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  1. Keith Graham (2006). Imposing and Embracing Collective Responsibility: Why the Moral Difference? Midwest Studies in Philosophy 30 (1):256–268.
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  2. Keith Graham (2004). Altruism, Self-Interest, and the Indistinctness of Persons. In Jonathan Seglow (ed.), The Ethics of Altruism. F. Cass Publishers. 49-67.
    The problem of altruism is to determine intellectually compelling grounds for allowing others' interests and desires to weigh with us as well as our own. Two considerations impact on that problem. One concerns the clustering of particular interests and desires. The doctrine of the distinctness of persons gives prime importance to their origin in a particular individual. But clustering across individuals, rather than within individuals, may be more reasonable in the light of meta-attitudes towards our interests and desires and the (...)
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  3. Keith Graham (2002). Practical Reasoning in a Social World: How We Act Together. Cambridge University Press.
    In this book Keith Graham examines the philosophical assumptions behind the ideas of group membership and loyalty. Drawing out the significance of social context, he challenges individualist views by placing collectivities such as committees, classes or nations within the moral realm. He offers a new understanding of the multiplicity of sources which vie for the attention of human beings as they decide how to act, and challenges the conventional division between self-interest and altruism. He also offers a systematic account (...)
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  4. Keith Graham (2001). Preconditions for Normative Argumentation in a Pluralist World. Argumentation 15 (4):471-487.
    A problem arises, both for philosophy and for argumentation theory, in a pluralist world where people hold widely different beliefs about what to do. Some responses to this problem, including relativism, might settle but do not provide any criteria for resolving such differences. Alternative responses seek a means of resolution in universalist, culture-neutral criteria which must be invoked in assessing all human action. A philosophically adequate account of universalism would contribute to an ideal of critical rationality, as well as to (...)
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  5. Keith Graham (2001). The Moral Significance of Collective Entities. Inquiry 44 (1):21 – 41.
    The claim is that some collective entities can be thought of as part of the moral realm by virtue of their status as objects of moral concern. Collectivities are defined in terms of irreducibly corporate action and distinctive conditions of persisting identity. Their lack of sentience does not preclude moral concern, and their raison d'être may render moral concern for them appropriate. Recent attempts by Pettit, McMahon, and Broome to limit the moral realm to individuals are considered. They are rebutted (...)
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  6. Keith Graham (2000). Are All Preferences Nosy? Res Publica 6 (2):133-154.
    The significance which any human action carries for normative reasoning is held to include its causal preconditions as well as its causal consequences. That claim is defended against a series of natural objections. The point is then extended from actions to preferences via discussion of Barry and Dworkin. The grounds for excluding nosy preferences from aggregation must involve appeal not just to rights and intention but also to the consequences of acting on them. But then some of the features in (...)
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  7. Keith Graham (2000). Collective Responsibility. In. In A. van den Beld (ed.), Moral Responsibility and Ontology. Kluwer. 49--61.
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  8. Keith Graham (1996). Coping with the Many-Coloured Dome: Pluralism and Practical Reason. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 40:135-146.
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  9. Keith Graham (1996). Voting and Motivation. Analysis 56 (3):184–190.
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  10. Keith Graham (1995). Book Review:The General Will: Rousseau, Marx, Communism. Andrew Levine. [REVIEW] Ethics 106 (1):204-.
  11. Keith Graham (1993). Robert Nozick. Property, Justice and the Minimal State. Philosophical Books 34 (1):55-57.
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  12. G. A. Cohen & Keith Graham (1990). Self-Ownership, Communism and Equality. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 64:25 - 61.
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  13. Frank Cioffi Obscurantism, G. A. Equality, Keith Graham, Peter Carruthers, Cynthia MacDonald, Paul Snowden, Howard Robinson, David Over, Paul Guyer & Ralph Walker (1990). The Mind Bursary. Mind 99:394.
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  14. Keith Graham (1989). Class - a Simple View. Inquiry 32 (4):419 – 436.
    The aim is to defend the starting?point of Marx's theory of class, which is located in a definition of the working class in the Communist Manifesto. It is a definition solely in terms of separation from productive resources and a need to sell one's labour power, and it is closely connected with Marx's thesis that the population in capitalism has a tendency to polarize. That thesis conflicts with the widely?held belief in the growth of a large middle class, unaccounted for (...)
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  15. Keith Graham (1989). Whose Justice? Which Rationality? Cogito 3 (3):260-263.
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  16. Keith Graham (1988). Liberalism and Liberty: The Fragility of a Tradition. Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures 24:207-223.
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  17. Keith Graham (1987). Morality And Abstract Individualism. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 87:21-33.
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  18. Keith Graham (1987). Morality, Individuals and Collectives. Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures 22:1-18.
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  19. Keith Graham (1983). Reviews. [REVIEW] British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 34 (1):84-88.
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  20. Keith Graham (ed.) (1982). Contemporary Political Philosophy: Radical Studies. Cambridge University Press.
    First published in 1982, this volume is a collection of original essays by young British philosophers reflecting the state of political philosophy.
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  21. Keith Graham (1982). Democracy and the Autonomous Moral Agent. In , Contemporary Political Philosophy: Radical Studies. Cambridge University Press.
  22. Keith Graham (1981). A Note on Reading Austin. Synthese 46 (1):143 - 147.
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  23. Keith Graham (1980). The Recovery of Illocutionary Force. Philosophical Quarterly 30 (119):141-148.
    Difficulties in quentin skinner's theory, According to which illocutionary force of historical utterances is recovered by attending first to the social conventions governing utterances of the given type and then to constraints on possible intentions arising from the utterer's beliefs. Skinner's account is incomplete since it will give us only a range of "possible" illocutionary forces, Giving no help in selecting from the range. And it is circular to suppose we can gain the information about conventions "in advance" of classifying (...)
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  24. Keith Graham & Norman Daniels (1978). Reading Rawls. Philosophical Quarterly 28 (111):179.
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  25. Keith Graham (1977). J. L. Austin: A Critique of Ordinary Language Philosophy. Harvester Press.
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  26. Keith Graham (1975). Democracy, Paradox and the Real World. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76:227 - 245.
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  27. Keith Graham (1975). Moral Notions and Moral Misconceptions. Analysis 35 (3):65 - 78.
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  28. Keith Graham (1974). Belief and the Limits of Irrationality. Inquiry 17 (1-4):315 – 326.
    (I) It is commonly held that a person cannot wittingly hold false or inconsistent beliefs. Edgley has argued that this follows from the normative implications involved in the concept of belief and the concept of a proposition, as expressed in the analytic principle 'if p, then it is right to think that p\ (II) But the principle, when taken in its analytic sense, does not have the required implications; and taken in the sense in which it would have those implications (...)
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