This book offers a theory of how human conceptual life begins, and shows how perceptual information becomes transformed into concepts. Drawing on extensive research, Mandler describes the development of preverbal concept formation, inductive inference, and recall, and explains how these processes form the conceptual basis for language and adult thought.

This book explains, in simple terms, with a minimum of mathematics, why things can appear to be in two places at the same time, why correlations between simultaneous events occurring far apart cannot be explained by local mechanisms, and why, nevertheless, the quantum theory can be understood in terms of matter in motion. No need to worry, as some people do, whether a cat can be both dead and alive, whether the moon is there when nobody looks at it, (...) or whether quantum systems need an observer to acquire definite properties. The author's inimitable and even humorous style makes the book a pleasure to read while bringing a new clarity to many of the longstanding puzzles of quantum physics. (shrink)

In this paper, I examine a neglected debate between Francisco Suárez and Pedro Hurtado de Mendoza about the unity of composite substances. There was a consensus among the Jesuits on the fact that the per se unity of composite substances requires something in addition to matter and form. Like most Jesuits, Suárez and Hurtado further agree on the fact that this additional ingredient is not a full-blown thing, but a “mode of union.” However, while Suárez claims that the union (...) is achieved through a single mode, Hurtado maintains that it is necessary to postulate two distinct modes of union, one modifying form and another modifying matter. I argue that this disagreement actually reflects an important ontological debate about the nature of the items that serve as the cement of things and that it eventually leads later Jesuits like Rodrigo de Arriaga to conceive of union as a polyadic or “straddling” mode. (shrink)

"This wonderfully eloquent and playful colloquy of two brilliant minds gives new life to the old notion of Dialogue, a sadly forgotten form now.... I "love" this book!

An important step in In Pierre Bayle’s defense of religious tolerance is to refute St Augustine’s claim that heretics who refuse to convert to the true faith do so out of ill will. This claim legitimizes, for Augustine and his followers, the application of temporal sanctions to those heretics, in order to offset their wicked inclination and restore their free will. To counter this view, Bayle uses the theological notions of invincible ignorance and dutiful erroneous conscience, elaborated during the Middle (...) Ages. However, these notions had a very restricted scope, which needed to be extended to so-called heretical beliefs. I show how two early modern scholastics, the Jesuits Gabriel Vázquez and Rodrigo Arriaga, have prepared this evolution and have paved the way for Bayle's denunciation any form of coercion in religious matters. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Impact of Aristotelianism on Modern PhilosophyJean-Robert ArmogatheRiccardo Pozzo, editor. The Impact of Aristotelianism on Modern Philosophy. Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2004. Pp. xvi + 336. Cloth, $69.95.The status of a "great" philosopher is to stand out for centuries, asking questions in such a way that the answers can never be definitive. Not so many of them are able to stand such a severe (...) proof. Aristotle phrased some questions we are still groping to answer. It was a very good idea to ask thirteen scholars to deliver a lecture series at the Catholic University of America during the Fall 1999 about the reception of Aristotle's theory of intellectual virtues (Nich. Ethics VI). The speakers did not stick to this issue, and enlarged their purpose to a general approach of Aristotle's receptions in various moments of Western modern philosophy.Edward Mahoney complements Charles Schmitt's basic introduction to Aristotle and the Renaissance, with some very valuable pages about Cardinal Bessarion's contribution to the Byzantine debate aroused in 1439 by Plethon's comparison between Plato and Aristotle (in favor of the former). Along with Charles Schmitt, Antonino Poppi is the best specialist of the Paduan tradition, and wrote a very qualified paper about Zabarella (1533-89), who shaped Aristotelianism into the rigorous science of the schoolbooks: for centuries, Aristotle is read through Zabarella's glasses. Apart from a bird's view on recent Galilean studies (where Alistair Crombie is not mentioned), William A. Wallace makes his point about Aristotle's influence on Galilean logics, linking Galileo's 1640 letter to Liceti (where he states that, in matters of logic, he has been an Aristotelian all his life) to the scientist's deep knowledge as revealed by the logical questions in one of the juvenile treatises (ms 27 in Florence, more thoroughly studied in Wallace's book, Galileo's Logic of Discovery and Proof [Dordrecht, 1992]). John Doyle, a specialist of Late Scholastic Philosophy, figures out a [End Page 209] strange character, the French Jesuit André Semery (1630-1717), who taught for thirty years at the Collegium romanum. In a very anti-Aristotelian way, he holds a definite belief in metaphysical beings of reason. The boundary between what we can think and say is quietly stepped over, when Semery and other Jesuits begin to think about thinking, opening a very modern path which leads to Brentano and Quine. Christia Mercer states that Leibniz's combination of a Platonist epistemology with an Aristotelian conception of nature brings a very innovative view in ethics. A very forceful paper by Richard L. Velkley compares Rousseau's politics to Aristotle's view of man (the paper became a chapter of his 2002 impressive book Being after Rousseau), while Riccardo Pozzo gives a short presentation of Aristotle's reception in modern Germany, and an elaborate analysis of Kant's debt to Aristotle for the intellectual virtues. Hegel's appropriation of Aristotelian intellect is presented by Alfredo Ferrarin, while Michael Davis reconstructs Nietzsche's path from Aristotle to the tragedy and back, in a very convincing way. Husserl (Richard Cobb-Stevens), Heidegger (Stanley Rosen), Wittgenstein (Daniel Dahlstrom) and Gadamer (Enrico Berti) conclude brilliantly the series, showing how the thought of the Stagirite fertilized contemporary philosophers, in a permanent dialogue of disagreement or borrowing, never at rest, and never leaving anyone indifferent. The old Greek man remains a vivid debater for our age of anxiety.Jean-Robert ArmogatheThe University of Paris-SorbonneCopyright © 2005 Journal of the History of Philosophy, Inc.... (shrink)

The history of the relations between Leibniz and Spinoza is a matter of philosophical and scholarly controversy. This chapter aims to refer to the first thesis as the Necessity of Actuality and to the second thesis as the Plenitude of Possibilities. It examines how Leibniz's stance with respect to these two theses, and more generally his views on modality, grew out as a response to Spinoza's views. Leibniz explicitly connects Spinoza's attributes with the concept of a world. As most (...) commentators, Leibniz reads Spinoza as a necessitarian, which is a natural interpretation. The difference between Leibniz's and Spinoza's views would reside in their conceptions of God and of the mechanism whereby the actual world comes to exist. Leibniz entertains the hypothesis of reality encompassing a plurality of actual worlds, which seems to achieve the Plenitude of Possibility. (shrink)

This article is concerned with the examination of the attitudes of the in two regions of the globe, both with respect to basic relations between citizen and state and with respect to the extent to which affects these relations. These questions have too long been discussed primarily at the level of elites or on the basis of assumptions or about what the reactions of the people at large may be. By providing at least some evidence pertaining to both these questions, (...) the study thus aims at beginning to fill a gap which has long needed to be filled and at giving the debate on and on some of the empirical basis which it badly needs. (shrink)

This English translation of Gebser’s major work, Ursprung und Gegenwart (Stuttgart, Deutsche Verlag, 1966), offers certain fundamental insights which should be beneficial to any sensitive scientist and makes it available to the English-speaking world for the recognition it deserves. “The path which led Gebser to his new and universal perception of the world is, briefly, as follows. In the wake of materialism and social change, man had been described in the early years of our century as the “dead end” of (...) nature. Freud had redefined culture as illness—a result of drive sublimation; Klages had called the spirit (and he was surely speaking of the hypertrophied intellect) the “adversary of the soul,” propounding a return to a life like that of the Pelasgi, the aboriginal inhabitants of Greece; and Spengler had declared the “Demise of the West” during the years following World War I. The consequences of such pessimism continued to proliferate long after its foundations had been superseded. It was with these foundations—the natural sciences—that Gebser began. As early as Planck it was known that matter was not at all what materialists had believed it to be, and since 1943 Gebser has repeatedly emphasized that the so-called crisis of Western culture was in fact an essential restructuration.… Gebser has noted two results that are of particular significance: first, the abandonment of materialistic determinism, of a one-sided mechanistic-causal mode of thought; and second, a manifest “urgency of attempts to discover a universal way of observing things, and to overcome the inner division of contemporary man who, as a result of his one-sided rational orientation, thinks only in dualisms.” Against this background of recent discoveries and conclusions in the natural sciences Gebser discerned the outlines of a potential human universality. He also sensed the necessity to go beyond the confines of this first treatise so as to include the humanities (such as political economics and sociology) as well as the arts in a discussion along similar lines. This was the point of departure of The Ever-Present Origin. From In memoriam Jean Gebser by Jean Keckeis. (shrink)

The position of the Belgian prime minister is hardly mentioned in the Belgian Constitution. lt was only after almost 140 years, in 1970 he was mentioned for the first time. lts power is rather a matter of common law. Since 1831 through the years, the position and power of the PM changed strongly. This often happened together with changes concerning the power of the King: the weaker the King, the stronger the PM.The existence of coalition governments puts forward bis (...) role as coordinator and even as arbitrator, whereas the federalisation process since the seventies places him as a conciliator between Regions and Communities. The growing importance of the European Council of Head of States have made him the most important decision-maker among the national politicians in the European integration process. The PM's skills concerning timing and agendasetting are very important because it is one of his most important power instruments. Other key skills are bis profound knowledge in certain issues but mostly as a generalist, his insisting on good minister nominations by the party leaders, the way he can motivate his cabinet members, a good team spirit among the government members and the existence of a clear government contract. In order to avoid a strongdependency on or tutelage from the political parties of the majority it is important to have their top politicians in the government. (shrink)

‘No matter how long I may look at an image, I shall never find anything in it but what I put there. It is in this fact that we find the distinction between an image and a perception.' - Jean-Paul Sartre L’Imagination was published in 1936 when Jean-Paul Sartre was thirty years old. Long out of print, this is the first English translation in many years. The Imagination is Sartre’s first full philosophical work, presenting some of the (...) basic arguments concerning phenomenology, consciousness and intentionality that were to later appear in his master works and be so influential in the course of twentieth-century philosophy. Sartre begins by criticising philosophical theories of the imagination, particularly those of Descartes, Leibniz and Hume, before establishing his central thesis. Imagination does not involve the perception of ‘mental images’ in any literal sense, Sartre argues, yet reveals some of the fundamental capacities of consciousness. He then reviews psychological theories of the imagination, including a fascinating discussion of the work of Henri Bergson. Sartre argues that the ‘classical conception’ is fundamentally flawed because it begins by conceiving of the imagination as being like perception and then seeks, in vain, to re-establish the difference between the two. Sartre concludes with an important chapter on Husserl’s theory of the imagination which, despite sharing the flaws of earlier approaches, signals a new phenomenological way forward in understanding the imagination. The Imagination is essential reading for anyone interested in the philosophy of Jean-Paul Sartre, phenomenology, and the history of twentieth-century philosophy. This new translation includes a helpful historical and philosophical introduction by Kenneth Williford and David Rudrauf. Also included is Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s important review of L’Imagination upon its publication in French in 1936. Translated by Kenneth Williford and David Rudrauf. (shrink)

The project of this book is to establish that Aristotle, contrary to what some have thought, did have a theory of distinctively "moral" responsibility, and one that is consistent with determinism. It is stipulated early on that having a theory of moral responsibility is a matter of first identifying the proper objects of peculiarly moral evaluation and thus specifying the range of responsible agents, and then identifying the actions for which those responsible agents are responsible. Aristotle’s account of moral (...) character is supposed to do the former. The latter is accomplished with his account of voluntariness. I will begin with that. (shrink)

During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, French authors did not ignore the word “éthique,” but neither did they make it play a specific role in their works like they did with “morale,” their preferred term. By contrast, English writers were more likely than their counterparts to distinguish “Ethicks” from “Morals.” Consequently, it is mainly in English-language writings that the separation of the two terms can be found. The key authors invested in refining these distinctions are Locke, Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, Hume, and (...) Bentham—the last one being the philosopher who enacted the splitting of these two terms. From their meditations gradually emerges a belief in the conditions for a common moral platform and position; in those authors’ estimation, this foundation could properly take the place of mathematical ethical inquiry. Among those exposing utilitarianism, ethics are a matter of calculation, ethical action achievable through mathematical rules. If calculation is still limited with Hutcheson, it becomes subtler still with Bentham, even if the first utilitarian author stays within the parameters of this moral philosophy. Bentham seems to be inspired by Bayesian–Pricean probability calculus, and his main and seminal ideas are developed in “The Axioms of Pathology” at the end of the “Pannomial Fragments.”. (shrink)

During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, French authors did not ignore the word “éthique,” but neither did they make it play a specific role in their works like they did with “morale,” their preferred term. By contrast, English writers were more likely than their counterparts to distinguish “Ethicks” from “Morals.” Consequently, it is mainly in English-language writings that the separation of the two terms can be found. The key authors invested in refining these distinctions are Locke, Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, Hume, and (...) Bentham—the last one being the philosopher who enacted the splitting of these two terms. From their meditations gradually emerges a belief in the conditions for a common moral platform and position; in those authors’ estimation, this foundation could properly take the place of mathematical ethical inquiry. Among those exposing utilitarianism, ethics are a matter of calculation, ethical action achievable through mathematical rules. If calculation is still limited with Hutcheson, it becomes subtler still with Bentham, even if the first utilitarian author stays within the parameters of this moral philosophy. Bentham seems to be inspired by Bayesian–Pricean probability calculus, and his main and seminal ideas are developed in “The Axioms of Pathology” at the end of the “Pannomial Fragments.”. (shrink)

« La situation coloniale : approche théorique », article publié par Georges Balandier dans le numéro XI des Cahiers internationaux de Sociologie en 1951, inaugure dans l’ethnologie et la sociologie françaises une nouvelle manière de concevoir l’étude des sociétés « ethnologiques » qui sont reconnues alors comme partie prenante d’une totalité coloniale en tant que sociétés colonisées puis sous-développées. Nous nous efforçons tout d’abord d’établir la conjoncture historique et intellectuelle qui a vu la naissance de ce texte. Puis nous nous (...) attachons à en mesurer la portée méthodologique actuelle. En effet, la sociologie semble aujourd’hui en retrait de l’anthropologie et des autres sciences sociales dans la tentative de compréhension de la mondialisation qui prolonge certaines des tendances de la situation coloniale. Le dernier ouvrage de Georges Balandier, Le Grand Système, devrait contribuer à mieux analyser cette situation.« La situation coloniale : approche théorique », an article published by Georges Balandier in issue XI of Cahiers internationaux de Sociologie in 1951, suggests a new type of analysis in the French ethnology and sociology of the time. « Ethnological societies » are to be considered as part of a colonial totality because they are colonized societies. They will eventually be studied as underdeveloped ones. First we shall describe the historical and intellectual situation that has determined the writing of the article. Then, we shall try to assess its methodological implications for the present. Indeed sociology seems to stand in the background compared to the other social sciences, including anthropology, when dealing with today’s globalization, which is, in some ways, a continuation of the colonial situation. Georges Balandier’s last book, Le Grand Système, should enable us to better appreciate his thinking on the matter. (shrink)

There were three such assumptions required, one explicitly stated, and two not made explicit until Bayle. The explicit one was a certain commonly accepted double understanding of ‘destruction’: a ‘natural’ version, which made it no more than a change in a particular arrangement or ‘organization’ of particles through which an aggregate was destroyed by losing its identity, and a metaphysical version, which entailed the actual annihilation of a substance. It was assumed that the latter could be accomplished only by miraculous (...) supra-natural means available only to God. Thus, if it could be shown that the soul was ‘without parts,’ it followed that the soul was ‘naturally’ indestructible and thus immortal. Bayle summarized the Cartesian argument to immortality as follows. (shrink)

An examination of the fundamental role cybernetics played in the birth of cognitive science and the light this sheds on current controversies. The conceptual history of cognitive science remains for the most part unwritten. In this groundbreaking book, Jean-Pierre Dupuy—one of the principal architects of cognitive science in France—provides an important chapter: the legacy of cybernetics. Contrary to popular belief, Dupuy argues, cybernetics represented not the anthropomorphization of the machine but the mechanization of the human. The founding fathers of (...) cybernetics—some of the greatest minds of the twentieth century, including John von Neumann, Norbert Wiener, Warren McCulloch, and Walter Pitts—intended to construct a materialist and mechanistic science of mental behavior that would make it possible at last to resolve the ancient philosophical problem of mind and matter. The importance of cybernetics to cognitive science, Dupuy argues, lies not in its daring conception of the human mind in terms of the functioning of a machine but in the way the strengths and weaknesses of the cybernetics approach can illuminate controversies that rage today—between cognitivists and connectionists, eliminative materialists and Wittgensteinians, functionalists and anti-reductionists. Dupuy brings to life the intellectual excitement that attended the birth of cognitive science sixty years ago. He separates the promise of cybernetic ideas from the disappointment that followed as cybernetics was rejected and consigned to intellectual oblivion. The mechanization of the mind has reemerged today as an all-encompassing paradigm in the convergence of nanotechnology, biotechnology, information technology, and cognitive science. The tensions, contradictions, paradoxes, and confusions Dupuy discerns in cybernetics offer a cautionary tale for future developments in cognitive science. (shrink)

The problem of the intensification and remission of qualities was a crux for philosophical, theological, and scientific thought in the Middle Ages. It was raised in Antiquity with this remark of Aristotle: some qualities, as accidental beings, admit the more and the less. Admitting more and less is not a trivial property, since it belongs neither to every category of being, nor to every quality. Rather it applies only to states and dispositions such as virtue, to affections of bodies such (...) as heat and sweetness, and to affections of soul such as anger. However, the property of admitting more and less was a matter of importance for the qualitative physics that had reigned up to about the time of Descartes, a physics which was concerned with concepts such as heat, coldness, lightness, heaviness, and so on. (shrink)

Colors can be understood in a logical way through the theory of opposition. This approach was recently developed by Dany Jaspers, giving a new and fresh approach to the theory of colors, in particular with a hexagon of colors close to Goethe’s intuitions. On the other hand colors can also be used at a metalogical level to understand and characterize the relations of opposition, including the relations of opposition between colors themselves. In this paper we furthermore develop a theory of (...) psychic dispositions, using the hexagon of opposition of colors. We present a hexagon of psychic dispositions based on colors that we compare in particular with Plutchick’s wheel of emotions. (shrink)

The term action of consciousness is used to refer to an influence, such as psychokinesis or free will, that produces an effect on matter that is correlated to mental intention, but not completely determined by physical conditions. Such an action could not conserve energy. But in that case, one wonders why, when highly accurate measurements are done, occasions of non-conserved energy (generated perhaps by unconscious PK) are not detected. A possible explanation is that actions of consciousness take place within (...) the limits of the uncertainty principle. Two models are reviewed that, using the latter assumption, propose that consciousness can originate an action potential in the brain. One (that of Eccles) uses the latter assumption only, and the other (that of Burns) additionally assumes that consciousness acts, within those limits, by ordering quantum fluctuations. (shrink)

We have never come face to face with ‘Philosophy’, that goddess who was courted, scorned, hated, and betrayed throughout history by those who claimed to represent her - we only come into contact with her officers: philosophers, that is, human beings who exist in an economic context, have religious ideas, support political opinions, find a way through their emotional history, are paid by institutions, fanstasize about a vision of hope, have appetites, can fight, are mad keen to be noticed and (...) recognized and above all frequently make certain types of statements that have claims to validity. So philosophers are not only creatures in history but also historical creatures who interrogate the meaning of the world and particularly their own work. However, one of the tricks of instrumental rationality - if we follow Marx's analysis - is to focus first on the product rather than the producer. This is the basic reason for the fact that a passion for the exegesis of philosophical texts often conceals philosophers’ practices. And this is why - where African philosophers are concerned, and they are not the only ones - people focus first, with benign curiosity, on their books, the theories that they expound and that may provide matter for heated discussion, but questions are hardly ever asked about the stance of African philosophers, in other words, the actual conditions in which their position is created, the particular abilities of African philosophers to achieve their emergence as ‘philosophers’, and their recognition in the international arena. The rhetoric about the acceptance of multi-culturalism argued on the basis of the complexity of present-day societies often hides practices and processes of legitimation that are revealed by their relationship to those two phenomena, economics and the state. The love of little abstractions that philosophy resists in the name of its historical position, the haste with which African philosophers, among others, clamour for recognition from their peers in other cultures are partly intended secretly to conceal their true relationship to money. Not that ‘disinterested’ philosophers ‘in love’ with knowledge do not exist, but we need to recognize that they often fail to say, as Adorno does in Dialectique négative, that ‘philosophy's freedom is simply the ability to allow its non-freedom to be expressed’. The purpose of this article is less to question philosophers’ capacity for knowledge than to urge them to have the courage to proclaim and challenge their non-freedom. (shrink)

A study of the shaping of the blocks of the temple of Aphrodite necessitates a revision of the question of the geometrie definition of the so-called "Nabatean" capitals and an examination of their possible links with the contemporay models with acanthus leaves. Experimental archaeology applied to the carving of a stone example on a quarter scale makes it possible to put forward concrete and confident suggestions in this matter. It can be shown that, starting with a capital of this (...) type, it is possible to continue shaping it so as to produce a model with acanthus leaves, but the production of the latter does not involve the same geometrie precision in its roughly hewn phase. The first from the start is conceived and carved to be presented definitively in this state, while the dressing of the second is generally too rough and imprecise for it to be later transformed into a capital of Nabatean type. The experiment has also made it possible to define clearly the different practical stages in the carving of this member. (shrink)

As we move our social institutions from paper and ink based operations to the electronic medium, we invisibly create a type of surveillance society, a panopticon society. It is not the traditional surveillance society in which government officials follow citizens around because they are concerned about threats to the political order. Instead it is piecemeal surveillance by public and private organizations. Piecemeal though it is, It creates the potential for the old kind of surveillance on an even grander scale. The (...) panopticon is the prison environment described by Foucault in which prison cells are arranged in a large circle with the side facing the inside of the circle open to view. The guard tower is placed in the middle of the circle so that guards can see everything that goes on in every cell. When we contemplate all the electronic data that is now gathered about each of us as we move through our everyday lives --- intelligent highway systems, consumer transactions, traffic patterns on the internet, medical records, financial records, and so on --- there seems little doubt that we are moving into a panopticon. The social issues that arise from this are too numerous to detail here, but data retention is an important part of it. In the paper-and-ink world, documents are filed, files are boxed, boxes are put away or thrown away. The capacity for data retrieval and manipulation is, thereby, limited by the sheer difficulty and cost of storing, finding, searching, and manipulating large numbers of paper files. This inconvenience functions as a mechanism whereby the system forgets past information, not unlike the way we ourselves forget. However, the story is very different in the digital world; digital information is easy to store, easy to search and manipulate, and inexpensive to keep over extensive periods of time. Digitalized information systems tend, therefore, to collect extensive ancillary information and to retain this information indefinitely. Such lack of forgetfulness is likely to hamper the ability of individuals to shed their past, and start over with a clean slate. Concerns about data retention were expressed in the early literature on the social impact of computing, but for the most part the issue has dropped from sight. Rarely, has the social good of discarding accumulated personal data been addressed. In this paper, we want to make the case by examining diverse cases in which retention of information by either business or governmental institutions hinders the ability of individuals to start over or to act autonomously. We hope our argument for the good of forgetfulness will challenge the standard framework in which such issues have traditionally been debated. The privacy debate exemplifies the traditional framework insofar as it has been characterized as involving an inherent tension between, on the one hand, the needs of organizations and institutions for more accurate and efficient information systems so as to further their goals and, on the other hand, the desire of individuals to have information about them kept private. Regan argues against this framing of the privacy issue in favor of one that recognizes the social importance of personal privacy. We will examine the non-forgetfulness of information systems as a problem threatening not just individual interests but social good as well. Cryptography is often cited as the technology that will give us privacy and mediate against surveillance. One of the uses of cryptography, encryption, will allow us, some hope, to create confidentiality and relationships of trust that will facilitate many of the social arrangements we now have and perhaps make them even more secure than they are now. Electronic cash, for example, could be created in such a form that it would have the anonymity associated now with hard cash Others are less optimistic of the potential for cryptography to re-create relationships of trust in the new medium. One important point that already seems clear is that even if encryption technology will protect the confidentiality and integrity of electronic transactions and data, it will NOT stop the observation of traffic patterns on networks. This seems an important distinction to put on the table. Our patterns of communication will continue to be available, no matter what is encrypted, and an amazing amount of information can be gleaned from this data. In a sense, it means content integrity but no anonymity. This will indubitably impact how we interact and with whom we interact. (shrink)

Delphica 1 The building accounts of Delphi again and the reconstruction of the temple of Apollon in the 4th century BC Years of concerted effort with the architect E. Hansen have led to a reexamination of the accounts of Delphi relative to the reconstruction of the temple of Apollon in the 4th century BC. Seeking to determine avec precision certain procedures, such as the awarding of the works, has led to modified textual restitutions, notably concerning prices, as well as translations, (...) such as of the word syggrophos (specifications more frequently than contract). Principal suggestions regarding architectural matters. The selides were slabs destined for the geison. The angle pieces of this geison were in place when, starting in 338, they were replaced by larger elements. On the contrary, those of the frize of the sekos, which were replaced at the same time, had not been mounted. Moreover, the walls, constructed after the peristyle, did not carry the woodwork before 335, acquisition date of the cypress wood destined for this purpose. (shrink)

This paper focuses on the way in which Feuerbach's attempt to develop a naturalistic, realist remodeling of Hegel's relational ontology, which culminated in his own version of “sensualism”, led him to emphasize the vulnerability of the subject and the role of affectivity, thus making object‐dependence a constitutive feature of subjectivity. We find in Feuerbach the first lineaments of a philosophical theory of object‐relations, one that anticipates the well‐known psychological theory of the same name, but one that also offers a broader (...) metaphysical basis in which all types of “essential objects” are shown to matter to subjectivity. This Feuerbachian theory of object‐relations, the paper then argues, foreshadows a number of important developments in 20th century post‐Hegelian philosophy. In it can be found an anticipation of Adorno's later theory of mimesis. Equally, this theory already emphasizes the “libidinal” nature of intentionality, in a way that announces Merleau‐Ponty's ontology of the flesh. Finally, the last section of the article proposes a model with which we might reconstruct the way in which object‐relations and self‐relations can be brought together consistently. In this instance, Feuerbach uses concepts that announce Freud's notion of “primary narcissism”. One contemporary philosopher who has proposed a sophisticated model of subjectivity, in which primary narcissism is shown to complement object‐dependence, is Axel Honneth. The last section argues that Feuerbach's full image of subjective identity as reciprocal scaffolding of self‐ and object‐relations reminds strongly of Honneth's core concept of “positive self‐relation”. (shrink)

Wage-earners voluntarily accept to work under the control, and for the account of, firms run by entrepreneurs1; they do not decide what, how and how much, they must produce; wage-earners are not responsible for the consequences of their activities when they comply with entrepreneurs' orders12; inside the firm, wage-earners are subordinates. Outside the firm, wage-earners freely choose the way they spend their wages in the markets for commodities and services. Such is the 'stylised fact' which characterises the wage relationship in (...) our economies. Any theory of the wage relationship should account for this 'stylised fact' by deriving it from a consistent set of assumptions and propositions. Three main propositions are advocated in this paper: Mainstream economists conceive the 'wage' as being the price of a commodity ('labour power' or 'human labour') determined by a market – as for any other commodity and service. As a consequence, the wage relationship is thought of as an exchange relation ruled by equivalence; this view cannot be derived from the usual basic assumptions without violating the very logic of mainstream theory. Following this logic: either the wage relationship should be thought of as a relation between human beings having such different conditions that it cannot be interpreted as an exchange ruled by equivalence or 'human labour' is not to be found within the commodity space. In any case, the 'stylised fact' mentioned above is not accounted for by mainstream theory. 'Wage' is the name of the payment entrepreneurs give to other people with the view to making them participate in production under their control and for their account; wage payment is neither a purchase nor a sale – it just allows wage-earners to enter the market and spend in order to acquire the commodities they desire Wage-earners are, economically speaking, a means used by entrepreneurs for their own ends; exploitation (Fleurbaey's M-exploitation) is inherent in the wage relationship. Propositions 2 and 3 do not fit general equilibrium theory (inspired by Walras and rationalised by Arrow- Debreu); they do not fit modern mainstream theory either. They have no room in the theory of prices of production (inspired by Ricardo and rationalised by Sraffa). Moreover, they are not compatible with Marx's theory of labour power. An alternative approach is needed to satisfy them. Paving the way for that alternative theory requires us to show that 'human labour' cannot belong to the commodity space from the very point of view of mainstream theory; a sharp incompatibility between assumptions and conclusions would follow, and justify resorting to an alternative approach. This is our first step. A second step is to effectively resort to a monetary analysis – the alternative approach to real analysis, according to Schumpeter in his History of economic analysis. In a nutshell, we have to discard the commodity space postulate, and to think of economic relations as money mediation. Instead of a commodity space, we presuppose money to be a unit of account ($) combined with a means of payment. Instead of a permutation of goods and services exchanged amongst people, economic relations are payments. Individuals are no longer endowments and preferences, but accounts into which payments write down quantities of $. Conditions of people may differ according to the form of money circulation – this view allows us to deal with different types of economic relations; for what matters here, the wage relationship involves a specific form of circulation not reducible to that of exchange. The final step is to suggest that exploitation is inherent in the wage relationship; such exploitation has nothing to do with justice, since there is no norm whatsoever for the level of wage; it is also quite different from the exploitation Marx thought he had unveiled. This exploitation is simply due to the special situation of wage-earners vis-a-vis the market, which a specific form of circulation makes clear. 1 'Entrepreneur' here means, following Coase, 'the person or persons who, in a competitive system, take the place of the price mechanism in the direction of resources' (Coase, 1937, p. 388). 2 David Ellerman distinguishes between factual/de facto and legal or de jure responsibility. What I mean here is economic responsibility only. Another way at looking at it may use David Ellerman's propositions. The 'Invisible Judge' market gives the entrepreneur the property of raw material and labour – and also of the finished product sold in the market. The market gives nothing to the wage-earner inside the firm; outside the firm it gives her the property of consumption of goods she acquires out of her wage. Inside the firm, the wage-earner is not economically responsible. Arguing that if she kills someone, the wage- earner is responsible has nothing to do with the 'Invisible Judge'! (shrink)

Pierre Bayle shows that, in order to avoid devastating objections, materialism should postulate that the property of thinking does not emerge from certain material combinations but is present in matter from the start and everywhere—a hypothesis recently revived and labelled “panpsychism”. There are reasons for entertaining the idea that Bayle actually considers this enhanced materialism to be tenable, as it might use the same line of defence that Bayle outlined for Stratonism. However, this would lead to a view similar (...) to Locke’s superaddition theory, and I contend that such cannot be Bayle’s position because he embraces the Cartesian principle that each substance has only one principal attribute. This makes untenable, in his eyes, any system that conjoins thought with matter in the same simple substance. By contrast, this makes clear which kinds of metaphysics and epistemology panpsychists need to adopt to defend their view. (shrink)

Assurant que « nous voyons toutes choses en Dieu », autrement dit par des idées universelles et infinies, la philosophie de Malebranche se doit d'affronter le problème de la connaissance des choses singulières, seules véritablement existantes. Après avoir montré que sa pensée échoue à fonder un authentique principe d'individuation physique des corps, nous tentons de mettre en évidence une difficulté identique à théoriser une véritable connaissance des êtres matériels. Ce déplacement de la question nous semble légitime dans la mesure où (...) les choses étendues ne sont accessibles qu'à partir de l'étendue intelligible et des sentiments qu'elle produit. Par là, nous souhaitons manifester l'inaptitude, peut-être irrémédiable, d'une métaphysique fondée sur la représentation à se saisir pleinement des singularités. Malebranche tells us that we see everything in Gods infinit and universal Ideas. In so doing, Malebranche seems unable to describe real knowledge of material singularities; more, it's quite difficult to discover a true principle of individuation in the physical treatment of matter. After all, the metaphysical background of the representative knowledge makes improbable a correct description, a philosophical experience of singularities. (shrink)

A social and political philosophy that ignores invisibility and visibility are not the matters of perception but of violent conditions, methods and social processes of confirming or infirming human existing that disprove the claims of a pure and abstract philosophy, is nothing more than ideology. A critical reflection of the 'normal' state of things implies an option for mutilated and unclassified existence of excluded, subordinates, poor, unemployed, beggar, caretakers, domestic workers, housewives, who are present but do not exist, and are (...) violated by discriminatory agendas of what is visible and invisible in modern society. Phenomenology and logic of the social question would analyze the living conditions of the public sphere, unravel this kind of violence, and discern the meaning and value of the struggle of invisible people to become visible ones. (shrink)

The myth of an economy where nobody could have a predominant position, has lost its credibility. The presentiment of a high risk of social explosion makes companies undertake tentative moral legitimation. Thus, a new paradigm develops according to which the firm has to care for the satisfaction of public interest if it wants to try to win forgiveness for misbehavior towards the decorum rules of the atomicity of competition. Thus, there is a wave of business ethics industry building up. However, (...) the stock exchange performances considered as ethical, are not different from others! The market does not seem to be able to say why it might be interesting to invest in stock considered as ethical. Moreover, opinion polls reveal a very significant discrepancy between the characterization of the responsible company as defined by itself or by notation agencies and, on the other hand, the hierarchy of criteria according to the answers of polled people. When companies and agencies favor sustainable development and good governance, rejecting child labor and so on, polled people consider that the paramount criterion of ethical conduct is personnel management. The problem is right here. Such is the view of a positively critical economist, situated at the point where macroeconomics meets corporate management. (shrink)

The implementation of a diplomacy that could put more emphasis on democracy and human rights was not an easy process in Belgium. Treatment of these matters have taken a different perspective in Zaïre, Rwanda and Burundi, Belgium 's three most important African partners. Reasons for that are twofold. Fore one thing, the Belgian foreign affairs service has always been overloaded by mercantile preoccupations. Secondly, knowledge on Africa has been limited to short circle diplomatic contacts while no instruments were ever implemented (...) that could have ensured some following up of the African civil society at large.In the future, the continuation for a slow process of disengagement might be foreseable. New "partners" might come to the forefront such as South Africa while the U.S. and international financial organisations will definitely try to impose "good governance" together with a reasonable dose of human rights. (shrink)

Analysing the debate in the press concerning the most crucial and sensible point of Public Service Broadcasting in Belgium, i.e. an objective and nationwide representative news service, shows clearly that this critizing of the news has primarily a political function because its aim is not to demonstrate how subjectivc or so the news is supposed to be.Accepting and demonstrating the point that a public service organization of broadcasting is no worse for objective newsreporting than a commercial or a Dutch one; (...) it follows from this that these critics must 'hide' other interests.Strong correlations are found between this press debate and the political debate on the nature of this system and the wish to change it. Thus the press, being part of the party system in Belgium, reveals itself as an agenda-setter of political action.These results do not suggest that the press bas an ultimate influence in political matters but it certainly demonstrates that the press indicates how the debate wilt develop.Showing up the agenda-setting concept in the dynamics of politics could be a more fruitfull way to define the political functions of the mass media. (shrink)

Authors from a variety of fields including law, political science, international relations and economics discuss matters of justice at the national, international and global levels.

This volume examines the evolving reputation of Rousseau as an authority on education in France from the publication of Emile in 1762 to the fall of the Jacobins in 1794. It takes as its focus the centrality of the debate over private and public education. The author argues that what unites Rousseau and the Revolutionaries is their holistic approach, which perceives an organic relationship between the internal constitution of the person as a moral and emotional being and what are normally (...) thought of as external public matters such as politics. Education is, in fact, the key to Rousseau's philosophy and it is also the key to revolutionary change. The Revolutionaries may start by looking at the necessary reform of the monarchy or the taxation system, but as things develop, they realise that if the Revolution is to last, education must be appropriate to it. In this way the Revolutionaries are obliged to consider education as a tool for thinking about the very problem Rousseau had perceived: the connection between the inner self and society and its institutions. The study examines the way in which the early revolutionaries are faced by Rousseau's already established reputation as an authority on private education and how this poses problems for them. Linked too emphatically with individualism and the private sphere, Rousseau represents an ambiguous symbol for those concerned with the reform of public education. Yet, his reputation in the field of child care the developing cult of him as inspiration and symbol of the Revolution make him an almost obligatory reference point for educational reformers. The author's analysis traces the progression of the Revolutionaries' attitudes. The volume demonstrates how the first thirty to thirty-five years of the fortunes of Rousseau's reputation as an educationist have, arguably, more to do with politics than pedagogy. Two major phases of the intermeshing of education and politics around the figure of Rousseau can be seen: the first in the years following the publication of Emile, when the supporters of absolute monarchy show their suspicion of the radical implications of Emile, and the second in mid-Revolution, when the association of Rousseau and his political doctrine spills over into the plans of educational reform. This volume charts the progress of these developments and casts new light on the vexed question of the relationship of Rousseau to the French Revolution. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Why Species Matter Man Is the Measure Mild versus Wild Culture Clash.

On attribue communément à Humboldt l’origine de la thèse selon laquelle la structure du langage détermine la structure de la pensée, connue sous le nom d’hypothèse de Sapir-Whorf. Nous voulons reprendre les conceptions de Humboldt en la matière à leur source, c’est-à-dire dans le contexte de sa réflexion sur les enjeux philosophiques et anthropologiques reliés au grand mouvement comparatiste allemand du XIXe siècle. Après avoir esquissé la mesure herméneutique de son approche du langage, nous indiquerons sommairement comment Humboldt concevait en (...) fait la relation entre la pensée et le langage en termes d’action réciproque et de synthèse.Humboldt is commonly identified as the source of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, according to which, in its canonical formulation, the structure of language determines the structure of thought. We intend to briefly revisit Humboldt’s conceptions on the matter, with the view of putting them into the context of the philosophical and anthropological issues involved in the early historical comparative movement. Having first outlined Humboldt’s general methodological-hermeneutical approach to language, we then proceed to show how Humboldt, indeed, conceived of the relation that obtains between language and thought in terms of mutual interaction and synthesis. (shrink)

This book takes a novel approach by highlighting comparative and long-term historical perspectives on experimental practice. The juxtaposition of accounts of natural, social, and medical experimentation is very enlightening, especially because the authors put the emphasis on the different kinds of objects of experimentation (physical matter, chemical reagents, social groups, organizations, sick individuals, archeological remains) and demonstrate how much the kinds of objects matter for the practice of experimentation, its methods, tools, and methodologies. Taken together, the chapters raise (...) several fascinating questions for further study: What do these different approaches have in common? Why do we call them “experimentation”? What are the intersections among the fields and their developments? The volume engages philosophical approaches that are not well known to Anglophone readers (Bachelard, Bergson, Bernard, Canguilhem, among others) and brings to attention a wealth of Francophone secondary literature on past and present scientific experimentation. The collection fills a yawning gap in science, science studies, and philosophy of science teaching, making it particularly valuable philosophers and historians of science in all subfields. (shrink)

According to the Dominican Thomas of Sutton (ca. 1250–1315), the reception of intelligible species in the potential intellect is in every point similar to the actualization of forms in matter, which means that the potential intellect remains completely passive through the whole process of concept acquisition. However, Sutton adds that when the intelligible species are stored in the memory and aggregate in logically organized clusters, thus becoming intellectual habitus, they have a way of being that is not found in (...) material things, namely, incomplete actuality. Without being properly speaking efficient causes of mental processes, they spontaneously tend to emerge by themselves into the light of awareness—even though other elements (other intelligible species, notably, or the will) may in fact block them. This special sort of self-actualization is compatible, Sutton thinks, with the passivity he ascribes to the potential intellect. (shrink)