independently motivated, single treatment of five other problems, that of subcategorization, that of phrasal projections of words, that of defining a model theoretic structure for phrase structure grammars, that of complement polyvalence and that of complement polyadicity. (shrink)

The later Wittgenstein’s perspective on mathematical sentences as norms is motivated for sentences belonging to Hilbertian axiomatic systems where the axioms are treated as implicit definitions. It is shown that in this approach the axioms are employed as norms in that they function as standards of what counts as using the concepts involved. This normative dimension of their mode of use, it is argued, is inherited by the theorems derived from them. Having been motivated along these lines, Wittgenstein’s perspective (...) on mathematical language may appeal also to those who are not friends of or experts on Wittgenstein’s later philosophy of mathematics. (shrink)

Research shows that goal-relevant objects are rated positively, which results from their functionality towards the aim. In previous studies these objects were always external to the agent. However, relevant knowledge of self is also potentially accessible during goal pursuit, as self-esteem is an indicator of aim’s feasibility. In two experimental studies we tested whether goal activation affects temporal changes in automatic evaluations of personality traits related to the dimensions of agency and communion. We administered affect misattribution procedure where participants rated (...) neutral Chinese hexagrams proceeded by words describing traits. The list of words comprised agentic and communal traits. The rating took place twice - before and after introducing a manual task. In the first study, goal activation led to slightly more positive implicit evaluations of agentic and more negative evaluation of communal traits, which is consistent with empirical data on self-perception depending on agentic knowledge rather than communal one. In the second study we showed that goal activation led to changes only for promotion-, but not prevention-oriented individuals, which is explained by motivation strength. The results indicate that valuation of traits changes temporarily along with goal pursuit. (shrink)